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
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Latin America and the war

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Latin America and the War

THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

By the liberality of Albert Shaw, Ph. D., of New York City, the Johns Hopkins University has been enabled to provide an annual course of lectures on Diplomatic History. The courses are included in the regular work of the Department of History and are published under the direction of Professor John H. Latané.

THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, 1921

Latin America and the War

BY

PERCY ALVIN MARTIN, PH.D.

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

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TO
MAY FRANKLIN MARTIN

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CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	ix
INTRODUCTION	i
CHAPTER I	
BRAZIL AND THE WAR.....	30
CHAPTER II	
CUBA AND THE WAR.....	107
CHAPTER III	
ARGENTINA AND THE WAR.....	173
CHAPTER IV	
CHILE AND THE WAR.....	264
CHAPTER V	
URUGUAY AND THE WAR.....	349
CHAPTER VI	
PERU AND THE WAR.....	383
CHAPTER VII	
COLOMBIA AND THE WAR.....	408
CHAPTER VIII	
THE REMAINING SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND THE WAR.....	437
CHAPTER IX	
CENTRAL AMERICA AND HAITI AND THE WAR...	483

CHAPTER X	
	PAGE
MEXICO AND THE WAR.....	521

CHAPTER XI	
CONCLUSION	542
INDEX	573

PREFACE

The purpose of the present book, which consists of an expanded version of a series of lectures delivered at Johns Hopkins University in 1921 on the Albert Shaw Foundation, is to subject to a somewhat detailed analysis the diplomatic relations of the Latin American republics as affected by the great war. To an introductory chapter has been assigned a brief appraisal of the factors which determined the attitude of these nations to the war and its issues. Succeeding chapters treat of the diplomatic activities of each of these nations during the war years. In the conclusion are indicated some of the outstanding post-war developments, more especially the problems created by the adhesion of practically all of the Latin American states to the League of Nations.

The present investigation, if it is to lay any claim to permanent value, must be based primarily on official documents. Of these documents obviously the most important are the reports of the ministers of foreign affairs of the various republics. Next in importance come such publications as official journals, collections of laws and decrees, and the debates of the legislatures. The task of assembling this material from a score of different countries is a formidable one. Thanks, however, to the generous assistance of his friends both in

Latin America and the United States the writer has had available practically complete sets of these materials for the war years.

These official data have been supplemented by material of a different order. The foreign policy of the more advanced of the Latin American nations is influenced, and in some cases determined, by the public opinion of the educated classes. Such public opinion finds expression not only in the legislative chambers but also in the press. The student of diplomacy cannot, therefore, ignore the views of public men and the policy of representative newspapers. As is well known, the more authoritative newspapers of the southern republics frequently combine the functions of our own daily papers and weekly reviews. In other words they are not merely purveyors of news but also journals of opinion. This is especially true of such papers as *O Jornal do Commercio* of Rio de Janeiro, *La Prensa* and *La Nación* of Buenos Aires, and *El Mercurio* of Santiago. In such organs is often reflected that political and social background, a knowledge of which is necessary to make the official acts of the government fully intelligible. Either through the use of the files of the papers themselves or by means of the admirable digests of the foreign press prepared by the British and French governments the writer has been enabled to place the most important of such material under requisition.

It is to be regretted that our own government has so little to offer the student of Latin American diplomacy during the war years. The *Foreign Relations* extend

only through 1915. Happily our southern neighbors have shown less reticence. All of the more important of the Latin American countries have published the reports of their ministries of foreign affairs for the war years. While the more confidential correspondence has in some cases been omitted the governments of many of these countries have been so anxious to justify their attitude before the world that they have published much material which in Europe—and even in the United States—would probably not have seen the light for many years. The Rio de Janeiro foreign office, for instance, issued a two volume *Green Book* dealing with Brazil's relation to the war. In his address delivered before the Argentine Congress in the fall of 1917 the minister of foreign affairs stated that he had made public absolutely all of the official correspondence of his government with Germany over the submarine crisis. Although future publications and revelations will undoubtedly shed light on certain phases of Latin American diplomatic relations during the war years it seems improbable that the broader outlines of the history of the period will suffer important modifications.

It is a pleasure to acknowledge the invaluable assistance which the writer has received in the preparation of this study. The resources of the great library of the Pan American Union at Washington have been freely placed at his disposal by the Director General, Dr. Leo S. Rowe, and his staff of courteous assistants. But the greater part of the material on which this investigation has been based is to be found in the Hoover War

Library of Stanford University, now recognized as one of the greatest collections of its kind in the world. Its Directors, especially Dr. E. D. Adams and Dr. R. H. Lutz, have been indefatigable in their endeavors to secure official documents, books, periodicals, and other material dealing with Latin America's relation to the war. But for the generous cooperation of these gentlemen the preparation of the present work would have been impossible.

The writer also wishes to record his gratitude to a number of distinguished South American scholars who have favored him with critical comments and advice. His thanks are especially due to Dr. Affonso de E. Taunay, the Director of the Museu Paulista and the author of many notable works of the history and institutions of São Paulo, to Dr. Helio Lobo, the scholarly Consul General for Brazil in New York and authority on the diplomatic relations between Brazil and the United States, and to Dr. Ricardo Rojas, the author of the standard history of Argentina literature.

In the preparation of this monograph for the press the writer is greatly beholden to his friend and colleague, Dr. B. O. Foster, who read the entire manuscript and made many useful suggestions on matter and style. Grateful acknowledgment is also due to Miss Lois Cottrell, Mr. Luis J. de Souza, and Miss Barbara Nolen for aid in collecting documentary material.

PERCY A. MARTIN.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
April, 1925.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE WAR

INTRODUCTION

When on February 3, 1917, President Wilson announced to the world that diplomatic relations with Germany had been severed he expressed the hope that the remaining neutral countries might see fit to follow the example of the United States. There can be little doubt that he chiefly had in mind the republics of Latin America; if so, his hopes were only partially realized. Of the twenty Latin American republics, eight eventually declared war: Brazil, Cuba, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. Five severed relations with Germany: Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic. Seven remained neutral: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Salvador, Venezuela, and Paraguay. Thus thirteen of our southern neighbors voiced in some official manner their solidarity with and sympathy for the ideals and purposes of the United States and our Allies.

Of the actual belligerents, only two, Brazil and Cuba, may be said to have taken anything like an active part in the war; while Argentina and Chile, both members of the group of the so-called A B C powers, carefully preserved a status of official neutrality. Mexico, the most important state north of the Isthmus, and next

door neighbor to the United States, falls within the same category. In other words, of the four countries of most consequence in the comity of Latin American powers three studiously remained aloof from the struggle. It must also be conceded that the military contributions of the Latin American belligerents to the common cause did little to tip the balance of victory in favor of the Allies. As will be pointed out in due time the military and naval aid offered by Brazil and Cuba, owing in part to motives outside their control, was all but negligible. Of much greater weight to be sure, was the material assistance rendered the United States and the Allies. But even here no hard and fast distinction may be made between belligerents and neutrals. All of the great exporting countries of South America supplied without stint those raw materials of which the enemies of Germany stood so sorely in need.

These considerations, important as they are, should not blind us to the tremendous significance of the Great War in the historical evolution of our southern neighbors. This is true of neutrals and belligerents alike; for it is now recognized as all but axiomatic that in a struggle of such unprecedented proportions neutrality could in no wise spell immunity from the effects of the war. In keeping with the purpose of the Albert Shaw lectures on American diplomacy our study will be primarily concerned with an analysis of the foreign policies and international relations of the Latin American republics during the war years. The contest had hardly begun before a number of these countries found

themselves involved in diplomatic problems for whose solution their previous history offered few if any precedents. As the shadow of the war was projected across the Atlantic and the United States found herself drawn into the struggle the maintenance of neutrality became increasingly difficult, and in the case of a number of states, impossible.

It was at this juncture also that the peculiar relations flowing out of membership in the Pan American family of nations introduced further problems. Several of the South American republics felt that the obligations of Pan American or continental solidarity could be discharged only through the formal severance of relations with Germany. Finally the war had a repercussion on the internal life of these countries which directly affected the conduct of their foreign policies. Especially was this true of those nations in which public opinion had become sufficiently articulate and powerful to influence the actions of the government. The student of Latin American diplomacy of this period cannot therefore afford to ignore the pronouncement of leading writers and public men, the policy of the representative newspapers, and the force of propaganda. The official documents alone, important as these are, in many cases present an incomplete or distorted picture of the attitude of the nation as a whole to the Great War and its issues.

One phase of the reaction of the war on Latin America will come in for incidental treatment only. To attempt an adequate analysis of the economic effects

of the war would not only fall outside the self-imposed limits of this study but would swell the present work to quite unmanageable proportions. Economic problems will be discussed therefore only in so far as is necessary properly to appreciate the motives and objects of the foreign policy of the country in question.

In our introduction to the study of Latin American diplomacy during the momentous war years it will make for clarity of presentation if we envisage the problems of our southern neighbors as a whole for the period beginning with the eve of the war and ending with the German announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare at the end of January 1917. During these two years and a half, when the conflict was still described as the European War, the Latin American nations remained neutral; any other attitude would have been unthinkable so long as the United States held aloof from the struggle. The activities of the various governments were largely absorbed in an attempt to exorcise the severe economic and financial crisis which immediately followed the outbreak of the war. Foreign relations, in so far as they dealt with the war, were confined to measures designed to safeguard neutrality, and in the case of a number of republics, to abortive efforts to secure the adoption of a continental policy for the protection of their rights as neutrals.

Possibly the chief importance of this period is the opportunity it affords for the study of certain factors which tended to mould public opinion—in so far as this may be said to exist—and eventually to influence the

orientation of the foreign policies of the nations themselves. Of these factors perhaps the most fundamental was the sympathy of the great mass of the educated classes in all the Latin American countries for the Allies and especially for France. We shall have abundant occasion to observe this sentiment when we come to deal with the individual republics. Here we may merely recall the historical commonplace that if racially the Latin Americans of European descent hark back to Spanish, Portuguese, and more recently to Italian origins, in all that makes up their culture and civilization their debt to France has been immeasurable. This appears in a thousand ways. French is spoken by all educated Latin Americans; French text-books are used extensively in all of the higher schools; French art and literature have served as the standards which Latin American writers and artists have consciously or unconsciously followed: the legal systems of a number of Latin American states have drawn heavily upon the *Code Napoléon*; French political theories have affected the constitutional development of many of the Latin American nations, especially those which have adopted the unitary type of government.¹ The achievement of French citizens and their descendents in Latin America have contributed to this devotion of all things Gallic. At various times throughout the nineteenth century French scientists have conducted notable explorations

¹ Cf. the brilliant exposition of the Uruguayan publicist Hugo D. Barbagelata, *L'Influence des idées françaises dans la Révolution et dans l'Evolution de l'Amérique espagnole* (Paris, 1917).

in South America. The list is headed by Humboldt's companion and collaborator, Bonpland, who after extensive explorations in the northern part of the continent, was held prisoner in Paraguay for nine years (1821-1830) by the dictator, Francia. Boussingault in Peru and Bolivia (1825-1831), d'Orbigny in Argentina, Bolivia and Peru (1826-1833), and Castelnau in the central part of South America (1843-1847) are among the most prominent of the great French explorers. In other fields, especially education, the French have made notable contributions.²

Possessed of such cultural and spiritual heritages, most Latin Americans instinctively felt that the issues of the war ultimately resolved themselves into a struggle between Latin civilization and Teutonic aggression, fully as much as into a contest between liberalism and autocracy.³

This view was strikingly expressed in an editorial appearing in the great daily, *La Nación* of Buenos Aires. Though written shortly after the United States entered the war, the sentiments expressed were equally true for the earlier period:

"In this great war it is not merely a question of the right of existence for small nations, respect for international treaties and the other great matters that

² Some of these will be noted in the chapters on individual countries.

³ The attitude of many Latin American intellectuals towards the issues of the war is revealed in Francisco Contreras, *Les Ecrivains Hispano-Américains et la Guerre européenne* (Paris, 1917) and *L'Amérique Latine et la Guerre européenne*, edited by E. Martinenche (Paris, 1916).

have been repeatedly set forth; it is also a question of races, a question whether the people of the Latin race have a right, not so much to the predominance which the Germans assume, but the right to be respected, to live in peace without having their rights disputed, to enjoy what they have legitimately achieved.”⁴

Next to that of France the cause of Great Britain made the strongest appeal to the sympathies of the Latin Americans. British interest in Latin America dates back to the wars of independence, a struggle in which a number of British subjects participated directly. It is only necessary to recall in this connection the exploits of Lord Cochrane in Chile and Brazil and those of the British legion in Venezuela and New Granada. Nor has English scientific interest in Latin America ever been lacking. The visit of Charles Darwin to the southern and western portions of South America in 1832, so graphically described in his *Voyage of the Beagle*, and the lengthy sojourn in the fifties of the naturalists Henry Bates and A. R. Wallace in the Amazon basin are cases in point. As is well known, British capital and British trade have from the early nineteenth century been powerful factors in the economic development of nearly all of the Latin American nations. In the field of transportation, for instance, England was the pioneer country in the building of railways and has reaped a magnificent reward, as is attested by her control of the great railway systems of Argentina. Prior to the war most of Latin America's foreign loans were floated in London, and international exchange

⁴ Quoted in *Christian Science Monitor*, July 19, 1917.

was usually calculated in terms of English currency. Although the English have tended to preserve their national identity, yet in certain South American countries, notably Chile, there has been considerable intermarriage and names of English origin appear frequently in the pages of Chilean history. Thus for reasons historical, economic and social, England had a powerful hold on the sympathies and interests of the Latin Americans at the outbreak of the war.

Italian influence should also be noted. The chief contribution of Italy to Latin America has been the labor of her sons. From the middle of the nineteenth century up to 1914 an ever increasing stream of Italian immigration had found its way to South America, especially to Argentina and Brazil, amounting in the case of the former country to nearly two and a quarter millions and of the latter a million and a quarter.⁵ Through their energy and frugality many of these Italians have risen to opulence and their descendents have attained to some of the highest positions in political life. Examples are former President Pelligrini of Argentina, and Dr. Alessandri, at present the chief magistrate of Chile. Naturally these Italian elements were profoundly moved by Italy's entry into the war and early championed the cause of *Italia irredenta*.

Another factor in the attitude of Latin America towards the war was the instinct of self preservation.

⁵ Cf. Vitaliano Rotellini, *Il Brasile e gli Italiani* (Firenze, 1906), a magnificent volume of twelve hundred pages in which are set forth the contributions of the Italians to the economic and cultural life of Brazil.

Obviously this was of varying intensity in different countries. Those Latin Americans who could read history aright, regarded with anxiety the possibility of a German victory. They were fully alive to the fact that their independence was due in large part to the outcome of the European conflagration following the French revolution. They had not forgotten that the designs of Napoleon on the Spanish American colonies and Brazil had been thwarted by England and those of Spain and the Holy Alliance on the recently liberated republics by England and the United States. Had it not been to the interest and in the power of Great Britain to protect Latin America from European designs through her command of the seas, the Monroe Doctrine, at least during the better part of the nineteenth century, might have been successfully challenged. It is no occasion for surprise, therefore, that a number of South American publicists have looked upon Great Britain rather than the United States as their bulwark against European aggression. There is even some ground for the belief that in the years immediately preceding the war Great Britain might have composed her difficulties with Germany by allowing her to work her will unhampered in South America.⁶ And a tri-

⁶ Cf. J. H. Latané, *The United States and Latin America* (New York, 1920), p. 323. The debt which Latin America owed to the United States and Great Britain at the beginning of her independent career is strikingly set forth by the distinguished Argentine scholar, Dr. J. V. González, in a speech made before the Argentine Senate on September 19, 1917. Congreso Nacional, *Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores*, 1917, t. II, p. 984.

umphant Germany dominating Europe and no longer held in check by the British fleet would in the opinion of many Latin Americans seize upon the first pretext to flout the Monroe Doctrine—styled by Bismarck “an international impertinence”—and menace the sovereignty of certain of the Latin American states. Such feeling was perhaps strongest in Brazil, whose southern states had long been regarded by many of the Pan-Germans as a future outpost of *Deutschtum*. Nor were Germany’s designs on Venezuela, frustrated by the forehanded activity of ex-President Roosevelt in 1902, forgotten.⁷ Those Latin Americans who had followed the trend of German imperialism could hardly regard with composure the defeat of that combination of powers which had enabled them to survive or had at least protected them from possible aggression during the past century.⁸

It is hardly necessary to point out that the increasing indignation at the methods of warfare pursued by the German Empire both on land and sea proved an important factor in moulding public opinion. The violation of the neutrality of Belgium, which in the case of

⁷ Latané, p. 252 ff.

⁸ Professor Becker expresses the same notion, though he views the situation from the angle of the United States rather than from that of Latin America. “A triumphant Germany would be more ominous than the Holy Alliance ever was; England defeated would be a more fatal reverse for the United States than the restoration of the South American Republics to Spain would have been in 1823.” C. L. Becker, “The Monroe Doctrine and the War,” *History Teachers Magazine*, February 1918, p. 80.

Brazil was followed by a formal protest, the accounts of atrocities in Belgium and France, the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the bombing of defenseless towns and hospitals, and finally the practice of unrestricted submarine warfare aroused the passionate resentment of those Latin Americans whose judgment had not been warped by prejudice or propaganda.

Yet it would be idle to deny that the force of these factors was in a measure neutralized by a number of others, likewise common to all of Latin America. Chief among these was German propaganda. It is now generally recognized that during the war many exaggerated not to say fantastic ideas regarding the importance and scope of German propaganda gained currency.⁹ It must be admitted, however, that the conviction, widely held in Allied circles, that during the preceding decades Latin America had been subjected to a highly organized and skillfully directed economic and intellectual penetration rested upon a substratum of fact.

Certain it is that in the latter part of the nineteenth century German interests in Latin America assumed wide proportions. The reputation enjoyed by German educational methods led to the employment, frequently through government contract, of German professors in universities and normal schools. At the same time army officers were engaged as military instructors in a number of republics, where they strove, not without success,

⁹ E. g., Edward Perry, "The German Menace to North and South America," *The Living Age*, March 10, 1917.

to inculcate the spirit of German militarism. The commercial possibilities of South America were fully realized by German industrialists, bankers and exporters.¹⁰ Though late in the field they displayed amazing ingenuity and perseverance in opening up new markets for German products or in conquering old ones. Their agents copied with fidelity the manners of the Latin Americans, flattered their *amour propre*, and catered to their whims and fancies. The success of Germany's program of trade expansion is witnessed by the fact that in 1913 her commerce with Latin America ran to well over a third of a billion dollars.

It is now realized that the whole problem of overseas trade was indirectly tied up with German militarism. Only as Germany could be industrially organized could she hope to be efficient in a military sense. Domestic commerce did not furnish an adequate basis for such an industrial organization; hence the increasing attention devoted to exports.¹¹ It is not surprising therefore that the Allies should have been convinced that much of the business expansion of Germany aimed not at legitimate profits but at making itself the instrument of an aggressive foreign policy. The famous Delbrück law evoked much hostile criticism. It was felt that

¹⁰ "No market in the world has such a power of absorption as the South American Market . . . Its conquest is (for us) a vital question." A. Hartwig, "Die weltwirtschaftliche Bedeutung des Südamerikamarktes," *Deutsche Rundschau*, March 1917.

¹¹ W. G. Wells, "Latin American Trade, a comparative survey," *Bulletin of the Pan American Union*, December, 1918.

the chief purpose of this act, which permitted Germans to keep their citizenship while acquiring nationality in a foreign state, was to enable the Empire to have in almost every Latin American country agents devoted to the furtherance of its aims.¹²

In the period immediately preceding the war and during the first years of the conflict this German propaganda in Latin America was skillfully directed by a number of powerful organizations, some of which enjoyed government support. The various associations for extending German influence abroad such as the Pan-German League, the German Navy League, the League for Germanism Abroad, the School League, the German Rifle Club, devoted increasing attention to Latin America. In addition to these agencies, Germany possessed three institutions especially devoted to Latin American purposes. Of these the most important was the German South American Institute at Aix-la-Chapelle (Das Deutsch-Südamerikanische Institut in Aachen), founded shortly before the war and enjoying the support of both the Prussian and Imperial authorities. Its object, according to its official program, was "the cultivation of scientific and artistic relations with South and Central America on the lines of a general

¹² This law, passed July 22, 1913, provided that "if any person before acquiring nationality of a foreign state shall have received written permission of a competent authority of his native state to retain his nationality of that state, he shall not lose his nationality of the said native state." André Chéradame, *The Pan-German Plot Unmasked* (London, 1917), p. 196.

cultural policy, as a means of furthering economic relations between South America and Germany." It published a Spanish monthly called *El Masajero de Ultramar*, and also a Portuguese version *O Transatlântico*. Both reviews were ably written and beautifully illustrated and well calculated to uphold German traditions and culture across the Atlantic. After the outbreak of the war two other organizations, in which the economic rather than the cultural aspects of German propaganda were stressed, made their appearance. One was the German Economic League for South and Central America (*Deutscher Wirtschaftsverband für Süd und Mittelamerika*) with its headquarters at Berlin. The membership was chiefly recruited from the great industrial and export companies of Germany as well as from the powerful banking agencies. The primary object of the League was to mobilize the great resources of Germany for the economic war against her rivals by uniting all Germans with business interests in Latin America in order to enable them to pool their knowledge, their resources and their endeavors. The third institution was the Hamburg Ibero-American League, established at Germany's greatest sea-port. This association chiefly concerned itself with the diffusion throughout Spain and Latin America of a knowledge of Germany's resources, and the cultivation of cordial relations with governmental and other agencies in these regions. It published an illustrated weekly *El Heraldo de Hamburgo*, in addition to a large number of pamphlets in Spanish and Portuguese. As originally

planned the League was to consist of twenty-two sections, one for each of the twenty Latin American republics and one for Spain and one for Portugal respectively.¹³

All of these organizations realized that in their efforts in Latin America, either towards the furtherance of intellectual or political propaganda, or in the conduct of a trade-offensive, the human element was of paramount importance. The value placed by Germany on the activity of her nationals is revealed by Dr. P. Gast, professor in the Technical High School of Aix-la-Chapelle and director of the German South American Institute. In his work *Deutschland und Südamerika*, published in 1915, he declared:

"Germany's main asset is the German in South America. Every German abroad means the investment of interest-bearing capital for German cultural expansion. . . . Two things are required of him, to win esteem by good works and to place his personal influence at the disposal of German national ends. . . . He must equip himself by assimilating Latin culture, must use his knowledge of French culture, and oppose French culture by encouraging Spanish culture. . . . We must never forget that our object is to catch souls, particularly those that do not wish to let themselves be caught."¹⁴ The all important condition for every cultural and political activity, next to financial strength, is tact."

¹³ F. A. Kirkpatrick, *South America and the War, being the substance of a course of lectures delivered in the University of London . . . in . . . 1918*. (Cambridge, 1918), pp. 29-31. Cf. also Lewis Melville, "A study of German Propaganda," *The Nineteenth Century*, October 1916.

¹⁴ "Immer müssen wir wissen, dass wir Seelen fangen wollen und meistens Seelen, die sich nicht fangen lassen wollen." p. 41.

Candid though Professor Gast is, his program covers only a part of the more innocuous phases of German activity in Latin America. After the outbreak of the war German money and diplomacy were freely employed to secure control of public opinion—the papers *La Unión* of Buenos Aires and *El Demócrata* of Mexico are cases in point—to flout and abuse the neutrality of nations with which Germany professed the warmest friendship, and to create dissensions and animosities. In some cases these manoeuvres were carried out with unparalleled cynicism and effrontery, as has been revealed by the Luxburg and Zimmermann dispatches. Although much of the German propaganda overshot the mark and recoiled upon its authors, it was none the less a force to be reckoned with. As will be pointed out later, on the outbreak of the war an influential minority in a number of the Latin American republics espoused the cause of the Central Powers.

While German propaganda was an important factor in arousing sentiments hostile to the Allies, other tendencies acting in the same direction should not be minimized. As is well known, in certain countries the influence of the clergy on public opinion and politics is still marked; in Chile, for instance, the church has long been one of the pillars of the Conservative party. The evidence seems fairly conclusive that the attitude of the clergy—with many exceptions, to be sure—took on during the war a distinctly pro-German tinge. This was due in part to the influence of Spanish priests, of whom there are a considerable number in Latin

America; in part to the hostility still felt towards France, owing to the anti-clerical legislation dating from the separation of church and state. Certain over-zealous prelates in Chile did not hesitate to declare that Germany was the divine instrument chosen to punish France for her alleged infidelity and atheism. It may also be noted as symptomatic that the Catholics of Argentina welcomed with avidity the peace proposal emanating from the Vatican. Yet one may easily place too much stress on this factor. It should be recalled that both Peru and Ecuador, countries in which the influence of the church is still very strong, broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, while in Colombia, long regarded as a bulwark of Catholicism, the Archbishop of Bogotá actively exerted himself to secure from the Colombian Senate a resolution condemning German submarine ruthlessness. In the case of Brazil, the clergy, headed by Cardinal Alcoverde, urged the fullest cooperation with the government in the prosecution of the war.

Strange as it may seem at first sight the nations of the Entente were partially responsible for the persistence or even increase of Germanophile sentiment in a number of the South American republics during the early years of the war. The operations of the British "Black List" in 1916 aroused intense dissatisfaction and repeatedly led to agitation for reprisals. Especially was this true in the case of Chile and Argentina, where certain over-zealous consuls and consular agents endeavored to force the provisions of the Black List

against firms legally domiciled in these countries. The prohibition on the part of Great Britain of the importation of coffee produced a most unfavorable impression in Brazil and Colombia.

Moreover, the measures undertaken to counteract German propaganda cannot always be characterized as felicitous. The official French mission to Argentina and Brazil, headed by ex-minister of finance, Caillaux, in 1914, was a case in point. Somewhat more successful were the British. In 1917 Sir Ernest Shackleton, the distinguished antarctic explorer, gave a series of addresses in Chile and Argentina on British war aims which was well received. In the spring of 1918 King George V sent on a special embassy to the South American republics Sir Maurice de Bunsen, a former British ambassador to Austria-Hungary. Sir Maurice embraced every opportunity to enlarge upon the traditional friendship between the Latin American nations and Great Britain. Finally, in any estimate of the propaganda carried on by Germany and the Allies in the early years of the war it should be remembered that the citizens of the Entente powers who fell within the military age practically all returned to Europe to fight. Six thousand Englishmen came from Argentina alone. The German reservists, on the other hand, were forced to remain in Latin America, where they contributed their efforts towards the furtherance of German aims.

A subject to which repeated reference will be made during the course of the ensuing chapters is Pan Americanism. The term is not easy of definition. In its

essence, however, it may be described as the moral union of the independent states of the Western Hemisphere, based upon certain distinctive principles which these states have in common and which they do not share—at least to any considerable degree—with Europe. These principles, which have their origin in geographical proximity and a common struggle for independence, may be defined as a belief in democracy as the ideal type of government, recourse to law rather than force for the settlement of international disputes, the maintenance of the territorial integrity of each of the American republics, the non-intervention of European powers in purely American affairs, and cooperation on the part of the American nations in the solution of their common problems and the safeguarding of their common interests. The importance of this last principle appeared very clearly on the outbreak of the war. For the first two and one-half years of the struggle all of the republics of the New World were neutral. As neutrals they had important rights to safeguard and obligations to uphold. Unfortunately these rights and obligations were not always clearly defined. The existing rules of international law, though theoretically designed to meet just such a situation, in practice often proved to be both inadequate and inapplicable. It will be recalled that those conventions of the Second Hague Conference which dealt with the rights of neutrals had been ratified and approved by only a few of the American states. And even those rules of neutrality which were generally recognized were difficult

for any one state to uphold. Here was obviously an occasion when the principle of cooperation might well be applied to the solution of a number of vexing problems common to all of Pan America.

As early as August 1914 the Peruvian government formally proposed that the American republics, through their representatives at Washington, endeavor to secure a more exact definition of their rights as neutrals and adopt a common policy for the protection of their commercial interests, which threatened to be seriously compromised through the activities of the belligerent powers. These overtures were favorably received; in fact they were quite in line with projects of a similar tenor put forth officially and unofficially¹⁵ in various other Latin American countries.

After much preliminary negotiation it was decided that the most appropriate body to pass upon these problems was the governing board of the Pan American Union at Washington. On repeated occasions during the past the Pan American Union had been instrumental in adjusting difficulties which affected the harmony and

¹⁵ Of the latter projects the most significant was that sponsored by the Museo Social Argentino of Buenos Aires. In November and December 1914, Dr. Emilio Frers, president of the Museo Social, sent a circular letter to a large number of official and unofficial bodies in both Americas, asking their favorable consideration of two proposals: (1) That all commerce between American countries be regarded as coastwise traffic, (2) that vessels engaged in this traffic be considered neutrals, even when sailing under the flags of belligerent nations. The letter of Dr. Frers, together with many replies, may be found in *El Aislamiento Pacífico de América* (Buenos Aires, 1916).

good relationship of the American republics.¹⁶ On December 8, 1914, the governing board held its first meeting to pass on the proposals dealing with the rights and duties of the American neutrals. After the gravity of the problems had been set forth in a number of speeches, Dr. Rómulo S. Naón, the Argentine ambassador, proposed the appointment of a commission of nine members, of which the United States secretary of state should be chairman, *ex officio*. This special neutrality commission "shall study the problems presented by the present European war and shall submit to the governing board the suggestions it may deem of common interest."¹⁷ The motion was seconded by the Brazilian ambassador and together with an amendment¹⁸ proposed by the Uruguayan minister was adopted unanimously.

It is unnecessary to analyze in detail the various projects and memoranda submitted to the commission. The Peruvian memorandum urged that the American

¹⁶ According to the Honorable John Barrett, former Director General of the Pan American Union, ex-Premier Asquith declared early in the war that had there existed in Europe a Pan-European Union similar in scope and purpose to the Pan American Union the catastrophe of 1914 would never have taken place.

¹⁷ The account here given of the activities of the Pan American Union in connection with problems of neutrality is based on: Pan American Union, Special Neutrality Commission, 1915-1916. *Documents*. (Copies of official minutes and reports supplied by the Pan American Union to the Hoover Library, Stanford University).

¹⁸ "Each government may submit to the commission such plans or suggested resolutions as may be deemed convenient on the different subjects that circumstances suggest." *Ibid*.

republics should agree that their commerce, within an area embracing the continent and extending to a line equidistant from Europe and Asia, should not be "subject to the contingencies of the present European War." Venezuela suggested the convocation of a conference of neutrals, an idea also put forth by Uruguay. Chile proposed that the American republics agree to limit the provision of coal to belligerent ships to the quantity necessary to arrive at the nearest port of a neighboring nation where coal is available.¹⁹

At its meeting on January 21, 1915, the commission voted to constitute a permanent sub-committee of three members whose duty should be to enquire of all of the American governments the rules of neutrality which they had established for the duration of the war. The sub-committee should then submit to the commission their opinion on the possibility of unifying these rules and of working out recommendations which might gain general acceptance by the American powers.²⁰ It was not until March 18, 1915, that this sub-committee made its first report. It was of the opinion that the commission should recommend to the governing board the adoption of a formula in line with Chile's proposal but which went much further: "During the present war the warships of the belligerent nations shall not be supplied with coal in American ports." At its meeting on May 13, the special neutrality commission voted to

¹⁹ The Chilean proposal was in harmony with a regulation which she herself had put into effect on December 8, 1914.

²⁰ The sub-committee consisted of the representatives of Argentina, Uruguay and Honduras.

forward this opinion, relative to the furnishing of coal, to the governing board with the recommendation that it be submitted to the various American governments for their information and for whatever decisions they might care to adopt.²¹

Meanwhile the sub-committee continued its labors. On September 18 and November 5, 1915, it drew up reports embodying a number of recommendations calculated further to define and protect the rights of neutrals. The recommendations were based on the principle that "the property of a neutral or of an enemy on the high seas on board of a neutral vessel is inviolable." Nothing came of these reports. Not until December 16 were they brought to the official attention of the special commission on neutrality. This body went no further than to distribute the reports among its members. The commission as a matter of fact did not meet again and so far as the evidence is available the labors of both the commission and the sub-committee²² bore no fruit.

The causes for this failure were various. A complete or even substantial unanimity of views among the American republics regarding the problems of neutrality would in any case have been hard to obtain. To

²¹ *Minutes* of the special neutrality commission, May 13, 1915.

²² The sub-committee did not entirely cease its labors. Its last report, dated January 2, 1917, reflected the anxiety felt throughout Latin America at the growing menace of submarine warfare. The sub-committee recommended the adoption of rules forbidding the attack on merchant ships by artillery fire or torpedo even when they were sailing under an enemy flag or within the territorial waters or war zones of the belligerents. Nothing came of this report.

be sure, during the autumn of 1914 the presence of powerful German and British fleets in South American waters acted as a strong motive for common action. But with the destruction of von Spee's squadron off the Falkland Islands early in December 1914, the South American republics found their task of safeguarding their neutral rights measurably lightened. Cooperation therefore became increasingly difficult. Again there is reason to believe that the government of the United States did not attach great importance to these Latin American proposals. It will be recalled that during the years 1915 and 1916 the energies of our state department were increasingly absorbed in efforts to adjust our difficulties with Germany. The United States government may well have felt that in the solution of these difficulties the Latin American nations, with their divided counsels and divergent views, could offer little practical assistance.

Before leaving the subject of Pan American cooperation in its broader aspects it may be well slightly to transcend the limits of our introduction and consider briefly a number of factors which tended to neutralize the influence of the United States both in the early and the later years of the war. Those in the United States who expected the nations south of the Rio Grande to follow unhesitatingly the lead of the great North American republic when she entered the war against Germany were prone to overlook an unpalatable but important fact, namely, the suspicion and distrust with which the "Colossus of the North" has long been

regarded in certain circles in Latin America. Not infrequently the motives and past actions of the United States have been misunderstood and misinterpreted. Fantastic as it may seem there were not lacking otherwise well-informed Latin Americans who firmly believed the United States was aiming at the establishment of a political preponderance over the entire Western Hemisphere. As proof of this assertion they pointed to the War of 1848, the circumstances under which Panama was separated from Colombia, and to the recent establishment of quasi-protectorates over certain of the Caribbean and Central American republics. The failure of the United States Senate to ratify the treaty of 1914 offering Colombia partial compensation for the loss of Panama cost the United States much sympathy and moral support at a time when a closer approximation with Latin America was particularly desirable. And it is quite unnecessary to add that the Monroe Doctrine, in its later-day interpretation, has given rise to a certain resentment. Even a cursory survey of the relations between the United States and Latin America in the decades prior to the war forces the admission that the conduct of the Northern republic in the past has lent a certain warrant to these suspicions. Not always have purposes been chastened and aims worthy. It is this distrust which in the case of a number of Latin American republics, notably Colombia, militated against a more cordial cooperation with the United States, even under the stress of the Great War.

It would be an error to assume that this latent antagonism towards the United States has been entirely instinctive. Apart from differences and misunderstandings naturally arising between two peoples of different cultures, language and racial background, apart from the imperialist trend which the Southern republics have detected in the past history of the United States, this antipathy is largely the result of the propaganda put forth by some of the most eminent writers of Latin America. Some brief reference must be accorded the work of these men if we are fully to appreciate the attitude of Latin America towards the issues of the war after the entrance of the United States. These writers, many of whom are outstanding figures in the literary development of their respective countries, have stood forth as the apostles of Latin Americanism or "Hispano Americanismo" as opposed to Pan Americanism. In their writings and propaganda they have stressed the impossibility of any real community of ideals between the people of the United States and themselves. Solidarity, cooperation, strengthening of spiritual and cultural bonds, are terms which frequently appear in their writings, but only in reference to the peoples of Spanish and Portuguese America. Such figures as José Enrique Rodó of Uruguay; José Martí of Cuba; Francisco García Calderón of Peru; Rufino Blanco Fombona of Venezuela; Manuel Ugarte of Argentina; Carlos Pereyra of Mexico; Antonio Prado of Brazil, to mention only the most prominent, have wielded an enormous influence in moulding what before

the war might be described as the traditional attitude of Latin America towards the United States. While some of these writers have descended to such weapons as invective and even slander and have not scrupled egregiously to distort United States history to suit their purpose, others have striven to give a dignity and a philosophical justification to their anti-American sentiment. Pre-eminent among this latter class is the distinguished Uruguayan essayist José Enrique Rodó whose death in 1918 was a grievous loss to Hispanic American letters. In a little book *Ariel*, one of the great classics of the South and not inaptly called the "spiritual breviary" of the Latin American youth, he warns the people of Latin America against an indiscriminating imitation of the United States. With great acumen he enlarges upon the thesis that the civilization of the United States is essentially material and that the Northern republic "is the Caliban that will eventually destroy Hispanic American idealism if care is not taken to counteract its influence." Yet in spite of the shortcomings of North American civilization he ventures the hope that "the spirit of that titanic social organization, which has thus far been characterized by will and utility alone may some day be that of intelligence, sentiment and idealism."²³

These efforts to build up and reenforce a community of interests in which the United States is to have no part

²³ *Ariel* (Montevideo, 1900), pp. 98-135. Cf. Hugo D. Barbagelata, *Rodó y sus críticos* (Paris, 1918). An excellent statement of Rodó's attitude towards the United States is given by W. E. Dunn. "Post-War Attitude of Hispanic America," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, May 1920.

were warmly seconded by certain influential elements in Spain. The movement known as *Pan Hispanism* is a recent phenomenon to which students of Latin American relations have been devoting increasing attention. Far-seeing Spaniards have realized the advantages to be gained from a cultural union based upon a common language, literature and tradition. The visit of the Infanta Isabel to the Argentine and Chilean centenary celebrations in 1910; the presence in South America of such distinguished historians and scholars as Professors Altamira and Posada; the plans approaching maturity on the eve of the war for a great Spanish-American exposition at Seville; the commercial activities of the "Casa de América" at Barcelona, are a few of the examples of Spain's efforts to repair the strands which were so rudely severed a century ago. Such Spanish influence as existed in America on the outbreak of the war was thrown mainly on the side of the Central Powers. This was perhaps to be expected in view of the attitude of Spain herself. Germany was quick to seize this advantage; some of the most notorious agents employed by the German government were Spanish. That the members of the higher clergy in Latin America were frequently pro-German is explained in part by the presence in their ranks of many Spanish priests.²⁴

In concluding our brief and necessarily inadequate appraisal of the motives which determined the attitude of Latin America towards the war and its issues we

²⁴ The best account of the Pan Hispanic movement in English is that of J. Fred Rippy, "Pan Hispanic propaganda in Hispanic America," *Political Science Quarterly*, September 1922.

must not fail to take into account a factor all too often misjudged and misconstrued. Throughout the entire course of the struggle many Latin Americans honestly believed that the best interests of their own nations, and even those of civilization and humanity, could be subserved by adherence to a strict neutrality. That such an attitude should have been regarded by many in the United States as short-sighted or even purblind was inevitable. That the democracies of the new world which held aloof from the struggle should be taxed with selfishness, ingratitude, and even subservience to Germany was to be expected. But a closer study of the relations of these countries to the war will reveal—at least in the case of most of them—that the men who guided their foreign policies were loyal, honest and patriotic. And in the case of a number of these neutral powers it developed as the struggle wore on that neutrality did not mean indifference to, or lack of sympathy for, the cause of those nations which on the field of battle were upholding the cause of liberty and democracy. Several of these neutral states even rendered the United States and the Allies inestimable services by placing at their disposal, within such limits as international law permitted, their raw materials, products and resources. Finally it is perhaps not amiss to recall that the tardy entry of the United States into the war should have made her people more disposed to suspend judgment in the case of those countries who elected to remain outside of the conflict, especially when the rights of their citizens were in no wise placed in jeopardy.

CHAPTER I

BRAZIL AND THE WAR

In any account of the reaction of the Great War on Latin America a prominent place must be accorded the Republic of Brazil. Such recognition is justified, not merely because Brazil is the largest and most populous of all of the nations of Latin America, but chiefly because in the dark days when the war projected its shadow over the western hemisphere, she completely identified her cause with that of the United States and the Allies. Alone among the South American republics Brazil entered the war as a full belligerent. The motives which impelled her to this step were: the defense of her national honor, the vindication of international law, and her belief in the principles of American solidarity.

An adequate appreciation of Brazil's part in the war cannot be gained through a mere analysis of the official acts and correspondence of the government, important as these are. In Brazil, as in the other more advanced nations of Latin America, the actions of the government tend to reflect the force of public opinion as it becomes articulate in the forum of the press, or in the halls of Congress. Hence the importance of a clear understanding of the convictions of the educated classes on the issues of the war and of their attitude toward the various belligerents.

From the early days of the struggle it was evident that the sympathies of the great majority of the Brazilian people gravitated towards the Allies and particularly towards France.¹ Latin America's cultural indebtedness to France, already noted in our introductory chapter, was especially marked in the case of Brazil. French influence antedates Brazil's independence from Portugal. King John VI, though forced to flee from Portugal through the machinations of Napoleon, did not hesitate to invite in 1816 a company of distinguished French painters, headed by Lebreton, the secretary of the École des Beaux Arts of Paris,¹ to take up their residence in Rio de Janeiro and to implant in Brazil the best French artistic traditions. Among the most famous of these French artists, who rendered such signal service to Brazil were Nicholas Antoine Taunay, his brother Auguste Marie Taunay and his son Félix Émile Taunay.² A little later in the century the French writer Ferdinand Denis (1817-1890) wrote a series of remarkable books and monographs which did much to reveal to the scholarly world the wealth of Brazilian history and traditions. Indicative of the close intellectual affiliation between Brazil and France was the establishment just before the outbreak of the war of a chair

¹ This point is freely conceded by a number of German writers. "Beyond question Brazil became the enemy of Germany in the World War because of her sincere love of France." Albert Haas, "The Foreign Policy of the A B C States," *Deutsche Politik*, July 2, 1921. (Translated in *Living Age*, Vol. 310, 1921, p. 447.)

² Cf. Affonso de E. Taunay, *A Missão artistica de 1816* (São Paulo, 1912).

of Brazilian history and institutions at the University of Paris. The first of the notable Brazilians to occupy this post was the historian Dr. Oliveira Lima, who in 1911 delivered a series of remarkable lectures on the evolution of Brazilian nationality.³ As in other Latin American countries the educational system of Brazil has been based on French models, and French text-books are widely used in the higher schools.⁴

The invasion of Belgium naturally strengthened this pro-Ally sentiment. As early as August 8, 1914, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies approved by a large majority the motion of Sr. Ireneu Machado, according to which Brazil went on record as opposed to the violation of treaties and the flouting of international law. Although neither Germany nor Belgium came in for specific mention the purport of the motion was unmistakable.⁵ It should be added that when Brazil, alone among the neutral powers, voiced a protest against the attack on Belgium she was merely following a precedent which dates back to the days of the Empire. In 1866 a Spanish fleet with no adequate justification bombarded the defenseless Chilean port of Valparaiso. In a vigorous but dignified note, signed by José Antonio Saraiva, who has not inaptly been called the "Nestor of Brazilian politics," the Imperial Brazilian government protested

³ *Formation Historique de la Nationalité Brésilienne.*

⁴ Cf. Mario de Lima-Barbosa, *Les Français dans l'Histoire du Brésil* (Paris, 1923).

⁵ *Le Brésil* (Paris), March 19, 1916. Cf. G. Gaillard, *Amérique latine et Europe occidentale; l'Amérique latine la guerre* (Paris, 1918).

in the name of the remaining American states and in the name of civilization against an act of excessive and unnecessary hostility.”⁶

The remaining European Allies also had their strong partisans in Brazil. Commercial and financial relations between Great Britain and Brazil had been intimate and of long standing; as early as 1810, only two years after the transference of the Portuguese court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro, an important commercial treaty had been negotiated with Great Britain. And, as is well known, British capital had for many decades been an important factor in Brazil's economic development. During the Empire, and to a considerable extent under the Republic, Brazil's foreign loans had been negotiated through London banking houses. Again the prosperous and respected Italian elements, whose labors had contributed so much to the prosperity of the great coffee state of São Paulo, were deeply affected by Italy's entry into the war. Finally the accession of Portugal, Brazil's former mother country, to the ranks of the Allies in the spring of 1916 evoked great enthusiasm and brought home to the Brazilians the realization that after all blood is thicker than water.

As early as the spring of 1915 sympathy for the nations composing the Entente crystallized into a powerful organization known as the Brazilian League for the Allies.⁷ As president of the league was chosen the distinguished statesman and publicist, Dr. Ruy Barbosa,

⁶ J. M. Cardoso de Oliveira, *Actos Diplomáticos do Brasil* (2 vols. Rio de Janeiro, 1912), Vol. II, p. 375.

⁷ The League was founded on March 17, 1915.

who had long and ably represented the great state of Bahia in the federal Senate. Ruy Barbosa's claim to recognition dates back, however, to the days of the Brazilian Empire, when he won his spurs in Parliament by his impassioned pleas for the abolition of negro slavery. Under the Provisional Government which followed the overthrow of the Empire in 1889, he was appointed minister of finance; later he gained an international reputation through his brilliant championship of the rights of the smaller nations at the Second Hague Conference. On two different occasions he had been candidate for the presidency. As orator, diplomat, and statesman his voice had always been lifted up in behalf of justice and the cause of humanity. His death early in 1923 was perhaps the greatest loss suffered by Brazil since the establishment of the Republic. The vice-presidents of the League were José Verissimo, Brazil's leading essayist and literary critic; the distinguished novelist and diplomat Graça Aranha; Senhor A. Azeredo, president of the Senate; Dr. Pedro Lessa, a member of the Supreme Court; and the federal deputy, Dr. Barbosa Lima. Among its most active members were Olavo Bilac, Brazil's foremost lyric poet, and the noted sociologist, Professor Manoel Bomfin. The untimely death of José Verissimo in January 1916 did not permit him to see the full fruition of his efforts. Fate dealt somewhat more kindly with Olavo Bilac as he lived to witness the triumph of Brazil and her Allies.⁸

⁸ He died in December 1918

Prior to Brazil's participation in the war, the League confined its efforts to creating new currents of sympathy for the Allies, to drawing tighter the cultural bonds between Brazil and France, and to the alleviation of suffering in the stricken regions of Europe. It was especially active in raising funds for the Brazilian and French Red Cross. It also arranged for public addresses, drew up petitions for presentation to Congress, and repeatedly protested against the German atrocities and violations of international law. After Brazil had formally entered the ranks of the belligerents the League greatly extended the scope of its activities; possibly its most useful service was its intensive campaign of public education on the issues of the war. It was not disbanded until the summer of 1919.

Further illustration of the attitude of prominent Brazilians toward the issues of the war might be cited almost indefinitely. In the fall of 1914, in a long article published in the *Jornal do Commercio*, Senhor Miguel Lemos, the head of the small but influential Positivist group in Brazil, vehemently proclaimed the responsibility of Germany in the European conflagration. Professor Sa Vianna, an eminent legal authority, at the inauguration of his course on international law in April 1915 was no less emphatic in laying the guilt of the world-wide catastrophe at the door of Germany.⁹ And as an illustration of a slightly different character it may be mentioned that in February of the same year the *Congresso Agricolo* of São Paulo, a powerful organiza-

⁹ *Le Brésil* (Paris), September 3, 1916.

tion of influential planters, voted to supply coffee gratuitously to the sick and wounded in the Paris hospitals.¹⁰

The magnitude of the catastrophe which had befallen Europe was brought home to Brazil in other ways. The economic life of all of the Latin American countries had been dislocated by the outbreak of the war; but there were special reasons why the crisis was felt acutely in Brazil. For several years prior to 1913 Brazil had enjoyed notable prosperity, largely as a result of the high prices secured for the two great staple products of coffee and rubber. Early in 1913 a reaction set in. The balance of trade during the preceding decade had been highly favorable to Brazil, but in 1913, the excess of exports disappeared, resulting in an adverse balance of some twelve million dollars.¹¹ The years preceding the Great War had also witnessed a succession of deficits on the part of the Federal Government, which rose from over twenty-two million dollars in 1908 to over forty-seven million in 1912. This growing deficit was accompanied by an increase both in the external and internal debts, the former in 1913 amounting to over half a billion and the latter to approximately two-thirds of this amount. Another adverse factor was the depression in Europe which followed the second Balkan War. European capital, on which Brazil had relied

¹⁰ *Idem*, March 14, 1915.

¹¹ A. H. Redfield, *Brazil, a study of Economic Conditions since 1913*. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Miscellaneous Series, No. 86 (Washington, 1920), p. 68.

to tide her over her temporary embarrassments, became increasingly scarce. Brazilian banks began to curtail their credit with a consequent decrease in business activity. A much more serious blow was the sharp decline in the prices of both coffee and rubber. The price of the former commodity declined about 20 per cent, the value of the exports dropping from \$223,479,000 in 1912 to \$195,734,000 in 1913. The drop in rubber amounted to over 25 per cent, a decrease from \$77,256,000 in 1912 to \$49,802,000 in 1913. This decline in itself would not have been so serious, if it had not come on top of a previous sharp price-reduction. Brazil was now beginning to feel the full effects of the competition of the plantation-grown rubber of the East. To meet this critical situation the government endeavored to float a large foreign loan. Negotiations were opened with the English banking firm of Rothschild, long the fiscal agents of the Brazilian Government, and in July 1914 it was announced that these negotiations were all but completed. It was expected that the loan would be taken by a syndicate including representatives of England, France, Germany, Italy and the United States.¹²

The outbreak of the war naturally brought these negotiations to an end. In common with the other Latin American countries Brazil was forced to take extraordinary measures to meet this new emergency. Successive moratoria, extending from August 1914 to March 1915, were put into force. The Conversion Office (Caixa de Conversão), created for the purpose

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 72.

of stabilizing exchange and eventually placing Brazil on a gold basis, suspended its operation, and to meet the large floating debt the government resorted to successive issues of paper money. Under these adverse conditions the government found it impossible to meet the interest on its foreign obligations. As repudiation was unthinkable, in October 1914 an agreement was made with Brazil's foreign creditors for a funding loan of fifteen million pounds sterling, the bonds of which met the interest on the foreign debt until August 1917 when regular interest payments were resumed.¹³

This financial crisis was naturally aggravated by the partial paralysis with which Brazil's foreign commerce was afflicted. It should be recalled that a considerable percentage of the revenue of the federal government is derived from custom dues, while one of the principal sources of the revenue of the states is the export taxes, chiefly levied on coffee and rubber. With the beginning of hostilities Brazil lost practically all of the trade of the Central Powers, while the Allies were forced to reduce the amount of their imports. The total volume of foreign commerce therefore shrank alarmingly.¹⁴

The disposition of Brazil's coffee crop during the years of the war not only constituted a grave economic problem but also involved Brazil in a serious and exasperating controversy with Great Britain, a controversy which the foes of the Allies exploited to the full.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ From 1913 to 1914 exports declined from \$313,628,078 to \$221,539,029, and imports from \$326,025,511 to \$165,746,688. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

The practical elimination of the market of the Central Powers and Belgium—countries which ordinarily absorbed some 4,000,000 sacks out of an average crop of some 12,000,000—naturally resulted in an over-production. To make matters worse the Allies, due to shortage of tonnage, began to restrict importations. Prices rapidly declined from 1913 to 1915, although late in 1915 and in 1916 there was a slight rise owing to the purchase of a portion of the crop by the State of São Paulo.¹⁵ On March 30, 1917, the British government issued a decree¹⁶ which placed coffee on the list of articles whose importation into Great Britain was forbidden. The decree was justified on the ground that all the available tonnage was needed for the transport of articles of vital necessity, while in the case of coffee there were stocks in the United Kingdom equal to five and one half years' normal consumption. The British government also pointed out that it was practically impossible to admit coffee from Brazil and keep out that exported from other countries.¹⁷ At the same time the British government placed coffee on the contraband list and subjected the Brazil exports to the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries to a strict rationing in order that no surplus might find its way to the Central

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹⁶ The pertinent sections of this decree are given in Brazil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Relatorio, 1917-1918*, Vol. II, anexo especial, p. 169.

¹⁷ Sir Arthur Peel (British minister at Rio de Janeiro) to Dr. Nilo Peçanha (Brazilian minister of foreign affairs) September 6, 1917. *Ibid.*, pp. 172-173.

Powers.¹⁸ These acts aroused chagrin and resentment in Brazil. "We are a people," declared the Brazilian minister in London to Lord Robert Cecil, "who are more moved by sentiment than by statistics. We assume that we are the best friend of England on the Continent (of South America) and desire that she treat us as such. The refusal of a half a dozen sacks of coffee impresses us as much as if it were a question of the eight million which we sell to the United States."¹⁹ The Brazilian press, despite its pro-Ally sympathies, was all but unanimous in denouncing the British attitude. "It is the law of the strongest . . . asserting its will at pleasure," declared the *Jornal do Commercio*.²⁰ What, however, irritated Brazil the most was the fact that Great Britain continued her policy even after Brazil had broken relations with Germany. Expressing this sentiment, the *Jornal do Commercio* of June 2, 1917, complained: "It is cruel of England to prohibit importation of coffee into her own ports even after we have broken with Germany. Our coffee is our gold. If the exportation of it is stopped, our financial position becomes precarious, and we cannot even pay our debts." The *Correio da Manhã*, considered to be of Germanophile tendencies, in its issue of November 4, 1917, even insinuated that the British prohibition was not dictated by a real blockade policy, but was an artifice to stimulate

¹⁸ Dunshee de Abranches, *A Ilusão Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro, 1917), pp. 205-206.

¹⁹ Brazil, Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, *Relatorio, 1917-1918*, Vol. II., anexo especial, p. 169.

²⁰ Abranches, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

the importation into Central Europe of tea and cocoa by British firms. For a time it seemed as if diplomacy might find a way out of this *impasse*. The British government at length agreed to allow a certain amount of coffee to be shipped to England on condition that it be carried in the ex-German ships requisitioned by Brazil. The Brazilian government flatly refused to agree to this, maintaining that the former German ships were an integral part of the Brazilian merchant marine; hence it was not practicable to make the differentiation suggested. The matter was thus left unsolved and remained a point of irritation between the two governments until the signing of the armistice.²¹

Another series of difficulties, partly economic, partly diplomatic, which Brazil had to face early in the war grew out of the imposition by the Allies of the "Black List." Here again Great Britain was in the eyes of most of the Brazilians the chief, if not the sole, offender. The Allied Economic Conference, which met in Paris in 1915, revealed clearly that the Allies were determined to fight Germany with all of the economic weapons in their power. Of these one of the most effective was the Statutory List, ordinarily known as the Black List. Early in 1916 the British Parliament passed the so-called "Trading with the Enemy Act," one of whose purposes was to prevent British subjects or British firms from maintaining trade relations with enemy subjects. Such enemy subjects, either individuals or firms, were

²¹ Brazil, Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, *Relatorio*, 1917-1918, Vol. II, annexo especial, pp. 165-181, *passim*.

placed upon the Black List. As is well known, the attempt to apply the Black List in the United States resulted in a long diplomatic correspondence between our department of state and the British foreign office. The attempt to enforce the Statutory List in Brazil aroused a great deal of bitterness. If we are to believe the Germanophile deputy Dunshee de Abranches, the British succeeded through the withholding of coal from firms with alleged German connections in paralyzing in large part the fluvial navigation in the three southern states of the Republic, in forcing the largest fishing concern of Bahia out of business, and in seriously dislocating the rubber industry in the Amazon basin. According to the same authority, through the medium of commercial associations protests against the arbitrary administration of the Black List poured in to the central government, one such protest containing the signatures of no less than eight hundred firms.²² A particular grievance was the activity displayed by the British consuls and consular agents in attempting to enforce the Black List.²³ The complaints against this latter practice

²² Abranches, *op. cit.*, pp., 265-312.

²³ In the summer of 1916 Sr. Abranches introduced into the Chamber of Deputies a bill requiring the federal government to cancel the exequatur of consuls who attempted to restrict freedom of commerce and to declare null and void contracts based on acts of foreign governments (*e. g.*, the "Trading with the Enemy Act") which were contrary to the fundamental law or civil liberties of the Republic. "For important reasons of state" Sr. Abranches was induced by the government to withdraw his bill before it came to a vote. *Ibid.*, pp. 264-265.

became so insistent that the minister of foreign affairs, Sr. L. M. de Souza Dantas, on August 9, 1916, protested to Mr. Arthur Peel, the British minister at Rio de Janeiro, against the unwarranted activity of these British agents. He specified one instance wherein the formation of a limited stock company, consisting of twenty-one Brazilian and Portuguese firms, was prevented by a threat from the British consul to place this firm on the Black List on the mere suspicion that it was promoted by Pralow and Company, a Brazilian-Portuguese company with a few German shareholders. This action, the note pointed out, was contrary to the laws of Brazil, which base the nationality of a corporation or any commercial establishment, not on the nationality of its members, but on the place of its registration and location. Furthermore, such action would run counter to Brazilian sovereignty, which guarantees to nationals and foreigners alike commercial freedom, respect to persons, and protection to property within its territory.²⁴ In reply the British minister merely promised to bring the complaints of the Brazilian government to the attention of His Majesty's government; and in order to make the British point of view somewhat more intelligible, he sent a copy of the British rejoinder to the protest of the United States government against the effects of the "Trading with the Enemy Act."²⁵

²⁴ Brazil, Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, *Relatorio*, 1917-1918, Vol. II, annexo especial, pp. 153-155.

²⁵ Peel to Souza Dantas, August 12, 1916. *Ibid.*, pp. 155-157. Sir Edward Grey's note to Ambassador Page, dated February 16, 1916, is given, *ibid.*, pp. 160-161.

Though the British reply failed to meet the Brazilian demands, the Brazilian foreign office took no further steps until the following year. Meanwhile, Brazil's status in reference to the belligerents had radically changed. The minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Lauro Müller, was succeeded early in May 1917 by Dr. Nilo Peçanha whose benevolent attitude towards the Allies was well known. On April 11—as will later be explained in detail—Brazil severed diplomatic relations with Germany, and on October 26 formally entered the war on the side of the Allies. These events were naturally reflected in Brazil's attitude towards the Black List. On October 26, Sr. Peçanha made clear to the British minister the changed situation. Henceforth there was to be no further interference by Great Britain or other powers in Brazil's internal commerce:

“In the present circumstance . . . the Brazilian government declares to that of his Britannic Majesty, as friend and ally, that it has assumed as is its duty, the entire supervision over enemy firms, or those that may become so, without distinction of nationalities, throughout the national territory. The functioning of an organ (*i. e.*, the Statutory List) which would now be parallel to the government and sovereignty of Brazil, is, therefore, no longer justifiable.”²⁶

Notes of similar tenor, *mutatis mutandis*, were sent to the Portuguese embassy and to the French, Italian

²⁶ Brazil, Ministerio da Relações Exteriores. *Guerra da Europa, Documentos Diplomaticos, Attitude do Brasil, 1914-1917*, pp. 181-183. (Hereafter referred to as *Documentos Diplomaticos, 1914-1917*.)

and Japanese legations.²⁷ The arguments of Sr. Peçanha were in fact irrefutable, and the issue was regarded as closed.

While it is quite true that the intransigent attitude of Great Britain on the question of coffee and the high-handed way in which the Black List was enforced aroused much irritation in Brazil, the importance of these two questions may easily be exaggerated. They were soon largely lost sight of in the increasing resentment against Germany, a resentment which steadily grew as Germany's methods of warfare began to affect Brazilian interests. Brazil is one of the few Latin American powers possessing a merchant marine of respectable proportions,²⁸ and with the dearth of shipping growing out of the war, she found it profitable and even necessary to maintain regular communication with Europe, thus exposing her ships to the peril of German submarine ruthlessness. It was in fact this submarine menace, culminating in the piratical sinking of a number of Brazilian ships, which finally goaded the nation into severing diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany and eventually into entering the war as a full belligerent. The steps leading up to the open break with Germany are sufficiently important to deserve recapitulation. They not only reveal the patience and forbearance of Brazil under provocation, but present a striking parallel to a similar chain of fatal developments in the United States.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ In 1916 the merchant navy consisted of 377 steamers of 290,637 tons net. *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1918, p. 723.

Whatever may have been the attitude of the Brazilian people or even of the Brazilian Congress towards the issues of the war, the executive, in whose hands rested the conduct of foreign affairs, endeavored from the first to maintain the strictest neutrality. The scrupulous care with which the Brazilian government, under both the empire and republic, fulfilled its obligation as a neutral in the various wars of the nineteenth century has in fact been a source of legitimate pride to all Brazilians.²⁹ As is well known, the discussions and debates of The Hague Conference of 1907, one of whose purposes was to define the status of neutrals, were illuminated and enlivened by the frequent participation of Brazil's distinguished representative Ruy Barbosa.³⁰ It is not without significance that prior to the outbreak of the Great War, Brazil was the only South American power which had ratified The Hague Convention (XIII) of 1907 concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war.³¹ By a series of decrees issued in August 1914, Brazil formally declared her neutrality

²⁹ Brazil's historic rôle as a neutral has been admirably discussed by Helio Lobo. *O Brasil e seus princípios de neutralidade* (Rio de Janeiro, 1914).

³⁰ Ruy Barbosa's most important speeches and remarks are to be found in *Deuxième conférence internationale de la paix, Actes et Documents* (La Haye, 1907), pp. 100 ff. and 289 ff.

³¹ The ratification took place on January 5, 1914. Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Salvador also ratified the Convention; Nicaragua formally adhered to it; Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela had signed the Convention but had not ratified it.

in the European War.³² At the same time the Brazilian government sent formal and detailed instructions to the presidents and governors of all of the maritime states of the republic regarding the means to be employed for the maintenance of neutrality.³³

The first of the series of incidents, which revealed the difficulties of Brazil's position as a neutral, arose in the spring of 1916. On May 2, Sr. Lauro Müller, the Brazilian minister of foreign affairs, received a telegram from the Brazilian legation at London announcing that "the British admiralty had just conveyed the information that the Brazilian steamer *Rio Branco* had been sunk by a German submarine."³⁴ When on the following day this statement was communicated to the press the leading newspapers of Rio de Janeiro were vociferous in their protests. The dignified *Jornal do Commercio*, the foremost representative of public opinion in Brazil, indignantly declared "The very name Rio Branco (Brazil's noted ex-minister of foreign

³² *Documentos Diplomaticos, 1914-1917*, pp. 5-7. Brazil declared her neutrality in the war between Portugal and Germany on March 10, 1916; between Italy and Germany on August 29, 1916; and (as will be noted later) between the United States and Germany on April 25, 1917. *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 8, 51.

³³ These instructions, which are given in Helio Lobo, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-124, are in the main an elaboration of the thirteenth Convention of the Second Hague Conference. The most striking departure is the provision (paragraph 7) by which the twenty-four hour rule may be extended to a maximum of twelve days in the case of belligerent ships when the theatre of operations or the home ports of said ships are more than twelve days' sailing from Brazil.

³⁴ Abranches, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

affairs) signifies for us the noblest principles of diplomacy and international law. The German torpedo which sank our ship shattered these principles. Our duty is to protest with the utmost vigor against this brutal and unjustifiable crime.”³⁵ This pronouncement was comparatively restrained. Most of the great dailies of Rio de Janeiro voiced in one manner or another the sentiment of the *Gazeta de Noticias*: “The staff of William of Hohenzollern is a veritable camarilla of assassins and bandits who have declared war on humanity. To combat this infamous Prussianism is the duty of all nations.”³⁶

The Brazilian government acted with a promptness which subsequent events showed to be almost precipitate. On May 4, Sr. Lauro Müller informed the German minister, Herr von Pauli, that the president had instructed him to make the most rigorous and searching investigations regarding the circumstances under which the *Rio Branco* was torpedoed; in case the previous reports should be verified the government would reserve the right to make a formal protest and demand the necessary reparation.³⁷ In his reply sent the following day, von Pauli asserted that the Imperial German government harbored only the friendliest feelings toward Brazil; at the same time he intimated that any protests which Brazil might eventually feel called upon to make would be treated with every consideration.³⁸ It soon developed that the anxieties of the Bra-

³⁵ Quoted in *Le Brésil* (Paris), May 7, 1916.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ The text of this note may be found in Abranches, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 309-310.

zilian foreign office were ill-founded. Three days after the exchange of correspondence just noted the government announced through the press that although the owner of the ship and two of the crew were naturalized Brazilians the vessel had been leased to a firm of British shippers and was sailing under British registry. In the sinking of the *Rio Branco* no lives had been lost. In view of these developments the Brazilian government made no protest and the incident was regarded as closed.³⁹

The real significance of the *Rio Branco* incident was the revelation of the extent of anti-German feeling in Brazil, and the zeal displayed by both the government and the press in the upholding of national interests. Later in the year the attitude of large circles of Brazilian public life was still more clearly manifested. In July the Argentine Republic celebrated the centenary of her complete independence from Spain as proclaimed in the Congress of Tucumán, July 9, 1816. To the elaborate festivities held at Buenos Aires Brazil sent as her special ambassador her most distinguished citizen and public man, Ruy Barbosa. In a brilliant oration delivered on July 14 before the Faculty of Law in the Argentine capital, Dr. Barbosa defined his conception of what should be Brazil's attitude in the European conflagration with a clarity and precision which left little to be desired. "No nation can be a law unto itself,"

³⁹ Additional data on the *Rio Branco* episode may be found in the presidential message, delivered May 3, 1917, and published in Brazil, Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, *Relatorio*, 1916-1917, Vol. I, p. 1 ff.

he declared in substance. "None can be an indifferent spectator in this world-tragedy. Neutrality entails obligations. Between those who destroy the law and those who uphold it, neutrality is not permissible. Neutrality does not mean impassibility; it means impartiality, and there can be no impartiality between right and justice on the one hand and crime on the other. To demand the observance of these precepts on which the conscience of nations reposes, to demand respect for treaties, is not to break neutrality but to respect it."⁴⁰ This speech found approbation in wide circles and its significance was enhanced by the fact that the author was generally regarded as having spoken in his official capacity as the representative of Brazil. Both branches of the Brazilian Congress voted on July 17, by a large majority, that the speech be published and preserved as a part of their proceedings. In presenting the motion to the Lower House, Deputy Pedro Moacyr declared: "We can no longer remain the criminal accomplices of the theories and instruments of might and brutality. It is absolutely necessary that we align ourselves with the forces of civilization menaced with destruction." In the Upper House, Senator Guanabara spoke in a similar strain.⁴¹

⁴⁰ *Jornal do Commercio*, July 15, 1916.

⁴¹ *Jornal do Commercio*, July 18, 1916: *Le Brésil*, July 23, 1916. This frank declaration of sympathy for the cause of the Allies evoked a feeling of deep gratitude in France. At the instance of MM. Clemenceau and Leygues the committee of foreign affairs of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, in the name of the French Parliament, sent to the Brazilian Congress a vote of thanks and appreciation, while a committee of

Causes of friction between Brazil and Germany continued to multiply. The refusal of Germany to make satisfactory settlement for the seizure of Brazilian coffee which had been stored in large quantities in Hamburg and Antwerp aroused a great deal of resentment which was skillfully capitalized by the partizans of the Allies.⁴² The growing intensity of the ship-famine stimulated sentiment in favor of the requisition of the forty-six German vessels, aggregating nearly a quarter of a million tons, lying idle in Brazilian harbors. The *Jornal do Commercio* persistently urged such a move, pointing out that in taking such a step Brazil would be merely following the example of Portugal.⁴³ A bill was even drawn up to this effect by Deputy Gonçalves Maia.⁴⁴ The possibility that such an act would be construed by Germany as a *casus belli* did not deter the sponsors of this project. But the government refused to be stampeded into a course of action fraught with possibilities of such serious consequences, and the fleet of German

French notables, including such names as MM. Paul Deschanel, Maurice Barrès, Henry Bergson, René Doumic, Anatole France and Auguste Rodin addressed an invitation to Ruy Barbosa to cross the Atlantic and "be a witness to the heroism and sacrifices of France in the maintenance of our common ideals and aspirations." Even Belgium sent a special mission consisting of the deputies of Ghent and Namur to bear a letter of greeting and thanks from the Belgian Parliament to the Brazilian Congress for its vote of sympathy and solidarity. *Le Brésil*, August 13, 1916.

⁴² The question growing out of the requisition of this coffee was not settled until the Peace Conference.

⁴³ Abranches, *op. cit.*, p. 329 ff.

⁴⁴ *Le Brésil*, July 30, 1916.

merchant ships remained inviolate in Brazilian ports as long as the republic continued neutral.⁴⁵

The announcement on January 31, 1917, by the Imperial German government of a blockade of the coast of the Allied countries enforced by a system of unrestricted submarine warfare,⁴⁶ followed almost immediately by the severance of relations between the United States and Germany, stirred public opinion to its depths. In a forceful but dignified reply to the German declaration the Brazilian government stated on February 9:

"The unexpected information . . . of an extensive blockade of the countries with which Brazil has active

⁴⁵ For a variety of motives—in which a desire to embroil Brazil with the Allies was probably not entirely absent—the German government in a note of April 9, 1916, announced its willingness to lease three German ships, the *Rauenfels*, *Steirmark*, and *Santa Lucia*, with an aggregate gross tonnage of 14,278, to the Brazilian government for the duration of the war provided these ships were used exclusively for coast-wise navigation, and provided further Brazil should secure a promise from the Allies that the ships would not be attacked outside Brazilian territorial waters. As Great Britain refused to agree to this latter condition, the project was dropped. Abranches, *op. cit.*, p. 304 ff., where the dispatch of April 9 is quoted.

⁴⁶ Zimmermann to Gurgel do Amaral (Brazilian minister to Germany), *Documentos Diplomaticos, 1914-1917*, pp. 9-14. All of the material in the *Documentos Diplomaticos* is to be found in the appropriate issues of the *Relatorios* of the minister of foreign affairs, while the material covering the period of 1914-1917 has been translated into English under the title of *The Brazilian Green Book, consisting of Diplomatic Documents relating to Brazil's Attitude with regard to the European War, 1914-1917*. Authorized English version, with an introduction and notes by Andrew Boyle (London, 1918). Hereafter referred to as the *Brazilian Green Book*. Zimmermann's dispatch of January 31 is found on pp. 14-16.

economic relations and with which she is in uninterrupted communication through ships, among which are Brazilian ones, has produced the most justified and profound impression through the imminent menace of unjust sacrifice of lives, destruction of property and the complete disturbance of commercial transactions.

"Under such circumstances . . . the Brazilian government . . . declares on this occasion that it cannot accept as effective the blockade now suddenly established by the Imperial German government. . . . Consequently the Brazilian government, in spite of its sincere and anxious desire to avoid disagreements with the friendly nations now at war, feels that it is its duty to protest against this blockade, as in fact it does protest, and therefore it leaves to the Imperial German government the responsibility for all events which may happen to Brazilian citizens, merchandise or ships as a result of the abandonment of the principles recognized by international law, or by the conventions to which Brazil and Germany are parties."⁴⁷

And in order that the position of Brazil should admit of no possible misconstruction a cablegram was dispatched to the Brazilian minister in Berlin ordering him to inform the German government that "we consider it essential for the maintenance of our diplomatic relations with the (German) government that no Brazilian ship should be attacked on any sea on any pretext, even that of carrying contraband of war, as the belligerent nations have arbitrarily included everything in that category."⁴⁸ The powder-train was laid; only a spark

⁴⁷ Gurgal do Amaral to Zimmermann, *Documentos Diplomaticos, 1914-1917*, pp. 15-17; *Brazilian Green Book*, pp. 18-19. Cf. the article by Hector Díaz Leguizamón, "Brazilian Diplomacy and the War," *Inter-America*, February 1919.

⁴⁸ *Documentos Diplomaticos, 1914-1917*, p. 19; *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 20.

was needed to cause an explosion. On April 5, 1917, one day before the United States declared war on Germany, a German submarine sank the Brazilian steamer *Paraná* some twelve miles off the coast of France without warning of any kind. Not only was no attempt made to save the crew, but five shots were fired into the Brazilian ship just before she sank. Three members of the crew perished; the remainder were rescued by two French destroyers and a British cargo boat.⁴⁹

The news of this brutal sinking of a Brazilian merchant ship aroused a storm of indignation throughout the republic. The suggestion advanced by the German foreign office that the ship had been sunk by a French or British mine, in complete contradiction to the sworn declarations of the captain and crew, received no credence. Excited crowds paraded the Avenida Rio Branco, the great thoroughfare of the capital, singing the Marseillaise and venting their feeling by attacks on German commercial establishments.⁵⁰ German buildings in Porto Alegre and Rio Grande do Sul suffered similar violence. As for the government, in the light of its previous declarations, but one course of action consonant with national honor and self-respect remained open. On April

⁴⁹ The voluminous correspondence relative to the sinking of the *Paraná* will be found in Brazil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Relatorio, 1917-1918*, Vol. I, p. 23 ff.

⁵⁰ The accounts are conflicting as to the amount of damage done. It may be noted that after the war the German firm of Prejawa and Company put in a claim for 206 contos (something over \$50,000), which was thrown out by the government. Nuno Pinheiro, *Problemas da guerra e da paz* (Rio de Janeiro, 1919), p. 83.

11, Herr von Pauli, the German minister, received his passports.⁵¹ On the same date the exequaturs granted the consular officers of the Imperial government in Brazil were cancelled by executive decree.⁵² The government found itself also obliged to place armed guards on board the German ships anchored in Brazilian harbors owing to destructive acts practiced by their crews.⁵³ Protection of Brazilian interests in Germany and the occupied portions of Belgium were taken over by Switzerland and Spain, respectively, and German interests in Brazil by the Netherlands.⁵⁴

If the press of the capital and the larger cities of Brazil forms an accurate index of public opinion,⁵⁵ the severance of diplomatic relations met with wide-spread and hearty approval. Such an act was regarded as a logical necessity in view of the stand taken by the government on the submarine issue. It was calculated moreover to strengthen the traditional friendship between Brazil and the United States, since the action of the South American republic was felt to be in harmony with the hope expressed by President Wilson on our suspension of diplomatic relations that "other neutral Powers will find it possible to assume the same position

⁵¹ Lauro Müller to Pauli, *Documentos Diplomaticos*, 1914-1917, p. 31-37; *Brazilian Green Book*, pp. 27-30.

⁵² *Documentos Diplomaticos*, 1914-1917, pp. 34-37; *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 31.

⁵³ *Diario Official*, April 13, 1917; *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 31.

⁵⁴ *Brazilian Green Book*, pp. 32-37.

⁵⁵ An assumption vehemently denied by Deputy Abranches who claims that at the outbreak of the war the Allies "took possession of the important papers of the capital." *Ibid.*, p. 36.

as that taken by the government of the United States of America.”⁵⁶

Unless Brazil was prepared to withdraw all her ships from European waters it was evident that in her case, as in the case of the United States, the situation created by Germany's submarine policy could not be met by any mere severance of diplomatic and commercial relations; and during the spring and summer national sentiment gradually crystallized into the conviction that Brazil should definitely cast in her lot with the United States and the Allies as a full belligerent. As early as April 16, a huge demonstration was held in Rio de Janeiro under the auspices of the Brazilian League for the Allies. In the presence of a vast concourse Ruy Barbosa declared, amidst tremendous enthusiasm, that all of Latin America would soon be fighting side by side with the United States in defense of the rights of humanity. The government itself gave intimations that changes in Brazil's official status were impending. The resignation on May 3 of Dr. Lauro Müller as minister of foreign affairs and the assumption a few days later of this important portfolio by Dr. Nilo Peçanha, ex-president of Brazil and at the time of his appointment governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, foreshadowed an orientation in the conduct of foreign affairs directly favorable to the Allies and the United States.⁵⁷ “ Doctor

⁵⁶ Benson (United States chargé d'affaires) to Lauro Müller, February 5, 1917. *Documentos Diplomáticos, 1914-1917*, pp. 20-21; *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 21.

⁵⁷ In pro-Ally circles in Brazil a veiled hostility to Lauro Müller had existed for some time. This was due partly to his

Nilo Peçanha," declared the *Jornal do Commercio* in what was apparently an inspired editorial, "with the support of the president of the republic and with the applause of the unanimous Brazilian nation, declared upon taking up his duties, that his policy, the policy of Wenceslau Braz, the policy of Brazil, would be frankly American."⁵⁸

The attitude of the administration was still more sharply defined when President Wenceslau Braz submitted to Congress on May 22 a special message designed to clarify an anomalous situation which had arisen between Brazil and the United States. The North American republic had declared war against Germany on April 7; four days later, Brazil, as we have seen, severed diplomatic relations. In spite of this action the Brazilian government on April 25 issued a decree proclaiming Brazil's neutrality in the war between the United States and Germany; but this decree differed from previous decrees of neutrality in that it expressly stated that neutrality was to be observed, not

name, as he sprang from a family of German origin, partly to the belief that he had shown too great complacency to the Central powers. Ruy Barbosa was the mouthpiece of this latter type of criticism; cf. his article "O Caso Internacional," in *Revista do Brasil*, June 1919, p. 113. In his letter of resignation (published in the *Jornal do Commercio* for May 3, 1917), Lauro Müller explained his action as a desire to return to his former post as general in the army, now that Congress had assembled and the onus of dealing with foreign affairs no longer rested with the executive alone.

⁵⁸ May 24, 1917.

for the duration of the war, but only until the contrary was ordered.⁵⁹

The reason for this decree, which on the face of it seemed somewhat paradoxical, as the rupture between Brazil and Germany had already been consummated, was the unwillingness of the executive to proceed further without the sanction of Congress. In accordance with its usual custom Congress assembled on May 3; in his message of May 22, President Wenceslau Braz, after analyzing the decree of neutrality of April 25, added:

“The government could go no further than this; but the Brazilian nation, through its legislative organ, can . . . adopt the attitude that one of the belligerents (*i. e.*, the United States) forms an integral part of the American continent; and that to this belligerent we are bound by a traditional friendship and by a similarity of political opinion in the defense of the vital interests of America and the principles accepted by international law.”⁶⁰

While this presidential recommendation was being studied by the Committee on Diplomacy of the Chamber of Deputies, news reached Brazil that another Brazilian ship, the *Tijuca*, had been sunk off the coast of Brest on May 20.⁶¹ On receipt of this intelligence the president once more addressed Congress, on May 26. After stressing the grave menace to the Brazilian merchant marine arising from the submarine policy of Germany, the president stated as the opinion of the government

⁵⁹ *Documentos Diplomaticos, 1914-1917*, p. 51; *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 39.

⁶⁰ *Documentos Diplomaticos, 1914-1917*, p. 54; *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 41.

⁶¹ *Documentos Diplomaticos, 1914-1917*, p. 55; *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 41.

"that the utilization of the German merchant ships anchored in Brazilian ports, without any notion of confiscation . . . is urgently necessary."⁶² This message was also made the subject of careful study by the Committee on Diplomacy of the Chamber which decided that the resolution authorizing the use of the German ships should not be presented separately, but should be incorporated in the form of an amendment to the act revoking the decree of neutrality in the war between the United States and Germany.⁶³ On May 30, this resolution was approved by the Chamber by a majority of 39 to 3, and on June 1, in the Senate, by a vote of 47 to 1.⁶⁴ President Braz immediately signed a decree sanctioning this act of Congress.⁶⁵

The revocation of neutrality, which was sponsored by Ruy Barbosa in a remarkable speech in the Senate on May 31,⁶⁶ was rightly regarded as an event of deep significance in the traditional friendship between Brazil and the United States. The history of the diplomatic relations between the two countries bears frequent

⁶² *Documentos Diplomaticos, 1914-1917*, p. 55; *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 42.

⁶³ Both in the Congress and in the Committee on Diplomacy there was a sharp difference of opinion as to whether the revocation of neutrality should apply to the United States alone or to all of the Allies. The former alternative was adopted in deference to the wishes of the government. The whole subject is discussed at length by Otto Prazeres, *O Brasil na Guerra* (Rio de Janeiro, 1918), p. 29 ff. Cf. also Gaillard, *op. cit.*, p. 74 ff.

⁶⁴ Prazeres, pp. 42, 43; Gaillard, p. 81.

⁶⁵ The text of this decree (June 1) is given in *Documentos Diplomaticos, 1914-1917*, p. 59; *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 43.

⁶⁶ *Jornal do Commercio*, June 1, 1917.

witness to this sentiment of cordiality and mutual esteem. It may be recalled, for instance, that less than two months after the reading of President Monroe's famous message the Brazilian government issued instructions to its representative at Washington to propose to the United States an offensive and defensive alliance on the basis of the newly enunciated Monroe Doctrine, acting on the belief that sacrifices, such as those which the United States undertook to make for the other American nations should not be accepted gratuitously.⁶⁷ Though this proposal bore no fruit, the United States was the first foreign power to recognize the empire, this event taking place on May 26, 1824.⁶⁸ During the fifties some friction developed between the two countries on the question of the free navigation of the Amazon; but in 1866 this difficulty was amicably settled by the recognition on the part of Brazil of the United States' contention that this great water way should be opened to the vessels of all friendly nations.⁶⁹ In the latter days of the Civil War, President Lincoln, on refusing all offers of mediation from the European powers, is reported to have declared that if mediation should ever be acceptable it would only be that of the

⁶⁷ W. S. Robertson, *Hispanic American Relations with the United States* (New York, 1923), p. 45. The instructions of Rebello (the Brazilian agent) were dated, January 31, 1824.

⁶⁸ M. de Oliveira Lima, "The Relations of Brazil with the United States," *International Conciliation*, August 1913, p. 6.

⁶⁹ Cf. P. A. Martin: "The Influence of the United States on the opening of the Amazon to the world's commerce," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, May 1918.

Emperor Dom Pedro II of Brazil.⁷⁰ When the United States and Great Britain agreed to submit the *Alabama* claims to arbitration, Dom Pedro was requested to name one of the arbitrators. The visit of Dom Pedro to the United States in 1876 on the occasion of the Centennial Celebration and the keen interest he took in our educational institutions are still remembered.⁷¹ On the overthrow of the monarchy and establishment of the republic in 1889, the United States was the first power to recognize the new régime.⁷² More recently,

⁷⁰ While this incident is not included in the standard histories or biographies of the period (*e. g.*, Nicolay and Hay, *Life of Lincoln*) its credibility is attested by high Brazilian authorities. Dr. Nilo Peçanha, who as minister of foreign affairs naturally had access to the confidential material in the Brazilian archives, in an official note to the Brazilian minister at Buenos Aires, under date of July 4, 1917, stated: "The line we are following is the line of our diplomatic traditions; we took up our place at the side of the United States, and the first ties of our political emancipation bind us to them; for we can never forget that Brazil, then a slave-owning Empire, was, when the great Northern Republic refused mediation abroad in the war of Secession, the only nation whose good offices she agreed to accept for the solution of her peace at home, thus preserving the Monroe formula, but admitting the respect, and indeed, confidence and prestige of the South American nations." Dr. Nilo Peçanha to Dr. Alcibiades Peçanha, *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 70.

⁷¹ Helio Lobo, *Cousas Diplomáticas* (Rio de Janeiro, 1918). The section of this work entitled "Uma velha amizade internacional" ("An old international friendship") is an admirable survey of Brazilian-United States relations. Cf. also Díaz Leguizamón, *op. cit.*

⁷² Such recognition was extended January 29, 1890. Cf. the article by Professor J. F. Rippey, "The United States and the Establishment of the Republic of Brazil," *Southwestern Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1922.

when in 1914 the attitude of the Mexican dictator Huerta caused the United States to withdraw her ambassador from the City of Mexico, the United States' interests in Mexico were entrusted to the Brazilian minister, Sr. Cardoso de Oliveira. And on the present occasion, the Brazilian government was at pains to point out the true import of the revocation of neutrality in the war between the United States and Germany. On June 2, a circular note was sent, through its diplomatic representatives, to all the powers to which the republic was accredited:

"The Republic has thus recognized that one of the belligerents is an integral part of the American continent, and that we are bound to this belligerent by a traditional friendship and by a similarity of political opinion in the defense of the vital interests of America, and the principles accepted by International Law.

"Brazil never had, and still has not, war-like ambitions, and if she always abstained from any partiality in the European conflict, she could not remain indifferent to it, when the United States was drawn into the struggle without any interest therein, but in the name alone of respect for International Law, and when Germany extended indiscriminately to ourselves and other neutrals the most violent acts of war.

"If hitherto the relative lack of reciprocity on the part of the American republics has withdrawn from the Monroe Doctrine its true character, permitting a scarcely well-formed interpretation of the prerogatives of their sovereignty, the present events, by placing Brazil, even now, at the side of the United States, in the critical moment of the world's history, continue to give our foreign policy a practical form of continental solidarity—a policy indeed which was that of the old *régime* on every occasion on which any of the other

friendly sister nations of the American continent were in jeopardy.”⁷³

President Wilson immediately replied by telegram under date of June 5, to the Brazilian minister of foreign affairs:

“I must submit to Your Excellency, in the name of my Government, the sentiments of deep appreciation with which the recent act of the Brazilian Congress, with reference to the present struggle for peace and liberty, was received in the United States.

“I am sure that I speak in the name of my fellow countrymen when I express my warm admiration for this act, and the hope that it is the forerunner of the attitude to be assumed by the rest of the American states. I face the future with the confident hope in their cooperation in the unified movement to put down the German menace.”⁷⁴

The response of President Braz, sent on June 13, should also be quoted:

“I thank Your Excellency for the memorable words with which you congratulate Brazil, in the name of the United States, for the frankness of her attitude in this historic moment. Brazil, in taking her place once more at the side of the United States, has remained faithful to her political and diplomatic traditions of continental solidarity, and, as in the case of the great American Nation, we are not actuated in this step by hatred or interest, but by a regard for International Law and the defense of principles which, if they are in dispute or danger in the Old World, must meet with shelter and support among the free peoples of the two Americas. Brazil has settled all her foreign questions; she has no ambitions in the present instance, and has not suffered in the past, and prizes as a great boon the friendship of the United States. More than any external manifesta-

⁷³ *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 49.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

tions, no occasion could so unite the hearts of Brazil and the United States as the present period of uncertainty and struggle.”⁷⁵

Although the fact is nowhere officially stated it seems probable that the revocation of neutrality was dictated at this particular time by the impending arrival of the United States fleet. As long as Brazil remained a neutral in the war between Germany and the United States she could not extend the full hospitality of her harbors to the warships of the Northern Republic without violating the provision of The Hague Convention which limited the sojourn of belligerent war-ships in neutral ports to twenty-four hours.⁷⁶ Almost immediately after the revocation of neutrality the executive issued the appropriate orders to the state and port authorities to extend every facility to the United States’ fleet.⁷⁷ On June 14

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47. The leading papers of the capital and São Paulo were unanimous in applauding the sentiments expressed in President Braz’ messages. As early as May 23 the *Jornal do Commercio* remarked: “An entente with the United States has always been the basic principle of our international policy . . . We have always shown in doubtful moments, particularly of late, solidarity in our friendship and confidence. . . . Absolute neutrality does not suit us now. The suspension of relations with Germany did not modify in itself our position, for strictly speaking the suspension of relations does not imply abandonment of neutrality. But in view of the newest move—the intervention of the United States—Brazil, whose heart and whose interests were always with the Allies, could not keep up the same neutral attitude and will not do so.”

⁷⁶ The Hague Convention (XIII) of 1907, art. 12.

⁷⁷ The text of these orders has never been made public but the fact is stated in an official report by Sr. Sarmiento, chairman of the Committee on Diplomacy. Prazeres, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

the armored cruisers *Pittsburg* and *South Dakota* arrived at Bahia, and Admiral Caperton was welcomed by the governor of the state, Dr. J. J. Seabra. To dissipate all misunderstandings regarding the presence of this fleet in Brazilian waters the United States embassy at Rio de Janeiro issued on June 15 the following *communiqué*:

"It is not correct, as some papers have announced, that the American squadron arrived without the knowledge of the Brazilian government. . . . The purpose of the squadron is to patrol the waters of the South Atlantic in order to guarantee the free passage of merchant ships. This difficult task has hitherto been fulfilled by the fleet of his Britannic Majesty, which now, with the arrival of the American squadron, will be able to take up other work."⁷⁸

After a sojourn of several weeks in Brazilian waters the fleet proceeded to Montevideo where it received an enthusiastic welcome.⁷⁹

We have already seen that in pursuance of the suggestions made by the president in his message of May 26, Congress passed, on June 1, a resolution authorizing the executive to utilize the German ships lying in Brazilian harbors. On June 2 the government took over the German vessels some of which were found to have

⁷⁸ *Correio da Manhã*, June 16, 1917. On the arrival of the fleet *O Paiz* declared: "The American squadron is the forerunner of our tacit alliance with an admirable people. The greatest service which the government of President Wenceslau Braz can render his country will be to give Brazil the rank which belongs to her in the American concert." Quoted by Gaillard, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

⁷⁹ See below, p. 367.

been badly damaged by their crews. In taking this step the government was at pains to point out that it was a question, not of confiscation, "which is as repugnant to the spirit of our legislation as to the general feelings of the country," but of utilization on the basis of the principles of The Hague Convention of 1907.⁸⁰ In reply to Germany's protest against the utilization of these vessels⁸¹ the Brazilian minister of foreign affairs asserted that they had been taken over as reprisals for the torpedoing of ships of the Brazilian merchant fleet.⁸² This uncertainty in regard to the legal status of these ex-German ships was later to give the Brazilian government much concern and caused the Brazilian delegation to the Peace Conference no little embarrassment.⁸³

During the summer and early fall of 1917 a number of acts of the government presaged Brazil's early entrance into the war. The decree of June 1, revoking Brazilian neutrality in the war between the United States and Germany, was supplemented by the decree of June 28, which revoked Brazilian neutrality in the war between Germany on the one hand and France, Russia, Great Britain, Japan, Portugal, and Italy on the other.⁸⁴ On June 29 the Brazilian minister of foreign affairs formally requested the American embassy and the British, French, Italian and Japanese

⁸⁰ *Documentos Diplomaticos, 1914-1917*, pp. 57, 58, 60.

⁸¹ Transmitted through the legation of the Netherlands in a note dated June 2, 1917. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

⁸² Note of June 5, 1917. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-67.

⁸³ See below, p. 98 ff.

⁸⁴ *Documentos Diplomaticos, 1914-1917*, pp. 106-107.

legations to inform him of the zone patrolled or guarded by the naval forces of their respective countries "so that with the assistance of the war-fleet of Brazil, on our coast and for mutual interest, Brazilian ships may derive, for their greater safety, the full benefit of these patrols."⁸⁵

With both Brazilian as well as United States and Allied warships guarding the Brazilian merchant marine, now augmented by the ex-German ships, it is obvious that a single overt act on the part of Germany could hardly fail to bring Brazil into the war as a full belligerent. On October 23, word reached Brazil that the steamer *Macau* (the former German ship *Palatia*) had been torpedoed off the Spanish coast by a German submarine and her captain taken prisoner. On the following day President Wenceslau Braz sent a special message to Congress; after stating that in all four ships had been illegally sunk, he declared that in the latest instance the gravity of the case was enhanced beyond measure by the capture of the commander. By these acts a state of war had in effect been imposed upon Brazil; it only remained for Brazil to take such action as might be necessary "to maintain uninjured the dignity of the nation."⁸⁶ On October 26 Congress passed a resolution which "recognized and proclaimed the state of war initiated by the German government against Brazil."⁸⁷ This resolution was adopted unanimously in

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75. The replies, being confidential, were naturally not published.

⁸⁶ *Brazilian Green Book*, pp. 87-88.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

the Senate and by a vote of 149 to 1 in the Chamber of Deputies.⁸⁸ Thus did Brazil, alone among the South American republics, definitely and unequivocally, align herself with the United States and the Allies in the World War.⁸⁹

It is to be noted that Brazil in taking this momentous step made no declaration of war against Germany but merely took official cognizance of the state of belligerency forced upon her by the hostile acts of the Imperial government. This point of view was in entire harmony with the past history and traditions of Brazil. Her national evolution ever since her separation from Portugal in 1822 had been characterized by the absence of aggression against her neighbors or of enlargement of her boundaries through wars of conquest. Her victory in the Paraguayan War (1865-1870), into which she was forced against her will, was followed by no increase in territory or despoiling of the vanquished. And this norm of her national policy was definitely incorporated into the Constitution of 1891 by the provision "that in no case, either directly or indirectly, alone or in alliance with another nation, shall the United States of Brazil engage in wars of conquest."⁹⁰ Likewise it has been

⁸⁸ The dissenting vote was cast by Deputy Joaquim Pires, on the ground that the resolution was unconstitutional as Germany had not been guilty either of invasion of national territory or an attack on Brazilian sovereignty. Prazeres, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

⁸⁹ Brazil's first belligerent act was the attempt to seize the German gunboat *Eber* anchored in the harbor of Bahia. The crew frustrated this move by scuttling the ship.

⁹⁰ Article 88.

her consistent policy to settle her numerous and vexatious boundary controversies through the channels of arbitration and diplomacy rather than through recourse to arms.⁹¹

Now that Brazil had become a belligerent, the government took measures to bring home to the rank and file of the people the full significance of her changed international status. On issuing the decree which sanctioned the congressional resolution of October 26⁹² the president dispatched to the presidents and governors of the states a manifesto which was given wide publicity in the press of the country. After summarizing the causes which forced Brazil into the war the president added:

“It is necessary that all internal differences disappear and that the nation stand forth one and indivisible before the aggressor; the government therefore advises and expects the greatest respect for its decisions. The press, which has never failed in its patriotism in the hour of danger, will avoid inopportune discussions. Our liberal traditions have always taught respect for the person and property of the enemy, as far as is compatible with public safety; such must be the procedure on the present occasion.

“It is fitting that we exercise the greatest economy in expenditures of every nature, public or private. Let

⁹¹ “There has been no diplomacy finer in its purpose than that of Brazil. Whether under the empire or in the republic, it has always showed an unswerving honesty. Public papers or secret documents all breathe an elevated sense of international justice, whether they concerned relations with Europe or with America.” Helio Lobo, *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), July 13, 1917.

⁹² The text of the decree is given in the *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 88.

production in the fields be intensified as much as possible, so that hunger, which is already knocking at the door of Europe, may not attack us also; rather must we strive to become the granary of our Allies.

"Let everyone be on his guard against the machinations of spies; and let everyone be silent when it is a question of national safety."⁹³

The proclamation was received with enthusiasm. Public demonstrations took place throughout the country, accompanied, unfortunately, by attacks on German property in southern Brazil. The church as well as the press came out unequivocally in support of the government. Cardinal Arcoverde issued a pastoral letter ordering the Brazilian clergy to lend full support to the authorities in the prosecution of the war. A number of the bishops and archbishops issued instructions of a similar tenor. The higher Brazilian clergy, unlike some of their brethren in Chile, apparently had no pro-German leanings.⁹⁴

Messages congratulating Brazil on her entry into the war poured in from the allied powers as well as from some of the South American republics. "Your action in this moment of crisis tightens the bonds of friendship which have always held the two Republics together," cabled President Wilson to President Braz on October 27.⁹⁵ In his reply, dated November 3, the Brazilian executive assured President Wilson that "in assuming

⁹³ Candido Costa, *Momento Historico* (Pará, 1919), pp. 53-55.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 62-82, where a number of these pastoral letters are given *in extenso*.

⁹⁵ *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 90.

this attitude in defense of the honor of her flag and the imprescriptible rights of her people, Brazil thus has the honor to cooperate, in complete solidarity and perfect accord, with the great friendly sister Republic, at the side of the other allied nations, united in the war against Germany to safeguard the higher interests of humanity.”⁹⁶

As was the case in the United States the formal entry of Brazil into the war was signaled by the creation or expansion of a number of patriotic organizations designed to second the actions of the government and bring home to the rank and file of the people the full significance of Brazil's status as a belligerent. Of these organizations the most important was the League of National Defense (*Liga da Defesa Nacional*), in some respects the analogue of our National Security League. Though established as early as September 7, 1916, it was not until October of the following year that it began to exert a nation-wide influence. Its name explains its *raison d'être*. Its object was to defend national interests from attacks both from without and within. Prior to Brazil's entry into the war it preached the doctrine of “preparedness,” urging all able bodied Brazilians to join the *tiros* or rifle clubs, which had been organized throughout the country. When Brazil became a belligerent, it carried on a vigorous campaign for compulsory military service. Its educational activities were many and varied. Its officials and leading mem-

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

bers⁹⁷ organized a series of public lectures given in Rio de Janeiro and later widely distributed through the medium of the Bulletin of the League and the public press.⁹⁸ The League urged the wide use of the ballot box, it combated illiteracy, it encouraged the boy scout movement, it opened a nation-wide competition for a "civic catechism" and a "manual of civil and moral education." On its central board of directors were to be found some sixty of the most representative men in the political, educational and business circles of the capital. Branches were established in all of the state capitals and in some of the larger municipalities.⁹⁹

Once Brazil had become a belligerent, the most pressing and obvious problems confronting the government had to do with internal defense. Renewed attacks on Brazilian shipping by German submarines were the immediate occasion for the passage of Brazil's so-called "War law" (*Lei da guerra*). On November 3, President Braz informed Congress that two more Brazilian ships, the *Acary* and the *Guahyba*, had been sunk in the

⁹⁷ As president was chosen Pedro Lessa, a noted juriconsult; the vice-president was Miguel Calmon, formerly minister of transportation and political leader of note; the secretary general was the poet Olavo Bilac; among its most prominent members were the historian, Count Affonso Celso (son of the last prime-minister under the empire), and the novelist Coelho Netto.

⁹⁸ The titles of a few of these lectures will help to make clear the aims of the League: "The idea of the country (*patria*)," "The idea of justice," "National education," "The importance of sport in national life," "The economic problem in its relation to national defense," etc.

⁹⁹ *Boletim do Directorio Central da Liga da Defesa Nacional*, published irregularly, 1917-1919.

vicinity of the Cape Verde Islands. It was intolerable, the president added, that while Germany continued to decimate the Brazilian commercial fleet, German commercial, banking, and colonial rights "should not suffer the limitations advised by our patriotism and that we should not take, with reference to them, the measure of exclusion and legitimate defense which may be necessary."¹⁰⁰

In pursuance of the suggestion of the president, Congress, on November 16, 1917, passed the War Law, investing the government with a number of extraordinary powers, perhaps the most important of which was the authorization, valid until December 31, to declare in any part of the country a state of siege.¹⁰¹ This provision was particularly aimed at the suppression of possible disorders in the three southern states of Paraná, Santa Catherina and Rio Grande do Sul, where the bulk of the German population was concentrated. These German settlements have given rise to a considerable literature, both within and without Germany. While plans for the eventual absorption of Southern Brazil into a greater German empire were generally regarded as the vaporings of Pan-German chauvinists¹⁰² the

¹⁰⁰ Text of the message in *Brazilian Green Book*, pp. 97-98.

¹⁰¹ Text of this law, *Ibid.*, pp. 99-102. A detailed account of the discussion of this law, both in Committee and in Congress may be found in Prazeres, *op. cit.*, p. 81 ff.

¹⁰² E. g., Richard Tannenberg, *Gross-Deutschland: die Arbeit des 20ten Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig, 1911). The following quotation is typical of the work: "The German settlements in South Brazil and Uruguay are the only ray of light in this dismal picture of South American civilization. Here dwell 500,000

measured statements of such authorities as Professor Gustav von Schmoller, one of the most distinguished economic historians in Germany, contained food for careful thought. Writing in 1910 von Schmoller declared:

"We must desire that at any cost a German country containing some twenty or thirty million Germans may grow up in the coming century in South Brazil—and that, too, no matter whether it remains a portion of Brazil or becomes an independent state or enters into close relationship with our empire. Unless our connection with Brazil is always secured by ships of war, and unless Germany is able to exercise pressure there, our development is threatened."¹⁰³

From certain points of view the apprehension of these alarmists seemed not without cause. A population of Teutonic extraction, estimated at from a quarter to half a million,¹⁰⁴ seemed to be firmly entrenched in one of the most fertile and productive regions of the repub-

Germans, and it is to be hoped that in a reorganization of South American conditions after the peoples of Latin and Indian mixtures are quite ruined by bad government, the immense plains of la Plata . . . will fall into the hands of the German people. . . . It is truly a miracle that the German people did not long ago resolve on seizing the country." pp. 228, 229.

¹⁰³ *Handels- und Machtpolitik* (Stuttgart, 1910), Bd. I, 36.

¹⁰⁴ Estimates of the population of these German-speaking communities vary, partly due to the fact that among the Teutonic elements are reckoned children and even grand-children of German emigrants, many of whom have been only partially "Brazilianized." The figures generally given are Paraná, 60,000 Germans, Santa Catherina, 170,000, Rio Grande do Sul, 220,000. The total population of these states on the outbreak of the war was between two and one-half and three million.

lic. German emigration to Brazil dates back to 1825 when colonies were established in Santa Catherina and Rio Grande do Sul at the invitation of the government of Dom Pedro I. German colonization societies and the Brazilian government cooperated in this enterprise, the former recruiting emigrants in Germany, the latter paying their passage and facilitating their settlement on the land. The movement continued actively until 1859 when, as a result of alleged ill-treatment of the colonists, the Prussian minister von de Heydt issued a rescript prohibiting further subsidized emigration to Brazil. This order was not repealed until 1896. Since then various organizations, of which the most important was the Hanseatic Colonial Society, have striven with some success not only to encourage German emigration to southern Brazil but above all to maintain close cultural affiliations between these transplanted Germans and the Fatherland.¹⁰⁵ There is moreover some evidence that the German government actively sponsored a number of movements designed to further German nationalism. Lutheran pastors, frequently sent out from Germany for sojourns extending over several years, preached the gospel of German nationalism. Clubs, es-

¹⁰⁵ A satisfactory introduction to the whole subject of German settlements in South Brazil—the details of which transcend the scope of the present work—will be found in E. Tonnelat, *L'Expansion Allemande hors d'Europe* (Paris, 1908), and an anonymous work, probably written by Austin Harrison, *The Pan-German Doctrine* (London and New York, 1904); cf. also the article by Loretta Baum "German Political Designs with Reference to Brazil," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, November 1919.

pecially the ubiquitous rifle clubs, were also agencies of propaganda. As noted elsewhere¹⁰⁶ the famous Delbrück law of 1913, which permitted a German to become a naturalized subject of a foreign country and at the same time enjoy for himself and his descendents the rights of a German citizen and the protection of the German empire, was aimed at such a situation as existed in Brazil.¹⁰⁷ The Brazilian authorities, both national and local, were themselves partly to blame for the success of these efforts to create and maintain centers of German nationalism in the three southern states of the republic. In the more compact communities very little attempt was made to assimilate these foreign elements. Especially delinquent were the state authorities in the matter of education. Schools in which the instruction was largely if not exclusively carried on in German, subsidized in many cases by funds from Germany, were practically exempt from state control. In certain regions the third generation of these German settlers could not speak Portuguese.¹⁰⁸ It was small wonder therefore that Brazilian politics

¹⁰⁶ See above, pp. 12-13.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. A. Cheradame, *The Pan-Germanic Plot Unmasked* (London, 1917), p. 195, and Nuno Pinheiro, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

¹⁰⁸ This failure to assimilate the Teutonic elements is freely conceded by the Brazilians themselves. Cf. Prazeres, *op. cit.*, p. 10. In an article published in *O. Pais* of March 6, 1917, Sr. Reis Carvalho, secretary of the Brazilian League for the Allies, stated that through an examination for military service in Rio Grande do Sul it was found that 73 per cent of the men of non-Teutonic origin were illiterate, as against 23 per cent of those of Teutonic origin. But of the men of Teutonic origin 61 per cent could speak only German.

and culture were frequently regarded with indifference if not contempt by the descendents of these German immigrants.

With Brazil's entry into the war the attitude of these Teutonic elements assumed great importance. The Brazilians might easily persuade themselves, especially under the influence of war-psychosis, that the German government would now attempt to strike at its latest antagonist by fomenting an armed rebellion in the southern states of the republic, or create international embarrassment by encouraging an attack on the neighboring Republic of Uruguay, whose government, a few weeks prior to Brazil's entry into the war, had formally broken diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany.¹⁰⁹ As a matter of fact, certain revelations made during the war cast a rather sinister light on German intrigues and designs in southern Brazil. The notorious Luxburg, the German minister to Argentina, wrote on July 7, 1917, in a confidential dispatch to his government: "Our attitude towards Brazil has created the impression here that our easy-going nature can be counted upon. This is dangerous in South America where the people under a thin veneer are Indians. A submarine with full power to act might save the situation."¹¹⁰ And on August 4 of the same year he informed Berlin: "I am convinced that we shall be able to carry through our principal *political aims* in South America, the maintenance of an open

¹⁰⁹ See below, p. 371.

¹¹⁰ *Official Bulletin* (Washington), October 31, 1917.

market in Argentina and the *reorganization of South Brazil*¹¹¹ equally well whether with or without Argentina.”¹¹² In his message to Congress, delivered in February 1918, President Viera of Uruguay stated that the Uruguayan government “harbored very serious suspicions that the German government was fomenting an insurrection of German settlers with the object of promoting an uprising in the provinces of South Brazil,” and also had reason to believe that “an invasion of our (*i. e.*, Uruguayan) territory was planned from the north.”¹¹³

If the German government had hoped that the entry of Brazil into the war would be the prelude to a revolution in southern Brazil, it was speedily undeceived. Save for occasional protests in the coast towns, notably Rio Grande do Sul, the German sections of the population remained quiescent. This tranquillity was undoubtedly due in part to the energetic action of the Brazilian authorities. A considerable portion of the army was sent to the disaffected districts; on November 17, the president declared martial law in the three southern

¹¹¹ The italics are not in the original.

¹¹² Official Bulletin (Washington), October 31, 1917. For a full discussion of Luxburg's intrigues in Argentina, see below, p. 215 f.

¹¹³ The apprehension of the Uruguayan government was so real that President Viera enquired of President Irigoyen what action Argentina would take should a request be made for arms and munitions to equip the militia in the event of hostilities. Irigoyen replied that the resources of Argentina would be placed at the disposition of Uruguay. República Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto. *Memoria . . . correspondiente al año 1917-1918*, pp. 189-192. Cf. below, p. 252.

states as well as in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and the Federal District.¹¹⁴ Coincident with the suspension of constitutional guarantees came the establishment of the censorship of newspapers and letters followed a little later by the suppression of papers printed in German.¹¹⁵ At the same time a number of Germans were interned.¹¹⁶ But the forehanded and vigorous action of the authorities did not entirely account for the absence of serious disturbances in southern Brazil. There can be little doubt that in spite of propaganda and pressure the sympathies of large numbers of these Teuto-Brazilians inclined towards Brazil, the country of their adoption or of their birth. Even before Brazil formally entered the war protestations of loyalty reached the authorities from widely separated districts. On April 22, 1917, President Braz, for example, received telegrams from the inhabitants of Blumenau and Joinville, important

¹¹⁴ The text of this decree is given in Candido Costa, *op. cit.*, p. 53. Cf. Nuno Pinheiro, *Problemas da guerra e da paz* (Rio de Janeiro, 1919), p. 259.

¹¹⁵ According to the press of the capital these papers reappeared in a Portuguese garb (*e. g.*, the *Deutscher Volksblatt* becoming the *Gazeta Popular*) and continued to publish propaganda against the Allies. The censorship was taxed with being capricious and unfair. Cf. *A Tribuna*, June 1, 1918, and *A Gazeta das Noticias*, June 20, 1918.

¹¹⁶ According to Nuno Pinheiro (*op. cit.*, p. 28), not more than 700 Germans were interned, among whom figured the members of the crew of the gunboat *Eber*. As quarters, were assigned the Immigrant Station in the beautiful Isla das Flores in Rio harbor and the naval sanatorium in the charming mountain town of Nova Friburgo. The Germans were treated as guests rather than as prisoners of war.

German communities in Santa Catherina, asserting their loyalty to the government. The majority of the signatures were German.¹¹⁷ Three days later the *Deutsche Post* of Porto Alegre, one of the most influential papers in Rio Grande do Sul, counselled the German population to carry out the orders of the authorities with the greatest zeal.¹¹⁸ Further evidence of the same sort, including declarations by representatives of these states in the national Congress, repeatedly appears in the public press.

Despite these assertions, some of which were obviously dictated by interested motives; it seems reasonably clear that the bulk of the German speaking population remained indifferent to the issues of the war. It could hardly have been otherwise. Many of these Germans had lived for two or even three generations in Brazil, insulated for the most part from all contact with the outside world, knowing little of what happened in the Fatherland.¹¹⁹ Only in the great coast cities, such as Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, and Pelotas, where the large business houses were in the hands of the Germans, did Brazil's entry into the war cause any strong reaction. In the final analysis the danger of German aggression in southern Brazil was potential rather than actual. A defeat of the Allies and the United States might conceivably have spelled for Brazil the loss of her states lying in the temperate zone.

¹¹⁷ Quoted in the *Jornal do Commercio*, April 26, 1917.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ This point is clearly brought out by Professor Paul Rohrbach, *Bei den Deutschen in Latein-Amerika* (Berlin, 1922).

Space will permit the mention of only a few of the remaining provisions of the law of November 16. The executive was authorized to declare null and void contracts concluded with enemy subjects and to cancel all negotiations which might be pending. He was also empowered to sequester all goods, moneys and properties of enemy subjects, and to sell all goods consigned to such enemy subjects, the moneys thus realized to be deposited in the national treasury as a security against losses caused by Germany during the course of the war. The law also provided for the liquidation of enemy enterprises in the country and established a special control (*fiscalização*) over all enemy financial, commercial and industrial enterprises. Firms were to be considered of enemy character when the total or greater part of the capital belonged to Germans, whether the head offices were in Germany or Brazil.¹²⁰

In the execution of this law the executive displayed a moderation that was absent in the case of a number of the belligerents. The treatment of the German banks was a case in point. These institutions, of which there were three,¹²¹ were through their numerous branches closely identified with many of the leading Brazilian industries, especially coffee. This was particularly true of the Brazilianische Bank, which financed a large part of the coffee crop of São Paulo. It also maintained intimate commercial relations with the great German exporting firm of Theodore Wille and Co. In accord-

¹²⁰ *Brazilian Green Book*, pp. 99, 101.

¹²¹ The Brazilianische Bank, the Banco Transatlantico, and the Banco Germanico.

ance with the decree of November 9, 1917,¹²² the government established control of the three banks including all of their branches. At first the government through its agents or representatives (*fiscaes*) prohibited all new banking operations and forbade the payment of any sums to German citizens or firms. It was soon discovered, however, that such a policy was detrimental to Brazilian interests. A number of German companies, owners of factories in which the employees were almost exclusively Brazilian, presently found themselves unable to meet their engagements. In such cases liberal concessions were made, the government merely insisting that the banks should engage in no enterprise which might be of aid to the enemy. It was not in fact until July 29, 1918, that the minister of finance prohibited any further operations by the German banks, while permitting those pending to be concluded.¹²³ Finally an executive decree dated October 11, 1918, formally cancelled the authorization to conduct business in Brazil, but allowed six months for the liquidation of the bank's affairs.¹²⁴ This period was subsequently extended for another six months.¹²⁵ A procedure analogous to that

¹²² *Diario Official*, November 23, 1917. Cf. Nuno Pinheiro, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹²³ Nuno Pinheiro, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

¹²⁴ *Diario Official*, November 6, 1918.

¹²⁵ Nuno Pinheiro, *loc. cit.* No complete statistics regarding the losses suffered by the German banks are available. It may be noted, however, that the president of the Brazilianische Bank, Herr von Schinckel, informed the stockholders in August 1919 that the bank had suffered a loss of 8,200,000 milreis (something over two million dollars) in Brazil. *Le Brésil*, September 7, 1919.

employed in the case of the banks was put into effect in the case of the German insurance companies doing business in Brazil.¹²⁶

The control of the German banks and insurance companies naturally brought to the fore the whole question of alien property. The Brazilian League for the Allies launched a campaign for the sequestration of all German property in Brazil, invoking the example of the United States.¹²⁷ But the government refused to take such drastic action, and German possessions, save under special circumstances, were not interfered with.¹²⁸ The government did not even avail itself of the authorization to draw up an inventory of the property of Germans resident in Brazil.¹²⁹

Aside from the control of German banks and insurance companies only such measures were taken against German enterprises as were dictated by the necessity of war. Thus on January 4, 1918, the contract for war material which some time previously had been made by the Brazilian government with the great firm of Krupp of Essen was cancelled.¹³⁰ On March 6 of the same year the government took over the Santa Catherina Railway, which was being operated by a German company. Finally, on September 6, 1918, it revoked the permission

¹²⁶ Cf. Nuno Pinheiro, *op. cit.*, p. 43 ff., where the subject is discussed at length.

¹²⁷ *Jornal do Commercio*, September 27, 1918. As a matter of fact the legislation in the United States applied only to property of Germans abroad.

¹²⁸ Nuno Pinheiro, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

to operate the German submarine cable between Pernambuco and Teneriffe.¹³¹ It is hardly necessary to add that immediately after the declaration of war all commercial relations with Germany were prohibited to residents of Brazil, nationals and foreigners alike.¹³²

It will be recalled that early in the war the various powers constituting the Entente initiated a series of Inter-Allied Conferences designed to coordinate their efforts against the common enemy. In keeping with her new status as a full belligerent Brazil was invited to send a representative to the Conference which met at Paris from November 30 to December 3, 1917. The Brazilian minister to France, Dr. Olyntho M. de Magalhães, was designated for this purpose. In January 1918, the French minister of blockade asked the Brazilian government to appoint one or two delegates to share in the labors of the Permanent International Committee of Economic Action, which had been created by the Inter-Allied Conference in March 1916. Dr. Magalhães served also in this capacity, explaining in detail to the committee the Brazilian war legislation, especially, as it affected matters of trade and commerce.¹³³

Brazil had hardly become a belligerent before the government began seriously to consider the eventuality of military and naval participation. "Brazil, having

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² Decree of December 7, 1917. This act merely gave official sanction to a prohibition which had been some time in effect. Nuno Pinheiro, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54.

¹³³ Brazil, Ministerio das Relacões Exteriores, *Relatorio*, 1917-1918, Vol. I, pp. xiii, 103-104.

declared war on Germany," announced Dr. Nilo Peçanha, "must now give some practical expression to her solidarity with her Allies. This she will do according to circumstances and her conception of duty."¹³⁴ It is a mooted question whether or not Brazil would have sent troops to the western front or even to the Near East had the war lasted another year. The Brazilian minister to Great Britain, Sr. Fontoura Xavier, persistently urged the dispatch of Brazilian troops to Mesopotamia on the ground that they were better fitted than the English to endure the hardships of a tropical climate.¹³⁵ Throughout 1917 and 1918 the question of transportation presented almost insuperable difficulties. Yet it is beyond cavil that the Brazilian government, supported by the nation as a whole, desired to put the army on a war footing and raise it to such a standard of efficiency that should occasion arise it would prove a useful addition to the Allied forces. When the war broke out the Brazilian army was organized according to the military law of 1908 which made military service obligatory in the case of every Brazilian from 21 to 45 years of age. In reality, however, the law had been only partially carried out and the army continued to be recruited by voluntary enlistment. The total peace strength was calculated at twenty-five thousand, though at times it had fallen somewhat below that figure. After Brazil had become a belligerent it was felt that such a

¹³⁴ *Jornal do Commercio*, January 3, 1918.

¹³⁵ Statement of Sr. Fontoura Xavier in *Pall Mall Gazette*, quoted by *Le Brésil*, December 7, 1919.

force was totally inadequate. On December 27, 1917, Congress authorized the president to revise the law of 1908 in order to establish the principle of a national rather than a professional army.¹³⁶ The total effectives of the army were increased to 54,000 men, the additional recruits being chosen by lot. The drawing took place at Rio de Janeiro on February 3, 1918, in the presence of the executive and the cabinet.¹³⁷ If one were to accept the verdict of the press, particularly those sections which agitated for the dispatch of troops to the Western front, the men who were drafted showed a praiseworthy enthusiasm.¹³⁸ Yet there was much criticism as to the way in which the drawings were carried out and the scandal finally became so great that on April 6, 1918, the government formally stated that it "has already taken measures, and will take whatever others are necessary, to discover and punish severely any frauds committed, whoever may be the guilty parties."¹³⁹

Further evidence of Brazil's desire to increase the effectiveness of her military and naval establishments is seen in the dispatch abroad of a number of military and naval missions. In December 1917 a mission under

¹³⁶ Prazeres, *op. cit.*, p. 166 ff. where long extracts are given of the speech of Deputy Ildefonso, reporter of the budget for military expenses, on Brazil's military problems. Cf. Pedro Cavalcanti, *A Presidencia Wenceslau Braz* (Rio de Janeiro) p. 192 ff.

¹³⁷ *Jornal do Commercio*, February 4, 1918.

¹³⁸ *Review of the Foreign Press*. (Issued by the General Staff of the British War Office), *Allied Press Supplement*, June 28, 1918, p. 68; July 10, 1918, p. 105.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, period for April 1-20, 1918.

Lieutenant-Colonel Alipio da Gama was sent to the United States to arrange for close military cooperation and for the purchase of such equipment and machinery as would enable Brazil to augment her production of war material.¹⁴⁰ A military mission under General Napoleon Aché was dispatched to France shortly after Brazil entered the war. Its members kept closely in touch with the military situation and actually participated in a number of engagements on the French front. Several of its officers were cited for bravery on the field of battle.¹⁴¹ Finally, late in 1917 Rear Admiral Francisco de Mattos was sent to Europe to follow the operations of the Allied fleets and superintend any naval operations which might eventually be undertaken by Brazil in European waters.¹⁴²

If dearth of shipping as well as other reasons condemned the Brazilian army to inactivity during the great war, the same could not be said of the navy. From one point of view one may even say that Brazilian ships lent aid to the Allied cause long before Brazil entered the war. In the fall of 1914 the British government incorporated in its fleets the three monitors *Javary*, *Solimões* and *Madeira* which were nearing completion on the Clyde for the Brazilian navy. Rechristened the *Mercy*, *Humber* and *Severn*, these light-draught vessels

¹⁴⁰ Brazil, Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, *Relatorio*, 1917-1918, Vol. I, pp. 116-117. Cf. *New York Times*, December 16, 1917; March 10, May 26, August 6, 1918.

¹⁴¹ Brazil, Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, *Relatorio*, 1917-1918, Vol. I, pp. 116-117.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

proved of great service to the British navy in patrolling the coast of Belgium. In 1917 the Brazilian navy consisted of two dreadnaughts, the *Minas Geraes* and *São Paulo*, laid down in 1907, and therefore somewhat antiquated; two protected cruisers, also laid down in 1907; ten destroyers and four torpedo boats, as well as a number of miscellaneous vessels, such as coast defense ships and submarines. As a result of a conference held immediately after Brazil's entrance into the war between the minister of marine, Vice-Admiral Alencar and Rear Admiral Caperton of the United States Navy, Brazil assumed partial responsibility for the patrol of the South Atlantic.¹⁴³ The duties of the Brazilian vessels were chiefly concerned with the patrol of the Brazilian coast line in order to prevent the establishment of German submarine bases.¹⁴⁴ On December 21, 1917, the British government inquired through the Brazilian legation in London if Brazil would send to European waters a fleet of light cruisers and destroyers to cooperate with the Allies under the command of the British admiralty.¹⁴⁵ The invitation was accepted with enthusiasm; in January the navy department set to work to fit out a fleet composed of the scout cruisers *Rio Grande do Sul* and *Bahia* and the destroyers *Parahyba*, *Rio*

¹⁴³ Prazeres, *op. cit.*, p. 48. (Statement of Sr. Alberto Sarmiento, chairman of the Committee on Diplomacy). Cf. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Relatório, 1917-1918*. Vol. I, pp. 86, 110, 111.

¹⁴⁴ *Correio da Manhã*, July 17, 1917.

¹⁴⁵ Fontoura (Brazilian minister in London) to Nilo Peçanha, *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 108.

Grande do Norte, Piauhys and Santa Catharina.¹⁴⁶ The fleet as finally organized was placed under the command of Admiral Pedro Max de Frontin. It left Rio de Janeiro May 14¹⁴⁷ and was eventually stationed off the coast of Africa where it was given exclusive charge of the triangle St. Vincent, Sierra Leone, Dakar. This was one of the zones frequently visited by German submarines which lay in wait for the passage of Allied convoys. The duty of the Brazilian fleet was to sweep up mines sown by the Germans and to guarantee the passage of the convoys. During this period the officers and crews of the ships suffered severely from the ravages of influenza.¹⁴⁸ Late in the autumn the fleet was transferred to the Mediterranean; it arrived at Gibraltar on November 10, where to the intense chagrin and disappointment of the officers and crews the news of the armistice put an end to all hope of further operations against the enemy.

If distance from the front and dearth of available shipping offered almost insuperable obstacles to the dispatch of a large military contingent to Europe, there was one branch of the service in which Brazil might hope actively to participate. This was aviation. Ever since

¹⁴⁶ Nilo Peçanha to Fontoura, December 31, 1917. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

¹⁴⁷ Same to same, May 15, 1918. *Documentos Diplomaticos*, 1918, p. 75.

¹⁴⁸ Interview granted the *Correio da Manhã* by Captain Jorge Dodsworth Martins (a member of Admiral Frontin's staff) reproduced in Candido Costa, *Momento Historico* (Pará, 1920), p. 158 ff. Cf. Nuno Pinheiro, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

the days of Santos Dumont and his successful flight in a dirigible balloon over Paris, the Brazilians have interested themselves in flying. It was both fitting and natural therefore that with Brazil's entry into the war the government should decide to develop the aviation service in connection with both the army and navy. In the winter of 1918, at the invitation of the British government, a group of ten aviators from the Naval Aviation Corps was sent to England for training.¹⁴⁹ These men were attached to the British aviation service. Quite naturally the Brazilian government desired to send its own aviation unit to the western front. To organize a corps of trained flyers it was necessary to acquire aeroplanes, hydroplanes and other material.¹⁵⁰ In the summer of 1918 arrangements were perfected with the Royal Italian Aeronautic Commission for the dispatch to Brazil of five aeroplanes and three hydroplanes. The former were to include two powerful Caproni machines, of 660 and 450 horsepower, respectively. At the same time the Brazilian government accepted the invitation of the Italian government to send a group of Brazilian officers to the training station of Orbetello.¹⁵¹ Finally

¹⁴⁹ Peçanha to Peel (British minister at Rio de Janeiro) March 30, 1918. *Documentos Diplomáticos*, 1918, p. 74.

¹⁵⁰ In the winter and spring of 1917 five Brazilian officers were sent to the United States to gain practical experience in the construction of aeroplanes and hydroplanes. Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, *Relatorio, 1917-1918*, Vol. I, pp. 116, 117.

¹⁵¹ The pertinent dispatches are to be found in *Documentos Diplomáticos*, 1918, pp. 120-126.

in the fall of the same year the French government announced its intention to send to Brazil a large aviation mission with thirty machines and a large technical staff.¹⁵² Had the war lasted another year there is every warrant for the belief that the exploits of the Brazilian aviators would have added a new and creditable chapter to the annals of the Brazilian army and navy.

In its eagerness to increase the effectiveness of its military and naval cooperation, the Brazilian government did not neglect opportunities for service in other fields. We have already seen that in the early years of the struggle the Brazilians contributed generously to the alleviation of suffering in the stricken regions of France and Belgium. And now that Brazil had become an active belligerent, both the Brazilian people and their government rose to their new responsibilities. The work of the Brazilian Red Cross underwent a great expansion; a medical mission under the distinguished physician, Dr. Nabuco de Gouveia, assisted by 100 surgeons, with a staff of assistants together with a body of soldiers to afford them protection in the field, was sent to France in the summer of 1918. Fifteen members of the medical corps were accompanied by their wives who served as nurses. In addition to fitting out a number of field hospitals the mission established on the Rue de Vaugirard at Paris a model hospital containing three hundred beds. This hospital, with its elaborate and even lavish equipment, was after the armistice turned over

¹⁵² Claudel (French minister at Rio de Janeiro) to Peçanha, August 19; Peçanha to Claudel, August 23. *Ibid.*, pp. 152-156.

as a gift to the Medical Faculty of the University of Paris.¹⁵³

Yet all things considered, the most important contribution of Brazil towards winning the war was her successful effort to augment the food supplies available for the Allies. Even before Brazil entered the war, Brazilian products began to figure prominently on the import-lists of Great Britain, France and Italy. Beginning with 1917, systematic efforts were made under governmental direction to increase the nation's agricultural and pastoral products suitable for export. Important results were achieved. During the last year of the war there took place an enormous expansion in areas planted, amounting in certain sections of the state of Minas Geraes to five hundred per cent. The minister of agriculture took the initiative by supplying large quantities of seeds; during the week of December 31, 1917-January 6, 1918, according to reliable estimates, no less than 24,092,000 kilograms were distributed in fourteen states from Rio de Janeiro north to Amazonas.¹⁵⁴ A few statistics will reveal the almost phenomenal increase in the exportation of certain classes of foodstuffs from 1915 through 1917 and 1918. Thus the export of beans, which in 1915 had slightly exceeded \$24,000 in value, rose in 1917 to over \$10,000,000; the value of the sugar exported in the same period

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 92-96, where the most important documents dealing with the Brazilian medical mission are given. Cf. also Candido Costa, *Momento Historico* (Pará, 1919), p. 119.

¹⁵⁴ *The Americas* (New York), Vol. IV, no. 6 (March, 1918), p. 28.

showed an increase from \$3,000,000 to \$17,000,000, and, most significant of all, refrigerated beef registered an increase in value from slightly over \$1,500,000 to over \$15,000,000.¹⁵⁵ Naturally some of this increase is accounted for by rise in prices. Yet in the case of chilled beef, at least, the increase in quantity was almost equally imposing. In 1914, 1 ton was exported; in 1915, 8,500 tons; in 1916, 33,600 tons; and in 1917, 66,400 tons.¹⁵⁶

In Brazil, as in the United States and Cuba, the problems connected with food supplies were too important and too complicated to be left without regulation. On June 12, 1918, a presidential decree¹⁵⁷ was issued providing for a Commission of Public Alimentation (*Commissariado da Alimentação Publica*) with Dr. Leopoldo de Bulhões, minister of finance under President Rodrigues Alves, at its head. The chief duties of the commission were to control and to maintain within certain limits the export of food in order most efficiently to meet the needs of the Allies and to assure a supply to the people at reasonable prices. It was specifically authorized to requisition supplies and regulate the sale of foodstuffs. Although no rationing system was introduced, on August 29, 1918, a decree¹⁵⁸ was issued fixing the retail prices of the necessities of life within the

¹⁵⁵ United States Department of Commerce. *Commerce Reports*, Supplement No. 40a, February 12, 1919.

¹⁵⁶ Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade. *A Report on general economic and financial conditions of Brazil for 1919*, p. 20.

¹⁵⁷ Text given in the *Diario Official*, June 13, 1918.

¹⁵⁸ Text in *Diario Official*, August 30, 1918; cf. Pinheiro, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

Federal District. Several establishments which failed to observe the terms of this decree were closed by the police. From the first the work of the commission encountered active hostility. Retail merchants naturally objected to it, while producers were chary of sending their goods to Rio de Janeiro and other large centers since they were uncertain as to whether or not they could dispose of them at a profit.¹⁵⁹ On December 30, 1918, Congress passed a bill¹⁶⁰ abolishing the commission, but it was vetoed by the president on the ground that in the abnormal period following the war its services were still needed.¹⁶¹ It was placed, however, under the direction of the minister of agriculture.

Food products, valuable as they were, did not exhaust the list of important exports which Brazil placed at the disposal of the United States and the Allies. The large shipments of manganese ore directly contributed towards winning the war. The demand for Brazilian manganese was pressing: first, because the manufacture of munitions required a large supply of this material; and second, because Brazilian manganese was the most available. In the pre-war days India and Russia had

¹⁵⁹ Mr. Hambloch, commercial secretary to the British embassy, states that the commission fully justified its existence. Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade, *A Report on general economic and financial conditions of Brazil for 1919*, p. 42. Echoes of the criticism of Brazilian producers may be found in *Le Brésil*, February 9, 1919.

¹⁶⁰ Text in *Review of the Foreign Press, Allied Press Supplement*, March 5, 1919.

¹⁶¹ Text of the presidential message in *Diario Oficial*, January 8, 1919.

met the greater part of the world's demands for this commodity. But with the outbreak of hostilities the Russian supply was entirely cut off and that of India was requisitioned by the British government. With the enormous expansion of the munitions industry in the United States after her entry into the war a real crisis might have arisen had not Brazil been able to meet the new and pressing shortage. The value of the exports of this mineral which had amounted to \$880,572 in 1913 rose in 1917 to \$14,341,004; during the same period the number of long tons exported increased from 119,854 to 524,436, or over four hundred per cent.¹⁶²

One other contribution of Brazil to the common cause must be noted. It will be recalled that by an executive decree of June 2, 1917, the Brazilian government requisitioned the forty-six German ships anchored in Brazilian harbors. In view of the tremendous dearth of shipping, the utilization of these ships became a matter of considerable importance to the United States and the Allies. Both the North American republic and France made overtures to Brazil looking to the purchase or rental of these vessels, but the Brazilian foreign office, unwilling that these powers should bid against each other, insisted that they reach a common understanding before the ships could be leased. The United States then withdrew in favor of France, and on December 3, 1917, was signed the agreement (*convenio*) by which Brazil

¹⁶² United States, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, *Brazil, a study of economic conditions since 1913* (Miscellaneous Series, no. 86), p. 34.

leased to France thirty of the ex-German ships (amounting to 259,500 tons) for a period expiring March 31, 1919, during which time France undertook to arrange for not less than forty voyages from Brazil and no less than thirty from Europe to Brazil. The ships would continue to sail under the Brazilian flag and would carry Brazilian crews. As a compensation for the use of these vessels the French government agreed to pay Brazil 100,000,000 francs and purchase two million sacks of coffee, and other Brazilian goods to the value of one hundred million francs. This agreement was carried out, and for the remainder of the war these ships proved a valuable reenforcement to the depleted merchant-fleets of the Allies.¹⁶³ At the same time the Brazilian merchant-marine, enlarged through the addition of the remaining ex-German steamers, strained every effort to supplement existing communications between Brazil and the United States and Europe.

Not even the most enthusiastic partizan of Brazil would claim that her participation in the World War was a determining factor in the defeat of the Central Powers. To assume, however, as certain writers have done "that Brazil only theoretically took part in the war"¹⁶⁴ is to fail to recognize that within the restricted

¹⁶³ The negotiations dealing with the lease of these ships will be found in Brazil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Relatório*, 1917-1918. Vol. I, pp. 136-141.

¹⁶⁴ The quotation is from the article by the German historian Professor Clemens Brandenburger, "Allgemeine Übersichten über den internationalen Gütertausch" in *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Vol. XVI (1921), p. 238.

sphere of her activities Brazil played a rôle of some significance among the "allied and associated powers." As a summary of the services Brazil made to the common cause may be taken the statement of the British minister, Sir Arthur Peel, to Dr. Nilo Peçanha on the first anniversary of Brazil's entrance into the war.

"The declaration of a state of war with Germany, which, let it be said, was made at a time when the issues of war were most uncertain and the eventual success of the Allied arms appeared more distant than ever, was rapidly followed by a series of measures devised to prevent the overseas trading of enemy firms and to control the operation of enemy banks within the country, measures for which the responsibility may largely be attributed to Your Excellency's energy and sense of initiative. During the past year cooperation with her Allies has been Brazil's watchword. The majority of the German ships interned in her ports have been placed at the disposal of an Allied Government. Brazilian aviators have proceeded to the United Kingdom to take their share in the great aerial offensive which has done so much to bring Germany to her knees. Brazilian war-ships are at this moment cooperating with the Allied navies to put down German piracy and assure the safety of the seas. Brazilian medical officers, well known for their professional skill, are already engaged in alleviating the sufferings of the wounded but victorious heroes of the present offensive on the Western front.

Cooperation in the censorship, cooperation in the transportation of troops, cooperation in feeding the Allied troops with all the vast supplies of foodstuffs which the fertile soil of Brazil produces, and, finally, the hearty cooperation of the Brazilian people who have never failed to manifest their sincere and whole-hearted sympathy with the great cause for which we are all fighting, a moral support of inestimable benefit, all these manifestations of good will cannot but be warmly ap-

preciated by nations engaged in a death struggle for the cause of liberty and the triumph of justice.”¹⁶⁵

Amongst the Latin American powers entitled to send delegates to the Peace Conference, Brazil took the most conspicuous part, although in comparison with the European belligerents, the United States and Japan her share in the deliberations at Versailles was necessarily limited. Brazil was represented by a number of her ablest and most distinguished public men.¹⁶⁶ The president of the delegation was Senator Epitacio Pessoa, former member of the Supreme Court, and later president of Brazil. The other members were Dr. Pandia Calogeras, former minister of finance; Dr. Olyntho de Magalhães, Brazilian minister to France; Professor Rodrigo Octavio L. de Menezes, one of the foremost legal authorities in South America; Deputy Paulo Fernandes; Captain Armando Burlamaqui, technical naval counsellor; Major Malan d'Angrogne, technical military counsellor. The secretary-general of the delegation was Dr. Helio Lobo, Brazilian consul general in London, and a recognized authority on the diplomatic history of Brazil.

¹⁶⁵ *Documentos diplomaticos, 1918*, pp. 205, 206.

¹⁶⁶ As a result of an unhappy misunderstanding the name of Ruy Barbosa did not figure among the delegates, although he had been invited by the president to head the delegation. Personal and political differences between Ruy Barbosa and Dr. Domicio da Gama, the newly appointed minister of foreign affairs, seem to have been at the bottom of the difficulty. Ruy Barbosa has justified his action in two lengthy articles entitled “O caso internacional,” in the *Revista do Brasil*, June and July 1919.

Although Brazil was represented on a number of committees,¹⁶⁷ her interests in the Conference were largely confined to two questions of major importance; the settlement by Germany for the stocks of Brazilian coffee seized by the late Imperial government in various ports in its control, and the disposition of the German merchant-ships requisitioned and utilized by Brazil as a means of alleviating the shipping famine and as a security against losses caused by German submarines.

The first of these questions was easily disposed of. On the outbreak of the war in 1914, the State of São Paulo possessed 1,835,361 casks of coffee deposited in the ports of Antwerp, Hamburg, Bremen and Trieste as security for two valorization loans contracted in 1913 and 1914. Shortly after the declaration of war Germany threatened to confiscate these stocks. This move was successfully opposed by the Brazilian government. The State of São Paulo, fearing complications, ordered the coffee to be sold. The proceeds of this sale, amounting to something over one hundred and twenty-five million marks, were deposited in November 1914 and May 1916 in the German banking house of S. Bleischroeder. São Paulo wished to withdraw this sum in order to cancel its loans of 1913 and 1914. The Imperial government refused to agree to such a step. The Brazilian govern-

¹⁶⁷ Notably on the committee on the League of Nations in the person of Dr. Epitacio Pessoa. The Brazilian delegate was largely responsible for the provision (Article 4 of the Peace Treaty), providing that the lesser powers should have four representatives on the Council, instead of two as was proposed by Lord Robert Cecil. Cf. *Le Brésil*, February 16, 1919.

ment intervened in the question and after protracted negotiations obtained from Germany the promise that "the proceeds from the sale of the valorization coffee, deposited in the Bleischroeder Bank would remain intact, and would be at the disposal of the Brazilian government on the signing of peace."¹⁶⁸

At Versailles the question was submitted to the Finance Commission, on which Brazil was not represented. The Commission at first refused to take the matter under advisement on the ground that it was a private transaction between the State of São Paulo and a German banking house. But as a result of the protests of Brazil it agreed to include the debt as one of the obligations of Germany, to be merged in the reparations which Germany should be obliged to pay the Allies throughout a period embracing several decades. This solution was unjust to Brazil, because, as Sr. Pessôa pointed out, the money deposited with Bleischroeder was the price of the sale of property belonging to the State of São Paulo, and this right of property had not passed to Germany by virtue of any war-right acknowledged by law. It was merely a case of the return of a deposit and not one of reparations or damages.¹⁶⁹

Although Sr. Pessôa succeeded in converting the Commission to his viewpoint, Brazil's problem was really no nearer solution. By a cruel irony the Commission,

¹⁶⁸ Brazil, Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, *Relatorio*, 1920, p. ii. The reference is to the message of President Pessôa, who rehearses in detail the work of the Brazilian delegation to the Peace Conference.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. iii.

though it recognized Brazil's claims, decided that Germany should meet her obligations at the rate of exchange prevailing on the day payment was made. This meant in effect that the coffee belonging to São Paulo, sold to Germany at a time when the mark was worth twenty-four cents, should be repaid in marks worth between two and three cents. Not until Sr. Pessôa had succeeded in convincing Mr. Davis, a member of the Finance Commission, of the justice of the Brazilian claims, was the question settled in Brazil's favor.¹⁷⁰ The solution was embodied in the Treaty of Peace, Article 263, which runs:

"Germany gives a guarantee to the Brazilian government that all sums representing the sale of coffee . . . which were deposited with the Bank of Bleischroeder at Berlin, shall be reimbursed, together with interest at the rate or rates agreed upon. Germany, having prevented the transfer of the sums in question to the state of São Paulo at the proper time, guarantees also that the reimbursement shall be effected at the rate of exchange of the day of deposit."

The second item which occupied the attention of the Brazilian delegation was the final disposition of the forty-three German ships which Brazil had requisitioned and utilized in 1917 and thirty of which had been leased to France. The subject is exceedingly complicated and only its most important phases can be discussed here. It is treated in some detail in the presidential messages of 1920 and 1921, while all additional documents having to do with the "convenio" or lease of the vessels to

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. v.

France were at the request of the Brazilian Congress published on May 22, 1920.¹⁷¹

It will be recalled that when Brazil, by the decree of July 2, 1917, took over the German ships the government was at pains to point out that this was not an act of confiscation, but merely "requisition" or "utilization." This distinction, regarded by many as unnecessary and quixotic, was later to return and plague Brazil at the Peace Conference. When the question of the ex-German ships was broached, the Brazilian delegation insisted that Brazil should be allowed to retain the ships, on the payment of a reasonable value, which sum was to be credited to Germany when it came to the final settlement of reparations. This contention was summarily rejected by the Finance Commission. M. Loucheur, minister of reconstruction and chairman of the Finance Commission, informed Sr. Pessoa that the Commission had with the approval of the Supreme Council determined to distribute among the Allies, in proportion to their maritime losses, all those German ships which had been sequestered or requisitioned by the belligerent and neutral nations, and which had not been duly condemned as prizes of war prior to November 11, 1918.¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ The presidential messages appear in the annual reports of the minister of foreign affairs for the years in question. The present writer did not have access to all the documents published at the request of Congress, but the most important are given in extenso in *Le Brésil*, June and July, 1920, *passim*.

¹⁷² Brazil, Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, *Relatório*, 1920, p. ix.

This proposed action encountered the most determined opposition on the part of Sr. Pessôa. The chief of the Brazilian delegation was able to demonstrate that France had already acknowledged Brazil's title to the ships when she had asked Brazil to cede them definitely to France, and later through the insertion in the lease-contract of a proviso giving France precedence over any other nation, should Brazil decide to sell the ships. He further pointed out that the United States had likewise tacitly recognized Brazil's right of ownership when she offered to buy the vessels from Brazil.¹⁷³

In its decision to apportion the ships among the Allies the Finance Commission had made one exception. The United States alone was to retain the ships she had utilized, on the grounds that the ships had been used to transport troops to Europe. Not unnaturally this exception caused the Brazilian delegation to feel that they had been unfairly treated by their American ally, and Sr. Pessôa formulated a renewed protest before the Finance Commission. Upon receiving an unsatisfactory reply from M. Loucheur, Sr. Pessôa wrote directly to Lloyd George and President Wilson. To the former he stated that Brazil would refuse to sign the Peace Treaty if it should embody the decision of the Finance Commission in regard to the ships; to the latter he appealed for support of Brazil's contention. President Wilson replied that he was in full agreement with the views of the Brazilian delegation and would plead the cause of

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. ix, xiv.

Brazil before the supreme council.¹⁷⁴ And, as a matter of fact, the council on May 8, 1919, adopted a protocol which contained the provision that a "Reparations Commission should take all the necessary measures to assure to each of the allied and associated governments the conservation with the full right of property and use of all the ships captured, seized or retained during the war."¹⁷⁵ But this protocol which apparently fully met Brazil's contentions, proved to be a bitter deception. It was signed by President Wilson and Lloyd George without reservation but by Clemenceau only in so far as it applied to the United States.¹⁷⁶ This action by the French premier caused a most unfavorable impression in Brazil¹⁷⁷ and forfeited to a considerable extent the sympathies which the Brazilians had so convincingly extended to France during the trials of the Great War. Brazil, it was recalled, had willingly sacrificed large profits when, instead of selling or leasing the ships to the United States for a substantial figure, she had turned them over to France "in view of the appeal made to

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. xi, xii.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xii.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xiii.

¹⁷⁷ This unfavorable impression was heightened by the attitude and utterances of certain of the Parisian newspapers. Thus the deputy, Buisson, wrote in *L'Humanité*: "Voilà un allié ayant la bonne fortune de posséder une flotte allemande qu'il a capturée et qui dirait à ces compagnons d'armes: J'ai mis la main sur des navires ennemis, mais je ne les mettrai au service de la cause commune que contre espèces sonnantes et trébuchantes. Je suis entré en guerre à vos côtés, c'est vrai, pour le droit et la justice, mais à la condition que cela rapporte." Quoted by *Le Brésil*, June 27, 1920.

her by France in the name of all the Allied powers.”¹⁷⁸ And now France was endeavoring to deprive Brazil of the most important asset to be balanced against Brazilian claims for reparations. The press of Rio de Janeiro and other large cities displayed something akin to bitterness at the alleged ingratitude of Brazil’s ally.¹⁷⁹

It would be wearisome and unprofitable to rehearse the vicissitudes through which this ship question passed. The Brazilian delegation refused to abate in the slightest degree its claims to the ex-German vessels. These claims were strengthened by the terms of Article 297 of the Peace Treaty which guaranteed the Allied and Associated Powers the right to retain, liquidate, or sell enemy properties in their possession, the sum realized to be debited to the reparation account, and the surplus, if any, to be turned over to the Reparations Commission.¹⁸⁰ After some hesitancy the French government, on May 2, 1920, retreated from its intransigent position, and recognized fully the claims of Brazil. This happy consummation was due in considerable part to the efforts of the distinguished jurist Dr. Rodrigo Octavio, who in repeated conferences with the French ambassador, M. Conty, supported Brazil’s contentions.¹⁸¹ On March

¹⁷⁸ Brazil, Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, *Relatorio*, 1920, p. xxxv.

¹⁷⁹ The attitude of the Brazilian press may be followed in the columns of *Le Brésil*, 1919-1920, *passim*.

¹⁸⁰ Brazil, Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, *Relatorio*, 1920, p. xvii.

¹⁸¹ Brazil, Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, *Relatorio*, 1921, p. 1, ff.

31, 1921, the renewal of the lease under which France had been using thirty of these ex-German ships expired and the French government forthwith took step to restore the vessels to Brazil. Thus was solved, to the full satisfaction of the South American republic, the thorniest international problem bequeathed to Brazil by the war.¹⁸²

¹⁸² *Ibid.* Cf. *Le Brésil*, June 12, 1921.

CHAPTER II

CUBA AND THE WAR

On none of the republics of Latin America did the entry of the United States into the war produce a more immediate effect than upon Cuba. It could hardly have been otherwise. The United States was chiefly responsible for the achievement of Cuban independence; under the ægis of her northern neighbor Cuba had gained her apprenticeship in self-government; during the last two decades the phenomenal development of her resources and expansion of her trade had tended to draw Cuba more and more within the economic orbit of the United States. It might furthermore be argued that the treaty of 1903, providing as it did for mutual defense in case of attack,¹ placed Cuba under the moral obligation to throw in her lot with the United States.² Finally strategic considerations growing out of Cuba's proximity to the United States, her location at the

¹ Malloy, *Treaties* (Washington, 1910), vol. I. p. 314.

² This view was unhesitatingly accepted by the Cubans themselves. "Cuba's declaration of war against Germany is moreover nothing more than a ratification of the treaty concluded on May 22, 1903, between Cuba and the United States and a consequence, in the domain of international law, of the geographical, economic and political position of our country in relation to that of the republic of the north." Juan A. Martínez, "La Entrada de Cuba en la Guerra Universal," *Cuba Contemporánea* (Havana), May 1917.

entrance of the Gulf of Mexico and on the route to the Panama Canal, the length of her coast line and the number of harbors serviceable for a hostile submarine base, would have made the rôle of neutral a difficult one to adopt.³

Yet Cuba's prompt, spontaneous and effective participation in the Great War was based on something more than treaty obligations, the safeguarding of neutrality, or the necessities of national defense—important as these were. During the first years of the war the sympathies of Cuba, as in the case of her sister republics, inclined strongly towards the Allies.⁴ When it became evident that the New World was to be included within the theatre of the conflict, public opinion, in so far as it was articulate, made it clear that the United States could count on a sentiment of complete solidarity and loyal cooperation. In response to the German war-zone

³ This point is strongly emphasized by Martínez, *loc. cit.*

⁴ The diplomatic history of Cuba during the first three years of the war may be quickly summarized. On August 5, 1914, the government officially proclaimed its neutrality. (*Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, September, 1914, p. 46.) On August 10 President Menocal issued a decree providing for the observance of Cuba's obligations as a neutral. (*Ibid.*, p. 47.) In general the terms of this decree were in harmony with the thirteenth convention of the Second Hague Conference dealing with the rights and duties of neutrals. On September 24, 1914, the Cuban department of state dispatched a circular to the members of the foreign consular corps in Havana stating that henceforth the government would forbid the use of wireless apparatus by all ships during their sojourn in Cuban jurisdictional waters; commercial vessels of belligerent powers would be obliged to keep one flag hoisted while in or near Cuban harbors. *Ibid.*, October 1914, p. 517.

decree of January 31, 1917, Cuba at once took a stand with her northern neighbor by severing relations with the Imperial German government.⁵ And when on April 6 the United States formally declared war on the German empire, President Menocal submitted to the Cuban Congress a special message in which he developed at length the motives which impelled Cuba to abandon neutrality, and conform her actions to those of the United States. In characterizing Germany's violation of international law and the rights of neutrals, the president declared:

"Such acts of war without quarter against all nations whose subjects sail the seas . . . cannot be tolerated or consented to without accepting them, *ipso facto*, as lawful for the present and for all time. The Republic of Cuba ought not to remain indifferent in the face of such stupendous violations of international law. . . . Nor can she by any means decorously remain aloof from the stand nobly and courageously taken by the United States to whom we are bound by sacred ties of gratitude and fraternity."

The message ended with the request that Congress should forthwith declare that a state of war existed

⁵ For reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained the action of the Cuban executive was not made public until much later, and the note to Germany severing relations has never been published. From a statement made in the Cuban Congress by Deputy José María Collantes, who in the spring of 1917 was chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, we learn that on the receipt of the German note the president, after summoning the Commission of Foreign Relations of both Houses, immediately severed relations with Germany. *Boletín de Información publicado por la Comisión nacional cubana de propaganda por la Guerra y de Auxilio á sus Víctimas*, June 1920, p. 496.

between Cuba and Germany.⁶ A joint commission of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies was immediately appointed to draft a report in accordance with the president's recommendations. On the following day, April 7, the report of the committee was submitted to both Houses. It took the form of a joint resolution; a state of war should be formally declared to exist between Cuba and Germany and the president should be empowered to employ all the forces of the nation and resources of the government for the maintenance of Cuba's rights on land and sea.⁷

⁶ *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, April 1917, pp. 207-211; *Official Bulletin* (Washington), September 24, 1918.

⁷ The Joint Resolution was as follows:

Art. 1. *Resolved*: That from today a state of war is formally declared between the Republic of Cuba and the Imperial government of Germany and the President of the Republic is authorized and directed by this resolution to employ all the forces of the nation and the resources of our government to make war against the Imperial German government with the object of maintaining our rights, guarding our territory, preventing any acts which might be attempted against us and defending the navigation of the seas, the liberty of commerce, and rights of neutrals and international justice.

Art. 2. The President of the Republic is hereby authorized to use all the land and naval forces in the form he may deem expedient, using existing forces, reorganizing them, or creating new ones, and to dispose of the economic forces of the nation in any way he may deem necessary.

Art. 3. The President will give account to Congress of the measures adopted in fulfillment of this law, which will be in operation from the moment of its publication in the Official Gazette. *Gaceta Oficial*, Edición Extraordinaria, No. 20, p. 3. In English in Naval War College, *International Law Documents*, 1917. (Washington, 1918), pp. 77-78.

Submitted to the Senate, the War Resolution was adopted unanimously and practically without discussion. The only speech delivered was that of the chief of the Conservative Party, Dr. Ricardo Dolz, who strongly urged its passage.⁸ In striking contrast to the calm and decorum of the Senate were the enthusiasm and dramatic tension in the Chamber of Deputies. After a motion had been unanimously passed that the Chamber remain in permanent session until a vote should be reached, the Conservative Leader, Sr. Alfredo Betancourt Manduley, delivered an eloquent and impassioned speech in favor of the War Resolution. Cuba in thus aligning herself with the United States, he declared in effect, was not only evincing her fidelity to her noblest traditions and her historic friendship with the United States, but was likewise following the dictates of dire necessity. Owing to her insular position, to the inefficiency of her navy, and to her exposed sea-coast Cuba was quite incapable of enforcing her neutrality should it be menaced by either a friendly or a hostile power. "For all these reasons, gentlemen of the Chamber of Deputies, in consideration of gratitude, of affection, of convenience, of bonds of friendship . . . we cannot place ourselves between an autocratic and military empire such as Germany and a republic like the United States, but must be on the side of the latter with heart and soul and can but pray that this World War shall end soon and that the peace of the world and

⁸ *El Mundo* (Havana), April 8, 1917.

brotherhood of all civilized peoples may return and reign in the infinite universe.”⁹

Of even greater interest than the speech of Sr. Manduley was that of the representative of the Liberal Party, Deputy Dr. José Manuel Cortina. It will be recalled that the Liberal Party, charging that the Conservative candidate for the presidency, General Mario Menocal, had been illegally elected, had launched an open rebellion against the government during the preceding February. The accusation, since proven to be baseless, was freely made that this insurrection was not entirely divorced from German propaganda and machinations in Cuba. In any case the prompt and effective suppression of the revolt had left a gulf of distrust and suspicion between the two great parties, which it was hoped the imminence of Cuba's entry into the war might serve to bridge. Nor did such a hope prove to be groundless. The tenor of Dr. Cortina's speech was a happy omen of the unanimity with which all patriotic Cubans might be expected to sink their party differences in all matters affecting the foreign policy of the government. The most dramatic and effective portions of his address were those devoted to the moral obligation, based on gratitude and loyalty, which devolved upon Cuba to rally to the support of the United States in one of the great crises in her history.

“We go to fight as brothers beside that great people who have ever been the friends and protectors of Cuba, who aided us during the darkest days of our tragic history, in moments when opposed by enormous strength

⁹ *Ibid.*

we had nearly disappeared from the face of the earth, when we had no other refuge, no other loyal and magnanimous friend than the great North American people.”¹⁰

In the Chamber of Deputies as in the Senate the War Resolution was passed on April 7 without a dissenting vote. Whatever cleavage in popular opinion as to Cuba's duties and obligations as a belligerent may have later developed there can be little doubt that in the crucial days of the spring of 1917 the sentiments expressed and tumultuously applauded in the national Congress were those of the entire nation. In commenting on the declaration of war by both the Senate and

¹⁰ Dr. Cortina's speech is published *in extenso* in *Cuba Contemporánea*, June 1917, pp. 89-95, under the title “Por la Justicia, por el Derecho, por la Libertad.” It is interesting to note that the entry of Cuba into the war as the ally of the United States brought to the fore the frequently debated question of the exact significance of the Platt Amendment, long a thorn in the flesh of many patriotic Cubans, and a convenient shibboleth for all those who impugned the motives of the United States in her dealings with Cuba. The interpretation now given was a much more favorable one than had been the case in the past. Dr. Eveleo Rodríguez Lendian, a professor in the University of Havana, published in the early summer a pamphlet entitled *La interpretación de la Emmienda Platt*, which was the occasion of a brilliant article in *Cuba Contemporánea* for August 1917, by its editor, Carlos de Velasco, “La única interpretación racional de la Emmienda Platt.” The thesis of both these publicists was that by the very terms of the amendment the United States could intervene in Cuba only to conserve the independence of the republic and never to destroy it; thus the amendment instead of affording a pretext for intervention possibly followed by annexation, was in reality a self-denying ordinance.

the Chamber of Deputies President Menocal rightly declared:

"The spontaneity and decision of these acts impart to them a high and patriotic significance. No recommendation of the government of the United States moved the will of the government of Cuba nor excited the generous passions of her people. None was necessary. The horror, universally inspired by the haughty and violent attitude by which an imperialistic power, vain of its might, attempted to impress upon the world an intolerable domination, was united in the Cuban people with the energetic will, the noble ambition, to cooperate with all their strength and with all their resources in the sacred defense of the liberty and sovereignty of all peoples against a malignant and menacing military power."¹¹

Following the declaration of war the Cuban government at once proceeded to take the necessary measures for the country's internal and external defense. The German minister, Herr von Verny du Verdois, was given his passports on April 8, German interests being turned over to the Spanish legation; the Spanish embassy in Berlin likewise took over Cuban interests in Germany.¹² The disposition of the enemy ships interned in Cuban harbors was also a matter of immediate concern to the government. Of the German ships there were five; four—the *Bavaria*, *Adelhaid*, *Kydonia* and *Olivant*—had sought refuge on the outbreak of the great war in

¹¹ *Official Bulletin* (Washington), September 24, 1918, p. 15.

¹² In harmony with the recommendation of President Menocal, embodied in a special message of November 17, 1917, Congress declared war against Austria-Hungary by a joint resolution of the same date. *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, December, 1917, p. 875.

Havana harbor; one—the *Constantia*—had been interned at Cienfuegos. The authorities set about at once to intern the crews and place the vessels under armed guard. On inspection all four of the German ships at Havana were found to be more or less seriously damaged; in the case of the *Bavaria*, whose captain was an officer of the German reserve and hence was presumably acting under orders from his superiors, a number of dynamite bombs were located. It was generally believed that the ship was to be blown up and sunk in the entrance of Havana harbor. The crews and officers of the four ships were promptly interned in Cabanas fortress.¹³

As was to be expected, the government set energetically at work to cope with the menace of German espionage and propaganda. On the evidence available it is difficult to state how far German machinations had been carried in Cuba. That the island republic had been included in German's far-flung and elaborately organized espionage system admits of little doubt. Outside of Cuba the belief had gained currency that the disastrous revolution of February, launched by the Liberals, and resulting in the destruction of a large number of sugar centrals and a serious decrease in the sugar yield, was instigated by German agents. This view was sponsored by the London *Times* which in its well-known *History of the War* went so far as to charge that "the Cuban insurrection of February 1917 was attributed by the State Department at Washington to the intrigues of German agents; later in the year they fomented a strike

¹³ *El Mundo*, April 7 and 8, 1917.

of sugar-mill operatives at Santa Clara; there was evidence moreover to prove that the Cuban Consul-General at Rotterdam had been induced to act as the forwarding agent for German corporations.”¹⁴ These charges aroused great resentment in Cuba and in a memorable session of Congress were stigmatized by the Liberal deputy, Dr. Fernando Ortiz, as falsehoods and gratuitous insults reflecting on the honor and loyalty of the Cuban people. The accusation that the revolt was the work of German agents was repudiated with equal vehemence by the “leader” of the Conservatives Dr. Betancourt Manduley.¹⁵ While a revolution or civil war in Cuba at this period would indubitably have redounded to the advantage of Germany, there is not one scintilla of valid evidence that the February revolutionists were amenable to German pressure. *The Times*’ reference to the state department of the United States has little or no warrant in fact.¹⁶ Finally the statement that the strike in Santa Clara was the work of German agitators was emphatically denied by the Conservative

¹⁴ *The Times History of the War* (London, 1918). Vol. XV, Chap. ccxxii, p. 19.

¹⁵ *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso*, July 11, 1918.

¹⁶ The only statement emanating from the government calculated to link up the revolt with German intrigue was entirely unofficial. “Officials of the government are of the opinion, based on official advices, that German agents have had a hand in the revolutionary outbreak in Cuba. They will not admit that anything official has been received, but say privately that the hostilities began about the time the break came in the relations between the United States and Germany.” Special dispatch to the *New York Times* from its Washington correspondent, February 19, 1917.

representative from that province, Sr. Oswaldo Díaz, himself a member of the laboring classes.¹⁷

With the entry of the United States into the war the spy menace took on a somewhat different aspect. It seemed not unreasonable to assume that German agents, driven from the United States, would transfer their activity to Cuba. Thus the danger that Cuba, like Mexico, might become a hot-bed of German intrigues directed against the United States and the Allies was a real one and fully justified the drastic actions taken by the governments of both republics.¹⁸ With the assistance and cooperation of the Washington authorities and the American legation at Havana the Cuban government elaborated a system of contra-espionage which proved effective in preventing German intelligence from reaching Mexico where it might be relayed to Berlin. In Cuba's determination to break up this arrangement, even at the cost of international friction, is probably to be seen the cause of the otherwise inexplicable severance of diplomatic relations between Mexico and Cuba in May 1918.¹⁹

¹⁷ *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso*, July 11, 1918.

¹⁸ It was hardly to be expected that Cuba should escape that phase of war hysteria which begat a crop of rumors—some of them utterly fantastic—of German plots and intrigues. It was reported, for instance, that the Province of Pinar del Rio was menaced with an invasion of Mexicans and Germans, while a fleet of Zeppelins, flying from Mexico, was about to bombard Havana, Matanzas, and Cardenas. *El Mundo*, April 11, 1917.

¹⁹ See below, p. 126.

Unfortunately the success of Cuba's efforts to extirpate German espionage was somewhat impaired by a duplication of effort and even jealousy between the intelligence department of the army and the secret police force (*Policia Secreta Nacional*) of the capital. None the less a considerable number of arrests were made, certain more notorious foreigners were expelled from the country, and a number of German subjects were kept under constant surveillance.²⁰ Yet the charge was freely made that some of the most noted and influential members of the German colony were allowed unrestricted liberty.

The suspension of constitutional guarantees by executive order on July 13, 1917,²¹ was dictated by a desire to secure for the government a free hand in coping with the spy menace. President Menocal justified this measure both on the ground of the absence of any adequate legislation on the subject and because "it would render more effective the suppression of espionage and the hostile machinations of the agents or emissaries of the enemy powers in the great contest for right, liberty

²⁰ Indications of the activity of the *Policia Secreta Nacional* appear from time to time in the public documents. On March 25 and April 17, by executive decrees ten foreigners were expelled for having "been guilty of acts of manifest partiality in favor of Germany." *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, April 1918, p. 248; May 1918, p. 284.

²¹ *Gaceta Oficial*, July 14, 1917. This decree was issued in accordance with a law passed by Congress on March 7, 1917, authorizing the president to suspend in all parts of the national territory, should he judge necessary, the guarantees established in Articles 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24, and 27 of the Constitution.

and justice.”²² Finally on July 23, 1918, Congress passed the so-called *ley de espionaje* or “espionage law” which clothed the executive with far-reaching powers in dealing with all alien enemies residing in the republic, and provided for heavy penalties for those convicted of espionage.²³ The need for the suspension of constitutional guarantees having thus disappeared, they were restored on August 14, 1918.²⁴ The only exception was the article guaranteeing the inviolability of private correspondence.

German propaganda, in the sense of an organized campaign to win sympathy for the Central Powers and to misrepresent the cause and motives of the Allies, had never made much headway in Cuba. This failure was in part due to the ideals and methods of Germany as shown in the war, and was in part based on solid historical grounds. Those who were familiar with the alignment of European diplomacy in the critical days when the independence of Cuba was hanging in the balance felt that they had little reason to regard the German Empire as their friend. It was well known that German sympathy in 1898 strongly inclined towards Spain; one of Cuba's foremost scholars and historians, Dr. Fernando Ortiz, even made the assertion in the

²² Statement of President Menocal in decree of August 14, 1918, reestablishing constitutional guarantees. *Gaceta Oficial*, August 14, 1918. The long delay in taking this step aroused much opposition.

²³ *Gaceta Oficial*, July 24, 1918. *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, August 1918, pp. 387-389.

²⁴ *Gaceta Oficial*, August 15, 1918.

House of Representatives on July 11, 1918, that on the eve of the outbreak of the Spanish American War Germany turned to both England and France with the secret proposal that a European coalition prevent the United States from coming to the aid of Cuba.²⁵

It was not surprising therefore that from the very beginning of the war almost all of the leading papers of Havana had been staunchly pro-Ally; especially was this true of the influential and widely read daily, *El Mundo*.²⁶ The only paper which might in any sense

²⁵ *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso*, July 18, 1918. Also printed separately under title *Discurso sobre el Proyecto de Ley acerca del Servicio Militar Obligatorio . . .* por Fernando Ortiz (Habana, 1918).

The whole subject of the attitude of the European powers towards Cuba and the United States at this time is shrouded in obscurities as none of the pertinent documents have been published. The problem has been excellently summed up by Professor John Spence Bassett: "Persons connected with the British government later said that just before the war was declared the German minister and other continental diplomats were about to give the United States notice of a purpose of joint intervention to save Spanish sovereignty and that their plan was defeated by Sir Julian Pauncefote, British ambassador. Germany denied this assertion and said that the plan for joint intervention came from Sir Julian and was disapproved by the German emperor. It is impossible to reconcile the two statements, but it is true that while both governments were formally friendly we had every reason to believe that Germany wished Spain's triumph and England desired ours." *A Short History of the United States, 1492-1920* (New York, 1921), p. 790.

²⁶ Throughout the duration of the war *El Mundo* had its own special wire to Washington. At regular intervals it ran Mr. Frank Simond's articles on the progress of the war.

have been regarded as friendly to the Central Powers was *El Diario de la Marina*, an ultra-conservative sheet, the leading exponent in Cuba of the idea of *Hispanismo*, or closer approximation between Spain and her former colonies. But on Cuba's entry into the war its attitude was all that even the most exalted nationalist might reasonably demand. All confessedly pro-German sheets were clandestine in character and had little effect in moulding public opinion.²⁷

Closely allied to the problem of German espionage was the problem of the enemy alien. Though comparatively few in number²⁸ the German residents in Cuba were well regarded and even after Cuba's entry into the war they did not become the object of any racial or national animosity. Those against whom no suspicion of espionage or intrigue was directed enjoyed almost complete liberty and no attempt was made to sequester their property. Efforts to stir up anti-German sentiment and arouse the public to the alleged dangers of German economic and commercial penetration likewise met with little success. The Committee of Public Security (*Co-*

²⁷ On April 11, 1917, the secretary of the secret police, Sr. Domingo Rodriguez, raided the house of the German subject Adolfo E. Schmitt expecting to find evidence of German support of the rebellion of February. Instead he discovered seventy copies of a monthly review called *Germania* written partly in Spanish and partly in German. Many of the articles consisted of violent attacks on the United States. Investigation showed that it had been clandestinely circulated for three years. *El Mundo*, April 12, 1917; *New York Times*, April 13, 1917.

²⁸ According to the statistics compiled by *El Mundo* (April 10, 1917), there were 936 Germans in Cuba in 1917.

mité de Seguridad Pública), organized on April 25, 1918, by a number of members of the House of Representatives, and having as its prime object the systematic boycott of German goods and firms, gained few adherents; the same fate befell the *Liga Anti-Germánica* organized among the women of Havana.²⁹

When the Cuban government began to carry out its plans for military participation in the war it was recognized that certain additional restrictions must be laid upon German residents. Thus the executive decree of June 22, 1918,³⁰ debarred the subjects of enemy nations from residing within a restricted zone which had been created about the various ports; those living within this area were allowed ten days to find new quarters. The decree further ordered all enemy aliens to appear within twenty days at the office of the secret police and register their place of residence. Failure to comply with these rules was punished by internment.

Finally on July 3, 1918, Congress passed the so-called Espionage Bill to which reference has already been made. This law contained a number of sections dealing with the status of enemy aliens. They were forbidden to possess fire-arms, explosives, aviation or signal apparatus; to enter or leave the country without the permission of the president; to reside within a radius of half a mile of any fortress, arsenal, camp, shipyard, or factory; to publish any attack against any of the departments or

²⁹ *El Mundo*, April 26, 1918. The *Liga Anti-Germánica* also actively interested itself in the Liberty Loan campaigns.

³⁰ *Gaceta Oficial*, June 22, 1918. *El Mundo*, June 23, 1918.

officials of the government. Violation of the law was punishable by summary arrest and internment.³¹

On September 17, 1918, a decree was issued providing for the custody of the possessions of those alien enemies imprisoned or interned in accordance with the terms of the law of July 23. Such possessions were to be placed under the direct supervision of an official to be known as the enemy property custodian (*interventor de la propiedad enemiga*).³² This office, which carried with it no emoluments, was held by Dr. Antonio Sánchez de Bustamante, a distinguished jurist-consult, dean of the faculty of law at the University of Havana and later appointed delegate from Cuba to the Peace Conference. To the enemy property custodian was also turned over all correspondence to and from enemy aliens containing money or securities.³³

The thorny problem of the censorship of the press, though neglected during the first eight months after Cuba's entry into the war, eventually engaged the attention of the government. On November 27, 1917, an executive decree was issued providing for the creation of a *Comisión de Censura de la Prensa* or Board of Press Censorship.³⁴ According to this decree all telegrams, originating abroad, whether addressed to the press or to individuals, were to be passed upon by the commis-

³¹ *Gaceta Oficial*, July 23, 1918.

³² *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, October, 1918, pp. 572-580.

³³ *Ibid.*, November, 1918, p. 609.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, December 1917, pp. 880-883.

sion. No printed matter of any kind might be placed in circulation which contained information regarding the movements of steamers to or from Cuban harbors, which referred to the movements of troops, which advocated treason or rebellion against the constituted authorities or incited strikes or attacks on property, which was calculated to interfere in any way with the operation of the compulsory service law.³⁵ The creation of the censorship board stirred up considerable resentment among the papers of Havana, especially after it had peremptorily ordered on December 3, 1917, that papers having direct wire service abroad should suspend this service within eight days.³⁶ This act aroused such a storm of opposition that the Board of Censorship rescinded the decree a few days later. That some sort of supervision was desirable would appear from the fact that as a result of their ill-advised utterances several of the less responsible papers had been frequently admonished and on several occasions their publications had been suspended. Finally in June 1918, at the invitation of Secretary Montalvo of the department of government (*gobernación*), all the editors of the capital agreed to submit all news items or editorials dealing with international affairs to the secretary before publication.

The necessity of a strict surveillance over letters and cablegrams naturally did not escape the attention of the

³⁵ A bill providing for compulsory military service had for some time been advocated by President Menocal but was not passed by Congress until August 3, 1918.

³⁶ *Cuba Review* (New York), July 1918. The papers affected were *El Mundo*, *La Discusión*, and *El Diario de la Marina*.

Cuban government. Here the authorities acted in close cooperation with the United States. Captain Goelet, who had aided in the organization of the postal censorship in the United States, was detailed by the authorities at Washington to assist in the establishment of similar service in Cuba. Early in 1918, a Postal Censor Bureau was organized by the General Director of Communication acting in cooperation with Captain Goelet. The sum of \$150,000 was provisionally assigned to defray the expenses of the new bureau; as head censor was appointed Sr. Miguel A. Montalvo, chief of the Bureau of Postal Affairs. In the months which followed the scope of the bureau steadily expanded; branch offices were established in Matanzas, Cardenas, Caibarien, Cienfuegos, Manzanillo, Santiago de Cuba.³⁷ It was found necessary to more than double the original appropriation for its support.³⁸

The bureau of postal censorship was created by President Menocal by virtue of the extraordinary powers with which the executive had been clothed when constitutional guarantees had been suspended on July 13, 1917. As the time for the restoration of such guarantees was approaching, the need of special legislation dealing with this subject became manifest. On August 3, a law was sanctioned which authorized the president to censure all postal or telegraphic correspondence between

³⁷ *Cuba Review*, March and July 1918.

³⁸ The budget for the fiscal year 1918-1919 was finally set at \$386,960, which sum was appropriated by presidential decree on the recommendation of the secretary of government. *Cuba Review*, July 1918.

Cuba and foreign countries as well as all correspondence of any kind received or sent by enemy aliens.³⁹

At this point some reference may be made to one of the most curious incidents in the annals of recent Latin American diplomacy: The suspension of diplomatic relations between Mexico and Cuba on May 24, 1918, and the recall of the Mexican chargé d'affaires at Havana. The nearest approach to an official explanation of this act was that furnished by General Candido Aguilar who stated that the Mexican government "considers it indispensable to take these measures for the highest interests of both countries at the present moment of the world's crisis. Guided by the state of war in which Cuba is now engaged the Cuban government has been obliged to pass measures which in many cases injure the interests of Mexican citizens. For this reason the Mexican legation was in duty bound to make frequent representations before the Cuban government which were ineffective and curtailed the liberty of action of a friendly republic which found itself in an afflicted situation."⁴⁰

Various explanations were at once suggested for the extraordinary step of severing relations in order to promote the "highest interests of both countries." The belief was widely held that President Carranza, the father-in-law of Aguilar, had chosen this roundabout

³⁹ *Boletín de la Secretaría de Estado*, August 1918, pp. 389-390.

⁴⁰ The text of Aguilar's communication to the press is given *in extenso* in Colombia, *Informe del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores*, 1918, p. 63. An abridged version may be found in the *New York Times* for May 26, 1918.

and clumsy way of attacking the United States. The Cuban secretary of the interior, Sr. Juan A. Montalvo, who chanced to be in New York at the time, is said to have declared: "Mexico is actuated without a doubt by hostility towards the United States and is striking at it through Cuba. General Aguilar's protestations of friendship for Cuba are in my opinion insincere."⁴¹

While Carranza's anti-American attitude may have been a factor in precipitating this crisis, other causes were doubtless operative as well. The Mexican government, at this time distinctly pro-German in its tendencies, regarded with exaggerated suspicion and fear the precautionary measures which Cuba was obliged to take as a result of her entry into the war. A number of unfortunate incidents, though all of a minor character, occurred at this time, and were the occasion of caustic commentaries in the Mexican press. So anxious, however, was the Cuban government to remain on good terms with Mexico that regardless of the expressed wishes of Cuba's allies it granted permission for the export of relatively large consignments of sugar to Vera Cruz and Tampico. "As for the measures which injure the interests of Mexican citizens," to repeat the charge of General Aguilar, it is hard to see how they afforded the Mexican government any legitimate cause for complaint. The citizens of other neutral powers accepted Cuba's war measures without serious protest. That they were particularly obnoxious to the govern-

⁴¹ *Ibid.* The view that the action of President Carranza was directed against the United States was shared by the *Vossische Zeitung*, as quoted by the *New York Times* on June 8, 1918.

ment of Sr. Carranza was probably due to their adverse effect on the extensive interests of the large German colony which at this time was enjoying the hospitality of the Republic of Mexico.

In the months immediately following Cuba's entry into the war enthusiasm ran high. Various organizations and individuals vied with each other in offering their services to the government. The Havana Yacht Club, whose members were recruited from the aristocratic circles of the capital, offered all its craft and equipment to the government for the duration of the war.⁴² On May 14, in plenary session the Council of the University of Havana tendered to the government the services of the teaching staff, together with the plant and equipment of the university, for the same period.⁴³ But the finest evidence of the spirit of self-sacrifice and national altruism was evidenced by the eagerness, both on the part of the government and individuals, to alleviate the suffering in the stricken regions of Europe.⁴⁴

⁴² *El Mundo*, April 18, 1917.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Lack of space precludes any detailed account of the activities of the various relief organizations fostered by citizens of the Allied countries and liberally supported by the Cubans. One or two references will indicate the scope and importance of their work. According to the bulletin of the French Chamber of Commerce of Havana, issued on July 15, 1917, up to that date various French organizations, including the French Red Cross, had raised 252,695 francs. *El Mundo*, July 16, 1917. The *Comité Cubano de Medicos* (Cuban physicians who had studied in France) sent through the French legation during the same period various articles (chiefly tobacco and coffee) to the value of over 200,000 francs. *Ibid.*

The Cuban Red Cross which had maintained a somewhat precarious existence prior to Cuba's entry into the war at once underwent a thorough reorganization and enormous expansion. An extraordinary meeting of the directorate was held on April 9, under the presidency of Major General Pablo Mendieta y Montafur. The decision was reached to extend the activity of the Red Cross throughout all of Cuba and to offer unlimited cooperation to the United States.⁴⁵ Under the able direction of Señora Menocal, the wife of the president, the Cuban Red Cross raised nearly half a million dollars.⁴⁶ The beautiful Chateau Espluches, in the suburbs of Paris, was purchased and presented to the French government during the war, to be used as an orphan asylum.⁴⁷ Just before the signing of the armistice, plans had been worked out for the equipping and sending to the front of a hospital unit of one hundred doctors and nurses.⁴⁸ By a law signed on May 15, 1918, Congress authorized the executive to dispose of an annual credit of \$600,000 for the maintenance of such hospitals,

⁴⁵ Under date of April 9, 1917, the Cuban Red Cross sent the following telegram to Washington: "Asamblea Suprema Cruz Roja Cubana, reunida sesión extraordinaria acordó ofrecer en momentos actuales incondicional cooperación finalidad noble Institucion." *El Mundo*, April 11, 1917.

⁴⁶ *Boletín de Información publicado por la comisión cubana de propaganda por la guerra y de auxilio á sus víctimas*. (Havana), December, 1918, p. 120. This publication will hereafter be cited as *Boletín de Información*.

⁴⁷ *Bulletin of the Pan American Union*, December 1923, pp. 604-606.

⁴⁸ *New York Times Current History Magazine*, November 1918, p. 318.

ambulances and *asiles* which the Red Cross might establish through its own resources in the territory of the Allied nations.⁴⁹ Among the other noteworthy achievements of this organization was the dispatch to France of large consignments of bandages, clothing, granulated sugar, cigars, and cigarettes.⁵⁰ During the entire period of its war activities the Cuban Red Cross worked in closest harmony with the Havana Chapter of the American Red Cross.⁵¹

On May 15, 1918, a law was passed by Congress, granting for the duration of hostilities an annual credit of \$2,400,000 to be employed for the victims of the war.⁵² Its disposition was entrusted to an organization known as the *Comisión de propaganda por la guerra y*

⁴⁹ *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, June 1918, p. 319.

⁵⁰ A list of such consignments, whose total number was ten and whose average value some eight thousand dollars, is given. *Boletín de Información*, December 1918, pp. 120-121.

⁵¹ The Cuban Chapter of the American Red Cross with its fourteen auxiliaries in Havana, although organized only for the duration of the war, rendered such effective service that it received the consent of the Cuban Red Cross to retain a skeleton organization for two years after the armistice. Not only did this Chapter make large money contributions to the parent organization, but it deserves great credit for the excellent work performed by its members among the American soldiers and sailors stationed in Cuba. Its Chapter production rose to large figures: surgical dressings, 133,934; hospital garments and supplies, 45,875; articles for soldiers and sailors, 2,424; refugee garments, 11,692; total 193,925. *Bulletin of the Insular and Foreign Division of the American Red Cross*, November 1919, p. 7.

⁵² *Gaceta Oficial*, May 16, 1918.

de auxilio á sus víctimas, whose president was Dr. Cosme de la Torriente, former secretary of state, and senator from Matanzas. In June 1918 was distributed the sum of \$450,000, in November \$550,000 and in March 1919, \$100,000, making a grand total of \$1,100,000. The greater part of these amounts was allocated to the Red Cross organizations of the United States and the Allies.⁵³

The economic effects of the war on Cuba naturally call for a brief discussion. During the first three years of the war Cuba suffered no serious dislocation in her economic life. The relative immunity from the economic depression or even paralysis through which the majority of her sister Latin American republics were forced to pass was due partly to her dependence on the United States rather than on Europe for her imports and exports, partly to the increasing demands from belligerents and neutrals alike for her great staple products of sugar and tobacco. Owing to the absorption of her energies in the production of these two great crops, Cuba, despite her favorable climate and fertile soil, was a heavy importer of food-stuffs. From statistics submitted by the Cuban government to the United States Food Administration in October 1917, it appeared that the island republic had been consuming some \$71,000,000 worth of food-stuffs annually—over a

⁵³ These sums were apportioned as follows: Belgium, \$170,000; United States, \$165,000; France, \$360,000 (\$130,000 to the Red Cross); Great Britain, \$165,000; Italy, \$170,000; Portugal, \$20,000; Serbia, \$20,000; Greece, \$21,000. *Boletín de Información*, October 1919, pp. 439-443.

third of the value of her total imports—by far the greater part coming from the United States.⁵⁴

Upon the entry of the United States into the world conflict the disadvantages of the lack of crop diversification in Cuba became painfully obvious. With the American people straining every nerve to augment their food supplies, particularly wheat, in order to have a surplus to meet the needs of the European Allies, Cuba was forced to realize that curtailment of her imports and increase in production of food-stuffs were imperious necessities. It was also clear that some means must be devised to check the threatened increase in the prices of staple commodities with the inevitable concomitants of hoarding and profiteering. The Cuban authorities would have been remiss in their duties had they not made every effort to grapple with these problems.

On April 11, 1917, less than a week after the declaration of war, the secretary of justice, Dr. Laguardia, recommended to the *fiscal* of the Supreme Court of Havana that appropriate orders be issued to the judges of the provincial courts (*audiencias*) to draw up a list of wholesale maximum prices applicable to the articles of prime necessity throughout the various provinces.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Of these commodities, cereals, including flour, amounted to \$15,000,000; meats \$13,500,000; vegetables and tubers, including potatoes, \$7,000,000. *Cuba Review*, November 1917. During the fiscal year 1916-1917, there were imported dairy products to the value of \$3,710,983; fruits, \$1,206,362. The total imports for this year were valued at \$201,023,670. *Cuba: General Descriptive Data*, issued by the Pan American Union (Washington, 1919).

⁵⁵ *El Mundo*, April 12, 1920.

It was recognized that this was but an emergency measure, and two days later, April 13, by virtue of the powers conferred upon him by the Joint Resolution of April 7, President Menocal created an extraordinary food commission, to be known as the *Junta de Subsistencias*.⁵⁶ The duties of this body were varied and important. It was authorized to fix maximum prices for all food-stuffs, to carry on a campaign of intensive education to induce the planters and small farmers to raise greater quantities of fruits and vegetables, and finally to lessen the scarcity and lower the high prices of articles of prime necessity by the purchase of supplies through the Cuban legations and consulates abroad; to this end the sum of \$200,000 was rendered immediately available.

It was early recognized that if any serious increase in the production of food supplies was to be hoped for it would be necessary to enlist the support of the owners of the great sugar centrals, who in turn might persuade or induce their tenants or *colonos* to raise fruits and vegetables. To this end the secretary of agriculture, General Emilio Núñez,⁵⁷ sent out a circular letter bespeaking the cooperation of all the great centrals in the solution of the food problem. The replies, especially

⁵⁶ The executive decree creating this body is given in extenso in *El Mundo*, April 14, 1917. The membership as originally constituted was composed of the secretaries of agriculture and justice, the mayor of Havana, a representative from the Chamber of Commerce and the secretary of the *Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País*.

⁵⁷ General Núñez was appointed director of the food commission on May 2, 1917, *vice* the secretary of justice, resigned.

from the American plantation owners, were all that could be desired. As early as April 24, forty-one of the centrals had answered General Núñez' letter and the great majority signified their willingness to aid their *colonos* by means of allotments of land, farm instruments and seeds.⁵⁸ On April 28, a committee representing the Cuba Fruit Exchange, the National Horticultural Society and the Herradura Shipping Association, three of the most powerful agricultural and commercial societies on the island, addressed a letter to President Menocal pledging their full support to all efforts put forth by the government to increase or conserve the nation's food supplies.⁵⁹

By the early fall of 1917 it became evident that the *Junta de Subsistancias*, relying as it did largely on voluntary cooperation, was unequal to the task of grappling with the food problem. More specifically the Junta

⁵⁸ *El Mundo*, April 25, 1917, where the replies are summarized. In 1918 the nationality of the owners of sugar mills was as follows: Cuban, 18; American, 67; Spanish, 33; others, 12; total, 130. *Cuba Review*, March 1918.

⁵⁹ *El Mundo*, April 29, 1917. Some of the Americans had not waited for the invitation of the government before tendering their services. Within a few days after Cuba's declaration of war, Mr. H. M. Remy, manager of the Central "Constancia," owned by the Colonial Sugar Company, issued a circular to all the *colonos* on the estate, urging them to plant fruits and vegetables, and offering to supply them with lands, cattle and agricultural instruments. *Ibid.*, April 15. Typical of the attitude of another section of the American business community was that of Mr. F. E. Seglie, President of the United Trading Company of Cuba, who in a letter addressed to President Menocal offered to supply the Government at cost with agricultural instruments, especially plows. *Ibid.*, May 2, 1917.

failed in its attempts to fix maximum prices. Such measures, hard to enforce under any conditions, proved quite unworkable as applied to articles coming from abroad. The importers simply refused to introduce them when they had no control over their sale price. The work of the Junta finally reached such an impasse that the director, General Núñez, resigned in disgust.⁶⁰

In September a larger, more representative, and more powerful organization known as the *Consejo de Defensa Nacional* or Council of National Defense was created.⁶¹ The scope and authority of the old food commission were greatly expanded; the new body had as its aim nothing less than the mobilizing of all of the resources of Cuba under the direction of experts in order not only to meet Cuba's most pressing domestic problems but also to aid Cuba's allies in the successful prosecution of the war. The council was divided into four sections: Importation, exportation and consumption; articles of prime necessity (*materias primas*); communication and transportation; labor and social problems. The most important members of the council were Dr. Martínez Ortiz, the director; General José Martí, the son of the famous Cuban patriot and apostle of independence, and at this time the secretary of the newly created department

⁶⁰ Fernando Berenguer, *El Problema de las Subsistencias en Cuba* (Havana, 1918), p. 25.

⁶¹ By executive decree signed September 29, 1917. *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, October 1917, pp. 657-659. The *reglamento*, or detailed instructions for the administration of this decree, was issued October 23. *Ibid.*, November 1917, p. 850 ff.

of war and navy ;⁶² Dr. Juan Montalvo, secretary of the interior ; and Dr. Eugenio Sánchez Agramonte, who had recently succeeded General Núñez as secretary of agriculture. A fund of \$2,000,000 from the Cuban treasury was at once placed at the council's disposal for expenses and branches were established throughout the republic under the direction of the provincial governors and the mayors.⁶³

Obviously only a few of the manifold activities of the council can be mentioned in this brief account. Systematic efforts were made to establish a system of "war farms" and agricultural zones, under the direct supervision of the council, for the cultivation of food-stuffs. Lists of articles of prime necessity (*artículos de primera necesidad*), together with the maximum prices at which they might be sold, were drawn up. Such lists were posted conspicuously in Havana and the provinces and advertised in the public press.⁶⁴ The council exercised a general control over the imports and exports of

⁶² This department was created in July 1917.

⁶³ On the organization and functions of the Council of National Defense *cf.* in addition to the references cited the *Cuba Review* for October 1917, *El Mundo*, December 1917, *passim*; Berenguer, *op. cit.*, p. 29 ff. This last authority has given a comprehensive though rather critical account of the council's various activities.

⁶⁴ Some mention should be made of the laudable efforts of the municipal authorities of Havana to lower the cost of certain staple commodities. In December 1917, three public markets were opened on Carlos III Avenue, and in the Jesús del Monte and Cerro districts respectively. The markets were from the first heavily patronized as the prices, especially of meats and vegetables, were much lower than elsewhere. Buyers were

food-stuffs, as well as over such essential commodities as petroleum and its products, coal, sugar, bags and a number of other items. On October 4, acting on the advice and with the consent of the council, President Menocal, issued a decree applying to all exports from Cuba the export regulations in force in the United States.⁶⁵

Like the United States Food Administration the Cuban Council of National Defense appealed to the patriotism and spirit of self-sacrifice of the Cuban people. Written and spoken propaganda, advertisements, proclamations and other methods of publicity were employed to bring home to the nation at large the supreme necessity of the conservation of food and other necessities; regular wheatless and meatless days were decreed; coal was allocated only to the most essential industries and strict economy in its use was urged upon all.⁶⁶

While the Council of National Defense undoubtedly served a useful purpose through its endeavors to control

so numerous that the police were frequently called upon to preserve order. *El Mundo*, December 3, 1917; *Cuba Review*, January 1918.

⁶⁵ The text of this decree, which was drafted in conformity with President Wilson's proclamation of August 27, is given in the *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, October 1917, pp. 667-670.

⁶⁶ The following proclamation issued by the council in December 1917, just before the Christmas holidays is not without interest:

The council exhorts all the inhabitants of Cuba:

I. To make the effort to diminish, in the greatest degree possible, the consumption of bread and all other commodities

and conserve Cuba's food supplies and to mobilize the nation's resources, it could hardly escape the defects and shortcomings inherent in all bodies in which responsibility is divided. Complaints against its actions, particularly the manner in which the distribution of food-stuffs was handled at Havana, were frequent and insistent. Charges of favoritism and partiality were freely ventilated in the public press. The difficulty of enforcing adequate penalties, owing to the lack of appropriate legislation, was all but insurmountable. Finally the relations between the council and the United States War Trade Board and the United States Food Administration, though cordial, were not as close and harmonious as was desirable.

These difficulties were fully appreciated by President Menocal. Largely as a result of his insistent urgings Congress passed a so-called "Food Bill" on May 8,

of which wheat flour is an ingredient; sugar and sweets, meat, lard and olive oil, gas, electricity and gasoline.

II. To make greater use of vegetables, bananas and legumes as substitutes for the food-stuffs mentioned above.

III. To have at least once a week a meatless day, and not to have a greater illumination in houses and stores than necessary.

IV. To manage it so that there is no waste at their Christmas and New Year's dinners.

V. To grow vegetables or breed poultry in every case where one has the land available for so doing.

By eliminating superfluous consumption and practicing economy, both things that are absolutely necessary today, we will contribute to make the actual scarcity more tolerable and at the same time perform a high social and patriotic duty. *Cuba Review*, January 1918.

1918.⁶⁷ The most important provision of this act was the creation of the Cuban Food Administration (*Dirección de Subsistencias*) presided over by a food administrator (*Director de Subsistencias*) to whom most of the executive functions of the Council of National Defense were delegated. The bill also furnished the government with effective means of punishing the violation of food regulations, especially hoarding; it likewise made compulsory the raising of food crops by land owners and tenants to the extent of three per cent of their cultivated land.

To the all-important office of food administrator President Menocal appointed Sr. Armando André, a man of wide experience in public life, and a recognized authority in all questions affecting public finance.⁶⁸ Thanks to the ability and energy of Sr. André the scope and the usefulness of the Cuban Food Administration were greatly extended. Its relations to the authorities at Washington were much facilitated through the appointment of the American Consul General, Mr. H. H.

⁶⁷ This bill was signed by President Menocal May 10, 1918. *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, May, 1918, pp. 270-279. Details of its operation are given in the presidential message of November 4, 1918. *Ibid.*, December, 1918, p. 680 ff.

⁶⁸ Sr. André was a veteran of the late War of Independence, in which he had won the rank of Major; later he was attached to the Havana Police Department in a confidential capacity; he was one of the Conservative Deputies representing the province of Havana in Congress from 1909 to 1915; in April 1913 he was elected president of the commission for the examination of the national accounts and the verification and inspection of the national debt. *Cubans of Today* (New York, 1919), p. 164.

Morgan, as representative in Cuba of the United States War Trade Board.

Any detailed record of the activities and accomplishments of Sr. André would far transcend the scope of this chapter. It may merely be noted that he was instrumental in relieving the very serious shortage of wheat flour by perfecting an arrangement with the United States War Trade Board. In pursuance of this plan the board agreed to issue a special license, covering Cuba's minimum requirements of wheat flour, to the United States Food Administration Grain Corporation for the shipment of wheat flour direct to the Cuban Food Administration, and not to individual traders or consignees. The Cuban Food Administration in turn acting under the direction of Sr. André, and in consultation with Mr. Morgan, was responsible for the distribution of the flour throughout the island.⁶⁹

To check the rapidly increasing prices in clothing and shoes, Sr. André issued an order in July 1918, announcing that in the future all dealers in these articles would be compelled to show documents, giving their actual cost, before they could clear them through the custom house; in establishing their retail price the dealers would be allowed only a certain fixed percentage of profit. The dealers were loud in their protests; a number of them threatened to suspend all imports unless the obnoxious decrees were rescinded. A compromise was finally agreed upon. With the consent and cooperation of the dealers the food administrator de-

⁶⁹ *Cuba Review*, June 1918.

cided to introduce a certain inexpensive type of footwear to be known as "calzado económico nacional," which would be sold practically at cost, while all price restrictions were to be removed from the finer type of boots and shoes. Early in September 1918, a committee of three was sent by the Council of National Defense to Washington to confer with the American authorities for the purchase of large stocks of shoes for resale in Cuba. This plan was approaching consummation when the signing of the armistice caused the project to be dropped.⁷⁰

No account of Cuba's relation to the war would be complete without some reference to her plans for placing her army on a war basis as a preliminary to military participation. From the very outset a large and influential class in Cuba were determined that their country should assume her full obligations as an active belligerent. While it was freely conceded that such reenforcements as Cuba might send to the Western front could not weigh heavily in the final balance of victory or defeat, it was felt that the presence of Cuban troops on the battle fields of France or Cuban aviators flying over the German trenches would constitute the most impressive testimony to Cuba's complete solidarity with her allies and her willingness to make every sacrifice for the triumph of the common cause.

On none of the Cuban leaders did this moral obligation weigh more heavily than on the president of the

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, October and November, 1918; *El Mundo*, October 1918, *passim*.

republic, General Mario Menocal. His famous message to Congress on April 6, in which he demanded a declaration of war against Germany, was typical of his attitude throughout the entire struggle. To him, as to many other Cubans, a merely platonic allegiance to the cause of the United States and an offer of mere moral support seemed unworthy of the great occasion and of the Cuban people. When on May 20, 1917, in the course of his second inaugural message, he declared that "Cuba should dedicate all her energies to the defense of the ideals of democracy and international justice"⁷¹ he was indulging in no rhetorical exercise but gave utterance to his profound and uncompromising conviction.

The president, of course, realized that any considerable increase in the armed forces of the nation would impose certain financial sacrifices. As early as April 18, 1917, he urged upon Congress the necessity of authorizing a bond issue of thirty million dollars as an extraordinary war loan.⁷² When, however, Congress showed no alacrity in acting on this recommendation he took matters into his own hands and basing his action on the authority granted him by the Joint Resolution of April 7 to utilize all the material resources of the nation, he signed a decree on May 26 authorizing the issuance of these bonds.⁷³ It was hardly to be expected

⁷¹ *El Mundo*, May 21, 1917.

⁷² *El Mundo*, April 19, 1917; *New York Times*, April 19; *Christian Science Monitor* (extract from President Menocal's speech), April 25.

⁷³ According to this decree the bonds were to run nine years and were to be issued in three sections, the first in the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1917, and the second and third in the

that this act would escape criticism. While there was fairly general agreement as to the necessity for the extraordinary loan, many prominent Cubans, both within and without Congress, objected to the procedure followed by the president, and especially to the imposition of a whole new series of taxes with which the interest and sinking fund were to be met. Under these circumstances it was not surprising that the House on July 9 after an all night session, voted to give its sanction to the issuance of the bonds but refused to authorize the special taxes.⁷⁴

But President Menocal refused to be balked by congressional opposition. On July 14 he convened Congress in special session and largely as a result of his insistent urging a bill was passed on July 28 authorizing the new taxes.⁷⁵ On September 19 an executive decree

succeeding fiscal years. They were to bear interest at not less than 6 per cent. and revenues to meet both interest and sinking fund were to be raised from a number of special taxes. *El Mundo*, May 27, 1917; *Cuba Review*, June 1917.

⁷⁴ *New York Times*, July 10, 1917; *El Mundo*, July 12, 1917. Opposition to the taxes was wide-spread in business circles and was headed by the *Cámara de Comercio, Industria y Navegación*; this body appealed to public opinion by full page advertisements in the public press pointing out the disastrous effects the taxes would have on business. *El Mundo*, July 13, 1917.

⁷⁵ The bill was signed by the president on July 21, but was not to become effective until September 1. *Gaceta Oficial*, August 1, 1917. The taxes applied to a wide range of business operations, including all commercial transactions, except checks. Cf. the *Cuba Review* for November 1917, where full data are given based on the *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Hacienda* (treasury department).

provided for the immediate issue of bonds up to thirty millions of dollars, bearing interest at six per cent, computed from September 1.¹⁶ And the United States government, realizing that even with the proceeds of this bond issue the finances of the republic would be strained to meet her extraordinary war expenses, extended in March 1918 a credit of fifteen million dollars, taking in exchange Cuban treasury bonds for a like amount.¹⁷

In the spring and summer of 1917 there seemed good ground for the belief that the war might open a new and inspiring chapter in the military annals of Cuba. Funds for the reorganization of the Cuban army on a war footing were, as we have seen, available, or would be forth coming; the United States, while exerting no pressure on Cuba, gave every intimation that the island republic might count on unstinted cooperation and assistance; the president, supported it would seem by public opinion, had repeatedly gone on record as favoring military participation in the war on a scale commensurate with the man-power and resources of the nation.

The acts of the government in the months immediately succeeding Cuba's entry into the war presaged such military intervention. Before the end of April 1917 a military and technical mission was sent to the United States to discuss Cuba's war problems with the General Staff of the Army and the higher officers

¹⁶ *Gaceta Oficial*, September 20, 1917.

¹⁷ *Cuba Review*, April 1918.

of the Navy.⁷⁸ On July 12, 1917, the president, by executive decree, created a new department of the government, the ministry of war and navy. The first incumbent of this important position, appointed on July 28, was General Jose Martí y Zayas Bazán, son of the famous Cuban patriot and apostle of independence, and himself a soldier of distinction. The appointment to this new and important post of one of the living exemplars of Cuba's most glorious military traditions was also regarded as an earnest of the government's intention to intervene actively in the war.⁷⁹ Finally in less than two months after the declaration of war against Germany, President Menocal asked Congress to authorize the establishment of a selective draft system, similar in scope to that effective in the United States.⁸⁰

Unfortunately these auspicious beginnings were succeeded by a period of hesitation, disillusionment and

⁷⁸ This mission which arrived at Washington on April 30 was composed of General Martí, Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army and President of the Mission; Captain Alberto de Carriarte; Major Ernesto Tabio, and Naval Lieutenant José Vandergutch. The latter two members of the Mission were subsequently appointed military and naval attaches at the Cuban legation at Washington. *El Mundo*, April 24 and May 1, 1917; *Cuba Review*, July 1917.

⁷⁹ *El Mundo*, July 3, 11, 31, 1917; *New York Times*, July 31, 1917. *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, August 1917, p. 516.

⁸⁰ This recommendation was first made in his message of June 5, 1917, and repeated in that of June 21. *El Mundo*, June 6 and 21; *Cuba Review*, July 1917.

partial failure. As is well known, not a single Cuban soldier, if we except several aviators enrolled in the French army, ever reached the western front. The compulsory service bill was not passed until seventeen months after Cuba entered the war and the signing of the armistice found the Cuban army still virtually on a peace basis. In Europe and the United States the impression became general that a fatal policy of procrastination, alleged to be typical of the Latin American republics, had robbed Cuba of the glory of cementing her alliance with her allies on the battlefields of Europe.

This explanation of Cuba's delay in mobilizing her military resources is much too simple and fails to take into account certain factors which only those initiated into the mystery of Cuban domestic politics can appreciate at their full value. Even a cursory examination of the currents which dominated the political life of Cuba during the two crucial years of 1917 and 1918 will show that beneath the apparent harmony and unanimity in all matters affecting Cuba's relation to the war were deep and bitter antagonisms. As has already been suggested, the armed revolt of February 1917 had left a heritage of rancor and resentment which rendered a complete unity of purpose very difficult and, as events were to show, all but impossible. The Liberals, who constituted a strong and aggressive minority in Congress, were for the most part honestly convinced that they had been robbed of the presidential election of 1917 by the chicanery and corruption employed by

their opponents. Yet in the wave of patriotic exaltation which swept over the country in the second week of April political animosities and political differences disappeared; we have already seen that the Liberals vied with the Conservatives in their support of Cuba's declaration of war against Germany.⁸¹ The government, had it been well advised, would have capitalized this surge of nationalistic sentiment, and by offering a truce to politics would have made a bid for the full and ungrudging support of both political parties. While the appointment of a coalition cabinet would probably have put too great a strain on the party system as it had developed in Cuba it was not unreasonable to expect that government would invite the fullest cooperation of the Liberals, and above all would have avoided any act which might revive or inflame the latent animosities engendered by the February revolution.

These expectations were at best only partially realized. The appointments of President Menocal to the important posts created under the stress of war fell for the most part to able men, but they included few Liberals of distinction. Some of the most prominent

⁸¹ The willingness of the Liberals to cooperate with the government in all national and patriotic endeavors was repeated by Representative Arturo Betancourt Manduley at the opening of the special session of Congress on July 27, 1917. This declaration was all the more noteworthy as Sr. Betancourt had taken an active part in the revolution of 1917, and was appointed legal advisor to the provisional government of Oriente and Colonel in the legal staff of the revolutionary army. Cf. *El Mundo*, July 28, 1917; *Cubans of To-Day*, p. 89.

Liberals were in exile;⁸² a still larger number were in prison awaiting trial for complicity in the February uprising. A general amnesty, especially if granted in the period of patriotic exaltation following Cuba's entry into the war, would not only have acted as a sedative to party irritations but would also have proclaimed to the world at large the willingness of the Cuban government to subordinate all party and partizan issues to the supreme issue of winning the war. The government chose otherwise. Such concessions or favors as were granted the former revolutionists were regarded as either so scant or so tardy as to win little gratitude from their beneficiaries. To be sure the secretary of justice, on April 11, 1917, issued a decree releasing from prison such participants in the revolt as could give adequate assurances of their loyalty to the government.⁸³ But at

⁸² A notable example of these Liberal exiles was Dr. Orestes Ferrara, the Director of *La Reforma Social* (published in New York), and formerly professor of public law in the University of Havana. He is the author of *Causes and Pretexts of the World War* (New York, 1918), and *Lessons of the War and the Peace Conference* (New York, 1919). From the very first his sympathies were strongly pro-Ally.

⁸³ *El Mundo*, April 12, 1917. This act resulted in the release of about one thousand persons. During the spring of 1917 a number of incidents caused party feeling to run high. On May 10 an attempt was made to assassinate President Menocal and the American minister, Mr. Gonzales. The result was the arrest of nine adherents of ex-President Gómez. On May 16 the American government issued a proclamation stating that all those in arms against the government of Cuba should be treated as enemies. Many Liberals felt that this proclamation was directed against them, although there is no evidence that

the same time it was decided to subject to a trial by a military court the officers in the army implicated in the revolution. This trial which lasted from June 15 to July 17, 1917, fanned into white heat the flame of party passion in Congress and to a certain extent through the country. Especially was this the case when the prosecuting attorney demanded the death penalty for a number of the defendants. Death sentences were, as a matter of fact, passed on four officers most deeply involved in the revolt, but these were commuted to life imprisonment by President Menocal.⁸⁴ From now on the efforts of the Liberal members of Congress were chiefly directed towards the enactment of a general amnesty. They had for a time to face the opposition of President Menocal and an important fraction of the Conservatives. The amnesty bill at last passed in the spring of 1918,⁸⁵ nearly a year after Cuba's entry into the war, pardoned all those connected with the February revolution, with the exception of army officers who at the outbreak of the revolt had been on active service. But even this class was brought within the

any responsible members of the Liberal party were involved in the attempted crime of May 10. *El Mundo*, April 1917, *passim*; *New York Times*, May 11, 1917.

⁸⁴ The officers condemned were Colonel Quinones, Captain Izquierda, Lieutenants Calzadilla and Roldos. *El Mundo*, July 1917, *passim*; *Cuba Review*, August 1917.

⁸⁵ The bill passed the House of Representatives on January 28, 1918, but was held up in the Senate until March 18, 1918. *El Mundo*, January 28 and March 19, 1918; *Cuba Review*, February and April, 1918. Text in *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, March 1918, pp. 130-132.

scope of the amnesty by a supplementary decree signed by the president. Finally the law permitted the return to Cuba of those revolutionists who had fled to the United States to escape arrest. The immediate result of the passage of the measure was the release from custody of a number of officers, including the former President, General Gómez, and his son.⁸⁶

Another source of intense dissatisfaction to the Liberals was the the long duration of the suspension of constitutional guarantees. When on May 7, 1917, Congress passed a bill investing the president with these extraordinary powers, it was assumed that its period of enforcement would be short. Yet for reasons already noted,⁸⁷ for fifteen months the country was subjected to this abnormal régime during which the president was invested with almost dictatorial authority. To the credit of President Menocal it should at once be made clear that he did not abuse these powers to interfere with the political or civil rights of the citizens or to subserve party or partizan ends.⁸⁸ Yet his unwillingness to

⁸⁶ *Cuba Review*, April 1918. Owing to the ill health suffered by General Gómez while in prison he had for some time prior to his release been permitted to live at home.

⁸⁷ Cf. above, p. 118. Constitutional guarantees were restored on August 14, 1918.

⁸⁸ President Menocal was very emphatic on this point: "La suspensión de las garantías no había subsistido, justo es consignarlo, en perjuicio de los derechos políticos de los ciudadanos ni para fin político alguno que la vida interna se refiere, después de sofocado el movimiento sedicioso de Febrero." Extract from message of August 14, 1918. *El Mundo*, August 15, 1918.

relinquish these extraordinary prerogatives was a source of both anxiety and exasperation to the Liberals. They not only refused to recognize the necessity for the long duration of these powers but also were apparently apprehensive that they might be misused.

The intensity of this party antagonism and its paralyzing effect on the efforts of the government to put the Cuban army on a war basis are strikingly shown by the vicissitudes through which the compulsory service bill passed before it was enacted into law. First broached by the executive in his messages of June 5 and 12, 1917, the proposal met with such a chilling reception that it was allowed to rest in abeyance until the late autumn. But in his message of November 5, 1917, President Menocal recurred to the subject with greater insistence, pointing out that the system of voluntary enlistment had met with insuperable obstacles, the chief being the high wages offered in the cane fields, sugar mills and tobacco plantations.⁸⁹

But the opposition of the Liberals, who were aided by a sprinkling of Conservatives, was still strong enough to balk the will of the president. The argument was freely used that any increase in the army would still further aggravate the labor shortage in the sugar industry. Moreover, many of the Liberals refused to support

⁸⁹ *El Mundo*, November 6, 1917. As early as July 1917, President Menocal had issued a decree materially increasing the pay of the privates and non-commissioned officers. According to the new scale the first sergeant received \$600 per year; second sergeant, \$540; third sergeant, \$300; corporal, \$300; enlisted men, \$276. *Cuba Review*, August 1917.

the draft bill until a general amnesty had been decreed ;⁹⁰ the declaration was also made that "they did not consider it proper to demand of the country the most sacred tribute which it could offer, that of its blood, as long as individual guarantees were not restored."⁹¹ These successive defeats only spurred the executive to greater exertion. When Congress convened in regular session on April 1, 1918, the president once more urged immediate action. As the opposition showed little sign of yielding, it was freely rumored that in case Congress refused to pass the measure within a reasonable time the president would establish the draft by executive decree, in virtue of the authority granted him by the Joint Resolution of April 7, 1917.⁹² Fortunately it was not necessary to resort to such extreme measures ; when the bill was introduced again into Congress in July 1918, it was evident that the government could count on sufficient support in both branches to secure the passage of the bill.

The debates which preceded the vote on the measure were highly illuminating. It would be a grave injustice

⁹⁰ "The chief opposition to the Compulsory Service Bill has come from the Liberals who are unwilling to vote for this bill unless the President supports a general amnesty bill ; the President indicates in conferences held with leaders that he is firmly opposed to a general amnesty, particularly as regards leaders of the Revolution." Habana correspondent of the *Cuba Review*, December 1917.

⁹¹ Escobar, Antonio, "El Contingente Cubano," *El Mundo* August 6, 1918. Sr. Escobar was, during the war, the New York correspondent of *El Mundo* and was thoroughly conversant with every phase of Cuba's war activities.

⁹² *Cuba Review*, May 1918.

to many patriotic and able Cuban public men to assume that their opposition to the bill was primarily based on partizan motives or animus.⁹³ While willing or even eager to see a Cuban contingent of volunteers sent to France the opponents of the measure objected primarily to the principle of compulsory military service. The bill as advocated by the president, they regarded as unsound in principle and vicious in practice. All of the arguments advanced by the opponents of the draft law in the United States found their echo in the halls of the Cuban Congress. Particular stress was also laid on the point that if compulsory military service was to be successful it must be preceded by a campaign of education and patriotic propaganda; it must transcend all party affiliation or allegiance; it must in a word represent the desires and aspirations of the Cuban people as a whole. These indispensable conditions, it was claimed, did not exist in Cuba.⁹⁴

⁹³ By no means all the Liberals were opposed to the compulsory service bill; it was, for instance, ably defended in the Senate by the Liberal Senator, Sr. Antonio Ganzalo Pérez.

⁹⁴ The most cogent and convincing arguments against the compulsory service bill were those of the Liberal Representative Fernando Ortiz embodied in a notable speech delivered in the House on July 11, 1918. In stressing the lack of any united, non-partizan support of the bill he declared: "Nuestro cuadro actual es lobrego y desconsolador. Todos parecemos aun cegados por la humareda de Febrero. Hoy en Cuba, he de decirlo con una frase eufemística porque no quiere arañar el oído de nadie, *la fraternidad cubana está rota*. No nos hagamos ilusiones, no nos engañemos, no cometamos la falta más grande de nuestro patriotismo, la villanía de oldarlo." *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso*, for July 11, 1918. Also printed separately under the title of *Discurso sobre el proyecto de ley acerca del Servicio Militar Obligatorio* (Havana, 1918), p. 10.

The compulsory service bill as finally passed on August 3, 1918, made all male citizens of Cuba between the ages of 21 and 28, inclusive, liable to military service. Though it was to remain in force for one year after the signing of peace all recruiting was to cease on the termination of hostilities. The carrying out of the draft law was entrusted to the Provost General (*Preboste General*)—an official especially appointed for the purpose—and a National Draft Board (*Comisión Nacional de Reclutamiento*) which in turn exercised general supervision of a large number of local draft boards (*Comisiones Locales de Reclutamiento*). Sixty days were allowed those liable to the draft in which to register; penalties were imposed upon those who attempted to evade the law.⁹⁵ On the basis of the census of 1916 the total number of men liable to military service was calculated at 112,000.

The opponents of the compulsory features of the draft law won a partial victory in that section of the act dealing with the dispatch of an expeditionary force of Europe. Article 62 of the bill declared: "The executive will arrange for the immediate dispatch of a contingent of our present volunteer army to the battle fields of Europe, reenforcing this contingent, in so far as it is possible, with those volunteers, who may express such a desire." Inasmuch as every inducement was held out to those who might voluntarily enlist pending the en-

⁹⁵ The text of this law is given *in extenso* in the *Gaceta Oficial* and *El Mundo*, August 3, 1918; that of the *reglamento* or decree governing its execution in *Gaceta Oficial*, September 4, 1900.

forcement of the draft law it was hoped by this means to send to France an expeditionary force of some 25,000 men.⁹⁶ By the terms of the bill as passed by Congress permission was given the president to send military missions to the United States, England, France and Italy.⁹⁷ As a result of the signing of the armistice before Cuba's military plans had been completed no use was made of this authorization.

The difficulties of carrying out the compulsory service bill lent a certain justification to the arguments of those who had voted against it. Opposition to the enforcement of the draft law was to be found among all classes of the population, especially among the laboring elements in the Provinces of Oriente and Camagüey, the region from which the February uprising had gained most of its recruits. Of those liable to the draft not more than a third to a half actually registered, and of this number a large proportion sought exemption on one ground or another. The law was repealed in January 1919, and a general amnesty was granted to all who failed to obey it while it was in force.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ *Current History Magazine*, November 1918, p. 318.

⁹⁷ It is not without interest to note that the Cuban government was invited to send a delegate to the Inter-Allied Conference held in Paris, November and December 1917. Sr. Carlos García Vélaz, Cuban minister to Great Britain, was instructed to serve in this capacity. *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, December 1917, p. 877.

⁹⁸ There existed in many quarters the deeply ingrained belief, quite unwarranted by the facts, that the draft law was a political manoeuvre designed temporarily to disfranchise the members of the Liberal party.

Yet despite the relatively unfavorable results of the compulsory military bill there is reason to believe that Cuba would have sent a contingent to the western front had the war lasted another year. Thanks to the Officers' Training Camp established at the University of Havana⁹⁹ and to the assistance of the United States, a sufficient number of competently trained officers would have been available, while the Cuban government was in a position, with the aid of the loan from the United States and the thirty million dollar bond issue, to finance such an undertaking. The difficulty of transportation, all but insuperable in 1918, might have been solved the year following, when the ship-building program of the United States began to show results. Finally the president and the administration, both supported by a considerable section of public opinion, were definitely committed to such a step.

The most convincing evidence we possess of the determination of the Cuban government not to allow Article 62 of the compulsory service bill to remain a dead letter is the correspondence which passed between the secretaries of state of the two republics in the early fall of 1918. On September 19 Sr. Pablo Desvernine informed Secretary Lansing that "Cuba is disposed to organize and send without delay the contingent provided for by the law of August 3," and asked if the government of the United States "judges it convenient to

⁹⁹ The Officers Training Corps was organized as early as the autumn of 1917. *Boletín del Ejército* (Havana), November 1917, p. 306.

extend to us the cooperation which we request, it being understood that the government of Cuba will accept all suggestions looking to the better realization of said undertaking . . . and will assume all the corresponding military and financial obligations." The offer was declined on September 2, owing to absence of means of transport. Secretary Lansing pointed out that the immense shipment of supplies and munitions as well as the dispatch of troops had caused all available vessels to be assigned months in advance. "The government of the United States profoundly regrets that it is not in a position to avail itself at this moment of the highly appreciated offer of the Cuban government to send forces to Europe. For this generous cooperation and spirit of sacrifice of the Cuban people the government and people of the United States feel a deep gratitude." In concluding his note Mr. Lansing urged the government of Cuba to continue its military preparations against the time when changed conditions would permit the acceptance of this offer.¹⁰⁰

One other phase of Cuba's military preparations deserves mention. Even before Cuba entered the war aviation had its enthusiastic votaries. And when Cuba became a belligerent, it was at once recognized that the

¹⁰⁰ This correspondence is published in the *Boletín de Información*, November 1918, pp. 66-69. Cf. also the comments of President Menocal in his message of November 4, 1918. *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, December 1918, p. 644. The text of Mr. Lansing's note is available only in the Spanish translation.

obstacles to the dispatch to the western front of a contingent of the regular army were much less formidable in the case of a small group of aviators. At first, however, private initiative bade fair to outstrip the activities of the government. In August 1917 Colonel Manuel Coronado, a member of the Cuban Senate and editor of the paper *La Discusión*, undertook to organize a volunteer aviation unit of nearly one hundred members to be known as the *Escadrille Cubaine*. These young men, many of them members of the most prominent families of the island, were expected to bear the expense of the aeroplanes and equipment. But owing probably to the lack of training facilities and the difficulty of securing materials, the project, at least in its original form, was abandoned.¹⁰¹

On the following January the government set about to create an aviation corps for service in Europe. Two young Cubans, Lieutenants Campuzano and Terry, who had enlisted in the French aviation service at the beginning of the war¹⁰² were granted permission by the French government to return to Cuba to serve as instructors, while the American authorities supplied from the Aviation School at Mineola the needed machines. On July 25, 1918, President Menocal signed a decree formally authorizing the formation of a Cuban aviation

¹⁰¹ *Cuba Review*, September 1917.

¹⁰² Both of these aviators had distinguished themselves; Campuzano had received war crosses from both France and Belgium, while Terry had received the French Croix de Guerre. *Cuba Review*, May 1918.

corps.¹⁰³ On August 31 the members of the *Escuadrille de Combate* of the Aviation Corps (*Cuerpo de Aviación*) were dispatched to the United States for instruction. Seven were sent to the School of Military Aeronautics at Austin; twenty-two to the Aviation School at San Antonio, and two to Brooks Field near San Antonio. The signing of the armistice found these Cubans still in the United States.¹⁰⁴

From the very first, reciprocal cooperation was effective between Cuba and the United States in the sending and receiving of troops for military instruction. In addition to the members of the aviation corps, just mentioned, twenty-one officers of the Cuban coast artillery were ordered to the United States to obtain military instruction. It was the purpose of the government to prepare these officers to take charge of the new fortifications being erected for the defense of Havana. Plans had been drawn up for the dispatch of a second contingent as soon as the first had completed their training. Most of these artillery officers were stationed at Pensacola.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ *Gaceta Oficial*, July 26, 1918. This act of the president was based on the authorization granted by Congress in a bill signed May 15, 1918, empowering the president to expend such sums as were necessary for the organization and maintenance of a military aviation corps. *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, July 1918, p. 320.

¹⁰⁴ *El Mundo*, August 25, 1918, and *passim*.

¹⁰⁵ These data are found in the president's message of November 4, 1918. *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, December 1918, p. 728.

The Cuban government extended the widest hospitality to the military and naval forces of the United States. As is well known the Marines had long been in possession of a permanent training station at Guantánamo Bay. The facilities of this station were greatly expanded, while a Marine Corps was dispatched to the Province of Camagüey, where its camp was located near the battlefield of San Juan. At the invitation of President Menocal a considerable number of American troops were sent to Cuba for training and were stationed in the Provinces of Oriente and Camagüey. A number of American officers were detailed to assist the Cuban military authorities in the work of the training of the Cuban army at Camp Columbia near Havana; in March 1918, a school for Cuban officers was opened in Santiago with instructors from the United States Marine Brigade.¹⁰⁶

The rôle of the Cuban navy in the war calls for a brief mention. Its activities were necessarily entirely confined to the defense of the coast line against possible submarine activities. One of the results of General Martí's mission to the United States in the spring of 1917 was a plan for naval cooperation between the two republics. The coasts of Cuba were divided into zones.

¹⁰⁶ Unfortunately for the historical investigator the material on the activity of our military and naval forces in Cuba is difficult to obtain. During the course of the war the censorship prevented all discussion of the movement of American troops on Cuban soil; the subject is therefore practically ignored in the Cuban press. Some data are given in President Menocal's message of November 4, 1917, already cited.

to each one of which was assigned a number of submarine chasers. These craft, which were added to the small fleet already existing,¹⁰⁷ were purchased or borrowed from the United States and a number of warrant officers were detailed by the Guantánamo Naval Station to give courses in gunnery and technique to the non-commissioned officers of the Cuban navy.¹⁰⁸ According to President Menocal this mosquito fleet of submarine chasers "exercised unceasing vigilance and prevented the possible establishment of submarine bases."¹⁰⁹ In his letter of September 23, 1918, to which reference has already been made, Secretary Lansing stressed "the very great aid [rendered by the Cuban navy] in the protection of the coast of Cuba, since the island offers an important strategic position in the defense of those portions of the western hemisphere against which the German government has directed its efforts."¹¹⁰

In the summer of 1918 a scheme was launched, largely on the initiative of the magazine *Bohemia*, for the purchase of a submarine by each of the six provinces of Cuba, the funds to be raised by popular subscription. In the Province of Havana, at least, the work was prosecuted with great zeal and enthusiasm by the secretary of the provincial committee, Sr. Antonio Pardo

¹⁰⁷ This fleet consisted in April 1917 of one cruiser, one school ship, and eighteen revenue cutters. *Statesman's Year Book*, 1918.

¹⁰⁸ Message of President Menocal, November 4, 1918. *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, December, 1918, p. 731. *Cuba Review*, September 1917.

¹⁰⁹ Presidential Message, of November 4, *loc. cit.*

¹¹⁰ *Boletín de Información*, November, 1918, p. 69.

Suárez.¹¹¹ This campaign, like most of the other Cuban war activities, was entirely dropped after November 11.

It has already been pointed out that one of the charges by the opponents of the draft bill was the dereliction of the government in failing to bring home to the nation at large the magnitude of the issues involved in the war and the sacrifices which Cuba should be prepared to make for the common cause. In support of this accusation it could be pointed out that for sixteen months after Cuba had thrown in her lot with the United States and the Allies no concerted or systematic attempt was made to carry on any patriotic propaganda, either in the capital or in the provinces. In the summer of 1918 steps were taken to meet this need. Thanks in great part to the initiative and energy of Dr. Cosme de la Torre, senator from Matanzas, an organization was perfected known as the *Comisión Cubana de Propaganda por la Guerra y de Auxilio á sus Víctimas*.¹¹² As president was chosen Dr. de la Torre and as secretary Sr. José Mariá Collantes, representative from Pinar del Rio and chairman of the commission on foreign relations in the House of Representatives. The plans of the new commission were plotted on an imposing scale. Patriotic propaganda was to be carried to every corner of the island by means of printed material, public meetings, moving pictures, and theatres.

¹¹¹ *El Mundo*, August 22, 1918.

¹¹² The commission was sanctioned by a law signed May 15, 1918. *Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, June 1918, p. 319.

Music and literature were even placed under requisition ; prizes were offered for patriotic songs and poems.¹¹³ The Commission, in fine, was to be the analogue of our own Committee of Public Information, with such departures as were demanded by the psychology and taste of the Cuban people. Despite the fact that the Commission got under way barely five months before the end of the war its activities were distinctly creditable. While not every feature of its program was fully carried out, it did publish sixteen numbers of a *Boletín de Información*, which under the editorship of Dr. Colantes presented in a graphic and interesting manner Cuba's stakes in the great war and her duties to her allies. Here again the signing of the armistice interrupted a work which had the war lasted another year would have done much to tone up the morale of the Cuban people and keep alive a vital interest in the issues of the war.¹¹⁴

All things considered, Cuba's most effective contribution to the cause of her allies and indirectly towards the

¹¹³ Thus in cooperation with the *Academia Nacional de Artes y Letras* the Commission organized a competition in which all musicians, poets and painters of the republic were invited to participate. A prize of \$250 was offered for the best poem in *metro libre* on the subject of the freedom of the world and the aims of the Allies. The *Sección de Pintura* of the National Academy of Arts and Letters was authorized to award ten prizes of \$150 each to the ten artists submitting the best war posters, etc. *Cuba Contemporánea*, September 1918, p. 124.

¹¹⁴ The first number of the *Boletín* appeared in September 1918; the last number (a special one dealing with Cuba and the Peace Treaty) was issued in June 1920.

winning of the war lay in the field of economic cooperation. When the United States was preparing to throw into the scale all her military and economic resources, Cuba spontaneously and ungrudgingly offered her quota to the common cause. The disposition of the interned German ships was a case in point. In the summer of 1917, when the ship-famine was becoming exceedingly acute, the Cuban government without any thought of compensation transferred as a gift to the United States the German ships in Havana harbor.¹¹⁵ But the greatest service rendered her allies was unquestionably the turning over during two successive years of her great sugar crop under conditions which assured its equitable distribution and its sale at a reasonable price. It was the good fortune and privilege of Cuba when the victory or defeat of the Allies was intimately bound up with the problem of subsistence to supply a commodity of which the world stood in the sorest need.

It does not fall within the compass of this chapter to discuss in detail the machinery devised for the disposal of Cuba's sugar crop during the crucial years 1917-1919. Suffice it to say that the Cuban government was fully cognizant of the responsibilities thrust upon it. Vigorous efforts were made to increase the acreage planted as well as the size of the crop. Immigration restrictions were temporarily lowered.¹¹⁶ New

¹¹⁵ The transfer was made in August 1917. *New York Times*, August 22, 1917; *El Mundo*, *passim*.

¹¹⁶ By a law signed August 3, 1917, and an executive decree issued October 29 of the same year. *Boletín Oficial de la Secre-*

and improved sugar machinery was imported in large quantities.¹¹⁷ Unfortunately the rebellion of 1917, occurring during the grinding season and resulting in the destruction of a large number of centrals, checked the curve of increased production which for a number of years had been steadily mounting. In fact there seems warrant for the belief that without this interruption the 1917 crop would have shown the same increase over that of 1916 as that of 1916 over the preceding year, namely 423,770 tons. As it was the increase amounted to but 3312 tons. Yet despite this unfortunate setback the crop of 1917 registered the imposing total of 3,009,936 tons, the largest yield in the history of the island.¹¹⁸ Under the circumstances it represented an invaluable

taría de Estado, September 1917, pp. 563-565; November 1917, pp. 842-852.

The chief cause for the acute labor shortage was the decrease in the number of immigrants from Spain and the Canary Islands, due to the action of the Spanish government in prohibiting emigration of Spanish citizens subject to military service. This labor was seasonal in character, the immigrants remaining in Cuba only during the grinding season. The shortage was met in part by the importation of Chinese, Jamaicans and Haitians. Despite the remedial measures fostered by the government, from 1916 to 1917 immigration dropped from 71,599 to 31,537. *Statesman's Year Book*, 1918; *Cuba Review*, February 1918.

¹¹⁷ The value of sugar machinery imported during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917, amounted to \$11,000,000 as against \$6,000,000 for the preceding year. *Cuba Review*, December 1917.

¹¹⁸ *New York Evening Post*, *Primera Edición Cubana*, April 26, 1919; *Weekly Statistical Trade Journal*, November 14, 1920.

increment to the food supply of the United States and the Allies.

It was obvious that if the maximum advantage was to be secured from the crop of 1917, both its distribution and price should be subjected to rigorous control. Accordingly in the autumn of 1917 President Menocal appointed a committee of prominent planters which on December 24 signed an agreement with the International Sugar Commission, consisting of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, according to which Cuba agreed to sell to the United States seventy-five per cent of the crop at a fraction over four and one-half cents per pound and to give an option on the remaining twenty-five per cent to the United States and the Allied Powers with the exception of 50,000 tons reserved for Spain and Hispanic America.¹¹⁹ In the case of the 1918 crop a somewhat different procedure was adopted. The crop was purchased outright by the United States Sugar Equalization Board, a company with a capital stock of \$5,000,000 subscribed for in the name of the United States by President Wilson and paid for out of his appropriation. The Board purchased the crop at five and one-half cents a pound; two-thirds of the crop was sold in the United States at prices determined by the Food Administration; the remainder was purchased by the Royal Commission on Sugar Supply of the United Kingdom for

¹¹⁹ Presidential message of April 1, 1918. *Bolétin Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado*, April 1918, p. 202 ff.

account of Great Britain, France and Italy. As is well known, the Sugar Equalization Board in its majority report recommended to President Wilson that the 1919 crop, for which the board had received an unofficial but authorized offer at a price which was known to be six and a half cents, in any event not to exceed seven cents, should be purchased as was the crop of the previous year. But President Wilson declined to accept this recommendation with the result that the Cuban planters disposed of this crop at a figure practically double that offered the Equalization Board.¹²⁰ While it is perfectly true that the thrifty Cuban planters, thanks to the unprecedented demand for sugar, reaped a golden harvest for the 1919 crop, it cannot be gainsaid that they as well as the Cuban government, evinced a patriotic and unselfish attitude during the two critical years of the war. Such profits as were realized were very modest and in the opinion of competent writers¹²¹ did little more than cover the cost of production; certainly the two crops were sold at a lower figure than would

¹²⁰ Cf., the article by Dr. Alonzo Englebert Taylor, "Why is sugar scarce and high?" in *The Saturday Evening Post*, March 6, 1920. On this whole subject there is a large amount of material in the files of the *Cuban Review*, almost every number containing at least one authoritative article on the sugar question. Cf. also article by Dr. Eugenio Sánchez Agragomonte, "El Porvenir del azúcar, principal problema comercial de Cuba," *New York Evening Post, Primera Edición Cubana*, April 26, 1919, p. 5.

¹²¹ E. g., Dr. Antonio Bustamante, Cuban delegate to the Peace Conference, in *New York Evening Post, Primera Edición Cubana*, April 26, 1919, p. 8.

have been the case had the law of supply and demand been operative.¹²²

In concluding our survey of Cuba's war activities some space must be accorded to the enthusiastic and loyal support given the Liberty Loan and United War Work Campaigns. While no drive was attempted for the First Liberty Loan, the figures for the other three loans reached imposing totals. Of the second loan \$1,633,550 was taken by 1031 subscribers; of the third \$5,161,000 by 10,417 subscribers; of the fourth \$10,752,850 by 22,189 subscribers. In view of the remarkable showing on the last loan—the original allotment was only \$6,000,000—the United States government extended to Cuba the same privilege as that given to the Federal Reserve Districts when they oversubscribed their allotments, namely, the right of naming an American ship and tank.¹²³ It should be observed, moreover, that the amounts subscribed for the various loans by no means represented the full amounts raised in Cuba as large subscriptions were placed direct with American banks by Cuban firms, as well as by American

¹²² A small but by no means negligible side of Cuba's economic cooperation is represented in the product of her mines. Copper, iron and manganese were produced and exported in considerable quantities, especially under the stimulus of the war. At the height of their activity, during 1917 and 1918, the manganese mines, chiefly in the Panupo Group, to the northwest of Santiago, produced an average of 50,000 tons a month. E. I. Montoulieu, "The Mining Industry of the Republic of Cuba," *Cuba Review*, November 1918.

¹²³ *Cuba Review*, October, November 1917; October, November, December, 1918. *Boletín de Información*, November 1918, p. 65.

companies having offices in the United States. As for the United War Work Campaign, though allotted the relatively large sum of \$100,000, Cuba contributed all told \$278,836, of which \$100,000 was donated by the *Comisión de Propaganda* and \$5000 by the Cuban Red Cross.¹²⁴ Finally the sentiments of the Cuban people found expression in a magnificent tribute to the American nation and the American army in the shape of an imposing celebration staged in their honor in Havana on November 28, 1918. In the great procession of over 40,000 persons, which for hours defiled through the principal streets of the city, every branch of the Cuban army and navy as well as innumerable civic and patriotic organizations were represented.¹²⁵

Cuba was represented at the Peace Conference by one of her most distinguished sons, Dr. Antonio Sánchez de Bustamante. For over a quarter of a century Dr. Bustamante has been an outstanding figure in the political and international life of Cuba. In 1895 he was elected to membership in the Institute of International Law, and in 1907 represented Cuba at the Second Peace Conference at The Hague. He is Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of Havana, President of the Academy of Arts and Letters and

¹²⁴ *El Mundo*, November 21, 1918.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.* November 29, 1918. Additional evidence of Cuba's moral support of the United States and of her enthusiasm for the cause of freedom and democracy may be seen in her proclamation of the 4th, 14th and 21st of July, as national holidays in honor of the United States, France and Belgium respectively. *Cuba Review*, July 1918.

member of the Permanent Arbitration Tribunal of The Hague. As already noted, he was custodian of alien enemy property during the war. As will be pointed out later, he was elected by the League of Nations as one of the judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The activities of Dr. Bustamante during the Peace Conference were largely directed towards securing adequate recognition of the rights and equality of the smaller states. He was partially responsible for the modification of certain articles of the Treaty dealing with the constitution of the League of Nations, more especially the provision of Article I which permits any members of the League to withdraw after two years notice, provided all its obligations under the Covenant have been fulfilled. Of the various commissions on which Cuba was represented the more important was that on labor. Dr. Bustamante took a prominent part in the discussion which centered about the adoption of the eight-hour day. While recognizing the desirability of establishing the principle of the eight-hour day he pointed out the peculiar conditions existing in Cuba in connection with the sugar industry, in which a period of intense activity (during the harvesting of the crop) was followed by a period of comparative idleness. Supported by the delegate from Belgium he was largely responsible for the declaration¹²⁰ that "The High Contracting Parties . . . recognize that differences of climate, habits, and customs, of economic opportunity and

¹²⁰ Article 427.

industrial tradition, make strict uniformity in the conditions of labor difficult of attainment.”¹²⁷

By an overwhelming majority the Cuban Congress approved the Treaty of Versailles on February 4, 1920. The debates which preceded ratification of the Peace Treaty were illuminating. Opposition to the Treaty was largely based on the attitude of the United States Senate. Several members of the Cuban Congress¹²⁸ felt that would be inexpedient and contrary to Cuba's traditional foreign policy to ratify the Peace Treaty when its rejection by the United States was practically certain. Moreover, the presence of Cuba in the League of Nations might be a source of embarrassment if her powerful northern neighbor held aloof from this body. But the congressmen who held these views constituted a small minority. The feeling was general that to reject the Versailles Treaty and remain without the League of Nations, in deference to the action of the United States Senate, would be a humiliating confession of Cuba's inability to conduct her foreign affairs in harmony with her own best interests.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ The part played by Cuba at the Peace Conference is fully discussed in the debates in the Cuban Congress on the Treaty of Versailles. The most important speeches are reproduced in the *Boletín de Información*, June 1920. Cf. also the article by Juan Clemente Zamora, "Política Internacional Americana: el Tratado de paz ante el Congreso Cubano," *Cuba Contemporánea*, December 1919, pp. 450-459.

¹²⁸ Their point of view was well set forth by Senator Maza y Artola, *Boletín de Información*, June 1920, pp. 480-484.

¹²⁹ Cf. the able address of Senator Cosme de la Torriente, *ibid.*, pp. 484-491.

It can hardly be questioned that Cuba's international prestige and influence have been enhanced as a result of her entry into the war, her approval of the Peace Treaty, and the active part which her representatives have taken in the work of the League of Nations. The election of Dr. Bustamante as one of the original members of the Permanent Court of International Justice has also been a source of legitimate national pride.¹³⁰ Yet Cuba's chief gain from the new dispensation following the war has been the growing recognition by the world at large that she has justified her existence as an independent power and, in the words of one of her most distinguished public men, her success in convincing the American people "that they were not mistaken . . . when they established the Republic of Cuba, allowing the Cubans forever to rule their own destinies as a free and sovereign nation."¹³¹

¹³⁰ See below, p. 551.

¹³¹ Cosme de la Torriente, "Cuba, the United States of America and the League of Nations," *International Conciliation*, September 1922.

CHAPTER III

ARGENTINA AND THE WAR

Of the countries of Spanish America directly or indirectly affected by the war none presents a more interesting series of problems than the Argentine Republic. For while Argentina, unlike her great Portuguese-American neighbor, Brazil, neither broke relations with Germany nor entered the war even as a technical belligerent, the reaction of the world conflagration on the national and international life of the country was intense and far-reaching. The diplomatic complications caused by German maritime aggression, the flouting of Argentine national self-respect and dignity through the intrigues and treachery of the representative of the Imperial German government, the contest between the bulk of the nation and the executive on the rôle which should devolve upon Argentina in the World War, form chapters of contemporary history of dramatic and compelling interest. It is true that the nearness of the events and the serious *lacunæ* in the documentary evidence rob such chapters if essayed at the present time of the stamp of finality. None the less the outlines and chief episodes stand out with sufficient clarity to merit the serious attention of the student of the diplomatic and international relations growing out of the great war.

By way of a preliminary to our study of the diplomatic history of Argentina during the years 1914-1918 it seems desirable to attempt a brief analysis of public opinion and popular sympathies in those early years of the struggle, before the war had begun to cast its ominous shadows over the New World. As the largest and most influential of the nations of Spanish America the attitude of Argentina towards the war was naturally regarded with anxious interest both by the Allies and by the Central Powers. In none of the American republics, with the exception of the United States, was propaganda more unremitting and, in the case of that of Germany, less scrupulous. Yet, of the popular sympathies of the great mass of the Argentines there had never been any real question. Almost at the outset the tide set in very strongly in favor of the Allies. It was natural and even fitting that this should be so. Ties—racial, cultural, and economic—between Argentina and the Allied countries of Europe had been close and of long standing. These ties were materially strengthened through the presence within the republic of over two million¹ unnaturalized foreigners, drawn for the most part from the Allied countries. Nor should it be forgotten that these foreigners constituted the more recent waves of that vast tide of immigrants—

¹ The figures for 1914 were 2,350,935 out of a total population of 7,836,615. In 1916 the number of unnaturalized foreigners had dropped to 2,185,907. *Revista de Economía Argentina*, January 1919.

some four and a half million strong²—who since the middle of the last century had found new homes in the hospitable soil of Argentina. The numerical strength of the nationalities represented in these two classes, foreigners on the one hand and immigrants and their descendents on the other, is not necessarily indicative of their standing and prestige in the community. Thus, though comparatively few in number,³ the members of the British colony and the descendents of British immigrants wielded a large influence. Commercial and financial relations with Great Britain date back to the very beginning of the republic; as is well known, British capital, particularly in railways, has powerfully contributed to Argentina's phenomenal economic progress. It was quite to be expected therefore that many Argentine citizens, drawn to England as they were by ties of commerce and kinship, should warmly espouse the cause of the Allies and in some cases even encourage their sons to volunteer for the British and French

² In the years 1857-1915 the number of immigrants by sea was 4,709,092 (*Statesman's Year Book*, 1918, p. 640). From this number must be deducted at least a million and a half emigrants.

³ According to the census of 1914 the number of British subjects in Argentina was 27,692. *The Economic Development of the Argentine Republic in the last Fifty Years*, compiled under the direction of Ernesto Tornquist & Co. (Buenos Aires, 1919), p. 10. This book is largely the work of the distinguished Argentine statistician, Dr. A. E. Bunge. It is the most complete and satisfactory synthesis which has yet appeared of the economic, commercial and financial statistics of Argentina.

armies.⁴ The thrifty and respected Italian elements, constituting over one-fourth⁵ of the total population, though at first comparatively indifferent, were profoundly moved by Italy's entry into the war and enthusiastically championed the cause of *Italia irredenta*. The relatively small but highly esteemed French population,⁶ whose members had done so much to mould the intellectual and artistic progress of the country naturally won proselytes for the cause of the Allies. Of the various elements of Latin extraction represented in the heterogenous population of Argentina the Spanish⁷ alone refused to see in the catyclism which was overwhelming Europe a menace to Latin civilization. In so far as their sympathies were expressed they inclined not towards the Allies but towards Germany.

⁴ Cf. W. S. Robertson, "Argentina's Attitude towards the War," *The Nation* (New York), March 1, 1917.

⁵ The number of Italian immigrants in the years 1857-1915 is given by the *Statesman's Year Book* (*loc. cit.*) as 2,295,019. The number of Italians (classed as foreigners) in the republic according to the census of 1914 was 929,863. *The Economic Development of the Argentine Republic*, p. 10. It should be recalled that by the constitution of the republic all children of foreigners born in the country are Argentines.

⁶ The number of French (classed as foreigners) in the republic according to the census of 1914 was 79,491; the number of French immigrants in the years 1857-1915 was 215,479. *The Economic Development of the Argentine Republic*, and the *Statesman's Year Book*, *loc. cit.*

⁷ According to the census of 1914 the number of persons of Spanish nationality residing in the country was 829,863. *The Economic Development of the Argentine Republic in the last Fifty Years*, p. 10.

To appraise the attitude of the Argentine people towards the war and its issues merely on the basis of the sympathies cherished by immigrants or their descendants would be both misleading and unjust. In Argentina as in the United States there exists a national self-consciousness which cuts athwart all distinctions based on race or origin. Assimilation of the foreign elements has been remarkably successful. In no country in Latin America has patriotism in an extreme nationalistic or even jingoistic sense been more pronounced than in Argentina. Competent and discriminating foreign observers, such as Bryce and Clemenceau, have remarked on this cult of the *patria*, at times becoming almost a mania. The Argentines were therefore quite capable of judging the war and its issues on the basis of criteria in which their own national interests and own national point of view were prominent factors. This disposition to envisage the problems of the war from a somewhat detached or purely Argentine standpoint did not lead to indifferentism or a tendency to ignore the real issues at stake. To the great majority of the thinking Argentines the purposes and methods of Germany were essentially repugnant. To have lent their approval to the actions of the Central Powers would, in the opinion of many, have been lamentably recreant to the traditions and culture of Latin and Anglo-Saxon Europe in which they had been nurtured and from which they had derived their ideals.

This point of view was well brought out by one of the leaders of Argentine thought, Dr. Rodolfo Rivarola,

dean of the faculty of philosophy and letters of the University of Buenos Aires, and a scholar distinguished in the fields of letters, education and philosophy. Writing in the winter of 1917 Dr. Rivarola declared: "The majority of the Argentines, in consonance with the origin of the present population and the Anglo-Latin civilization to which it belongs, places the sentiment of justice and right above the cult of might and follows the work of the Allies with sympathy."⁸ Views of a like tenor, though usually uttered in less restrained language were held, among many other Argentine intellectuals, by Dr. Ricardo Rojas, a prominent literary figure and editor of a scholarly edition of the Argentine classics; by Dr. Pablo Groussac, the erudite director of the Biblioteca Nacional and author of several authoritative works dealing with the period of Independence; by Dr. J. J. Biedma, director of the National Archives; by Sr. F. A. Barroetaveña, lawyer and publicist, whose book *Alemania contra el Mundo*,⁹ consisting of a series of articles contributed to *El Diario* beginning with August 1914, rapidly passed through four editions, of which the last was of four thousand copies.

The poets of Argentina were practically without exception ardent, even passionate, champions of the Allied cause. Writing under the *nom de plume* of Almafuerte the poet Pedro B. Palacios launched a tremendous philippic against the Kaiser, who is apostrophized as the

⁸ *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas*, February 1917, p. 498.

⁹ Buenos Aires, 1915.

"crowned assassin whose hands are reddened with the blood of millions of innocents."¹⁰ But little less emphatic was the octogenarian poet Guido y Spano, the patriarch of the Platine republic of letters. His wrath was especially kindled at the famous manifesto of the ninety-five German professors. "When one contemplates these moral deformities," he declared to his fellow-poet Almafuerte, "one is seized with the desire to set fire to all books and libraries and run into the street shouting 'Viva la santa ignorancia.'"¹¹

As the war gained in intensity, and the methods employed by Germany, especially towards the civilian population in the conquered regions, were better known, the expression of popular sympathies became more unrestrained. The sufferings and heroism of Belgium, the tragic fate of Serbia, the long martyrdom of the population in the invaded districts of France struck a responsive chord in the hearts of a people particularly susceptible to generous emotion. Above all, the admiration and affection for France had become almost a passion among the Argentine intellectuals. In somewhat extravagant words one of the Argentine writers declared shortly after the outbreak of the war: "In our literary circles, in our artistic coteries, in the scientific academies of the universities, and in the mansions of the aristoc-

¹⁰ Juan Mas y Pi, *Almafuerte, Poesías y un Estudio de la Personalidad del Poeta y sus Obras*. (Buenos Aires, 1916.) Cf. also Victorio M. Delfino, *Almafuerte, su personalidad y su obra*. (Buenos Aires, 1917.)

¹¹ Juan Mas y Pi, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

racy, France is revered as was Athens in the days of Pericles." ¹²

Yet contrary tendencies were at work. In Argentina even more than in Brazil the emissaries of *Kultur* kept up an insidious and tireless propaganda.¹³ Prior to the entry of the United States into the war, a flood of carefully edited cable dispatches poured out from the New York branch of the German Press Bureau and were furnished gratuitously to such newspapers as would print them; after the spring of 1917 much of the war news favorable to Germany was manufactured in Buenos Aires, although plans were being actively pushed

¹² Sr. Manuel Carles (professor in the University of Buenos Aires) in *L'Amérique Latine et la Guerre Européenne* (Paris, 1916), p. 9. An admirable synthesis of the rôle played by French idealism in the evolution of Spanish America is to be found in the booklet of the distinguished Uruguayan writer Hugo D. Barbagelata, *L'Influence des idées françaises dans la Révolution et dans l'Evolution de l'Amérique Espagnole* (Paris, 1917).

An interesting sidelight on the attitude of the Argentine intellectuals is to be found in the response to a letter sent to a large number of professional and literary men by the editors of the review *Nosotros* in January 1917. Two questions were asked: What effect will the war have on humanity as a whole? What influence will the war have on the moral and material evolution of the nations of America, especially Argentina? Thirty-five replies were received. Of these thirteen were so framed as to make uncertain the sympathies of the writers, seventeen were pro-Ally; five were pro-German.

¹³ A suggestion of the amount of money spent for propaganda and other purposes by the German legation in Buenos Aires is found in Luxburg's telegram of July 20, 1917, in which he states that the legation balance at the bank on June 30 was 856,000 pesos. Luxburg to Zimmermann. *Official Bulletin* (Washington), December 21, 1917.

for the erection, with capital partially furnished by the Imperial government, of a wireless plant capable of communicating directly with Nauen.¹⁴ Unluckily for the German cause the great majority of the metropolitan and provincial dailies were pro-Ally in sympathy. Of these organs the most important was *La Nación*, edited by Dr. Jorge Mitre, the grandson of General Bartolomé Mitre, president of Argentina during the period of the Paraguayan War. Though somewhat less emphatic in its espousal of the Allied cause, *La Prensa*, edited by the distinguished publicist, Dr. Eziquel Paz, was far from maintaining an indifferent attitude.¹⁵ Two other pro-Ally dailies, both likewise enjoying a large circulation and wielding considerable influence were *La Argentina* and *El Diario*; the former during the concluding year of the war published a remarkable series of exposés of German intrigues and espionage in Argentina. *La Época*, which after the election of Dr. Hipólito Irigoyen as president in 1916, became the mouthpiece of the government, remained consistently neutral. This was likewise true of the widely read socialist organ *La Vanguardia*.¹⁶

¹⁴ One of the telegrams of Luxburg deciphered by the state department at Washington reveals the existence of this wireless plant. "Receiving plant erected according to instructions. When does Nauen receive at greatest strength and what is the wave length?" Same to same. July 20, 1917. *Ibid*.

¹⁵ As the attitude of *La Prensa* had at various times been misconstrued, on June 28, 1916, it published a confession of faith in the cause and ideals of the Allies.

¹⁶ The war caused a violent split in the ranks of the Argentine socialists. In 1917 the socialist members of Congress voted in favor of the severance of relations with Germany and Senator Iberlucea resigned as editor of *La Vanguardia*.

To the German residents of Buenos Aires and to those of pro-German leanings the attitude of the press was the cause of much anxiety and mental distress. In order therefore to initiate the Argentines into the real causes and progress of the war a professedly neutral but in reality violently pro-German organ, *La Unión*, was launched shortly after the outbreak of hostilities and was maintained with funds, partly at least, supplied by the German legation.¹⁷ There is also reason to believe that *La Gaceta de España*, ostensibly the organ of the Spanish residents in Argentina, but which throughout the war faithfully reflected the views of the Wilhelmstrasse, was the recipient of a subsidy from the same source. From Buenos Aires as a center German propaganda¹⁸ invaded the Argentine provinces and the whole southern portion of the continent. No element of the population was neglected. Profusely

¹⁷ " *La Unión* is in need of a subsidy on account of the Black List and prices of about 10,000 pesos monthly." Luxburg to Zimmermann, July 25, 1917. *Official Bulletin* (Washington), December 21, 1917.

The German writer Alfredo Hartwig bemoans the criminal neglect of Germany to utilize the vernacular press in the period preceding the war. He contrasts the negligence of the Germans in this regard with the shrewd activity of the English and French. And when finally the Germans did attempt a back-fire—as in the case of *La Unión*—the harm had already been done. "Die politische Stellungnahme der Südamerikanischen Staaten im Weltkreis." *Deutsche Rundschau*, December 1917, p. 339.

¹⁸ Cf., e. g., the dithyrambic accounts of German prowess by the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin, translated into Spanish and published in Buenos Aires in 1915 under the title of *Un Pueblo en Armas*.

illustrated periodicals, distributed broadcast over the country, were designed to appeal even to the illiterate. For the benefit of the Italian colony, the Central Labor Exchange of Berlin launched the publication of a periodical *Il Lavoro*, which, well edited and written in excellent Italian, enjoyed a large circulation.

In spite of these efforts, some of which antedated the outbreak of the war, German propaganda had made no appreciable progress, save in two classes of the population: those directly or indirectly amenable to clerical influence, and a small group of Argentine intellectuals, mostly young men, who had fallen under the spell of German scientific and educational methods. The influence of this first group could easily be exaggerated. Clerical influence had never been strong in Argentina; relations between church and state had been in the main cordial and harmonious. Spanish influence, exerted largely through the medium of Spanish priests, was accountable in considerable part for the pro-German sympathies of certain clerical circles. Their center was the old provincial capital of Córdoba, where in the shadow of the one-time Jesuit university, was to be found a focus of German intrigue and propaganda.¹⁹

The attitude of the small but active group of pro-German intellectuals may be explained on various

¹⁹ Much of this agitation at Córdoba appeared in a puerile and ridiculous guise; scrawls on the walls and public buildings of the word "Malvinas," the Spanish name for the Falkland Islands, whose control by England had long been a thorn in the flesh of Argentine nationalists.

grounds. A certain intellectual snobbery, with whose counterpart many in the United States are not unfamiliar, may have been a factor. In certain circles the study of German science, almost always in French translations, had become fashionable. The much lauded German efficiency had become a cult, a kind of fetish. Consciously or unconsciously the rôle of propagandists had also been played by a number of distinguished German teachers and scientists who at various times had held chairs in the Universities of Buenos Aires and La Plata. In the years preceding the war the seed had been quietly but effectively sown; the harvest appeared in 1914 when a small but influential group of scholars, writers and publicists openly espoused the cause of the Central Powers.

Prominent among the advocates of the German cause was Dr. Juan P. Ramos, professor of law in the University of Buenos Aires. In 1915, on the occasion of the anniversary of the outbreak of the war, he published a book with the title "The Significance of Germany in the European War."²⁰ Germany, according to Professor Ramos, is the victim of a wave of all but universal hatred for which neither her past history nor her conduct in relation to the war offers the slightest justification. "As a human being one experiences an intense bitterness as he beholds this Germany so heroic, so grand, and so alone; this Germany which today struggles against a world of armed enemies and against a

²⁰ *La Significación de Alemania en la Guerra Europea* (Buenos Aires, 1915).

world of neutrals who hate her merely because they have been convinced that they should hate her in the name of civilization; this Germany which is being rent, as a pack of infuriated hounds ('jauria embravecida') rends the noble prey which falls within the power of its fangs."²¹ Among other notable Argentines who evinced Germanophile tendencies, though manifesting little of the violence of Dr. Ramos, were Dr. Ernesto Quesada, whose writings on legal and kindred topics would fill a good sized book shelf and Dr. Estanislao S. Zeballos, professor of law in the University of Buenos Aires, editor of *La Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras*, and former minister of foreign affairs.

As revealing another type of Argentine mentality should be noted the attitude of a distinguished representative of the army. Not that the military circles of the Platine Republic were obsessed by the spectacle of German militarism in action, as was true, for instance, in Chile. None the less a group of the higher officials of the Argentine army were frankly Germanophile in sympathy. Such was the case of General Uriburú. In a series of articles originally written for *La Nación* and afterwards assembled in book form²² this officer emitted opinions far from flattering to the Allies. The Battle of the Marne was an Allied victory not in any military but merely in a political sense. The rôle of the English

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44. This same thesis is developed in an article in *La Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas*, January 1915.

²² *La Guerra actual. Apuntes y enseñanzas* (Buenos Aires, 1915).

on this occasion was that of an army unworthy of the name; "it was a conglomeration which moved at the impulse of minds which did not even rise to the level of mediocrity."

From the foregoing analysis of the utterances of a few of the admirers of German methods and aims it will be seen that the apologists of the Central Powers, though distinctly in the minority, were in a position to wield an influence far from negligible.

The history of the diplomatic relations between Argentina and the belligerent powers from the beginning of the war to the end of 1916 is relatively unimportant. With her sister American republics Argentina announced early in August 1914 that she would maintain the most strict neutrality, and to make this disposition effective would follow in all cases the rules and procedure laid down in the convention referring to the rights and duties of neutrals subscribed to at the session of the Second Hague Conference on October 18, 1907.²³ Like the United States, but unlike Brazil, Argentina voiced no protest at the invasion of Belgium, although the Argentine vice-consul was murdered in the sacking of Dinant.²⁴

Like most of the other maritime Spanish American powers Argentina issued regulations early in the war

²³ Decree signed by Vice-President de la Plaza and Sr. José Luis Muratore, minister of foreign affairs, August 5, 1914. República Argentina; Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, *Documentos y actos de gobierno relativos á la guerra en Europa* (sometimes known as *El Libro Azul*) (Buenos Aires, 1919), p. 5.

²⁴ Cf. *New York Times*, October 2, 1921.

regarding the use of radio apparatus both in the stations located on Argentine territory and on vessels in Argentine jurisdictional waters. On August 18, 1914, the government suspended the use of secret codes in international service;²⁵ on August 19 vessels of belligerent powers in jurisdictional waters were forbidden the use of their apparatus except in cases where it might be necessary to call for aid or reply to calls for assistance;²⁶ on October 2 orders were issued requiring vessels of the belligerent powers to keep their radio-telegraphic poles lowered and their stations closed during their sojourn in jurisdictional waters;²⁷ on November 18 these orders were made applicable to all merchantmen without exception within the ports of the republic;²⁸ and finally on December 8 the minister of marine ordered that all vessels flying the Argentine flag engaged in coasting trade or navigation of the La Plata River should keep their radio-telegraphic stations closed, except when such stations were opened in the presence of authorized employes of the Argentine government. The same order stipulated that only persons of Argentine nationality might be employed as radio operators on such vessels.²⁹

The full significance of the order of December 8 can be appreciated only after a reference to the equivocal action of the radio operators on two steamers belong-

²⁵ Naval War College. *International Law Topics*, 1917, p. 24.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

ing to a German company engaged in coast-wide service under the Argentine flag. On one of these ships, the *Presidente Quintana*, it developed from the reports of the general prefecture of ports that the radio plant was under the effective control of two individuals of German nationality, who figured neither among the passengers nor crew. The regular radio operator, an Argentine citizen, was prevented from carrying on his duties by the two German interlopers. The minister of marine in his analysis of this curious situation would lead one to believe that the purpose of this manœuvre was to enable the *Presidente Quintana* to communicate with the fleet of von Spee on the eve of the naval engagement off the Falkland Islands. In the case of the other vessel, the *Cabo Corrientes*, the whole radio outfit had been removed, "which apparatus," according to the minister of marine, "could well serve in part for the installation of a plant either on shipboard or at some point as yet unknown."³⁰

The presence of the fleet of Admiral von Spee in South Atlantic waters in the late fall and early winter of 1914 and the subsequent activities of German raiders in the same region raised other problems of a somewhat different order. Not without reason were the Argentine authorities apprehensive lest merchantmen belonging to the belligerent powers would use the Argentine sea-ports as a basis for assisting warships operating off the coast. As early as August 6 the minister of marine issued a general order forbidding foreign merchantmen

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

in Argentine waters to arm or equip themselves for the purpose of becoming auxiliary cruisers in the fleets of the belligerent countries, while captains of foreign merchantmen which were already part of such fleets were obliged to make a declaration to this effect within twenty-four hours.³¹ By a subsequent order, issued August 17, merchant ships belonging to this category were to be treated in the matter of neutrality exactly as if they were warships.³² On at least three different occasions the Argentine authorities were called upon to intern German merchant ships, which in one way or another had infringed the neutrality regulations issued by the government. The *Patagonia*, regarding whose movements we know nothing save that she had violated certain of the Argentine neutrality decrees, was ordered interned on January 18, 1915.³³ On the 22d of the same month similar action was taken in the case of the *Seidlitz*. This vessel had formed a part of von Spee's fleet from September 3 to 8, 1914; after the battle off the Falkland Islands she had taken refuge in the port of San Antonio on the coast of Patagonia. As she was unwilling to leave at the expiration of twenty-four hours she was convoyed by an Argentine warship to Puerto Militar, where she was interned for the duration of the war.³⁴ Finally on February 26, 1915, the steamer *Holgar*, which had been for thirty-six days in the service of the auxiliary cruiser *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, was

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

ordered interned in the waters of El Arsenal del Rio de la Plata.³⁵

As the European War took place on greater proportions and the two groups of belligerents strove to destroy not merely the military but also the economic resources of their enemies, it was inevitable that irritating problems affecting Argentina should arise. When in February 1916 the British government drew up the so-called "Black List" and proceeded to apply it to German firms and to neutral firms dealing with German houses in Argentina a vigorous opposition was aroused which played directly into the hands of the German propagandists. A number of commercial and other organizations, such as the Grain Exchange, the Association of Produce Merchants and the Industrial Union of Argentina as well as the "Museo Social" exerted pressure on the government to secure from Great Britain a modification of the terms of the Black List. Dr. Muratore, the minister of foreign affairs, did, as a matter of fact, lodge a protest with the British government. Very little, however, was accomplished, and the entry of the United States into the war in the following year still further increased the disabilities under which trade by or with German firms was carried on.³⁶

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 32. On the Holgar case cf. *New York Times*, February 21, 1915.

³⁶ Any detailed discussion of the effect of the Black List lies outside of the scope of this chapter. The material is not readily accessible, as the Argentine government has not published its correspondence with Great Britain on this subject. The Argentine point of view was set forth with much erudition and considerable vehemence by Dr. E. S. Zeballos during the course

Prior to the entry of the United States into the war Argentina was confronted with one diplomatic incident which might have taken on a character of exceptional gravity. This was the seizure on November 28, 1915, of the Argentine ship *Presidente Mitre* by the British auxiliary cruiser *Orama*. The *Presidente Mitre*, though sailing under the Argentine flag and regularly employed in coast-wise navigation as a part of the merchant marine, was the property of the Compañía Hamburgo Sudamericana, which the Argentine law regarded as a foreign corporation, despite the fact that it maintained an office in Buenos Aires. Great Britain justified her procedure on the grounds that she had abrogated Article 57 of the Declaration of London which established that the neutral or enemy character of a ship is determined by the flag which it is entitled to carry.³⁷ In place of this article she adopted the rule that the nationality of the owner should be considered as the test of enemy or friendly character. In the case in question she might have alleged with some show of reason that the Treaty of February 2, 1825,³⁸ between

of a series of lectures delivered July 23-26, 1916, in the Law School of the University of Buenos Aires and published in an English translation under the title of *A Critical Study of the Emergency Legislation of Warring Nations* (Cleveland, The Penton Press Co., 1916).

³⁷ Order in Council, October 25, 1915. Cf. J. W. Garner, *International Law and the World War*, 2 vols. (London & New York, 1920), Vol. I, p. 97.

³⁸ República Argentina. *Tratados, Convenciones, Protocolos, Actos y Acuerdos Internacionales*, 10 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1911), Vol. viii, pp. 278-288.

Argentina and herself was still in force. According to this instrument the nationality of a ship is determined by the country in which it is built, the character of its ownership, and the nationality of its crew. The *Presidente Mitre* had been built in Germany and was owned by a German company; the members of its crew, however, were naturalized Argentine citizens.

In its protest against the seizure of this ship the Argentine foreign office pointed out that the vessel had navigated under the Argentine flag for fifteen years and for the preceding ten years had touched only at Argentine ports. The Argentine government likewise stressed the fact that the Argentines were, to a large degree, dependent on German-owned vessels for the carriage of their commerce, and especially the transportation of coal for the use of the navy. But this interesting case never came before a prize court for adjudication, as the British government, yielding to the demands of Argentina, released the ship. This solution of the controversy was generally regarded as a triumph of Argentine diplomacy as well as an example of magnanimity on the part of Great Britain.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ The diplomatic correspondence relative to the *Presidente Mitre* has never been published. The facts in the case, however, are reasonably clear as they have been the subject of repeated discussions in the Argentine press. The account given above follows in the main the views of Benito Javier Pérez Verdía, "La Situación internacional de la Argentina ante la diplomacia y el derecho," in *La Revista de Derecho Historia y Letras*, Vol. LXI., pp. 195-196 (October, 1918), and Leopoldo Lugones, "La Devolución del *Presidente Mitre*" in *La Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas*, January 1916, and reprinted in *Mi Beligerancia* (Buenos Aires, 1917), pp. 136-142. Dr. Zeballos, on the other hand, affirms that Great Britain, though returning the

The year 1917 ushers in a new chapter in Argentine diplomacy. With the notification by the German minister Count von Luxburg on February 2, that the Imperial German government had established about Great Britain, France and Italy a blockaded zone into which the ships of neutral powers would enter at their peril⁴⁰ the great war embarked upon a new phase to which none of the maritime powers of the New World could long remain indifferent. In certain respects Argentina was ill-prepared to cope with the new emergency. The preceding year had witnessed a momentous change in the political evolution of the republic. Thanks to the electoral law of 1912, providing for secret and compulsory voting, the Argentine electorate was given its first opportunity to register freely and without pressure its choice for candidates for the presidency. The result was the complete overturn of the party in power, which for over a generation had made and unmade presidents, and the election of the representative of the Radical Party, Dr. Hipólito Irigoyen. Even to his friends and supporters the new executive was something of an

ship, acted throughout the whole transaction in a high-handed and arbitrary manner, chiefly through her insistence that the Argentine government obtain from the owners of the ship and her cargo a written agreement to present no claims for damages or indemnity. Cf. his comments on the article of Pérez Verdía, *loc. cit.*, and his speech before the Argentine Congress, reproduced in the *Congressional Record* of the United States for February 21, 1916, p. 3366.

⁴⁰ Luxburg to Becu, February 2, 1917. República Argentina, *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto presentada al Honorable Congreso Nacional correspondiente al año 1916-1917* (Buenos Aires 1917), pp. 7-8.

enigma, while his foreign policy and attitude towards the issues of the great war were subjects of the most diverse conjectures. Though he had entered upon his term of office on October 12, 1916, he had thus far given no intimation of his views on Argentina's foreign relations. It was regarded as strange that the legation at London was allowed to remain vacant; still more ominous was the president's failure to fill the all-important post of minister of foreign affairs, this portfolio being temporarily assigned early in February to Dr. Honorio Pueyrredón, minister of agriculture.⁴¹

Under these circumstances the Argentine reply to the German note of February 2 was awaited with some anxiety. In his communication, dated February 7, Pueyrredón merely informed Luxemburg that "the Argentine government laments that His Imperial Majesty has felt it necessary to adopt such extreme measures and declares that it will adjust its conduct as ever to the principles and fundamental norms of international law."⁴² The reply was generally regarded as an adequate and dignified statement of Argentina's position although there was a disposition in certain pro-Ally circles to regard it as too mild.

The rupture of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany on February 3, followed on April 6 by a declaration of war by the Congress of the United States, could hardly fail to awaken rever-

⁴¹ It was not until the end of July 1917 that Dr. Puerreydón was appointed minister of foreign affairs.

⁴² *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto presentada al Honorable Congreso Nacional correspondiente al año 1916-1917*, pp. 8-9.

berating echoes in Argentina.⁴³ On April 9 the following telegram signed by more than one hundred Argentine intellectuals was sent to President Wilson congratulating him on his war message:

“Interpreting the traditional conscience of our country, we wish to present the respectful homage of our admiration to the illustrious president of the sister republic, who with his splendid message and his actions has arisen to the height of the great emancipators of humanity. . . . We also manifest our fervent adhesion to the principles proclaimed in this immortal document, which henceforth will be the standard of democracy and liberty in the contest being waged against tyranny and absolutism, whose last defense is found in the central empires of Europe.”⁴⁴

With the realization that the New World was at length to be brought within the theatre of hostilities many thoughtful Argentines began to question the wisdom or even the possibility of indefinitely remaining aloof from the struggle. The actions of Cuba and Brazil in severing relations and in the case of the former republic in declaring war brought up the whole question of continental solidarity. The government, however,

⁴³ It is not without interest to note that on February 8 Dr. Rómulo S. Naón, the Argentine ambassador at Washington, telegraphed his government urging the Argentine foreign office to propose a Conference of Neutrals in Madrid “to exert moral influence to prevent the rupture between the United States and Germany ending in hostilities.” This suggestion was not acted on by the Argentine government. *La Prensa*, November 20, 1918.

⁴⁴ F. A. Barroetaveña (and others), *La Argentina ante la Guerra* (Buenos Aires, 1917), p. 3.

proceeded with caution. The note⁴⁵ of Ambassador Stimson of February 5 in which he not only informed the Argentine government that the United States had severed relations with Germany but also conveyed the hope of President Wilson that the remaining neutral powers might do likewise met with a simple acknowledgment.⁴⁶ On the other hand the announcement of the formal declaration of war called forth a reply which might be characterized as at least a moral approval of the action of the United States.

"The government of the Argentine Republic, in view of the causes which have prompted the United States to declare war against the government of the German Empire, recognizes the justice of that decision, founded as it is upon the violation of the principles of neutrality, established by the rules of international law which have been considered a definite accomplishment of civilization."⁴⁷

This declaration, from which it is clear that the government had no intention of any immediate departure from its policy of strict neutrality, may well have interpreted the sentiments of the majority of the Argentines.⁴⁸ Yet there were not lacking distinguished and

⁴⁵ Stimson to Pueyrredón, República Argentina, *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto . . . correspondiente al año 1916-1917*, p. 11.

⁴⁶ Pueyrredón to Stimson, February 9, 1917. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁴⁷ Pueyrredón to Stimson, April 10, 1917. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴⁸ The Argentine point of view is well expressed in the editorial of *La Prensa* of April 12, 1917. "The declaration of war between the United States and Germany has called forth another statement on the part of the government in the nature of state etiquette, and this time the government has openly declared its adherence to the principles which have caused

influential public men who regarded the course of the government as both injudicious and unpatriotic. Among these may be singled out for mention Dr. Luís María Drago, the eminent authority on international law, formerly minister of foreign affairs, and author of the well-known Drago Doctrine. In a carefully prepared statement issued a few days after the entry of the United States into the war he declared:

“As I advised our government, we should have followed the United States when it broke relations

the United States to take such extreme measures, which are no more than the contention of Argentina for the maintenance of the rights of neutrals and strict conformity with the dictates of international law. This latter declaration of Argentina, specifically endorsing the action of the United States, is a logical sequence of its policy as originally announced, and specifically recognizes the justification of the action of the United States by reason of the violation of the international law by the Germans. If Argentine vessels had been sunk, and Argentine lives been lost through the use of German corsairs and submarines, this country would have done no less than the United States. Argentina stands for the observance of international law and the maintenance of the rights of neutrals. When neutral rights are violated or denied, and when neutral vessels are sunk under the pretext of a blockade which is not and cannot be made effective, an aggrieved country, like the United States or Brazil, is justified in resorting to extreme measures in defense of its rights and its honor, and at the same time championing the rights of smaller countries. Argentina, by recognizing the rectitude of the course of the United States, in no way violates her iterated and reiterated declaration of neutrality; she simply recognizes the correctness of the procedure of a sister republic, as she would expect other countries to recognize her right to proceed in a similar manner under similar circumstances.” Quoted in *The South American* (New York), June 1917, p. 24.

with Germany. Such action was justified by the German notification that it prohibited all ships from crossing a war-zone arbitrarily established on a free sea against all conception of international law. The situation is aggravated today. The war between Germany and America is a struggle of democracy versus absolutism and no American nation can remain neutral without denying its past and compromising its future. How can Argentina break the bonds of solidarity with its Latin brothers and abandon its traditional policy, to remain in an isolation which nothing would justify? We ought to prepare to range ourselves as soon as possible with those who are opposing the oppression of an absolute government. We should constitute the material and moral union of this continent for the defense of law and democratic principles in international relations.”⁴⁹

Equally emphatic was the distinguished publicist, Sr. Leopoldo Lugones. In an article entitled “Neutrality Impossible,” written on April 7, he declared:

“When President Wilson proposed to us that we accompany the United States in defining its attitude towards the piratical blockade by breaking likewise our relations with Germany, this proposal, in addition to being an appeal to our national honor, recalled to us the historic rôle which becomes us. Our refusal shattered the structure of American solidarity, since it was tantamount to a declaration of isolation in the face of the most grave continental peril. We were ungrateful towards our sister nation, and recreant to our own destiny. The cause which (the United States) upholds is exactly the same as we should uphold; respect for neutrals and defenseless right, the equality of the strong and the weak before the laws of humanity. There was repeated in this case, although with much greater gravity, the same error as when we kept silence before

⁴⁹ *La Razón*, April 10, 1917.

the invasion of Belgium; the same lack of intelligence and real dignity.”⁵⁰

Events were soon to show on what a slender foundation the neutrality proclaimed by the Argentine government rested. On April 4 a German submarine sank the Argentine bark *Monte Protegido* in the North Atlantic some thirty miles off the Scilly Islands; the captain and crew were abandoned to their fate in a small boat and were only saved by the timely arrival of a British warship.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Article entitled “Neutralidad Imposible,” originally published in *La Nación* of April 7, 1917, and reprinted in *Mi Beligerancia* (Buenos Aires, 1917), pp. 156-172. Views of similar tenor were held by Dr. Naón, Argentine ambassador at Washington.

There were a number of Argentine writers and public men who interpreted the intervention of the United States from an entirely different angle and who strongly deprecated any effort to bring their country in line with the northern republic. A striking instance of obfuscation on the part of one of Argentina's foremost thinkers is to be seen in the declaration of Dr. Estanislao S. Zeballos, the editor, as has been noted, of *La Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras*. In an editorial appearing in *La Revista* as late as September 1917, he declared: “It is my conviction that the United States has not entered the war against Germany. This is a matter of appearance only. In reality she is directing her action against Great Britain in order to dislodge her from her control of the seas and the world's commerce. A war between Great Britain and Japan on the one hand and the United States on the other appears a fatal and inevitable event, an inevitable consequence of the liquidation of the present war.”

⁵¹ Deposition of the Captain, Hans Teigen. Villegas (Argentine chargé d'affaires at London) to Pueyrredón, April 15, 1917. *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto . . . correspondiente al año 1916-1917*, pp. 47-51.

When the news of this attack reached Buenos Aires all the latent but wide-spread hostility against Germany came quickly to a head. On April 22 an immense mass-meeting was held in one of the public squares of the capital. The objects of this gathering, according to the announcement, were to protect against the violations of international law committed by Germany, to voice approval of the war message of President Wilson, to express sympathy with the allied cause, and to demand that the government adopt an attitude in consonance with national dignity and past traditions. Speeches were made by the lawyer and publicist, Dr. F. A. Barroetaveña, whose work *Alamania contra el Mundo* has already been noted, by Dr. Juan C. Rébora, a member of the law faculty of the University of Buenos Aires, by Dr. Alfredo L. Palacios, professor of industrial legislation in the same institution, and by Sr. Ricardo Rojas, the author of the standard work on Argentine literature. At least two of the speakers advocated the immediate severance of diplomatic relations with Germany. After the meeting the great crowd marched through the principal streets of the capital.⁵²

In the crisis caused by the destruction of the Argentine ship the government acted with commendable vigor. Under date of April 22 an energetic note was telegraphed to Dr. Molina, the Argentine minister at Berlin, for immediate submission to the German government. After reciting the circumstances under which the *Monte Protegido* was sunk, the Argentine government declared

⁵² *La Argentina ante la Guerra*, p. 9 ff.

that in accordance with its declaration of February 7 it considered that the sinking of this ship "constituted an offense against the sovereignty of the nation, which imposes upon the government of the republic the duty of formulating . . . a just protest and the demand for proper explanations. The Argentine government hopes that the Imperial German government in acknowledging the right of the republic will give the satisfaction which it owes her, and will likewise make redress for the offense against the Argentine flag and will pay an indemnity for the damages inflicted. The government of his Imperial Majesty will not fail to recognize the promptitude with which the Argentine government wishes to secure an answer to its claim."⁵³

The Imperial foreign minister, Zimmermann, was under no illusions as to the gravity of the situation in America as affecting Germany in the last days of the fatal month of April 1917. The United States, Panama and Cuba were already formally at war with the Imperial German government; Brazil and Bolivia had broken relations; other powers seemed to be on the point of taking the same step. Should the legitimate grievances of Argentina not be fully and promptly met, the inevitable consequence would be the diplomatic rupture with the most powerful and influential of the remaining neutral states. The prestige of Germany, already dim, was in danger of total eclipse in the New World.⁵⁴

⁵³ Pueyrredón to Molina, April 22, 1917, *ibid.*, p. 56-58.

⁵⁴ Other evidence of the tension in the relations between the two countries is not lacking. According to Associated Press despatches the Argentine authorities on April 15 ordered

These considerations doubtless explain the avidity with which the German foreign office caught at any plausible pretext which might placate Argentina, while at the same time reserving to Germany future liberty of action. Luckily the *Monte Protegido* had weighed anchor in Pernambuco, the last American port at which she touched, on January 20,⁵⁵ and hence was in entire ignorance of the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare made by the German government on January 31. Accordingly on April 28 Zimmermann delivered to the Argentine minister at Berlin a note with which he hoped to close the incident:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note of the 24th inst., in which you were kind enough to inform me that the Argentine bark *Monte Protegido* had been sunk by a German ship. From the information furnished by the government of the Argentine Republic it appears that the bark weighed anchor in Pernambuco before the German declaration of January 31 had been published, and that, as a result, she could not be aware of the new German measures. In the light of this information the Imperial government, desirous of demonstrating the friendly spirit with which it is animated, hastens to assure the Argentine government that it is

the interned German ships to be concentrated in the inner harbor of Buenos Aires and armed guards were placed upon them. Investigation showed that the crews had seriously damaged their machinery. At this same period all employes of German, Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian nationality were dismissed from the government arsenals and work shops. *New York Times*, April 15, 19, 20, 1917.

⁵⁵ This is the date given by the Captain of the *Monte Protegido* in his formal deposition before the Argentine Consul General at London. In his despatch of April 22 Pueyrredón gives the date of January 27.

disposed to offer reparation for the damage caused and expresses at the same time its sincere regrets for the loss of the Argentine bark. These regrets are the more lively since the Imperial government is anxious to conserve, as always, the amicable relations which have never ceased to exist between the two countries, and of which the Imperial government has given proofs on many occasions.”⁵⁶

And in order to divest the incident of any lingering unpleasantness, Count Luxburg, the German minister at Buenos Aires, craved permission of Pueyrredón on May 2 to grant him a personal interview in order to assure him that “this incident” was a lamentable result of the conditions of intensive warfare forced upon the German government and in no wise to be construed as “a lack of respect for the Argentine national flag. That symbol of the sovereignty of a friendly people is honored and respected by all Germans. As a proof of this attitude the German fleet will avail itself of the first opportunity to salute the Argentine flag.”⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Molina to Pueyrredón, April 29, 1917 (containing note of Zimmermann to Molina of April 28), *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto . . . correspondiente al año 1916-1917*, p. 60. On June 5, 1920, the Argentine foreign office announced that Germany had paid Argentina the equivalent of \$62,000 for the sinking of the *Monte Protegido*. *New York Times*, June 6, 1920.

⁵⁷ Luxburg to Pueyrredón, May 2, 1917, *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto . . . correspondiente al año 1916-1917*, p. 61. Four years later this event actually took place. Early in September 1921 an official reception was given the Argentine minister in Germany on board the German cruiser *Hannover* in the harbor of Kiel. The Argentine flag was raised and saluted. Cf. *La Prensa* (New York), September 3, 1921.

These reiterated assurances of the Imperial government were regarded as entirely satisfactory by the Argentine foreign office and the incident was regarded as closed.⁶⁸ The resulting harmony was of short duration. Before the summer was well advanced two more Argentine ships fell victims to German submarine ruthlessness. On June 6 the bark *Oriana*, while carrying a cargo of steel and iron to Genoa, was sunk near Toulon; all the crew were saved. Of much greater importance—at least it was so regarded by the Argentine government—was the case of the steamship *Toro*, which, bound for Genoa with a cargo of hides, wool, frozen meat, etc., was on June 22 sunk some eighty miles to the southwest of Cape Spartel. The crew were given barely five minutes to leave the doomed ship. The captain of the ill-fated craft was an Argentine citizen; the crew consisted of Argentines, Italians, Portuguese, Uruguayans and one Englishman. Part of the crew

⁶⁸ Yet criticism of the government was by no means lacking. The conviction persisted that the foreign office was taking a very narrow and legalistic attitude towards international affairs. This point of view is clearly expressed in a remarkable speech delivered by Deputy Rodolfo Moreno (hijo) in Congress on June 20, 1917. "Confronted with the most baffling and perplexing international situation in our history, we have left all our fronts uncovered. In London—where decisions of transcendental importance are taking place—we have no minister. For this strategic post we should have the most competent man in the entire diplomatic service. At home the ministry of foreign affairs remains vacant, all of which means that the Executive Power considers that all this is banal and of secondary importance at a time when the whole world is suffering the most tremendous convulsions." Quoted in *La Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas*, July 1917, p. 420.

were taken to Gibraltar by a French warship; the remainder were towed to Tangiers by a Spanish sailing craft. In the case of the *Toro* as in the case of the *Monte Protegido* no equivocation as to the nationality of the ship was possible; the Argentine flag, together with the words "Toro" and "Buenos Aires" were conspicuously painted on both sides of the steamer.⁶⁹

On being apprised of this latest attack the Argentine government displayed both energy and promptness. After making full and exhaustive investigations of the circumstances under which the ship was sunk, the Argentine minister at Berlin, Dr. Molina, on July 4 was instructed to present to the German foreign office a formal protest which in some respects partook of the character of an ultimatum. After noting the conditions under which the *Toro* was sunk, and referring to the Argentine declaration of intention to uphold the principles of international law as stated in the reply of the Argentine government to the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, the note continued:

"It (the Argentine declaration) was founded on this conception, that the Argentine government made its claim in the *Monte Protegido* case and accepted the explanations of the Imperial German government, inasmuch as it acknowledged the absolute right of the republic and granted in full the Argentine claim. In doing

⁶⁹ Deposition of the Captain of the *Toro*, summarized by the Argentine ambassador at Madrid. Avellaneda to Pueyrredón, July 3, 1917. República Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, *Memoria . . . correspondiente al año 1917-1918*, pp. 27-29. The text on the deposition is published in extenso, *ibid.*, pp. 32-36.

so the government understood that such attitude (of Germany) implied in the future the protection of Argentine shipping against the war measures to which the German government had seen fit to resort. The repetition of the offense, however, makes the moral satisfaction and the indemnities for material damages entirely insufficient to safeguard the right which has been flouted. It has been compelled, therefore, to enter a new protest and demand in addition to the moral redress and reparation of the wrong committed, the assurance of the German government to respect in the future the Argentine ships in their right to the freedom of the seas."⁶⁰

That the Argentine government was determined to maintain its position, even at the risk of precipitating a crisis, is indicated by the instructions furnished Molina by Pueyrredón. "Acknowledge by cable the receipt of this dispatch and advise of the date on which you present the note. Your Excellency will not fail to appreciate the significance of this protest and you will hold yourself prepared for every eventuality."⁶¹ And on July 7 or 8—less than a week after the dispatch of the protest—the German minister, Luxburg, in one of the telegrams intercepted by the department of state of the United States, declared in a confidential telegram to Zimmermann: "If the answer is unsatisfactory there is to be a rupture of relations."⁶² And in another intercepted telegram of the same date he requested instructions as to whether, after the severance of relations,

⁶⁰ Pueyrredón to Molina, July 4, 1917, *Ibid.*, pp. 27-29.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Luxburg to Zimmermann, July 7 or 8, *Official Bulletin* (Washington), December 21, 1917.

he was to return home or go to Paraguay or possibly to Chile.⁶³

The reply of Zimmermann was not sent until July 23, the delay being probably due to the advice of Luxburg, who was daily hoping that a change of ministry would produce a situation more favorable to Germany.⁶⁴ As the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare had been in effect for over five months the Imperial government obviously could not invoke any reasons analogous to that advanced in the case of the *Monte Protegido*. The destruction of the *Toro* was, however, justified on the ground that the ship, sunk outside the barred zone, carried both absolute and conditional contraband, such goods being liable to capture, according to Article 30 of the Declaration of London, when destined to a hostile territory. Moreover the ship carrying such goods was subject to capture and destruction if it could not be conveyed to a port without compromising the safety of the vessel effecting the capture.⁶⁵ The action of the submarine was therefore strictly according to international law, especially since Article 50, which provided that persons on board should be saved, had likewise been complied with. But "if the

⁶³ *Ibid.* It should be noted that Mr. Lansing was in error when, in giving these telegrams to the press, he styled Luxburg "German *chargé d'affaires*." As a matter of fact Luxburg was duly accredited German minister and is so styled in all the official correspondence addressed to him by the Argentine ministry of foreign affairs.

⁶⁴ Luxburg to Zimmermann, July 19, 1917. *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Articles 37 and 49 of Convention of London.

Argentine government believes that the commander of the submarine has not proceeded in conformity with these international rules, the Imperial government will be pleased to receive the explanations of the Argentine government which it will take into due consideration. Moreover, the case of the *Toro* will be examined with minute care by the prize court. Should the results of the investigations show that the rules of international law already cited did not permit the sinking of the *Toro*, it is understood that the German government will offer proper indemnities." Zimmermann added that "he desired to hope that it is superfluous to affirm that the 'painful accident' was not caused by the slightest lack of respect for the noble flag of the Argentine Republic, either on the part of the German government or the Imperial navy."⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Zimmermann to Molina, July 23. Contained in dispatch from Molina to Pueyrredón, July 24, 1917. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-49.

While the tension caused by the sinking of the *Toro* was at its height the United States fleet under Admiral Caperton visited Buenos Aires. The diplomatic antecedents of this event are not entirely clear. In an executive session, held on June 29 and 30, the Senate signified its approval of the declared intention of the executive to receive "in national waters the North American fleet in the character of a friend (*en calidad de amiga*) in case it should visit them, a line of conduct which the nation is authorized to adopt not only on the basis of its own sovereignty but also on the basis of the principles established in recent conferences and international declarations and in the Treaty with the United States subscribed to at San Juan de Flores, July 10, 1853."

This action of the Senate was sharply criticized. As pointed out by *La Prensa* on July 12, to receive the fleet "as a friend" was a redundancy since the United States was an excellent

These contentions of Zimmermann were rejected *in toto* by the Argentine foreign office. The pertinent sections of Pueyrredón's reply, dispatched on August 4, are worth quoting, as they constitute a novel and striking interpretation of that section of international law dealing with the status of contraband on the high seas:

"I have before me the note of Your Excellency of July 23 in reply to the question relating to the sinking of the Argentine ship *Toro*. Your Excellency circum-

friend of Argentina as were all the other belligerent powers. To base such action on "conferences and international declarations" was in violation of the provisions of the Second Hague Conference which in Article 12 of the thirteenth convention limited the sojourn of belligerent fleets in neutral harbors to twenty-four hours. Finally the provisions of the Treaty of San Juan de Flores were not germane to the present situation, as this instrument was simply a treaty of commerce and amity. Suggestions were broached both by *La Prensa* and several political leaders that the government should avail itself of the right of each nation to introduce modifications in the text of Article 12 to the effect that all belligerent fleets be permitted to remain in Argentine waters as in times of peace, provided the theatre of hostilities remained distant. But no such official action was taken by the government.

On July 11 Ambassador Stimson informed Sr. Pueyrredón that in harmony with the wishes of the United States government the fleet would be pleased to pay a visit of courtesy to the Argentine Republic. On July 12 Pueyrredón replied that "the Argentine government will have the greatest pleasure in receiving a visit from the ships and sailors of your friendly country." The fleet did, as a matter of fact, arrive late in July and was received with every mark of courtesy. Cf. *La Nación* for July 13, 1917, where the notes interchanged between Stimson and Pueyrredón are published, and the critical article by Zeballos, "Gobierno Radical. La Visita de la Escuadra Americana." *Revista de Derecho, Historia, y Letras*, Vol. 57 (August 1917), pp. 526-538.

scribes the question within the terms of the Convention of London, according to your interpretation, and the later modifications introduced by the belligerents. These are not the grounds on which the Argentine government has based its demands; nor are they the grounds on which it bases its rights as a neutral and sovereign nation. The differences existing between the government of his Imperial German Majesty and the Argentine government should be settled on the basis of inalterable principles and concepts. . . . While the plenitude of national sovereignty amply guarantees the person and the possessions of German subjects in the republic, it is not admissible that Argentine interests on the seas be attacked and destroyed by the fleets of the empire. The republic supports as a neutral the remote consequences of the war but it cannot accept as legitimate, immediate injuries on the basis of conventions to which it was not a party, or arising from a struggle in which it is not a participant.

"It is inconceivable that its (*i. e.*, the republic's) natural products should at any time be qualified as contraband of war, and never have they appeared in such guise in the treaties of which Argentina has been a signatory. *They are the fruits of the efforts of the nation in its vital work, (produced) not to satisfy war requirements, but to meet the normal needs of humanity.*"⁶⁷

Undoubtedly the acceptance of this Argentine doctrine that natural products "as the fruits of the efforts of the nation" should not be considered as contraband would mark a distinct step forward in the domain of international law. Unfortunately, however, the tendencies throughout the course of the war were quite in the

⁶⁷ Molina to Zimmermann, in dispatch of Pueyrredón to Molina, August 4, 1917. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-51. (The italics are not in the original.)

contrary direction. As is well known, both groups of belligerents were prone to expand the list of both absolute and conditional contraband, with the constant disposition to merge the latter into the former. Argentina would have had great difficulty in upholding her doctrine had she made any attempt to carry it out on a large scale by sending her products in Argentine ships to Europe. As will presently appear, Germany's reluctant consent to spare Argentine ships was based on motives in which the question touching the status and definition of contraband goods played a minor part.

An analysis of the correspondence which followed this virtual ultimatum reveals the German government impaled on the horns of a serious dilemma. To have yielded to Argentina's demands would have been tantamount to an admission of the illegality of the submarine blockade. It would have meant the granting to the Platine republic concessions vouchsafed to none of the other neutral powers. On the other hand to have subjected Argentina to the same treatment as had been accorded, for instance, to Norway, would in all probability have thrown the most influential and powerful of the remaining American neutral powers into the ranks of Germany's enemies. It was obvious to the German foreign office that the moral effects of such an act would have been very great. And to this moral consideration were added others of a somewhat different character. A break with Argentina would have affected adversely the tranquillity and economic status (and possibly the possessions) of the thousands of German citizens do-

miciled in Argentina.⁶⁸ It was also clearly in the interests of the Imperial government to maintain good relations with her best market in South America as a basis for the great economic expansion which was confidently expected would follow the war. In comparison with these factors the military and tactical advantages to be gained by submarine attacks on Argentine shipping would be very slight, especially since the amount of Argentine tonnage likely to venture into European waters was all but negligible.

In its embarrassment the German foreign office characteristically sought a *via media* which it hoped would prove a sop to Argentine pride and at the same time leave the submarine blockade unaffected. Through the medium of Luxburg, a formula was proposed whose tenor was as follows: In its desire to maintain cordial relations with Argentina, and as a striking proof of Germany's friendship for the republic, the German government resolved to apply to the solution of the *Toro* case the same procedure followed in the case of the *Monte Protegido*; it will therefore pay the Argentine government a suitable indemnity for the loss of the *Toro*, and finally will recognize the freedom of the seas as far as Argentine navigation is concerned. In

⁶⁸ According to the census of 1914 there were 26,995 Germans residing in the republic. *The Economic Development of the Argentine Republic during the last Fifty Years*, p. 10. Dr. Zeballos, speaks of "one hundred thousand" Germans who would have been adversely affected by a break between Argentina and Germany. "Gobierno Radical," *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras*, Vol. 58, p. 248 (October 1917).

return the Argentine government is to undertake that no more ships sailing under its flag shall attempt to cross the war zone established by the different belligerents. The Imperial German government agrees, however, to permit the Argentine ships already bound for Europe freely to reach their destination and return to home ports.⁶⁹

The Argentine government, in so far as its views were enunciated by the foreign office, refused even to consider such a proposal.⁷⁰ Forced at last to drop all subterfuge and evasion, the Imperial government yielded in every point to the Argentine contention. On August 28, Luxburg dispatched the following note to Pueyrredón:

“SIR: By order of my government I have the honor to inform Your Excellency the following: With the view to maintaining the old and cordial relations with the Argentine Republic, and affording a proof by acts of the friendly sentiments repeatedly expressed, the Imperial government after having examined anew the question referring to the steamer *Toro* has resolved to indemnify the government of the republic for the loss sustained by the sinking of said vessel, and to submit the assessment of said loss to the same procedure as observed in the case of the *Monte Protegido*.

“The Imperial government while offering a clear proof of its desire to give to the question of the sinking of the *Toro* an imposing and dignified solution (‘una solución grande y elevada’) declares at the same time that the freedom of the seas, in which Argentina has

⁶⁹ The text of the proposed protocol given in the dispatch of Pueyrredón to Molina, August 17, *Memoria . . . correspondiente al año 1917-1918*, p. 54.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

an immediate interest, is one of the principal objects of the war. In consequence, and though its liberty of action is restricted by the illegal proceedings of its enemies, it accepts with pleasure the rules of international law, and will endeavor to fulfill them. The Imperial naval forces have orders and instructions in accordance with these points of view.

"The Imperial government feels convinced that in view of the preceding declarations and under these circumstances no further incident is likely to arise to disturb the friendly and traditional relations between Germany and the Argentine Republic.

"Accept, Sir, the reiterated assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

"(Signed) K. LUXBURG."⁷¹

On the basis solely of the official correspondence which passed between the Argentine minister of foreign affairs and the German foreign office on the subject of the *Toro* and the treatment of Argentine ships entering the blockaded zone, Argentina would seem to have won a complete and spectacular triumph. Everything asked for had been granted apparently without reservation or subterfuge of any kind. Argentina found herself in the enviable position of having extorted from the Imperial German government concessions vouchsafed no other neutral. Well might Sr. Pueyrredón, through whose hands these negotiations passed, "recognize and duly appreciate the magnanimous and dignified manner" (*la forma grande y elevada*)⁷² with which Germany had acceded to the Argentine demands. The annals of Argentine diplomacy fail to record a similar triumph.

⁷¹ Luxburg to Pueyrredón, *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

⁷² Pueyrredón to Molma, September 12, 1917, *Ibid.*, p. 65.

Thanks to the revelations of the department of state of the United States government, we are now able to appreciate the true character of Argentina's diplomatic victory and at the same time gain a remarkable insight into the diplomatic methods pursued by the Imperial German government and by one of its most important and trusted agents. The famous Luxburg dispatches, of which something over four hundred came into the possession of our state department, were in part made public on three different occasions. On September 8, 1917, were published three intercepted telegrams sent by Luxburg to Berlin through the medium of the Swedish legation at Buenos Aires. On October 29 of the same year our state department gave out two more dispatches; finally on December 20 were made public thirty-seven additional telegrams, of which eleven were from the German foreign office to Luxburg, one from Luxburg to an unnamed correspondent in Santiago de Chile, and the remainder from Luxburg to Berlin.⁷³ Though an interval of some three months and a half elapsed between the publication of the first and third batches of telegrams they are all integral parts of a single series, which extends, unfortunately with many gaps, from May 19 to September 1. Partly from the circumstances attending their publication, partly owing to their contents, the first three dispatches aroused a passionate interest largely absent when the second and third sets were made public. Though these three tele-

⁷³ These telegrams are published *in extenso* in the *Official Bulletin* (Washington) on September 8, October 30 and December 21, 1917.

grams have been frequently reprinted their historical importance warrants their inclusion here:

"May 19, 1917, No. 32. This government has now released the German and Austrian ships in which hitherto a guard has been placed. In consequence of the settlement of the *Monte* [*Protegido*] case there has been a great change of public feeling. The government will in the future only clear Argentine ships as far as Las Palmas. I beg that the small steamers *Oran* and *Guazo*, January 31, [meaning, which sailed on this date] 300 tons, which are now nearing Bordeaux, with a view to changing flags, may be spared if possible, or else sunk without a trace being left (*spurlos versenkt*).

"LUXBURG."

The second message reads:

"July 3, 1917, No. 59. I learn from a reliable source that the acting minister of foreign affairs, who is a notorious ass and Anglophile, declared in a secret session to the Senate that Argentina would demand from Berlin a promise not to sink more Argentine ships. If not agreed to relations would be broken off. I recommend refusal, or, if necessary, calling in the mediation of Spain.

"LUXBURG."

The third message reads:

"July 9, 1917, No. 64. Without showing any tendency to make concessions postpone reply to Argentine note until receipt of further reports. Change of ministry probable. As regards Argentine steamers, I recommend either compelling them to turn back, sinking them without any trace, or letting them through. They are all quite small.

"LUXBURG."

Of the immediate effect of the publication of these dispatches, especially the phrase "*spurlos versenkt*" or "sinking without trace," we are not for the moment con-

cerned. As will be presently noted this evidence of cold-blooded cynicism on the part of Luxburg and the moral complicity of the Berlin government in his intrigues stirred public opinion to its depths, and but for the action of President Irigoyen would have caused Argentina to break relations with Germany. Our present problem is to examine the entire series of telegrams for the light which they shed on the settlement of the submarine controversy. The forty-two confidential dispatches dealing for the most part with the same topics will prove an invaluable supplement to the official dispatches which passed between the two foreign offices. It should be noted, however, that the value of the Luxburg telegrams is discounted by the Argentine minister for foreign affairs, who declared on the publication of the second lot that they "showed a number of inaccuracies so surprising that no epithet would fit them, as they are at complete variance both in substance and form with the terms in which the negotiations were entered into, carried on, and brought to a conclusion."¹⁴ While all due consideration must be accorded the statement of an official of Sr. Pueyrredón's importance, it would be ingenuous to regard the Luxburg dispatches as entirely unworthy of credence. Unscrupulous and treacherous Luxburg undoubtedly was, but there is no reason to believe that he would intentionally deceive his own government on an issue of such importance as the settlement of the submarine controversy. It is perfectly true that certain of the dispatches "are at complete

¹⁴ *New York Times*, December 21, 1917.

variance both in substance and form with the terms in which the negotiations were entered into and carried on"; that they were on this account inaccurate by no means follows. Assuming that Luxburg was acting in good faith with his own government, his telegrams reveal the fact that throughout the negotiations on the submarine issue the Berlin foreign office regarded President Irigoyen as its friend and that it endeavored, not without success, to negotiate with him over the head of the minister of foreign affairs, who was regarded by Luxburg as a partizan of the Allies and probably bought by Allied gold. The German minister throughout treated Sr. Pueyrredón with scant courtesy. In the cablegram of July 3 he was described, as we have seen, as "a notorious ass and Anglophile"; in the telegram dated July 7 or 8 he is characterized as "a theatrical person who has shown an insane cunning in preventing me from having an interview with the president";⁷⁵ on August 4 Zimmermann was informed that "the minister of marine and the minister for foreign affairs are probably bribed."⁷⁶

It may readily be understood that as long as the views of Pueyrredón determined the orientation of Argentina's foreign policy Luxburg should regard the situation with pessimism. Under these conditions the typical Prussian policy of force and ruthlessness was advocated. The dispatches of May 19, July 3 and July 9, already quoted, advocated a policy of no concessions,

⁷⁵ Luxburg to Zimmermann, *Official Bulletin* (Washington), December 21, 1917.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

with the recommendation that all Argentine vessels entering the barred zone be sunk without trace, on the theory that dead men tell no tales. The moral effect produced by a display of force is suggested in the telegram of July 7. "Our attitude toward Brazil," declares Luxburg, "has created the impression here that our easy-going good nature can be counted on. This is dangerous in South America, where the people under thin veneer are Indians. A submarine squadron with full powers to me might possibly save the situation."⁷⁷ This demand for a submarine squadron to salute the president is repeated in later dispatches; the Berlin foreign office even went so far as to empower Luxburg "to announce a submarine visit should politico-military situation allow."⁷⁸

The telegrams of July 9 and 10 presage a change in Luxburg's attitude. His influence is suddenly exerted in favor of moderation; in place of sinking Argentine ships without trace, a policy of conciliation coupled with delay is urged upon the German government. The reasons for this *volte-face* may be readily discerned. In the dispatch of July 9 Luxburg holds out the hope that a change of ministry is impending;⁷⁹ the intransigent Pueyrredón as we learn from a later telegram is to give place to the more pliant Sr. Saguier.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Luxburg to Zimmermann, August 4, 1917; Luxburg to Kühlmann, August 10; Kühlmann to Luxburg, August 12, *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Luxburg to Zimmermann, *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ The reference to Sr. Saguier is found in Luxburg's dispatch to Zimmermann under date of July 24, *Ibid.*

And on the 9th or 10th the German minister succeeds in circumventing the "insane cunning of Pueyrredón" and gaining an audience with the president. On the latter date Luxburg cabled: "The president in the course of a long interview protested his friendship for Germany and firm desire for neutrality in spite of severe pressure. He demanded forbearance for all ships, about six in number, proceeding to the war zone, but conceded that contraband found on board might be destroyed. . . . He regretted the possibility of a rupture."⁸¹

Luxburg was quick to seize this favorable opening. On July 15 he informed Berlin that "at the special request of the president" he was prepared to submit a proposal for the settlement of the *Toro* controversy which he and Irigoyen had discussed together: The German reply to the Argentine demands should express regret for the sinking of the *Toro* and give desired assurances for the future provided that henceforth Argentine ships avoid the blockaded zone.⁸² This proposal, to be embodied in a protocol, was agreed to in substance by Zimmermann on or about July 24; Luxburg was authorized to draw up the protocol necessary to carry it into effect.⁸³

Through our analysis of the official correspondence between the German and Argentine foreign offices we have seen that after the German government had entirely failed to justify the sinking of the *Toro* on the

⁸¹ Luxburg to Zimmermann, *Ibid.*

⁸² Luxburg to Zimmermann, July 15, 1917 (two dispatches); same to same, July 19, *Ibid.*

⁸³ Zimmermann to Luxburg (about) July 24, 1917, *Ibid.*

ground that its cargo was both conditional and absolute contraband,⁸⁴ it actually proposed through Luxburg on August 17 a protocol covering practically the same ground as that proposed by Luxburg to Zimmermann at President Irigoyen's instance on July 15. We have also seen that this protocol was indignantly rejected by Pueyrredón. Confronted by this *non possumus*, the Berlin foreign office, as has already been pointed out, yielded in every point by unreservedly accepting the Argentine contention.⁸⁵

Pueyrredón's peremptory rejection of the protocol drafted along the very lines suggested by President Irigoyen to Luxburg—assuming always that the German minister had correctly interpreted the president's sentiments to his home government—seems at first sight inexplicable. A partial explanation is possibly to be found in the tardy realization on the president's part that such a solution of the submarine controversy, once it became a matter of public record, would bring down upon the administration a storm of opposition and would rightly be regarded in the light of a diplomatic fiasco. He may possibly have decided to make a virtue of necessity when he gave his sanction to Pueyrredón's uncompromising insistence on Argentina's rights.

Unfortunately the remaining telegrams of the Luxburg correspondence suggest a still less flattering explanation of the president's official rejection of the protocol. They also make it clear why the German government was not unwilling to make what seems at first

⁸⁴ See above, p. 209.

⁸⁵ See above, p. 213.

sight an abject capitulation to the Argentine demands. Up to this time the president and Luxburg in the course of their unofficial *pourparlers* followed fairly closely the course pursued by the two foreign offices in their official correspondence. But as early as August 13 Luxburg states that he had made new proposals "over the head of the minister for foreign affairs."⁸⁶ These proposals dealt once more with the protocol providing for the sparing of Argentine ships provided no more entered the war zone. But within a few days Irigoyen entirely abandoned the protocol idea, as we learn from the important dispatch of August 18, the pertinent sections of which may be quoted:

"Secret. I have had a long and agitated conference with the president. He is conscious that there have been errors in the past and has firm intention of adhering to neutrality and it is asserted that all pending conflicts may be settled on loyal broad lines on a basis of mutual confidence. He recommends that an early settlement should be arrived at. First, instead of there being a protocol *Argentine ships should on the one hand be tacitly spared and on the other prevented from going to sea.* As a matter of fact the use of the Argentine flag has latterly been refused repeatedly, moreover, ship-building material is exhausted."⁸⁷

These new recommendations of the president that a settlement be reached through a tacit understanding, which was not to be embodied in a protocol, met with the approval of the Berlin foreign office, provided the whole matter was kept secret. Kühlmann wrote on

⁸⁶ Luxburg to Kühlmann, *Official Bulletin* (Washington), December 21, 1917.

⁸⁷ Same to same, *Ibid.* (The italics are not in the original.)

August 25: ". . . the proposed sparing of ships must remain absolutely secret, otherwise submarine warfare would be endangered."⁸⁸ And on the following day he instructed Luxburg "to point out that we rely on his (*i. e.*, Irigoyen's) promise to prevent ships from proceeding to the blockade area."⁸⁹ Finally, in the last dispatch of the Berlin foreign office thus far made public the under minister for foreign affairs cabled Luxburg under date of September 1:

"Now that the *Toro* matter is satisfactorily disposed of, please express to the president the expectation of the Imperial government that he will prevent ships from proceeding to the blockade area."⁹⁰

As revealed in the files of the Luxburg correspondence, the attitude of President Irigoyen appears in an unfavorable light. As early as the middle of July he was regarded both by Luxburg and the Berlin foreign office as distinctly favorable to the German cause. As the negotiations over the sinking of the *Toro* proceeded he showed himself not unwilling to enter into *pourparlers* with the German minister over the head of his minister of foreign affairs. And finally he gave his sanction to a secret understanding which officially his government had repudiated in the strongest terms. The Imperial German government might well "accept with pleasure the rules of international law"⁹¹ as applied to

⁸⁸ Kühlmann to Luxburg, *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Same to same, August 26, 1917, *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Von dem Bussche to Luxburg, *Ibid.*

⁹¹ The quotation is from the note of Luxburg to Pueyrredón, August 28, 1917, in which the German government fully accepts the Argentine demands. *Memoria . . . correspondiente al año 1917-1918*, p. 54.

Argentine shipping since it had the promise of President Irigoyen that no more Argentine ships would trespass on the blockaded area.

It is quite possible that Irigoyen's motives would be open to a different and less unflattering interpretation were all of the dispatches—over four hundred—which passed between Luxburg and the German government available. It is conceivable also that Luxburg wilfully or unconsciously misrepresented the president's real attitude. And finally, were any plausible motive present, we might assume that the wily Luxburg intentionally deceived and misled his own government. But even taking into account all of these possibilities we can hardly escape the conclusion that the revelations furnished by the Luxburg correspondence sadly dim the brilliancy of Argentina's diplomatic triumph and place the executive in a position that is at least equivocal.

Thus far our interest in the Luxburg telegrams has been chiefly for the light they shed on certain mooted points of the submarine controversy and its solution. Of equal interest and significance, however, is the effect which they produced on the public opinion of Argentina as revealed in the press, in public meetings and demonstrations, and in the halls of Congress. In discussing this aspect of the subject it should be borne in mind that during the greater part of the autumn of 1917 when popular sentiment against Germany all but swept Argentina into the camp of the Allies only three of the dispatches were available; the famous telegrams of May 19, July 3, and July 9. In two of these telegrams is advocated the sinking of Argentine ships

without trace ; in the third the acting minister of foreign affairs, Sr. Pueyrredón, is characterized as " a notorious ass and Anglophile." ⁹² When two more were released on October 29 the tension had already perceptibly slackened ; by the time the third and last series was divulged, on December 21, there was little likelihood of any departure from neutrality and the publication occasioned comparatively little comment.

The first effect of the publication on September 8 of the " spurlos versenkt " dispatches was one of stupefaction coupled with incredulity. Even the most rabid of the partizans of the Allies found difficulty in believing that cynicism could go to such length. Yet here was the accredited representative of the German Empire, while enjoying the hospitality of a neutral and friendly country, with incredible brutality urging the cold-blooded murder of Argentine citizens on the high seas in order that the disappearance of Argentine ships without trace might forestall diplomatic complications between the two countries. ⁹³ But when a cablegram from Ambassador Naón at Washington confirmed the genuineness of the dispatches, the government on this occasion fully responsive to public opinion, acted with swiftness and decision. The German government was given no opportunity to recall its unlucky minister ; on September 12, four days after the publication of the incriminating dispatches, the diplomatic master of cere-

⁹² Cf. above, p. 216, where these dispatches are quoted in full.

⁹³ A trenchant analysis of the Luxburg dispatches is given by ex-Ambassador David Jayne Hill, " The Luxburg Secret Correspondence," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. XII, p. 135 (January 1918).

monies (*introducción de embajadores*) presented the following note to the first secretary of legation in the temporary absence of Luxburg:

"MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE: I regret to have to inform Your Excellency that as you have ceased to be *persona grata* to the Argentine government, the latter has decided to hand you your passports, which you will find herewith. The diplomatic master of ceremonies has received instructions to facilitate your departure from the republic's territory. God keep Your Excellency.

"(Signed) H. PUEYRREDÓN." ⁹⁴

Accompanying this note of expulsion was a passport duly signed by the minister of foreign affairs.⁹⁵ And on the same day Pueyrredón cabled the following note to the Argentine minister at Berlin:

"Please inform the government to which you are accredited of the following:

"The Argentine government, which has recognized and duly appreciated the magnanimous and dignified manner in which the German government met to the fullest extent the Argentine demands, regrets to inform Your Excellency that, by reason of the terms in which the published dispatches of your minister Count Karl von Luxburg are drawn, he has ceased to be *persona grata*, and consequently the Argentine government finds itself obliged to hand him his passports. This is communicated to Your Excellency to take the necessary measures." ⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Pueyrredón to Luxburg, *Memoria . . . correspondiente al año 1917-1918*, p. 64.

⁹⁵ Text of passport, *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 65. The circumstances under which Luxburg was handed his passports elicited the views of a number of authorities on international law, notably E. Clunet, "La remise de

The dispatch of these notes, whose contents were immediately communicated to the press, aroused intense excitement throughout all classes of the capital. The people at large, supposing that the expulsion of Luxburg was equivalent to the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany, rushed into the street. The wild enthusiasm found vent, not only in cheers and *vivas* for the country, the flag, and the government, but also in a series of attacks on the offices of the pro-German *Gaceta de España*, the German Club, and a number of business establishments including breweries.⁹⁷

Within a few days public attention shifted from the expulsion of Luxburg⁹⁸ to the larger problem of

passports à un agent diplomatique étranger (incident Germano-Argentine) " *Le Temps* (Paris), September 16, 1917, and E. S. Zeballos, in an editorial entitled "Gobierno Radical. Incidente del Conde Luxburg." in *La Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras* (Buenos Aires), t. lviii, pp. 254-265 (October 1917). Both M. Clunet and Dr. Zeballos make the contention that merely the handing over of passports is in no sense tantamount to a severance of diplomatic relations, and they cite a number of instances to prove their point. Dr. Zeballos' larger thesis is that the actions of Luxburg were purely personal; on no account may they be construed as an offense committed by the German government or nation.

⁹⁷ These demonstrations are explained by Zeballos (*loc. cit.*) as largely the work of hoodlums and foreigners, chiefly citizens of the countries of the *Entente*.

⁹⁸ Luxburg did not immediately leave the country. He was arrested in the interior and for a time was interned in the fortress of the rocky island of Martín García in the La Plata estuary. The German government protested against this treatment of the ex-minister and he was permitted for a time to

Argentina's relations with Germany. The apparent hesitancy and aimlessness of the Argentine foreign office began to arouse serious misgivings. The leading papers began to comment adversely both on the failure of the government to follow up its action of September 12 in dismissing Luxburg and on the absence of any further instructions to Dr. Molina, the Argentine minister at Berlin. At the same time the text of the note of September 12 in which Molina was ordered to inform the German foreign office of the dismissal of Luxburg became the object of painful scrutiny. An inevitable comparison was drawn between the vigorous and even drastic character of Luxburg's dismissal and the conciliatory tone of the note to the German chancellery manifesting appreciation for "the magnanimous and dignified manner" (*la forma grande y elevada*) in which Germany had settled the Argentine claims. "In this case," in the words of *La Nación*, "no possible con-

return to Buenos Aires. According to the correspondent of *Le Temps* (November 29, 1917), he requited the favors shown him by the Argentine authorities by holding a conference with Herr Wackendorf, ex-German chargé d'affaires at Montevideo and by the dispatch of a circular letter to the neutral legations in which he complained of his bad treatment. He finally left Buenos Aires for Europe in the motor-boat *Suecia*, secretly on May 9, 1918 (*La Nación*, May 10). On May 29, 1918, Count von Donhoff, the German secretary of legation, was formally received by the under-secretary of foreign affairs, thus giving him the formal status of German chargé d'affaires in Argentine. (*Ibid.*, May 29.) Cf., the safe-conducts granted Luxburg by the governments of Brazil, United States, France, and Great Britain, given in the *Memoria . . . correspondiente al año 1917-1918*, pp. 99-101.

sonance can be discovered between the one thing and the other. On the one hand the government decided to apply the severest measures it is possible for a government to adopt with a diplomatic representative, and on the other it paid homage to the German government in acknowledgment of its excellent behavior in connection with the same affair."⁹⁹ From absence of any word from the executive and from the tone of the note of September 12, the conviction rapidly gained ground that the government considered the Luxburg incident as closed and that it was not disposed to regard the German government as in any wise responsible for the acts of its agent.

The reaction was immediate and forceful. In marked contrast to the indecision and reticence of the govern-

⁹⁹ *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), September 16, 1917. Even more caustic in its comments was *El Día* of Montevideo, one of the most influential dailies in the neighboring Republic of Uruguay. "In place of it being the government of Berlin which offers to Argentina ample and categorical satisfaction on the duly sanctioned attitude of its diplomatic emissary in Buenos Aires, it is the chancellery of the neighboring country which begins by explaining, elucidating and emphasizing with its cordial recognition of the magnanimous and dignified manner in which was settled the *Toro* controversy, the line of conduct followed in reference to the views enunciated by the agent Luxburg. The Argentine government weakens its attitude through this note, which reveals a deplorable ignorance of this fundamental circumstance; That the government of Berlin did not disavow its minister when he expressed himself in such unusual and insulting terms in respect to the minister of foreign affairs, and in respect to the treatment of Argentine ships, which were to be destroyed without leaving a trace. September 14.

ment was the vigorous initiative of the citizens. A group of young men, who called themselves the "Comité Nacional de la Juventud," proceeded to organize a number of great demonstrations and public meetings in favor of an immediate severance of diplomatic relations with Germany. At one of these mass meetings, held at the Plaza del Congreso, on September 22, no less than 100,000 persons were present. Germany's attitude towards neutral powers and particularly towards Argentina, was described and severely censured; her disregard for treaties was denounced; her indifference to the solemn pacts of international law and the inhuman methods of warfare to which she had resorted—all were recalled in turn by the different orators who occupied the public tribune. Delegates from Uruguay sent over by national committees representing popular feeling in the neighboring republic offered pledges of Uruguayan solidarity. But the note most frequently stressed was the moral complicity of the German government in the conduct of its agent Luxburg. On this point the "rupturistas," as those in favor of a break with Germany were soon called, had gained a powerful recruit in the person of Argentina's foremost authority on international law, the distinguished publicist and statesman, Dr. Luís María Drago. As early as September 13 Dr. Drago had publicly declared:

"The telegram of Count Luxburg cannot be considered as an individual act affecting only himself personally. It was the result of an intimate collaboration between him and his government, and it was part and parcel of an exchange of data, opinion and views . . . intended to determine the conduct of the empire

in its naval policy in regard to us. It is not the minister accredited here who has ceased to be *persona grata* to this country; it is the German government itself, which received the monstrous advice to sink Argentine ships without leaving a trace, that is directly responsible for the abusive conduct of its agent, who long after the date of the telegram, has continued in the discharge of his double duties of diplomatic envoy and of a spy attached to the Swedish legation.

"The German government seems to have received with pleasure the secret communications of the agent, who has treated us so contemptuously, if we are to judge by the fact that he was retained and encouraged in his office, and that it was through him that the case of the *Toro* was finally settled by which the good faith of our foreign office was betrayed. It must be recalled that the Imperial government formally proposed that the negotiations for this settlement should be carried on in Buenos Aires with Count Luxburg, the author of the telegrams. . . .

"If many months ago I thought, as I took occasion to say publicly,¹⁰⁰ that we should have severed our relations with Germany when she decreed her inadmissible blockade, I am today still more convinced that it is not possible to maintain cordial relations with a country which employs such methods and such agents."¹⁰¹

On the basis of such data as are available it would seem that in the early autumn of 1917 popular sentiment was, if not overwhelmingly, at least strongly in favor of severance of relations with Germany.

Additional evidence in support of this contention is to be found in the action of the legislative branch of

¹⁰⁰ See above, p. 197.

¹⁰¹ This statement of Dr. Drago, given to the Argentine press on September 13, is published *in extenso* in the *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. XII, p. 141 (January 1918).

the government. It was inevitable that the international situation should engage the attention of both branches of Congress, at that time in session. On September 15 the Senate voted to request the minister of foreign affairs to furnish information on the events leading up to the dismissal of Luxburg and to supply other data germane to the present crisis. In pursuance of this request Dr. Pueyrredón, on September 19, delivered a lengthy speech in which he reviewed the entire correspondence between Argentina and Germany relative to the submarine issue up to and including the departure of Luxburg. All of the official correspondence which had passed between the two foreign offices was laid before the Senate.

In reality the speech consisted of little more than the text of the documents which we have already analyzed, together with a running commentary designed to place the action of the government in the most favorable light. The address ended with the declaration that in the midst of the world convulsion "the republic has won imperishable conquests in the annals of universal public law."¹⁰²

The explanations of Pueyrredón were not regarded as satisfactory by the Senate. Upon the minister's departure Dr. Joaquín V. González, senator from La Rioja and former president of the University of La Plata, declared in an impassioned speech that the Luxburg affair far transcended in importance any question of the personality of the former German

¹⁰² The text of Pueyrredón's speech is to be found in the *Memoria . . . correspondiente al año 1917-1918*, pp. 71-82.

minister; it could only be regarded in the light of an international crime. The Imperial German government had tacitly accepted the criminal counsels of its representative; Argentina could not, therefore, remain passive before such an affront to her national dignity and honor.¹⁰³ Senators Roca and del Valle Iberlucea supported the views of Senator González and demanded an immediate severance of diplomatic relations.¹⁰⁴ The stand taken by Senator del Valle Iberlucea was especially noteworthy as he represented the Socialist party, which in a convention held during the previous April had stigmatized the war merely as a struggle for commercial expansion and had enjoined a policy of strict neutrality upon its members.¹⁰⁵ At the conclusion of the session the Senate, by a vote of 23 to 1, adopted the following resolution proposed by Senator González:

"The Argentine Senate is deeply affected by the conduct of the ex-minister of the German Empire, Count Luxburg, in the matter of the telegrams transmitted to the German foreign office through the Swedish legation of this capital and published by the department of state of the United States of America; it believes that such conduct is an offense against diplomatic morals and the most elementary principles of humanity as contained in our laws, against the traditional policy of loyalty, honesty, and justice of the Argentine Re-

¹⁰³ Congreso Nacional. *Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores*, 1917, p. II, pp. 971-991.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 992-1000.

¹⁰⁵ As a direct result of his attitude during the international crisis Senator del Valle Iberlucea resigned from his position as editor of *La Vanguardia*, the official organ of the Socialists, and virtually severed his connection with the party. Cf. his work *La Cuestión Internacional y el Partido Socialista* (Buenos Aires, 1917).

public, and against the right of free navigation of vessels carrying its neutral flag in the present war; it is firmly convinced that such acts may jeopardize the immunity of its flag, the lives of its nationals and the neutrality of the republic as well as its territorial sovereignty, in exercising within its jurisdiction acts of espionage to the detriment of the commerce of the republic and that of the belligerent nations which are friendly to it. It believes, furthermore, that the attitude to be adopted by the government in this emergency must foster the uninterrupted fraternal friendship which has united at all times the states of this continent, upon the basis of common democratic ideals and of international justice. The order of expulsion against the above mentioned minister from the territory of the nation is not, in its judgment, sufficient reparation for the seriousness of the offense and wrongs committed.

"The Senate of the nation accordingly decrees: That the proper step to be taken in the present circumstances is that the executive power sever relations with the Imperial government of Germany."¹⁰⁶

Three days later, on September 22, Pueyrredón appeared before the Chamber of Deputies and delivered a lengthy speech which was a plea for calmness and deliberation and at the same time an earnest, though somewhat specious, *apologia* for the policy pursued by the government in its handling of the international situation. The minister of foreign affairs maintained *inter alia* the thesis that the actions of the government in effectiveness and energy far transcended a merely nominal rupture of relations. Argentina by her vigorous and courageous insistence that the seas be free in accordance with the terms of international law and by

¹⁰⁶ Text in *Memoria . . . correspondiente al año 1917-1918*, pp. 82-83.

the expulsion of the German minister without waiting for explanations from his home government or giving an opportunity to secure his recall, showed that the republic was able not only to uphold her dignity and honor but also to serve the ideals of humanity. And as final proof of the determination of the government to omit no act in the vindication of its rights Pueyrredón made the astounding admission that "overcoming his personal repugnance" (*venciendo repugnancias personales*) he had ordered the seizure of the telegraph office and had sequestered copies of all the telegrams which passed between the German minister and his government. By this means four hundred telegrams were seized which were turned over to the government of the United States for translation.¹⁰⁷

Fortune seemed to play directly into the hands of the minister of foreign affairs. Just before the conclusion of his speech a dispatch arrived from Dr. Molina, Argentine minister at Berlin, giving the long desired and belated explanation of Luxburg's conduct. In a note dated September 21 and addressed to Molina, Kühlmann, the Imperial secretary of foreign affairs, acknowledged the Argentine note of September 14 describing the expulsion of Luxburg as *persona non grata*, and added "The Imperial government keenly laments what has passed and disapproves absolutely the ideas expressed by Count Luxburg in the telegrams published by our adversaries on the manner of carrying on cruiser warfare. These ideas are purely personal. They have

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 84-97, where the full text of Pueyrredón's speech before the Chamber of Deputies is given.

not had nor ever will have any influence on the decision and promise of the Imperial government." Molina adds in his covering telegram: "The secretary of state (Kühlmann) was most decided and emphatic, repudiating absolutely the contents of the telegrams in question. . . . Moreover the German press has unanimously condemned the attitude of Luxburg."¹⁰⁸

In spite of the tardy disavowal by the German foreign office of the conduct of Luxburg the Chamber of Deputies, like the Senate, declined to regard Pueyrredón's explanations as satisfactory. The belated repudiation by the German government of the actions of its agent produced little impression. In the speeches delivered on this occasion the point was stressed that long after the dispatch of the "spurlos versenkt" messages Luxburg continued to enjoy the full support and confidence of the German government, which had given him full powers to settle the *Toro* controversy. Deputy José Arce, leader of the Conservatives, insisted that the explanations of Kühlmann were inadmissible; public opinion demanded that the insult offered to Argentina be adequately punished.¹⁰⁹ Deputy Ricardo Caballero, leader of the Dissident Radicals—that section of the party which had cut loose from the president—declared: "We kept silence, while repressing our admiration for the great and heroic France; we kept

¹⁰⁸ Molina to Pueyrredón, September 22, 1917, *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96. Molina sent two other dispatches of a similar tenor on September 22 and one on September 27. *Ibid.*, pp. 96-98.

¹⁰⁹ Congreso Nacional. *Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados*, 1917, t. VI, pp. 3 ff.

silence before the sacrifice of immortal Belgium; we can no longer hold our peace.”¹¹⁰ Yet the expression of contrary views was not entirely absent. The Radical Deputy Melitón Camaño violently protested against what he alleged was the desire of certain of his colleagues to plunge Argentina into a war with Germany; he criticized the publication of Luxburg’s telegrams as an act of disloyalty and bad faith, and when paying his respects to the United States did not fail to enlarge on the circumstances under which Panama had separated from Colombia. That Sr. Camaño’s opinions were those of a small minority appeared clearly, however, from the action taken by the Chamber of Deputies three days later. On September 25, by a vote of 53 to 18, the Chamber adopted the following declaration:

“The Chamber of Deputies of the nation declares that suspension of diplomatic relations between the Argentine government and the Imperial German government should take effect immediately.”¹¹¹

During the remaining months of 1917 a curious situation developed. On the burning question of Argentina’s policy towards the German Empire the legislative branch of the government, supported in the main by public opinion, found itself in a position of frank antagonism to the executive. To the great bulk of the Argentines, including most of her intellectuals, nothing short of a severance of diplomatic relations would meet the situation created by the perfidity of the Imperial German government and the criminal intrigues of its

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-11.

agent. Among many of Argentina's foremost political thinkers this determination was reenforced through the desire to be associated with the United States and Brazil in upholding the ideals of New World democracy against the menace of German autocracy and imperialism. New designations and slogans appeared to meet the new conditions. No longer were the Argentines classed as "Aliadófilos" and "Germanófilos" but "rupturistas" and "neutralistas." As was the case in the United States after its formal entrance into the war many of the erstwhile pro-Germans were suddenly metamorphosed into pacifists and enrolled under the banner of the "neutralistas." But the nation at large confidently believed that the executive was only waiting for a propitious moment to interpret the clearly expressed will of the Argentine people and by a severance of relations to bring Argentina in line with the United States and those Latin American powers united in a common action against Germany.

As the weeks passed and the government remained inactive it became increasingly clear that the president had determined to adhere to his policy of neutrality regardless of public opinion as manifested in the press or in Congress. In certain respects the position of the government was highly anomalous. On several occasions the president had publicly proclaimed his entire satisfaction with the amends made by Germany for the conduct of her ex-minister. Nothing apparently marred the harmony of the diplomatic relations between the two countries, for if the post of German minister

remained vacant at Buenos Aires, Dr. Molina continued to fulfill his duties as Argentine representative duly accredited to the German government.¹¹² And yet against this same government Argentina had assumed the responsibility for acts in glaring contrast to the friendship professed by Irigoyen. The Argentine executive had not only expelled the German minister without affording his government opportunity to recall him or explain his action, but had seized the entire files of the telegraphic correspondence between the German legation and Berlin and turned it over to be deciphered by the United States, now standing forth embattled as one of Germany's most determined and active enemies. That the Argentine executive should acknowledge itself responsible for acts of such patent hostility towards the German Empire and at the same time delay or refuse its sanction for the severance of diplomatic relations seemed to many Argentines both inconsistent and ridiculous. As the distinguished dean of the faculty of philosophy and letters of the University of Buenos Aires, Dr. Rodolfo Rivarola, well expressed it:

"This procrastination compromises the dignity of the nation since it is not decorous that we continue to apply the term friend to a government whose correspondence we secretly sequester, turning it over to its enemy. This appears a piece of duplicity inconsistent with recti-

¹¹² According to the correspondent of *Le Temps* (Paris) the budget committee of the Chamber of Deputies voted to suppress for the fiscal year 1918 the expenses allotted to the Argentine legation at Berlin, as a result of the vote of the Chamber in favor of severance of relations. *Le Temps*, October 29, 1917.

tude; for one is either a friend or an enemy; one does not pretend to be the former and act as the latter."¹¹³

The attitude of the executive in this crisis gave rise to criticism and protest in still another quarter. Since 1911 Argentina had been represented in the United States by the distinguished scholar and diplomat, Dr. Rómulo S. Naón. On various occasions during the course of the war Ambassador Naón clearly voiced his sympathies for the cause of the United States and the Allies.¹¹⁴ From his point of vantage at Washington he had been following with increasing anxiety the course pursued by his government in the weeks subsequent to the publication of the Luxburg dispatches. Towards the end of 1917¹¹⁵ he felt that the divergence of views between the Buenos Aires foreign office and himself necessitated his resignation. In his letter to Puerreydón on this occasion he declared in part:

"Your Excellency is aware that ever since a state of war was declared between this country and the German Empire I have expressed my opinion in the sense that our attitude ought to be defined by a resolution of open sympathy in favor of the Allies. . . . The

¹¹³ "La Situación Argentina en la Cuestión internacional," speech delivered at Córdoba on October 20 and published in *La Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas*. November 1917, p. 212 ff.

¹¹⁴ On July 26, 1918, for instance, he declared in a speech delivered at the Hog Island shipbuilding yards: "I consider that your success is our success; your welfare our welfare, and your glory our glory." Quoted in the *South American* (New York), August 1918.

¹¹⁵ The exact date of this letter has never been divulged, although its text was published, apparently *in extenso*, in *La Prensa* of November 17, 1918.

recognition on our part of the justice of the attitude of the United States in declaring a state of war with Germany¹¹⁶ induced me to believe that it signified the beginning of what would come to be our own entry into the conflict, and subsequent happenings (all of them, in my opinion, demonstrating the moral impossibility of a neutrality which can no longer subsist for the countries of America) continued to make me confident that, even if delayed, the definite action of the Argentine government in this universal crisis would become adjusted to what I consider to be an imperative exigency of our basic tradition in international affairs. Holding this conviction . . . I have been defending the interests of this Argentine policy in the midst of increasing difficulties.

“With the recent diplomatic incident of the publication of the Luxburg telegrams there came for me the definite crisis of this divergency, daily more difficult to overcome. A sense of patriotic duty, as well as a sense of loyalty towards my government, obliges me, therefore, to place in your hands my resignation.”

Dr. Naón then points out that in his judgment Argentina should respond to two exigencies, equally imperative. The first emerges from her character as a member of the comity of nations. The Argentines cannot remain passive in the present conflict without placing themselves in antagonism to their own international antecedents which have always presented them before the world as champions of right and justice. The second exigency requires a policy of harmony and co-operation with the other republics of the continent, and especially with the United States. The Argentine am-

¹¹⁶ The reference here is to Pueyrredón's note to Ambassador Stimson, April 10, 1917.

bassador declares as his intimate conviction that his country should adhere to a policy of the most complete and thorough-going Pan American cooperation. "Continental solidarity is today more than ever an imperative necessity in order to assure the political equilibrium under which universal peace shall be organized at the termination of the present conflict."¹¹⁷

Unmoved by such considerations President Irigoyen rigidly adhered to his policy of neutrality. Certain factors, at first sight extraneous to the international situation, facilitated his task. A nation-wide railroad strike, temporarily paralyzing the economic life of the country and entirely cutting off Buenos Aires from the interior of the republic, was declared on midnight of September 23. Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that there existed any connection between German intrigue and these labor troubles, all the British residents of Argentina as well as many others were convinced that German machinations and German

¹¹⁷ *La Prensa*, November 17, 1918. Dr. Naón was persuaded to reconsider his resignation at this time; early in 1918 he returned to Argentina and after several conferences with the president went back to Washington in the dual capacity of ambassador and high financial commissioner of the Argentine government. But as the war continued the divergence of views between himself and his government continued to widen and on November 11, 1918, he again offered his resignation which this time was accepted. The letter tendering his final resignation and the official decree of the government accepting the same are given in *La Prensa* for November 20, 1918. In the latter document the government defends its course of action in refusing to accept Dr. Naón's suggestions.

money were behind the strike.¹¹⁸ Moreover, the passive attitude of the government, its indifference to the public clamor for restoration of order and its vacillation in taking action to protect the vital interests of the country lent color to the belief that it was not unwilling to utilize these disorders as a means of diverting popular attention from foreign affairs and the international problems arising from the Luxburg revelations.

Assured of the benevolent attitude of the government the various elements in favor of neutrality, supported actively by *La Unión*, and *La Gaceta de España* and including the former "Germanófilos," set about to organize an active propaganda. In connection with the great "Fiesta de la Raza," held on October 12 (the anniversary of the discovery of America) as a demonstration of Spanish and Argentine solidarity, a mass-meeting of "neutralistas" took place; conspicuous among those present were a number of Argentine intellectuals and politicians of pronounced German sympathies, many representatives of the so-called Catholic party, and a sprinkling of socialists and even anarchists.

¹¹⁸ Apropos of the strike the correspondent of the *London Times* wrote: "There has existed, and still exists, in the minds of 99 out of every 100 men outside of the ranks of the strikers themselves, the conviction that German intrigue, German money, and German designs were at the root of the strike. The coincidence between the declaration of both houses of the Argentine Congress in favor of a rupture of relations with Germany and the outbreak of a general strike was too marked, especially when the analogy of similar strikes at critical moments in Spain, in the United States and in Russia is taken into account. *The Times History of the War*, Vol. XV, p. 19.

Resolutions were adopted exhorting the president to persevere in his determination to safeguard neutrality despite all pressure from the "rupturistas."¹¹⁹

The opponents of those in favor of severance of relations did not scruple to stir up the enmity and jealousy between Argentina and Brazil which were still latent in certain quarters. While the international tension was at its height there appeared a pamphlet signed by one Pedro de Córdoba, entitled *Nuestra*

¹¹⁹The plans for this mass-meeting of "neutralistas" aroused the indignation of Dr. Enrique Larreta, ex-cabinet minister, former Argentine minister to France, and author of the famous novel "La Gloria de don Ramiro." In an article appearing in *La Nación* for October 10 with the title "To be or not to be" he declared: "I take it for granted that the Argentines who propose taking part in the neutralist meeting on October 12 . . . are as patriotic as the majority. I do not dispute sentiments or individual intentions. . . . I only wish them to ask themselves whether it is the right thing to do to hold a meeting of this kind at a time when the other neighboring and sister countries, true to their essential and democratic spirit, break one after the other their relations with Germany. Today it is Peru and Uruguay. Tomorrow it may be Chile and Paraguay.

"The neutrality idea, which possibly had some justification some time ago, today is absurd and lamentable. Those who are so eager to maintain it at all costs only make it appear more suspicious every time, by showing us up before the whole world as a country bound secretly to Germany.

"It is no use allowing oneself to be misled or placing one's faith in subtleties and distinctions. If at the present juncture we add to our unfortunate diplomatic attitude a neutralist meeting, we shall appear definitely before the eyes of the world as a pro-German country. That is a reality. And what will our situation be then? Isolation? No. Something much worse. It is easy to foresee, but I do not wish to mention it."

Guerra, and designed to show that a war between Argentina and Brazil was inevitable. It was in effect a clumsy, though violent and scurrilous attack on the United States and Brazil. The essence of the Monroe Doctrine is summed up in the phrase: "There is no God but the dollar and the Yankee is his prophet." The Brazilians are characterized as a degenerate race seeking to extend their hegemony over the rest of the continent. The next war will be between Argentina on the one hand and a coalition headed by Brazil and abetted by the United States on the other. Certain of the documents included in the pamphlet appear to have been supplied by the German legation at Buenos Aires.¹²⁰

This piece of propaganda stirred up a pother grotesquely disproportionate to its importance. The Argentine minister at Rio de Janeiro felt called upon publicly to condemn it and the activities of the Buenos Aires police were set in motion. As a result of their investigation it was shown that the real author was a Spanish citizen, Julio Cola, director of the notorious *La Gaceta de España*, a paper partially subsidized by the German colony in Argentina.¹²¹

It would be unprofitable and wearisome to attempt to follow the conflicting currents of public opinion during the memorable autumn of 1917. Despite the

¹²⁰ *Nuestra Guerra. La Coalición contra la Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1917).

¹²¹ Official statement transmitted by Sr. Luís de los Llanos, Argentine minister to Brazil, to Sr. Nilo Peçanha, Brazilian minister of foreign affairs. *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), October 6, 1917.

efforts of the pacifists and the "neutralistas" the tide continued to set strongly in favor of the Allies and of a diplomatic rupture with Germany. On October 30 two more of the Luxburg dispatches were published. The first of these, to which reference has already been made,¹²² was sent on July 7. It was the famous telegram in which the ex-minister informed Zimmermann that "our attitude toward Brazil has created the impression that our easy-going good nature can be counted on. This is dangerous in South America, where the people under a thin veneer are Indians."¹²³ The second, dispatched on August 4, was to the effect that Luxburg was "convinced that we shall be able to carry through our principal political aims in South America, the maintenance of an open market in Argentina, and the reorganization of South Brazil equally well whether with or against Argentina."¹²⁴ This frank avowal of

¹²² See above, p. 219.

¹²³ Luxburg to Zimmermann, *Official Bulletin* (Washington), October 31, 1917.

¹²⁴ The explanation for the publication of these two telegrams at this time is to be sought in Rio de Janeiro rather than in Buenos Aires. On October 10 Sr. Larreta, ex-Argentine minister to France, referred in a somewhat cryptic manner to certain unpublished dispatches of Luxburg dealing with German intrigues in Argentina and Brazil. A little later the Buenos Aires newspapers published telegrams from their Rio de Janeiro correspondents to the effect that the Brazilian minister of foreign affairs, Sr. Nilo Peçanha, had let it be known that the translation of additional Luxburg dispatches would reveal a German plot to invade southern Brazil. The Argentine press then demanded that the government either publish the dispatches or "authorize their publication by a foreign government." That this demand was not without effect is indicated

the political aims of the Imperial German government on a continent whose inhabitants were alleged to be but slightly above the level of barbarism naturally proved an effective weapon to those in favor of more vigorous diplomatic action. The Comité Nacional de la Juventud, whose activity we have already noted, exerted all its efforts to keep popular attention focused on the international crisis. On December 17 this group of enthusiastic young men held a convention in the Teatro Nuevo, presided over by Sr. Mariano Villar Sáenz-Peña. The assembly, consisting of representatives of the intellectuals of Buenos Aires, voted unanimously the following resolutions, drawn up by a committee composed of Srs. Osvaldo Magnasco, Felipe Yofre, Joaquín V. González, Leopoldo Lugones:¹²⁵

"1. That the decision of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, sanctioned respectively at the sessions of September 18 and 14 last, as also the unequivocal demonstrations of national opinion, should be maintained.

"2. That in consequence a formal rupture of diplomatic relations between the republic and the Imperial government of Germany should be proclaimed, not only on account of the attacks made upon the rights and interests of the Argentine people and government, but principally an account of the securities to which the

by Secretary Lansing's declaration when the two telegrams were made public: "In view of the fact that the substance of certain telegrams addressed by Luxburg to the German foreign office has been published the secretary of state makes public the actual texts of the telegrams." *Official Bulletin*, October 31. Cf. *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, New York, Jan. 5, 1918, p. 45.

¹²⁵ All the members of this committee on resolutions, with the exception of Dr. Lugones, had been cabinet members.

nation is entitled and because of the purposes of the Imperial government in the war, which violate the essential principles of civilization.

"3. That in view of the solidarity of the nations, and especially American opinion and sentiment, at least for the time being, agreements and alliances between the Republic and other nations are unnecessary."¹²⁵

Just before the year drew to its close the cause of the *rupturista* element was strengthened by the publication of the third and last set of the Luxburg dispatches. These were the telegrams sequestered early in September on the order of the minister of foreign affairs and turned over to the United States government for translation. For reasons that have never been divulged only thirty-seven out of the some four hundred remaining telegrams were at this time made public. The contents of the greater part of this last installment of the Luxburg dispatches have already been analyzed. We have seen that they reveal that the German foreign

¹²⁵ These resolutions, together with a lengthy exposition for their reason, were published in *La Revista de Filosofía*, January 1918. The text of the resolutions is also found in the *Hispanic American Historical Review*, May 1918, p. 201.

Mention should also be made of the meeting on November 9 of *La Federación de los Comités Universitarios*, consisting for the most part of the members of the faculties and student bodies of the Universities of Buenos Aires and La Plata. The speakers advocated the same policy as that championed by the Comité Nacional de la Juventud. Of equal importance was a great mass-meeting held during the preceding month in the Teatro Argentina at which some of Argentina's most distinguished writers and leaders in politics urged the severance of diplomatic relations. Among the speakers were Ricardo Rojas, Rodolfo Rivarola, Leopoldo Lugones, Alfredo L. Palacios.

office was in substantial if not entire agreement with the minister whose actions the German government subsequently disavowed. They constitute a devastating argument against the thesis of the "neutralistas" who endeavored to draw a sharp line of distinction between the German government and its representatives. Finally they give excellent grounds for the inference that Luxburg and President Irigoyen had entered into a secret agreement by which Argentine ships should be spared provided they were kept out of the barred zone. As was pointed out by certain of the anti-administration papers¹²⁷ the actions of the government during the preceding months had been quite in harmony with such an understanding.

Had these thirty-seven telegrams been published simultaneously with or even slightly later than the "spurlos versenkt" dispatches, it is probable that they would have swelled the storm of protest to such an extent that the government would have been forced to yield. But coming as they did, after public opinion had crystallized into two opposing camps, they merely tended to confirm the "rupturistas" in their views while

¹²⁷ E. g., *La Patria degli Italiani*, on December 22. During the course of a violent attack on the policy of the government this organ of the Italian elements endeavored to prove that the terms of the alleged secret agreement had been faithfully carried out by Argentina: no Argentine ships had been permitted to sail for the barred zone; the government had impeded the departure and often refused clearance of any ship carrying the Argentine flag; no protest of any kind was made regarding the sinking of the *Oriana*.

at the same time they won few converts from the ranks of the "neutralistas" and pacifists.

Save to tax the Luxburg telegrams "with inaccuracies so surprising that no epithet would fit them"¹²⁸ the government took no official cognizance of these further revelations of Germany's attitude towards Argentina. And as the winter wore on it became increasingly clear that President Irigoyen, supported by a powerful and well-organized minority of the people at large as well as of Congress, was sufficiently well entrenched to defy his opponents and keep Argentina within the ranks of the neutral powers.

Up to the present time no thoroughly satisfactory explanation has been advanced for President Irigoyen's attitude, at the time so out of harmony with that of the bulk of the thinking classes of Argentina. The enigma is rendered the more perplexing through the elusive personality of the president. Not only the foreign diplomats, to whom he had accorded brief interviews, but even well-informed Argentines regarded him as a man of mystery. From almost every point of view he presented a striking antithesis to the executives who preceded him. Swept into power by the success of the Radical Party, in 1916, he had broken with almost all Argentine political traditions. Unlike so many occupants of the presidency he could not claim descent from one of the old and wealthy aristocratic creole families of the capital. He was of provincial upbringing and in sentiments and personality was heartily democratic;

¹²⁸ The expression is that of Minister Pueyrredón. Cf. above p. 217.

even after his election his simple and unostentatious manner of living had been in striking contrast to that of his more socially exigent predecessors. It was no secret that he was ill at ease in the company of foreign diplomats, especially the representatives of the Allied powers. This diffidence the intriguing and insinuating Luxburg seems to have exploited to his own and to Germany's advantage.

The first and most obvious explanation of Irigoyen's conduct perhaps comes closest to the truth. The president was profoundly convinced that the interests of Argentina were best served by neutrality. Since Germany, in his judgment, had met all of Argentina's demands on the submarine issue and had formally disavowed the actions of her minister, there existed no valid reason for the interruption of friendly relations between the two countries. That such an interpretation of the rights and obligations of one of the great Latin American states rested on too narrow and legalistic a basis seemed self-evident to the majority of the thinking classes of the country, especially to such authorities on international law as Dr. Drago. But to the president, with his provincial or even parochial outlook, such considerations could offer but little appeal.

The president's unwillingness to defer to public opinion as voiced in the press and Congress was bound to raise the charge of pro-Germanism, especially on the part of his political opponents. It is impossible to prove this charge although some color is lent to this view if we are to place any great amount of credence in the

Luxburg revelations.¹²⁹ It would be a gross error to assume, however, that he was a pliant tool of the Central Powers. That Irigoyen's alleged friendship for Germany was, at best, of a platonic character appears from his unwillingness to countenance any attack, fomented by German agents or sympathizers, on Argentina's neighbor Uruguay. We have already noted in the chapter dealing with Brazil and the war¹³⁰ that some time during the autumn of 1917 the Uruguayan authorities came to harbor serious suspicions that the German government was sponsoring an uprising of the German colonists in southern Brazil. They likewise suspected that an invasion of northern Uruguay by these same insurgents was contemplated. President Viera thereupon proceeded to sound out the attitude of Irigoyen in the event that Uruguay should ask for arms and ammunition for use in repelling such an incursion. The Argentine president replied "that in case of such an attack the Argentine government would exert its full

¹²⁹ The most damaging of the Luxburg dispatches was that of July 10 in which the German minister declared: "The president in the course of a long interview protested his friendship for Germany and firm desire for neutrality in spite of severe pressure." *Official Bulletin*, December 21, 1917.

It is noteworthy that this charge of pro-Germanism was rejected by a number of writers thoroughly competent to speak on the subject. Thus the English writer, W. H. Koebel, who was in Buenos Aires at the height of the international crisis declares that Irigoyen was not actuated by any Germanophile sympathies. *The Great South Land of South America*. (New York, 1920), p. 131.

¹³⁰ See above, p. 77.

support in defense of the sovereignty of the Uruguayan nation, assuming the corresponding responsibilities.”¹³¹ And as will presently be pointed out the president’s attitude during the last year of the war, as shown, for instance, in his willingness to meet the economic demands of the Allies in the matter of grain shipments, would seem to belie the charge of any conscious antagonism towards the enemies of Germany. In the final analysis the foreign policy of Irigoyen was neither pro-German nor pro-Ally but simply pro-Argentine, or at the best pro-Spanish-American.

Again the suggestion has been offered that the president deprecated any action which might imply that his country was in international affairs merely following in the wake of the United States. In an interview accorded on September 26, 1917, to a delegation of the Comité Nacional de la Juventud he is alleged to have made the statement—which has never been officially denied—that “Argentina cannot be dragged into the war by the United States and that the nation must take

¹³¹ The text of the communications which passed between the Argentine and Uruguayan foreign offices in regard to the possible German-inspired invasion of Uruguay has never been published. The subject is referred to in the Message of President Viera of February 15, 1918; in the motion of appreciation of the attitude of President Irigoyen voted by the Uruguayan Chamber of Deputies in March of the same year; and finally in the acknowledgment of the receipt of the text of this motion by President Irigoyen, March 25, 1918. These documents (in the case of the presidential message only the pertinent excerpts) are given in República Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, *Memoria . . . Correspondiente al año 1917-1918*, pp. 189-192.

the position it deserves in the American continent.”¹³² The Luxburg revelations again shed an interesting side-light on this phase of the president's policy. On August 1, 1917, Luxburg cabled to Zimmermann: “The president has at last made up his mind to conclude a secret agreement with Chile and Bolivia with regard to a mutual rapprochement for protection vis-a-vis North America . . . Saguier with friendly under-secretary of state and full powers is on his way to . . . and Santiago.”¹³³ Certain it is that Dr. Fernando Saguier did undertake a diplomatic mission to La Paz in the summer of 1917 to represent Argentina at the installation of the new Bolivian president and returned to Buenos Aires via Lima and Santiago. In justice to President Irigoyen it should be made clear, however, that up to the present time no direct evidence tending to corroborate Luxburg's statement as to the secret purpose of Dr. Saguier's mission has been forthcoming. And if the object of this journey was really that attributed to it by Luxburg, it met with little success. As early as February Bolivia had broken relations with Germany while Peru took the same step at the beginning of October. Although Chile remained neutral the chancellery of Santiago evinced but slight enthusiasm for the formulation of any continental policy which excluded the United States.

¹³² This interview was widely published in the Buenos Aires press on October 1; a translation of the more important sections is given in the *Christian Science Monitor* under the same date.

¹³³ *Official Bulletin*, December 21, 1917.

This unwillingness on the part of Irigoyen to rally to the support of a Pan American policy—in complete variance with the course of action pursued by Brazil—is probably the key to the obscure¹³⁴ series of negotiations having as their object the holding at Buenos Aires of a Conference of Neutrals. The attempt was made on two different occasions, in the spring of 1917 and the beginning of 1918. The purpose of the conference, as defined in the telegrams of invitation sent out by Pueyrredón in April and May of 1917, “was to obtain a uniformity of opinion on the war and to bring closer together the American republics and strengthen their position in the concert of nations.”¹³⁵ The conference was originally designed to include only the South American republics; later all of the Latin American states were invited to join. By the middle of May all of these countries had accepted the invitation with the

¹³⁴ The Argentine minister of foreign affairs maintained the utmost secrecy in regard to this conference; nothing in regard to it is published in the *Memorias* issued under his auspices. Our information is derived from the publications of various other South American chancelleries which were less reticent, and the more or less intelligent conjectures of the press of Buenos Aires. The statements of *La Prensa* deserve the greatest confidence as this paper consistently championed the idea of the conference and possibly received a certain amount of information from the Argentine foreign office.

¹³⁵ The phraseology was probably left intentionally vague. The pertinent part of the telegram of invitation as sent, *e. g.*, to Venezuela, may be found in Venezuela, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. *El Libro Amarillo de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela* (Caracas, 1918), p. 19. Pueyrredón to Andrade (minister of foreign affairs), May 9, 1917.

exception of Venezuela and Colombia.¹³⁶ Enthusiasm, however, was by no means great. Chile lodged certain objections, such as the absence of any definite program, the unwisdom of excluding the United States, and in general the inopportuneness of the conference;¹³⁷ Brazil accepted the proposal with reservations depending upon the attitude of the United States.¹³⁸ By the middle of the summer, however, all plans for the conference were temporarily abandoned. The unfavorable attitude of the United States,¹³⁹ the changed status of Brazil growing out of her break of relations with Germany, the acuteness of the submarine controversy

¹³⁶ Telegram of Pueyrredón (as in preceding note) and statement of Manuel E. Malbran (Argentine minister to Mexico) under date of May 19. Quoted in message to Congress by President Carranza of September 1, 1917. *Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, 1917, t. II, p. 5. According to Carranza the initiative for the Conference of Neutrals came not from Pueyrredón, but from himself and was a result of his circular letter of February 11. (See below, p. 532.) Nothing in the material emanating from Argentina substantiates this claim.

¹³⁷ *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires), May 1, 1917.

¹³⁸ *Correio de Manhã* (Rio de Janeiro), May 17, 1917.

¹³⁹ While the attitude of the United States government towards the conference of neutrals has never been made public, it could hardly have viewed it in a favorable light, as the policy of its chief sponsor, Irigoyen, was at complete variance with that of the United States. On August 7, 1917, Luxburg cabled to Zimmermann: "I have certain information that North American note to Argentina asked that conference of South America neutrals should be dropped. Vanity does not allow them to tell the truth." *Officiel Bulletin*, December 21, 1917.

between Argentina and the German government—all contributed to this result.

An even greater fiasco followed Irigoyen's attempt to revive the conference in the following winter. In October the Argentine government again sent invitations to all of the Spanish American states, inviting them on this occasion to send delegates to a "Latin American Congress," as a "Conference of Neutrals," now that a majority of the Latin American republics had thrown down the gauntlet to Germany, either through a declaration of war or a rupture of relations, would be a palpable misnomer. Of the various countries addressed Mexico alone responded with alacrity. This interest in the Congress may be explained, in part at least, by President Carranza's well-known hostility to the United States.¹⁴⁰ In January 1918 a large delegation headed by Luis Cabrera, Mexican minister of finance, arrived at Buenos Aires only to find that the Latin American Congress had been definitely postponed.

It is probable that Irigoyen's insistence on neutrality was not unrelated to certain domestic policies which he was anxious to see carried out during his term of office. Both as a private citizen and as chief of the Radical Party he had long been the advocate of a series of far-

¹⁴⁰ The ardent desire of Carranza to create a Latin-American league or union as a counterpoise to the Monroe Doctrine appears very clearly in a work compiled by the Secretary of *Gobernación*, Sr. Berlanga, just before the collapse of the Carranza régime. It is called *El Ideal Latino-Americano; Colección de documentos . . . que se refieren á la proyectada Unión y Confederación de los países Centro y Suramericanas* (Mexico, 1919).

reaching social and economic reforms and he may well have been convinced that the absorption of Argentina's energies and resources in the world-wide conflagration would have indefinitely delayed the consummation of such a policy. He had no hesitancy in transforming an international into a domestic political issue, and was successful in committing his party to the policy of maintaining neutrality at all hazards. The results of the congressional elections of March 1918 in which the Radical Party rolled up a big majority would seem to indicate the soundness of his political reasoning.¹⁴

The diplomatic history of Argentina during the last year of the great war may be summarized very briefly. In general it may be said that the foreign policy gravitated in the direction of a neutrality distinctly favorable to the United States and the Allies. On January 14, 1918, was signed a Convention by the governments of

¹⁴ Further side-lights on Irigoyen's attitude towards international affairs are revealed in the interview of September 26, 1917, granted representatives of the Comité Nacional de la Juventud, an interview to which reference has already been made. After declaring that Germany's explanations were most satisfactory the president added: The time for Argentina's interference was past; it should have taken place before the Radical Party assumed power. (A reference to the so-called Dinant case—the murder of the Argentine vice-consul during the German invasion of Belgium.) Why did not the country demand a decision from the government then? At that time Argentina could have interfered in the struggle without being certain of victory, while now we may be charged with being guided by the certitude of victory. Severing diplomatic relations would place Argentina in an innocuous and neutral condition which would deprive us of rights that can be exercised while we continue a neutral."

France, Great Britain and Argentina for the purchase from Argentina of surplus wheat and other products amounting to approximately two and one-half million tons.¹⁴² The announcement of this gigantic operation had a most invigorating effect on public opinion which was clearly reflected in the national press. The immediate results were to relieve the feeling of anxiety throughout the country regarding the disposal of the surplus agricultural and pastoral products, to strengthen the position of the pro-Ally elements of the population, and in general to enhance the prestige of Argentina abroad. It was evident that whatever may have been the policy of the government in the past it would throw no further obstacle in the way of rendering economic assistance to the Allies at perhaps the most crucial period of the war.

The relations with the United States were at the same time placed upon a more satisfactory footing. This appears very clearly from the note of Ambassador Stimson of January 14, acknowledging the receipt of a copy of the Grain Convention. "With reference to the agreement concluded between the Argentina government and the governments of Great Britain and France," wrote the United States ambassador, "I am pleased to assure Your Excellency that the government

¹⁴² This Convention was signed by Pueyrredón and the representatives of the foreign governments concerned on January 14; was approved by Congress January 18; and was put into effect by executive decree on January 19. Cf. *Memoria . . . correspondiente al año 1917-1918*, pp. 134-135. (Text of Convention, pp. 137-139.)

of the United States will cooperate whenever possible, that is to say immediately after providing for the needs of the United States and of the war, by exporting coal for the requirements of the Argentine people by ships coming from the United States' ports for the wheat referred to."¹⁴³ And the growing cordiality of the president is clearly reflected in an interview granted on April 12 to Mr. Roy H. Howard, president of the United Press. On this occasion the Argentine executive was at pains to stress the friendly feeling of Argentina towards the United States.

"Argentina's sympathetic approval has followed the United States step by step," Irigoyen is quoted as declaring: "We have endorsed your course and voiced our approval of the loftiness of your objectives on every important occasion. I have personally followed every move of President Wilson and have read every public utterance by him regarding the aims and purposes of the United States with a feeling of the greatest admiration and respect. By his words and deeds we in Argentina have come to recognize and accept him as one of the world's great benign figures."¹⁴⁴

Finally some reference should be made to the expressions of friendship and appreciation voiced by the president at the presentation of credentials by the Belgian

¹⁴³ Stimson to Pueyrredón, *Ibid.*, p. 151.

¹⁴⁴ Mr. Howard's interview, published in the United States and Argentina on April 14 was taxed by the Argentine government with a number of inaccuracies. In a "rectificación" which was made public, *e. g.*, in *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras*, Vol. 60, p. 119 (May 1918), it was pointed out that the president had not intended to single out any one of the belligerents as the object of any special sympathy and cordiality as Argentina was on a footing of friendship with them all.

minister in January 1918. Instead of indulging in the diplomatic commonplaces customary on such occasions the president embraced the opportunity to render a striking testimony to the justice of Belgium's cause in the World War: "The cause of Belgium is, moreover, at the present juncture the cause of independence and the rights of nations, and humanity would be wounded in its most profound sentiments if the principles of justice on which it rests were not perennial and sacred."¹⁴⁵ This speech was the occasion of a telegram of thanks from the Belgian minister of foreign affairs, dated Le Havre, January 29, 1918.¹⁴⁶

As the year progressed and evidence accumulated that the foreign policy of the government though in theory strictly neutral in reality tended to favor the enemies of Germany¹⁴⁷ the bitter resentment harbored in many circles against the president was gradually

¹⁴⁵ República Argentina. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto. *Documentos y actos de gobierno relativos á la guerra in Europa* (Buenos Aires, 1919), p. 135.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

¹⁴⁷ In 1919 on the eve of the organization of the League of Nations, Dr. Alvear, Argentine minister in France, developed the thesis that Argentina could not be regarded as a neutral country inasmuch as during the war she had maintained an attitude of "diplomatic belligerency" towards the German government. As proof of this contention he cited the attitude of the Argentine foreign office during the submarine crisis, the acknowledgment of the justice of the cause of the United States in declaring war on Germany, the expressions of solidarity with Belgium on the occasion of receiving the credential of the Belgian minister in Buenos Aires, and the offer of military assistance to Uruguay when the German colonists in southern Brazil were thought to be preparing to invade the neighboring country. *La Nación*, March 23, 1919.

dissipated. The results of the congressional elections of March, in which the Radical Party rolled up a large majority may perhaps be regarded as indicative of this change in popular sentiment.¹⁴⁸ The conviction likewise gained ground that Argentina, benevolently neutral, willing to place her surplus agricultural and pastoral products at the disposal of the Allies, might contribute as much if not more to the defeat of the Central powers than through the mere severance of diplomatic relations or even a declaration of formal belligerency. These developments naturally tended to enhance the prestige of the executive, both at home and abroad, and seemed to vindicate the soundness of his international policies.¹⁴⁹ It cannot indeed be denied that

¹⁴⁸ It is not easy to interpret the meaning of the elections of 1918. As keen an observer as Dr. Estanislao Zeballos stated on one occasion that the results of the election constitute a striking repudiation of the actions of Congress in voting to sever relations with Germany; a little earlier he declared: "If the results of the March elections had depended on the deep and mature public reflection, the results would have been negative for the Radical Party, since it is evident that the majority of "personas reflexivas y idóneas" are not satisfied with the general course of the government. *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras*, Vol. 60, p. 111 (May 1918); *Ibid.*, Vol. 61, p. 211, note (October 1918).

¹⁴⁹ Up to the very end of the war Dr. Naón, Argentine Ambassador in the United States, struggled against the policy of isolation followed by the government. On October 21, 1918, he urged that the Argentine government should, with the governments of Chile and Colombia, counsel Germany to make peace, which would have secured Argentina a place at the Peace Conference. The rejection of this advice was one of the causes of Dr. Naón's resignation. Cf. *La Prensa*, November 20.

through the pertinacity and political acumen of the president the Argentine ship of state had been successful in keeping clear of the whirlpool of the World War. From the diplomatic controversy arising from the submarine issue and Luxburg's criminal intrigues Argentina had emerged, at least technically, the victor. The neutrality so skillfully conserved by Irigoyen's efforts had turned out to be exceedingly profitable, as the grain convention of January 1918 demonstrated. Yet one cannot but wonder if this neutrality was not purchased at too great a price. When the authoritative history of the great war comes to be written, it may well appear that Argentina sacrificed to a narrowly conceived and parochial nationalism the golden opportunity of companionship with the great democracies of the world in the conflict between the forces of despotism and liberty. But whatever may be the final verdict of history, it is heartening to recall that the Argentine people, in so far as their voice was articulate, declared themselves in favor of the cause of the United States and the Allies.

CHAPTER IV

CHILE AND THE WAR

In a number of important respects Chile's relation to the war differed from that of Brazil and Argentina. From the first her neutrality was looked upon as a foregone conclusion. A variety of circumstances conspired to keep her aloof from the struggle. With her outlook upon the South Pacific she was furthest removed of all the Latin American powers from the center of hostilities; at least such was the case after the two great naval engagements fought in South American waters in 1914. Though Chile possessed a merchant marine of respectable proportions, nevertheless, unlike Brazil, few if any of her ships were plying on the European run; hence no material interests were directly placed in jeopardy by the declaration of the barred zone and the policy of German ruthlessness. And while her economic life was temporarily dislocated in the early days of the war,¹ the tremendous demand for Chilean nitrate and copper on the part of the Allies and the United States ushered in an era of prosperity. To many Chileans neutrality seemed both logical and profitable.

¹ Cf. on this whole topic the excellent study by L. S. Rowe, *Early Economic Effects of the European War on the Finance, Commerce and Industry of Chile* (New York, 1918).

There were other reasons of a slightly different order which made the war and its broader issues somewhat more remote to Chile than to Argentina and Brazil. No such tide of immigration had flowed towards Chile as had changed the whole ethnic complexion of her neighbor across the Andes. Owing partly to their isolation from Europe, partly to the arduous struggle required to exploit their agricultural wealth and wrest their mineral treasures from the soil, the Chileans had become a singularly homogeneous, closely knit people, excessively proud of their national history and traditions, and extremely jealous of anything which might be construed as foreign interference or dictation.

Yet for Chile, as for her sister Latin American Republics, it was quite impossible to remain indifferent to the issues involved in the war. It was inevitable that the sympathies of the Chileans should be enlisted in the cause of one or the other groups of belligerents.

In the early months of the war the German influences were so much in the ascendent that the belief throughout Europe became generalized that Chile had become a moral ally of the Central Powers. As the struggle wore on it became clear that such an opinion was ill-founded, and the end of the war found the sympathy for Germany all but extinct.

This gradual but none the less striking change in sentiment towards the two groups of belligerents merits a somewhat detailed analysis if Chile's attitude during the war is to be fully understood. It can hardly be

denied that in the early years of the struggle the tide of popular feeling, at least in certain classes, ran strongly in favor of Germany. The reasons are fairly obvious. German propaganda had probably taken deeper root in Chile than in any other Spanish American country. The chief agencies for the dissemination of Kultur were the army and a group of professors in the higher institutions of learning, particularly the normal schools. The descendants of German immigrants living in the southern portion of the Republic and the German commercial houses in Santiago and Valparaiso helped create currents of sympathy favorable to Germany. And as was to be expected in a country in which clerical influence is still a vital force in the community, many of the militant Catholics were pro-German.

A great deal of emphasis has been laid on the "Germanization" of the Chilean army. Partly as a result of the prestige acquired by Germany in the Franco-Prussian War, the Chilean government began in the seventies to contract for German military instructors. Among the most notable of those officers was a Colonel Körner, who subsequently rose to the rank of general and played a prominent part in the Civil War of 1891 by joining the Congressional Party in its struggle against President Balmaceda. In a country like Chile, in which the military tradition is firmly implanted and the army the object of legitimate pride, adoption of German methods could not fail to bear fruit in

an increased admiration for everything German.² On the outbreak of the war it was both natural and logical that the Central Powers should find their most ardent supporters in Chilean military circles. This Germanophile attitude of the army was for a time cleverly exploited by the leaders of German propaganda. In the fall of 1914 appeared a rabidly pro-German newspaper edited by two Spaniards and bearing the deceptive title of *La Gaceta Militar*, the obvious purpose being to create the belief that it was an official organ of the army. The government was obliged to take cognizance of this abuse of the press and the offending sheet was forced to adopt another name.³

² The German writer Alfredo Hartwig lays great stress upon the importance of military training as a factor in the spread of German influence: "Nowhere does the activity of the German military instructor as pioneer of *Deutschtum* appear more strikingly than in the South American states. Wherever the German military spirit (*Soldatengeist*) had secured an entry its reaction on the popular mind and on the popular attitude towards Germany will never be lacking." And coming to the Chilean army Hartwig declares: "The army is pro-German through and through. Through its German officers with General Körner at their head the army has been thoroughly organized on a German basis (*ganz deutsch organisiert*) and has already in its officers absorbed so much German spirit that one may speak of a certain implanting (*Einpflanzung*), which also gives indications of growing into a tradition." Alfredo Hartwig, "Die politische Stellungnahme der Süd-amerikanischen Staaten im Weltkriege," *Deutsche Rundschau*, December 1917, pp. 331, 347.

³ República de Chile. *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto y Colonización, Diciembre de 1914-Diciembre de 1915* (Santiago de Chile, 1918), p. 89.

As has already been suggested a powerful agency in the work of German penetration was to be found in the group of professors and scholars with whom the Chilean government had entered into contracts during the latter decades of the nineteenth century. These men, several of them teachers and scholars of note, had been given important positions in the normal and technical schools. Not only had they been instrumental in grafting certain features of the Prussian school system on Chilean education, but they had left their mark on successive generations of teachers. Yet one might easily exaggerate this element of propaganda. The efforts of these German instructors were in considerable degree neutralized by the traditions implanted by a number of able scholars and teachers who had been recruited from France, Italy and even the United States.⁴

Much has been written regarding the influence of the descendents of German immigrants in Chile. It is true that there has long existed an industrious and fairly homogeneous German population in the southern portion of the republic, particularly about Valdivia. But these Teutonic elements, whose numbers do not exceed one per cent of the total population of the

⁴On the subject of these foreign (particularly German) teachers *cf.* the monograph by Dr. E. E. Brandon, "Latin American Universities and Special Schools" in *Bulletin of the Bureau of Education* No. 30 (1912), p. 84. Interesting data are also given in a cooperative work published in Santiago in 1910 entitled *Los Alemanes en Chile*, particularly the chapter by Dr. Wilhelm Mann, "La influencia alemana en la educación chilena en general."

country,⁵ were for the most part descendents of immigrants who had come to Chile in the middle of the nineteenth century, particularly in the days of 1848, and in general they have made no great effort to maintain intimate relations with the Fatherland. They have been Chileans first and Germans afterwards. While their sympathies were with the Central Powers, and while later in the war they undertook an active propaganda to keep Chile in the ranks of the neutrals their influence may easily be exaggerated. The German problem in Chile presents only a remote parallel to the "German peril" in Brazil.

Of greater importance than these peaceful and hard-working German agriculturists and petty tradesmen about Valdivia was the small but powerful group of German merchants, bankers, and importers having their headquarters in Valparaiso and Santiago. They represented the aggressive and militant Germany of 1914 and scrupled at nothing to further the interests of their native land. It was this class which so frequently tried to thwart the efforts of the Chilean authorities to maintain a scrupulous and loyal neutrality.

As is well known British traditions and British influences have left their mark on the national evolution of

⁵ Estimates vary; the author of the chapter on German immigration in *Los Alemanes en Chile* states that in 1910 there were 10,724 German and 17,686 "Chilenos-Alemanos" (p. 58). Sr. Carlos Silva Vildósola in an article "Chile and the War" published in *The South American* (New York), December 1917, gives the total number of Germans as 10,724 and of Austrians as 3,813. Many of the latter are Dalmatians.

Chile.⁶ The exploits of the Chilean navy are indissolubly linked with the names of a number of great English seamen, chief among whom was Lord Cochrane, one of the heroes of the Wars of Independence. Many of the Chilean naval officers, notably Captain Lynch who gained such prominence during the War of the Pacific, received much of their training in the British navy.⁷ It was therefore both natural and fitting that Chilean naval circles should be strongly pro-Ally in sympathy. In the fields of science and industry a number of Englishmen have contributed to the development of Chile. British capital has been freely invested in Chilean enterprises, particularly in the nitrate fields. Despite the growing competition offered by Germany, Great Britain at the outbreak of the war occupied the first place in the volume of exports from, and imports to, Chile. The high esteem enjoyed by the British commercial and mercantile interests in Chile, the enthusiastic admiration felt for British political institutions, the frequent intermarriages between English and Chileans, as is attested by the large number of distinguished families bearing English names, all naturally redounded

⁶ In the *Diccionario biográfico de los Etranjeros en Chile* by Pedro Pablo Figueroa are found no less than forty-five biographies of Englishmen. An analysis of this work is given in the South American Supplement of the *London Times*, February 25, 1913.

⁷ Captain Ismael Cajordo Reyes, "Lo que la Armada de Chile debe á Inglaterra," in *El Comercio Aliado en Chile*, (Santiago, 1918), pp. 35-57.

to the benefit of the Allies in the crystallization of public opinion on the issues of the war.⁸

A word remains to be said in regard to French achievements and influence in Chile. Though French prestige had suffered here as elsewhere a certain eclipse after the *debâcle* of 1870, the Chileans, like the other Latin Americans, have been prone to look to France as a source of inspiration in the domain of art, literature, and science. And in truth the debt is great. A number of French soldiers, notably Georges Beauchief and Benjamin Viel, distinguished themselves in the Chilean struggle for independence. Somewhat later, particularly during the ten-year incumbency of President Manuel Montt (1851-1861) public instruction was organized largely on a French basis. It was during this period, or slightly later, that the economist Courcelle-Seneuil introduced the scientific study of political economy in the Law Faculty of Santiago; a member of the Institute of France, Claude Gay, wrote a notable history of Chile; and another Frenchman, Aimé Pissis, prepared the first topographic map of the country. The Chilean law code, though largely the work of the great jurist and scholar Andrés Bello, found its inspiration in the *Code Napoléon*. And when in the tragic days of 1914 France called for her sons the world over the response from Chile was little short of remarkable. According to M. Paul Desprez, former French consul

⁸ According to the census of 1907 the number of British residing in the republic was 9,485. Silva Vildósola, *loc. cit.*

in Valparaíso, the relatively small⁹ French colony sent no less than three thousand combatants to the western front.¹⁰

From the foregoing analysis of the attitude of those sections of the population of Chile capable of moulding public opinion or influencing the course of the government, it seems clear that Chile would strictly adhere to a policy of complete neutrality as long as no vital or national interests were placed in peril. But it developed very early in the struggle that the maintenance of a loyal and scrupulous neutrality would entail heavy obligations and responsibilities and would bring Chile face to face with a whole series of perplexing problems from which the majority of the Latin American Republics were happily exempt.

The difficulties with which Chile had to cope resulted largely from her geographical situation. They may be summed up as follows: The long distance which separated Chile from the belligerent powers; the immense length of her coast line, over 2500 miles; the indented and fjord-like character of the southern littoral, not to mention the Straits of Magellan, with its thousands of islands, separated one from another by a labyrinth of narrow channels; the existence far out in the Pacific of two groups of islands, Juan Fernández and Easter

⁹ According to the census figures of 1907 the French residents in the republic amounted to 9,800. (Silva Vildósola, *loc. cit.*) M. Desprez states however that in 1914 the French elements in the Chilean population might be estimated at 18,000. He evidently has in mind both French citizens and Chileans of French extraction. "Le Commerce Franco-Chilien," *France-Amérique*, October, 1919.

¹⁰ Desprez, *loc. cit.*

Island, devoid of ready means of communication with the mainland; the inadequacy of the Chilean navy¹¹ for the task of patrolling this immense coast line; finally the fact that during the first half year of the war two of the belligerent powers, Great Britain and Germany, made the waters of the South Pacific one of the important fields of naval operations.

On August 3, 1914, the German minister at Santiago informed the Chilean government through the minister of foreign affairs that the German Empire had been at war with Russia since the first day of August.¹² The Chilean government immediately informed the German legation "that it would preserve the most strict neutrality in the present struggle."¹³ Identical replies were sent to the notes from the legations of the other bel-

¹¹ At the outbreak of the war the Chilean navy consisted of a total of 41 vessels of 95,406 tons displacement. Of these the most important were 1 pre-dreadnaught, 2 armored cruisers, 4 protected cruisers (all built before 1898), 16 torpedo-boats and destroyers, 8 scouts and 2 training ships. Two dreadnaughts and a number of minor craft under construction in England, were requisitioned by Great Britain at the beginning of the War. *Statesman's Year Book*, 1918, p. 738.

¹² Von Erckert to Villegas, August 3, 1914. República de Chile. *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Culto y Colonización, Diciembre de 1914-Diciembre de 1915* (Santiago de Chile, 1918), p. 79. This report really covers the period August 1, 1914-December 31, 1915. It was drawn up by the minister of foreign affairs, Sr. Alejandro Lira and consists of a large mass of diplomatic correspondence and a certain amount of commentary by the minister himself. It is the most important collection of documents yet published dealing with Chile's relation with the war. Henceforth it will be cited as *Memoria, 1914-1915*.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

ligerent powers. The policy here announced became the norm to which the government strove consistently to adhere.

In its desire to maintain a neutrality based upon the generally recognized principles of international law the government of Chile was confronted with a curious dilemma. The conventions¹⁴ signed at the Second Hague Conference and the decisions reached at the Naval Conference of London held in 1909 envisaged problems of exactly the type with which Chile was now called upon to cope. Unfortunately these conventions and decisions, though signed by the Chilean representatives, had never been ratified or adhered to by the Chilean government. Despite this fact Chile determined, as was made clear through official communications¹⁵ issued August 7 and 14, 1914, to adopt them as her line of conduct, not as rules to which she was formally bound, but as general principles of international law actually in operation. Upon these two juridical bases—the conventions of the Second Hague Conference and the Declaration of London—Chile proclaimed her neutrality.¹⁶

The government of Chile soon found that while the formulation of a policy of neutrality based on The

¹⁴ Especially Convention XIII, "concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war."

¹⁵ In the form of instructions sent out by the minister of foreign relations not only to other members of the cabinet but also to the local authorities in the departments and provinces. *Memoria, 1914-1915*, pp. 83-88. Naval War College, *International Law Topics*, 1916, pp. 15-17.

¹⁶ Alejandro Alvarez, *La Grande Guerre Européenne et la Neutralité du Chile* (Paris, 1915), p. 156 ff. Beltrán Mathieu

Hague conventions and the Declaration of London was comparatively easy, its practical enforcement met with many and unexpected obstacles. The most immediate problem, and one whose solution entailed heavy sacrifices, was the patrol of the extensive littoral, the Archipelagoes of the south, the Straits of Magellan and the Pacific Islands. With the small number of ships at her disposal it was obviously impossible for Chile to exercise an effective surveillance over such extensive and widely scattered areas. Something, however, was accomplished. On several occasions Chilean warships acted as convoys of merchantmen of the belligerent powers, notably those of Great Britain, within the limits of Chilean jurisdictional waters. That such protection was necessary appeared from the plight of the British steamer *Colusa* which on October 31 was chased by the German cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* within the three-mile limit, her safe advent at Valparaiso being due solely to the timely intervention of a Chilean gun-boat.¹⁷

(Chilean ambassador to the United States), "The Neutrality of Chile during the European War," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 14, No. 3.

The distinguished Chilean authority on international law, Dr. Alejandro Alvarez, gives a very interesting analysis of this procedure followed by Chile. He points that in thus observing rules which she had not officially ratified Chile was following a precedent set by Italy on the occasion of her declaration of war against Turkey in 1911. *Op. cit.*, p. 157.

¹⁷ Sir Francis Stronge (British minister at Santiago) to Sr. Salinas (Chilean minister of foreign affairs), November 1, 1914, quoted in memorandum of Sr. Lira (Chilean minister of foreign affairs), July 17, 1915. *Memoria, 1914-1915*, pp. 194-197.

The Straits of Magellan presented a somewhat different problem. Owing to the configuration of these and adjacent water-ways, in which at various places the shores are more than six miles distant from each other, it would be possible for belligerent ships to embark on a wide variety of hostilities without necessarily committing any technical violation of Chilean neutrality. To meet this situation the Chilean government issued on November 5, 1914, a decree which invested with a neutral character the interior waters of the Straits of Magellan and the southern adjacent channels, even in those parts in which the shores are more than six miles distant from each other.¹⁸

The same solicitude on the part of the government to safeguard neutrality appears in the case of the group of islands known as Juan Fernández, whose situation some hundreds of miles off the coast gave rise to the fear that they might be used as a base of operation by the fleets of the belligerents. On December 4, 1914, the minister of foreign affairs asked the minister of marine to arrange for a warship to be permanently stationed at the islands. This request was declined on the grounds of the excessive cost entailed. It was felt that to make surveillance really effective two ships would be necessary, stationed at each of the two larger islands of the group. A compromise was reached through the dispatch to Juan Fernández at frequent intervals of the training ship *Baquedano*.¹⁹ As will presently appear this decision, though dictated by sound motives, was ill-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 87-89.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

advised. If the Chilean government even at great temporary inconvenience or excessive cost, had kept these islands under a really effective control, certain very unfortunate incidents might not have occurred.

The Chilean authorities were quick to realize the possibilities of the violation of neutrality through the improper use of the wireless telegraph. It was to be expected that efforts would be made not only to exchange communications between wireless stations on Chilean soil and the merchant and naval crafts of the belligerents navigating neighboring waters, but also between ships anchored in Chilean ports and vessels on the high seas. As early as August 14, as appears in a note addressed by the minister of foreign affairs to the minister of marine, an order was issued forbidding any ship while it remained in Chilean waters to make use of its radio outfit.²⁰ It soon appeared, however, that more drastic measures were called for. On August 18, 1914, the British minister at Santiago complained that German merchant ships in the harbor of Valparaiso were in wireless communication with the German cruiser *Nürnberg* and he therefore requested that orders be issued for the dismantling of all wireless apparatus of all merchant ships belonging to the belligerent powers in the harbors or other territorial waters of Chile.²¹ This request was complied with as it was in harmony with the order of August 14.²² But charges of alleged

²⁰ *Memoria, 1914-1915*, pp. 86, 95. *International Law Topics, 1916*, pp. 15-17.

²¹ *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 96.

²² *Ibid.*

violations of these instructions continued to be made by both the British and German ministers. Finally, on October 14, 1914, the government issued a series of comprehensive instructions designed to meet all of these and similar objections. No ship, of whatever character, might use its radio installation while in Chilean territorial waters; in the case of vessels remaining in Chilean harbors less than four days, the apparatus was to be carefully sealed; if the sojourn was for a longer period, the apparatus was to be dismantled by the removal of the antennæ.²³ These dispositions were apparently effective, as no further complaints were lodged with the Chilean authorities.

On the basis of the evidence available it would seem that the Chilean government displayed somewhat less zeal in coping with a problem of equal magnitude, namely, the improper use of wireless stations on land. That a considerable number of clandestine stations did exist and that they were extensively used to furnish information to the ships of the belligerent fleets has been frequently asserted and never effectively disproved. It was not, however, until December 30, 1914, some time after the naval forces of the belligerents had been for the most part driven from or had abandoned the waters of the South Pacific, that the intendants and governors of the republic were ordered to proceed to the "dismantling of telegraph, telephone and wireless apparatus, whether intended for public service or not," whose installation had not been duly authorized.²⁴

²³ *International Law Topics*, 1916, p. 18.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24. Cf. Alvarez, p. 170.

As regards the ordinary cable communications between Chile and foreign countries, the government, although somewhat tardily, took measures to prevent infringement of Chilean neutrality. On November 13, 1914, an official circular was sent to all telegraph and cable agents throughout the country enjoining them to refuse telegrams written in cipher or relating in any way to the naval or military operations of the belligerent powers.²⁵ In practice it soon developed that these requirements entailed a good deal of unnecessary hardship. At the instance chiefly of merchants of neutral countries engaged in business in Chile, the government was induced to promulgate on January 25, 1915, a decree permitting the unrestricted use of code or cipher dispatches within the confines of the republic, between Chile and all neutral nations, and by all duly accredited diplomatic and consular agents. Code messages might also be sent to belligerent countries provided certain well-known codes were used and translations filed with the proper authorities.²⁶

In its laudable efforts to render the neutrality of Chile effective the government was forced to grapple with a problem which did not present itself, at least in a marked degree, in any other Latin American country. Alone among the South American republics Chile produced coal in any considerable quantity. Under normal conditions the port of Coronel was frequently entered

²⁵ *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 100; *International Law Topics, 1916*, p. 20.

²⁶ *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 101; *International Law Topics, 1916*, pp. 26-27.

by ships hailing from Europe and desiring to renew their fuel supply. The imperious necessity on the part of the belligerent naval divisions—especially the German—of replenishing their coal supply during their presence in the waters off the coast of Chile, the efforts made by the merchant ships of the belligerent powers to minister to this need, even at the risk of flouting Chilean neutrality, and finally the legitimate needs of certain merchant ships to obtain fuel if they were to complete their voyages; these and other considerations conspired to invest the whole problem of fuel, and to a less extent that of other provisions, with tremendous importance. Here was a weapon capable of almost infinite use or abuse by neutrals and belligerents alike.

For obvious reasons, of which the most important was the threatened paralyzation of foreign commerce, the Chilean government was extremely anxious to remove the presence of the naval divisions of the belligerent powers from waters adjacent to the coasts of Chile and to discourage the use of Chilean ports as coaling stations or bases of supplies. Immediately after the outbreak of the war the idea, apparently first sponsored by Brazil, of the establishment of a neutral zone about South America from which all warships should be debarred, merited serious consideration. The plan was soon abandoned owing to a number of inherent difficulties. As the greater part of the foreign commerce of South America was with European ports it was extremely doubtful if the belligerent powers would agree to any such measure; at best, therefore, it could have

been put into effect only in the case of neutral shipping between American ports. It was imperative, therefore, to find a new formula which would meet the existing situation and which could be rendered effective through its adoption by the nations of the Americas, without the necessity of securing the acquiescence of the belligerent powers. In harmony with this idea Chile decided that the best means of keeping the ships of belligerent powers away from Chilean waters was through a strict regulation of their coal supply.

To this end, on November 14, 1914, Sr. Manuel Salinas, minister of foreign affairs, submitted to the different representatives of the American governments a memorandum²⁷ in which, after recalling the serious dislocation suffered by the maritime commerce and economic life of the American republics, especially those of South America, through the activities of the belligerent nations, he suggested the advisability of altering certain provisions of Convention XIII of the Second Hague Conference, notably the paragraph which provided that belligerent warships may take on sufficient fuel to enable them to reach the nearest port of their own country.²⁸ As originally drawn up, this paragraph opened the door to abuses, at least in the case of certain of the American republics, which its framers had never contemplated. The distance between European and American, especially Chilean, ports was so great that

²⁷ *Memoria, 1914-1915*, pp. III-III.

²⁸ Convention XIII, Article 19, paragraph 2. This same article gave the neutral country the option of allowing the belligerent warships to fill up their bunkers built to carry fuel.

the large amount of coal to which belligerent war-ships were entitled permitted them to embark on extensive naval operations, thus defeating one of the manifest purposes of the Convention. The memorandum of November 14 proposed accordingly that the governments of the American republics should limit the amount of coal supplied to belligerent warships merely to the quantity necessary to enable them to arrive, not at a home port, but at the nearest neutral port. In proposing this modification of The Hague Convention the government of Chile justified its actions on the terms of Convention XIII itself which reserved to the signatory powers the faculty of modifying these prescriptions during the course of the war in cases where experience had demonstrated the need of such changes.²⁹

This proposal received favorable attention from the government of the United States, which had just signed with the government of Panama a convention regarding the form in which the hospitality of the waters of the Canal Zone and of the Republic of Panama should be extended to ships in the service of the belligerent powers. The primary object of the agreement was to prevent warships from securing coal alternately in one or the other of the respective jurisdictions.

Although the reception of this proposal on the part of the remaining American republics was distinctly cordial, there was little unanimity in the replies. The government of Brazil still hoped that its project of a neutral zone might win acceptance. The government

²⁹ Text of Protocol, dated October 10, 1914, given in *International Law Topics*, 1915, pp. 14-15.

of Argentina considered it preferable to submit the whole question to the governing board of the Pan American Union. The government of Uruguay accepted with minor modifications the plan proposed by Chile and issued the decrees necessary to put it into effect. Almost all of the remaining states accepted it in principle, but before taking definite action preferred to await the results of the session of the Pan American Union which had been summoned to consider this and analogous problems.³⁰

As the primary advantage of the measures proposed by Chile was dependent on its prompt adoption, the government determined to wait no longer. On December 15, 1914, the Chilean foreign office issued a lengthy decree, which after reciting in detail the reasons for the departure from Article 19 of the 13th Hague Convention of 1913, declared:

"Henceforth the supplies of coal which may be furnished to warships of the belligerent nations at Chilean ports shall be reduced to the quantity necessary to enable them to reach the nearest coaling port of the neighboring nation."³¹

The same decree took cognizance of similar abuses practiced by merchant ships flying the flags of the belligerent powers. As will presently be noted, one of the most flagrant violations of Chilean neutrality was

³⁰ The correspondence between the government of Chile and those of the other American states is, for the greater part, still unpublished. The account here given is based on the summary issued by Minister Lira in *Memoria, 1914-1915*, pp. 111-113. Cf. Alvarez, pp. 194-199.

³¹ *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 116.

that committed by the German steamship companies, particularly the Kosmos Line. These ships, acting as will be shown, under the orders of the German naval authorities, took on in Chilean ports large quantities of coal, ostensibly to enable them to continue on their regular itineraries, in reality to supply coal to the ships of the German squadron operating off the Chilean coast. The question was admittedly a perplexing one, as the restrictions imposed by The Hague Convention in regard to supplies of coal applied not to merchant ships but only to war vessels. None the less the Chilean authorities considered this practice as violating the spirit of true neutrality and endeavored to check such an abuse through the following provisions:

“In case of violation by a merchant ship of any of the rules established by the government of Chile for the safeguarding of neutrality, no more coal will be furnished in Chilean ports to any of the ships of the company to which the steamer committing the infraction belongs.

“The amount of coal which may be supplied in the ports of the republic to merchant ships will be limited to the capacity of their ordinary bunkers, except in those cases in which they wish to undertake a direct voyage to European ports; in such case the amount of coal necessary for the voyage may be supplied on condition that the company owning the ship furnish guarantees, in the judgment of the government sufficient, that the fuel will be utilized solely for the purposes of the voyage.”³²

³² Text of the decree in *Memoria, 1914-1915*, and in *International Law Topics, 1916*, pp. 22-23; Cf. Alvarez, pp. 194-199; J. W. Garner, *International Law and the World War* (London, 1920), Vol. II, p. 417.

As was to be anticipated the decree of December 15 engaged the attention of the governments most affected, namely, Great Britain and Germany. The British government, while according the Chilean government full recognition for the laudable purpose behind the decree, was disposed to doubt both its expediency and its effectiveness. Especially did it question the validity of the guarantees demanded of the companies owning the merchant ships, citing a number of instances in which the German ships had violated the engagements made by the company's agents. In answer to these objections, as formulated by the British minister, Sir Francis Stronge, the Chilean foreign office made it perfectly clear that the Chilean government would omit no act calculated to make the decree really effective.³³ The British government apparently accepted the explanations as satisfactory and considered the incident as closed.³⁴

³³ Notes of Lira (Chilean minister of foreign affairs) to Stronge of January 19 and 30, and February 10, 1915, in reply to notes of Stronge to Lira of January 13, January 25, and February 4, 1915, respectively. (Only last of Stronge's notes given *in extenso*). *Memoria, 1914-1915*, pp. 120-127. Dispatches of January 19, February 4 and 10, 1915, given in English in the work of Enrique Rocuant, *The Neutrality of Chile; the Grounds that prompted and justified it*, translated by H. E. Swinglehurst (Valparaiso, 1919), pp. 38-43. This work, written largely for purposes of propaganda, is inferior in value to that of Alvarez which more or less traverses the same ground.

³⁴ The desire of the Chilean authorities to allay the apprehension of the British government is probably to be seen in the decree of May 17, 1915, requiring a deposit of five pounds sterling for every ton of coal taken on as a guarantee that

Far different, both in spirit and temper, was the protest of the Imperial German government. The pertinent portions of the German objection, as lodged by the minister, von Erckert, may be quoted:

"Allowing myself to draw your attention to the decree on neutrality under date of December 15 last . . . I have the honor, by order of my supreme government, to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency, the following: According to the first article of said decree, belligerent ships of war may only take, in Chilean ports, the coal needful to reach the next neutral coaling port. That restriction on the taking in of coal signifies an innovation in international law, which is only advantageous to the states which have many ports to rely on, well distributed over the whole world, for which reason, in the actual circumstances, it favors England and France exclusively, and its purpose is to prejudice Germany.

"In the considerations of the decree cited, the view is expressed that Chile can and ought to do everything that lies in her power to hinder, as far as possible, all maritime war in the Pacific Ocean, as being contrary to Chilean interests.

"Such a conception implies a want of knowledge of the principle of international law, generally accepted, that the high seas form part of the theatre of maritime war.

"The measures of a neutral state, designed to reduce that theatre, would not be compatible with neutrality.

"Consequently the Imperial government is not in a situation to recognize the measure treated of."³⁵

this fuel would be used solely to enable the vessels in question to reach a home port; this sum to be returned to the agent of the company on telegraphic advice that the steamer had arrived at destination. *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 119.

³⁵ Von Erckert to Lira, September 7, 1915. *Ibid.*, p. 126; pertinent parts in Rocuant, pp. 43-44.

The Chilean government refused to make the slightest concession to the German demands as formulated by von Erckert. In his reply to the note of September 7 Lira stated the position of Chile with a frankness and cogency which admitted of no reply.

"The provisions of the government of Chile are in exact accordance with the provisions of impartiality and generality which Convention XIII of The Hague exacts.

"As regards the right itself to adopt this measure whose application must of necessity take place in national territory, my government considers that it is inherent in its sovereignty, which only recognizes those restrictions laid down in international law."³⁶

An analysis of the preceding correspondence lends itself to a number of commentaries. It is at once obvious that in adopting the decree of December 15, Chile, though acting strictly within her rights and according to a legitimate interpretation of The Hague Convention, in reality adopted a course of action distinctly favorable to Great Britain. The real gravamen of von Erckert's note was the fact that if this decree were enforced German warships would be prevented from obtaining coal in Chilean ports, which they could not otherwise obtain, and thus would be unable to attack the ships of war and merchant ships of the Allies. While it was true that at the time the protest was delivered there were no German warships in this section of the Pacific the German minister was doubtless endeavoring to secure a future liberty of action. He may well have had in mind the presence at some future date of a

³⁶ Lira to von Erckert, November 4, 1915. *Memoria, 1914-1915*, pp. 127-129.

German submarine squadron on the Chilean coast. That such a contingency was not beyond the bounds of possibility is suggested by the promise made two years later by the German foreign minister, Kühlmann, to authorize the German minister, Luxburg, to announce a visit of a submarine squadron to Buenos Aires "should politico-military situation allow."³⁷

Neither The Hague Conventions nor the Declaration of London had defined the status according to international law of merchant ships belonging to a company or individual which placed themselves at the service of the warships of the belligerent country to which the company or individual belonged. The government of Chile, from the very first, took the ground that through such a procedure these merchant ships were converted *ipso facto* into auxiliary cruisers of the navy to which they were rendering assistance. Such a possibility had been clearly envisaged in Article 2 of the Memorandum of August 14 prepared by the minister of foreign affairs for the guidance of the minister of marine. The article in question reads:

"Clearance papers will not be granted to any merchant ship which has changed or endeavored to change its status when there exist reasons to believe that the ship has desired to make this change in order to transform itself into an auxiliary cruiser or armed ship, whatever the character of the armament may be."³⁸

During the autumn of 1914 the Chilean government on the basis of its own investigations or by means of

³⁷ Kühlmann to Luxburg, August 12, 1917. *Official Bulletin*, (Washington), December 21, 1917.

³⁸ *Memoria*, 1914-1915, p. 86. Cf. Alvarez, p. 159.

information furnished by other governments found itself obliged to define as auxiliary cruisers practically all of the German merchant ships lying in Chilean harbors or operating off the coast.

The ships of the Kosmos Company, during the autumn of 1914, were repeatedly guilty of acts which in the judgment of the Chilean authorities placed them within this category. Immediately upon the outbreak of the war their activities were largely devoted to furnishing aid, support and information to the squadron of Admiral von Spee, which early in the autumn had crossed from the Orient to South American waters for the purpose of harassing the commerce of the Allied powers and destroying the British fleet under Admiral Craddock.

The case of Chile against the Imperial government, which was directly responsible for this flouting of Chilean neutrality, is admirably summed up in a lengthy memorandum presented on January 16, 1916, by Foreign Minister Lira to von Erckert. A brief extract from this document, which is both a protest against the attitude of the Kosmos Company, and by implication against the German government itself, and a justification of the acts put into effect by the Chilean authorities, will make clear Chile's legitimate grievances.

After pointing out a number of specific instances in which the ships of the Kosmos Line furnished provisions and food to the German warships, entered into clandestine communication with them, served as trans-

ports and violated Chilean sovereignty in a number of other ways, the note continues:

"It will not be necessary to cite other acts of violation of our neutrality, of disrespect to our laws, and of disobedience to our authorities committed by the agents and captains of the Kosmos Company, to establish in a form that admits of no appeal, that the conduct of that Company and of these ships merits the most rigorous measures of vigilance and repression.

"But the Kosmos Company has gone further yet; it has put forward protests in unacceptable terms, has made improper publications, and has even gone so far as to give orders to its subordinates, orders which imply a veritable rebellion against the maritime authorities of the republic. In fact only a few days ago the manager of the company ordered his agent in Punta Arenas to instruct the captain of the *Radames* not to allow the maritime authorities to remove any part of that ship and the manager himself declares that the orders of the said authorities are illegal.

"Your Excellency will recognize how irregular this proceeding is, and how sternly to be reprobated is the commission of such acts which are severely punished by the legislation of all countries. By no nation in the world would such language and such an attitude be allowed in a private person, and my government reserves to itself the right to bring the sanction of the law upon these operations."³⁹

Elsewhere in the note Sr. Lira refers to the statement attributed to the agent of the Kosmos Company of Valparaiso and published in *El Mercurio* of that city on November 20, 1915, to the effect "that every German steamer, although it belongs to private companies, remains in case of war subordinated to the

³⁹ Lira to Von Erckert, January 16, 1915. *Memoria*, 1914-1915, p. 160 ff.; in English in Rocuant, pp. 55-68.

orders which the German Admiralty may impart. Captains of ships should, above all, respect the orders which they may receive from the warships, and in this case should act with entire independence without giving any notice to this office." As no effort was made to deny this statement, the Chilean government was disposed to adopt the current belief that the Kosmos Company obeyed in their proceedings superior instructions from the German government.⁴⁰

If the Chilean authorities had ever harbored any doubts as to the wisdom of declaring the ships of the Kosmos Company auxiliary cruisers they were removed by such declarations as the preceding.⁴¹ On November 21, 1914, the Chilean government issued an order that all the vessels of the Kosmos Company should be interned in case they did not leave the ports of Chile within twenty-four hours in accordance with Article 12 of the 13th Hague Convention.⁴² At various times, during the course of the next three months practically all the ships of this company suffered this penalty. So little confidence, however, did the Chilean

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ As early as September 4 the agents of the Kosmos Company formally denied that the Chilean tribunals had any jurisdiction over the affairs of the company; the only courts competent to try cases in which the company was a party were those of the Imperial German government. "This refusal of jurisdiction," declared one of the agents, "is the more important from the fact that the Kosmos Company has received from the German government official notification that it cannot dispose, without the latter's authorization, of its ships or their cargo." Alvarez, p. 212.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 213.

government have in the professions⁴³ of the representatives of the Kosmos Company that on November 26 the minister of foreign affairs issued instructions for the removal of all supplies of coal from the bunkers of such ships as might be interned, leaving only such amounts as were necessary to insure service within the confines of the port.⁴⁴ Finally by the decree of De-

⁴³ An example of the manner in which the manager of the Company abused the good faith of the government appears clearly in the case of the *Luxor*. In his protest to von Erckert Sr. Lira declared: "The case of the *Luxor* has in the opinion of the undersigned special importance. When, on account of the Declaration of War, the spontaneous stagnation of the ships of the Kosmos Company on our coasts came about, special facilities were asked for them, with the object of procuring coal for their ships. The manager of that Company in a petition dated September 29 said: 'We trust, Your Excellency, that the word of the Company of high repute in this country for more than forty years, will continue to merit the confidence of the Supreme government.' In this petition, it was requested that the *Luxor* might be allowed to embark up to twelve thousand tons, to be distributed in equal parts, among the ships of the Company, so as to avoid the voyage of all the steamers of their fleet to the coaling ports. The shipment asked for commenced, but before its conclusion, it became necessary to suspend the authorization to complete the loading. It so happened that the *Luxor*, twenty days afterwards, illicitly fled from Coronel at midnight, with 3,600 tons of coal on board, without the customary papers, and without the permission of the authorities. After navigating for a month and a half, this ship arrived at Callao; and the Peruvian government has also declared it an auxiliary ship and interned it. This fact would be sufficient to demonstrate the just criterion of my government in mistrusting the declarations of the Kosmos Company and treating the *Luxor* as an auxiliary cruiser." Lira to von Erckert, January 16, 1915. *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 160 ff.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

ember 15, 1915, which, as we have already seen, denied fuel to all the ships of a company of which any steamer had been guilty of infractions of neutrality, the entire fleet of the Kosmos Company was forced to remain inactive and innocuous in Chilean harbors.⁴⁵

It is interesting to note that the German government made no protest against the internment of these ships, although it did later object to several ships having their status changed to that of auxiliary cruisers. The dilemma of the German government is well expressed by Sr. Lira, the Chilean minister of foreign affairs:

"The government of Chile stated the question in the following terms: Either the German government admits, as its silence indicates, that these vessels form a part of the Imperial Germany navy, or it denies them their character as such, thus leaving them in the position of vessels of private ownership that engage in acts of war upon their own responsibility, which is characteristic of vessels known as pirates, and which makes them susceptible to confiscation by the state in whose territory they are found."⁴⁶

With the destruction of the fleet of Admiral von Spee off the Falkland Islands in December 1914, the reason for the internment of these German merchant ships largely disappeared. In fact it was distinctly to the interest of Chile that they resume their normal activity, since their withdrawal from service had materially contributed to the dislocation of the economic life of the country. A number of these ships contained large quantities of imports consigned both to private individuals and to the government; owing to the intern-

⁴⁵ Cf. above, p. 291.

⁴⁶ *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 156.

ment of the vessels these goods had not reached their destination. The Chilean government, therefore, was not unwilling to mitigate the severity of certain of the penalties inflicted upon the German merchant shipping. Accordingly, in a memorandum dated January 12, Sr Lira, the minister of foreign affairs, informed the minister of marine that the government would remove the prohibitions laid upon those merchant ships which had themselves not been guilty of infractions of neutrality, but which had been involved in the general condemnation visited on certain companies, notably the Kosmos Company, a number of whose ships had been involved in unneutral acts. Henceforth these ships would be permitted to weigh anchor and resume their voyages; they would also be permitted to provide themselves with sufficient fuel and provisions in accordance with the decree of December 15, 1914. These concessions did not apply, however, to those German ships which had been declared auxiliary cruisers; but even in the case of certain of these ships the minister of foreign affairs intimated that the government might be willing to reopen the questions of their official status.⁴¹

It is interesting to note that none of these German merchant ships availed itself of these concessions. In the words of Sr. Lira:

"... they have spontaneously declared themselves incapacitated from moving from one port to another ... in spite of the fact that my government has offered Chilean ships of war to accompany them in our

⁴¹Text of memorandum of January 12, 1915, is given in *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 159. Cf. note of Lira to von Erckert, January 16, 1915, *ibid.*, p. 160, ff.

seas to protect them from all risk and thus to facilitate their arrival at the ports where they have to disembark the merchandise they have on board.”⁴⁸

Germany was not the only belligerent power whose merchant ships acquired the status of auxiliary cruisers. On this subject Great Britain and Chile became involved in a series of diplomatic negotiations, which, though lacking the importance and interest of those which arose between Chile and Germany, merit at least a summary discussion. In pre-war days the great commercial rival of the Kosmos Company was the Pacific Steam Navigation Company. It was inevitable that its great merchant fleet should be affected by the presence off the Chilean coast of the squadron of Admiral Craddock before its destruction at the Battle of Coronel on November 1, 1914. The German minister at Santiago repeatedly called the attention of the Chilean foreign office to alleged violation of Chilean neutrality by the vessels of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company. More specifically were they charged with having sup-

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* On September 2, 1918, the machinery of the greater part of the German ships was destroyed by dynamite, this despite the fact that a few months previous von Erckert had assured the Chilean government that no damage would be done them. As a consequence of these acts armed guards were placed on all of the eighty-four German ships which were interned or had sought refuge in Chilean harbors. República de Chile. *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Culto y Colonización, Diciembre de 1915-Noviembre de 1919*, pp. 221-222 (hereafter referred to as *Memoria, 1915-1919*).

Following the armistice these German ships were turned over to the Allies. Full details are given in *Memoria, 1915-1919*, p. 231 ff

plied coal to the British war-ships. Although all of these complaints were the object of the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Chilean authorities not a single case, according to Alvarez, was fully proved.⁴⁹ The Chilean government did, however, find it necessary to intern two British merchant ships as auxiliary cruisers. In a note dated October 27, 1914, von Erckert informed Sr. Lira that the English ship *Benbrook* had cast anchor at Punta Arenas after having left the harbor to rejoin a unit of the British squadron without any interference of the port authorities. The German minister therefore demanded that this ship as well as the *Langoe*, which had accompanied as a tender the same unit of the British fleet, "should be treated as auxiliary cruisers in case they should reenter Chilean ports." After due investigations the Chilean government acceded to the demands of the German minister and both ships were declared auxiliary cruisers and duly interned.⁵⁰

With the apparently definite removal of the menace of German naval activity from the South Pacific waters the British government found it desirable to return to merchant service a number of ships which had been armed and equipped as auxiliary cruisers. Accordingly, on February 4, 1915, Sir Francis Stronge, British minister at Valparaiso, broached the possibility to the Chilean government of the resumption on the part of

⁴⁹ Alvarez, p. 192.

⁵⁰ The diplomatic correspondence relative to the *Benbrook* and *Langoe* does not appear in the *Memoria* for 1914-1915. The account here given is based on Alvarez, pp. 192, 212, 220.

these ships of their former status as merchant vessels and their admission into Chilean harbors.

In his reply Sr. Lira pointed out that The Hague Convention made no provisions for such a change of status, and as a result the Chilean government would be obliged to take "into account the special conditions obtaining in this hemisphere." Following this criterion the Chilean government had no difficulty in admitting into Chilean ports and jurisdictional waters, and treating in every respect as merchant ships, those ships which had been auxiliary to the navy of any of the belligerent States, provided they met a number of conditions. Of these the most important were:

"That the auxiliary ship has not violated Chilean neutrality.

"That it is certain that the ship neither in its crew nor in its installation reveals that it can thereby lend assistance to the navy of its country, in the character of auxiliary which it previously possessed."⁵¹

An equal willingness to meet the wishes of Great Britain, in so far as they were compatible with her neutrality, was shown by Chile on the question of the admission of armed merchant ships within her ports. On June 15, 1915, Sir Francis Stronge informed Sr. Lira that he had learned through telegraphic advices from Sir Edward Grey that the first of the merchant ships, armed for self defense, would shortly leave England for Chilean waters. The British minister ex-

⁵¹ *Memoria, 1914-1915*, pp. 131-132. Stronge's note is not published but its substance is found in the reply of Lira, dated June 18, and printed in full.

pressed the hope that the Chilean government would follow the procedure already adopted by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, the United States and Spain, and would oppose no difficulty to the admission of such armed ships into Chilean harbors. Sir Francis also enlarged on the manifest injustice of regarding such ships as auxiliary cruisers or of insisting that their armament be removed during their sojourn in neutral waters.⁵²

In his reply Sr. Lira, after stressing the principles which Chile had endeavored to follow in safeguarding her neutrality, summed up the attitude of his government as follows :

“Chilean ports will receive merchant ships armed for self-defense, when their respective governments previously communicate the name of the ship which sails under these conditions, and when the itinerary, the muster roll, the list of the passengers, as well as the equipment and armament of the ship demonstrate that it is a question, beyond all cavil, of a merchant ship which is not intended to carry out hostile acts, nor to cooperate in the war-like operations of hostile fleets. If an armed ship arrives without the previous advice on the part of the government it will be treated as suspicious. If, violating these declarations, these ships participate in war-like operations against unarmed merchant ships, they will then be treated and considered as pirates, since the government of the country under whose flag they sail has formally declared their exclusively commercial character by not incorporating them as war ships within its navy.”⁵³

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 135; Alvarez, pp. 258-289; Garner, I, p. 387. The latter writer compares the attitude of Chile with that of other neutral powers.

During the remainder of the war armed merchant ships continued to enter Chilean ports without let or hindrance on the part of the Chilean authorities.

Abundant evidence has been adduced to prove the small consideration shown for the sovereign rights of Chile by the merchant ships sailing under the German flag when these vessels chanced to be in Chilean waters. It now remains to record the violations of Chilean neutrality perpetrated by the war ships of the Imperial German navy and to subject to a brief analysis the resultant diplomatic correspondence.

It will be recalled that the powerful German squadron commanded by Admiral von Spee was stationed in Eastern waters when war was declared. Early in the autumn of 1914 it was ordered to repair to the Pacific coast of South America. On October 12 this fleet, consisting of twelve units—four war ships⁵⁴ and eight transports—reached Easter Island, a remote possession of Chile, some twenty-three hundred miles west of South America. Geologically, Easter Island is entirely separated from the American continental system. It is the easternmost inhabited Polynesian island, and is chiefly known for its remarkable and ancient gigantic statues. In this forgotten corner of the world the few Chilean officials were in complete ignorance of the European War and with customary courtesy proceeded to offer the German fleet the hospitality of the island. Von Spee took good care not to enlighten the islanders of the world-shaking events of the past three months.

⁵⁴ These were *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst* of 11,600 tons and the *Nürnberg* and *Dresden* of 3,500 tons.

In violation of the 13th Convention of the Second Hague Conference the fleet exceeded its legal stay some four days, remaining at the little port of Angarroa from October 12 to 17. It also took on a supply of provisions, in amounts so large, according to the protests of the Chilean government, as to constitute an additional infraction of Chilean neutrality.⁶⁵

At the risk of interrupting the chronological sequence of our account of the various infringements of Chilean neutrality by the German naval forces it is perhaps worth while to examine the sequel of this first Easter Island episode. Early in November the German fleet entered the harbor of Valparaíso. Von Spee, in his official visit to the Chilean authorities, made no mention of his sojourn at Easter Island, nor of the replenishment of his supplies of provisions. But the Chilean government had learned from British sources that the German fleet had visited Easter Island and had taken on supplies, although in the denouncement nothing was said of the violation of Chilean neutrality. Von Spee when questioned by the Chilean officials declared that he did not feel called upon to offer any statement as to whether or not he had exceeded his stay at Easter Island, until the British minister, who had made the denouncement, should supply the proofs; he refused

⁶⁵ The neutrality of Chile was violated on a third count through the simultaneous presence of more than three warships in a Chilean harbor (Article 15 of the 13th Convention). Salinas (Chilean minister of foreign affairs) to Cruchaga Toconal (Chilean minister at Berlin), December 12, 1914, *Ibid.*, p. 169. Cruchaga to Zimmermann, May 26, 1916, *Memoria*, 1915-1919, p. 172 ff.

moreover to divulge any information regarding his itinerary or plans, as he considered that the protest presented by the British plenipotentiary was merely a ruse to learn the movements of the German fleet.⁵⁶

The second violation of Chilean neutrality by the fleet of Admiral von Spee was much more serious than the first. On November 6 the fleet, composed of the *Schornhorst*, *Gneisnau* and *Nürnberg*, arrived at the Island of Más Afuera, of the Juan Fernández group, whither it had been preceded by the cruiser *Leipzig* accompanied by a captured French bark *Valentine*, together with the two Kosmos liners, *Santa Isabel* and *Amasis*. A little later, on November 7 and 8, appeared three other German ships accompanied by the Norwegian bark *Helicon* and the American ship *Sacramento*. The warships leisurely proceeded to take on board coal and provisions from the two latter craft as well as from the French ship *Valentine*. All told the various units of the German squadron remained in Chilean territorial waters from seven to ten days, while the auxiliary cruiser *Santa Isabel* prolonged her sojourn to eighteen days.

As soon as the necessary investigations had been made the Chilean government addressed a strongly worded protest to the German foreign office through the Chilean minister at Berlin.

"From the investigations conducted by the maritime authorities of Chile it appears proved that a German Naval Division . . . remained in the northwest bay

⁵⁶ Salinas to Cruchaga, December 12, 1914, *Memoria*, 1914-1915, p. 169; Alvarez, pp. 224-225.

of the island of Más Afuera for seven days transshipping coal and provisions from the ship *Valentine* (French), *Helicon* (Norwegian), and *Sacramento* (American), which had been conducted there by the aforesaid Division as prizes and held up in that character for several days.

“ These actions signify flagrant violations of the neutrality of Chile, the more censurable as they have been consummated in an island where the immediate action of the central authorities could not reach, on account of the distance from the continent, and the want of telegraphic communication.”

The Chilean minister at Berlin was instructed to protest specifically against the presence of more than three ships of the German squadron at the same time at Más Afuera; against the failure of the warships to leave within the period of twenty-four hours stipulated in The Hague Convention; against the fact “ that the merchant ships *Valentine*, *Sacramento* and *Helicon* were conducted to a neutral roadstead, for a purpose distinct from sequestration, thus constituting in territorial waters a prize-dépôt and a base of naval operations in violation of Articles 5 and 23 of the Convention,⁵⁷ against the squadron supplying itself with fuel and provisions from the prizes in question, in violation

⁵⁷ Article 5: “ Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations against their adversaries, and in particular to erect wireless telegraph stations or any apparatus for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea.”

Article 23 (pertinent part): “ A neutral Power may allow prizes to enter its ports and roadsteads, whether under convoy or not, when they are brought there to be sequestered pending the decision of a prize court.”

of Article 19.⁵⁸ Finally the Chilean minister was ordered to state in his protest "that the government of Chile holds the government of Germany responsible for all the consequences that may arise from those acts, and for all the indemnities there may be, by virtue of the sentence of the Prize-Court, whether with regard to loss incurred by the ships, or by the cargoes captured under abnormal conditions."⁵⁹

In a lengthy communication dated June 23, 1915, Zimmermann, the German chancellor, undertook to reply to these protests of the government of Chile. As regards the presence of more than three German warships at one time, both at Easter Island and at Juan Fernández, he offered the following evasive and disingenuous explanation :

"In view of the order given to the commander of the squadron to keep within international law, the Imperial government cannot explain to itself how he can have forgotten the stipulations of Article 15 of said Convention. The Imperial government is interested in procuring precise data, so as to inform itself about the facts which can serve to corroborate the Chilean authorities."

⁵⁸ Article 19 (pertinent parts): "Belligerent warships may only revictual in neutral ports or roadsteads to bring up their supplies to the peace standard.

"Similarly these vessels may only ship sufficient fuel to enable them to reach the nearest port in their own country. They may, on the other hand, fill up their bunkers built to carry fuel, when in neutral countries which have adopted this method of determining the amount of fuel to be supplied."

⁵⁹ Salinas to Cruchaga, December 13, 1914, *Memoria*, 1914-1915, pp. 170-171; cf. Alvarez, p. 222.

In reference to the alleged non-observance of the twenty-four-hour limit, Zimmermann declared that this provision of The Hague Convention constituted an innovation contrary to the principles of international law and that Germany has therefore not recognized it as binding.⁶⁰ The fact that the Chilean government had accepted this provision as a fundamental principle of its neutrality was unknown to the commander of the German squadron; hence he should be absolved from all responsibility for this unfortunate misunderstanding.

In the matter of the establishment of a prize-dépôt and basis of naval operations at Juan Fernández, the German government virtually denied the contention of the Chilean government; the transshipment of coal, "if it only happens once in a place does not convert that place into a base of operations." Of the three ships, the *Valentine*, *Helicon* and *Sacramento*, only the first strictly speaking was a "prize" as the others had accompanied the German squadron voluntarily.

"As regards the last complaint, as to excessive provisioning in territorial waters, beyond the normal needs, in contravention of Article 19 of the Convention, the Imperial government regrets not being able to form an opinion for want of exact details."⁶¹

⁶⁰ As is well known, and as appears from Zimmermann's note, the German government was not consistent in regard to The Hague Convention. "Whenever it had occasion to invoke the benefit of a particular convention, it argued that the Convention was binding; but whenever it wished to avoid its obligations it took the position that the Convention was not binding." Garner, I, p. 23.

⁶¹ Zimmermann to Cruchaga, June 23, 1915, *Memoria*, 1914-1915, pp. 178-179; Alvarez, pp. 232-237; Rocuant, pp. 74-78.

It is unnecessary to analyze at length the Chilean rejoinder to these arguments and protestations. Suffice it to say that in a lengthy memorandum dated November 30, 1915, Sr. Lira effectively demolished each of the German contentions. The German explanation of the failure of von Spee to observe the twenty-four-hour limit is thus characterized by Sr. Lira:

"The excuse of the German government is founded simply on the conjecture that the commander of the squadron was probably unaware of the adoption of that regulation, and on the irresponsibility which is derived from that presumed ignorance.

"But it is not admissible to plead ignorance on his part more than two months after the European war broke out.

"The most elementary precaution imposed on him the necessity or convenience of knowing the regulations which the country to whose territorial waters he was going with the squadron under his command has adopted, in order to uphold its status of a neutral country, in view of this conflict.

"Nor is it admissible that a government, which for some time had been aware of the adoption of those regulations by Chile, should not have imparted them to the commander of the German squadron which was going to the territorial waters of that same neutral country, and still less can a government be exempted from giving satisfaction, alleging probable or actual ignorance on the part of one of its principal officials.

"At all events, if there be not a manifest intention to affront the sovereignty of Chile, there is a series of acts which reveal inexcusable indolence or negligence on the part of the German government or its naval subordinates, in not avoiding a breach of Chilean neutrality."⁶²

⁶² *Memoria, 1914-1915*, pp. 182-190; Rocuant, pp. 79-90.

The third violation of Chilean neutrality by the Imperial German navy is succinctly stated in the cablegram of protest sent to Berlin by the Chilean foreign office:

"The 6th of December last (1914) at 10 A. M. the German war transport *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* entered the minor port of Papudo.⁶³

"Without submitting itself to what the port regulations prescribed, and without showing the slightest courtesy to our authorities, the German transport sent in its boats and disembarked 58 men, including the captain of the British steamer *Charcas*, which the same *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had sunk between Corral and Valparaiso eight miles from the coast. This having taken place under the conditions disclosed, the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* left the port for the high seas."⁶⁴

The German government stated in its reply dated July 16, 1916, that according to the report of the captain of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* the cruiser had entered the harbor of Papudo solely for the purpose of landing at the earliest moment and under the most favorable conditions the wife and child of the captain of the *Charcas*. If it had merely been a question of the crew, they would have been set ashore in the environs of the port. The captain furthermore alleged that he was unaware that any Chilean authorities were stationed at Papudo, and had therefore no intention of committing

⁶³ An inlet on the Pacific located some 45 miles north of Valparaiso.

⁶⁴ Lira to Cruchaga (date not given), *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 171; Alvarez, p. 226; Rocuant, p. 71.

any act of discourtesy towards the Chilean government or its agents.⁶⁵

These explanations were considered satisfactory by the Chilean government and the incident was regarded as closed.⁶⁶

The fourth violation of Chilean neutrality was also committed by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. Immediately after the Papudo incident this auxiliary cruiser sailed directly for Easter Island, where it arrived four days later. The extraordinary haste in placing over two thousand miles between itself and the coast of South America is perhaps to be explained by the destruction of the fleet of Admiral von Spee off the Falkland Islands on December 8. On its arrival at Easter Island it was guilty of various infractions of Chilean neutrality which did not become known to the Chilean authorities until March 1915, owing to the infrequent communications between the island and the mainland. On the receipt of this intelligence the government at once dispatched to the island the training ship *Baquedano*, for the purpose of making a thorough examination of the unneutral acts alleged to have been perpetrated by the German warship. The results of this investigation are set forth in the telegram sent on August 6, 1915, by Sr. Lira to Sr. Cruchaga, Chilean minister at Berlin, for transmission to the Imperial government:

⁶⁵ Zimmermann to Cruchaga, July 16, 1915. *Memoria*, 1914-1915, p. 177; Alvarez, p. 237.

⁶⁶ Lira to Zimmermann, November 13, 1915. *Memoria*, 1914-1915, p. 190.

"The investigation made by the Chilean warship *Baquedano* proves that the auxiliary cruiser of the German navy *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* remained at anchor eight days in the roadstead of Angarroa at the Chilean possession of Easter Island, transshipping coal from the French sailing ship *Jean* conducted there as a prize.

"The said cruiser likewise had at that time an observation station on Mount La Pérouse in that island, with armed troops, under the command of an officer.

"All these acts were realized with absolute disregard of the resident maritime authority, which naturally had not the coercive power to resist them.

"The grave violation of our neutrality, which the facts indicated signify, and the serious insult inflicted thereby on the sovereignty of the republic, induce the government of Chile to formulate an energetic protest, on the following grounds:

"(a) Inasmuch as the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* remained more than 24 hours in the said roadstead, in contravention of the stipulations in Article 12 of the 13th Convention of The Hague;

"(b) Inasmuch as the merchant ship *Jean* was held up as a prize, in contravention of the stipulations in Article 21 of the same Convention;

"(c) Inasmuch as it (*i. e.*, the German warship) provided itself with fuel, taking it from said prize in violation of Article 19 of said Convention;

"(d) Inasmuch as it disembarked troops in the roadstead of Angarroa, making it a base of operations against its adversaries, in contravention of the stipulations of Articles 1 and 2 of the 5th Convention of The Hague⁶⁷ and Articles 1 and 5 of the 13th Convention already cited."⁶⁸

⁶⁷ The articles in question are as follows:

Article 1: The territory of neutral powers is inviolable.

Article 2: Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power.

⁶⁸ *Memoria, 1914-1915*, pp. 172-173; Alvarez, p. 232; Rocuant, pp. 72-73.

For reasons that are not at all clear the Chilean ministry of foreign affairs has not seen fit to make public the German reply to this protest. The character of the German defense is indicated with sufficient clarity, however, in the concluding paragraphs of Sr. Lira's memorandum of November 30, 1915:

"In the German reply, dated the 31st of said month of August (1915), it is argued that The Hague Convention, whose provisions have been violated by the ship here named, is not applicable in the present war, because it has not been ratified by the various belligerent states, nor by Chile herself. Neither is it acknowledged to be the expression of the principles of international law, generally recognized, especially Article 12, which establishes the 24-hour limit.

"But as has already been recognized in the note of June 23⁶⁹ and is recognized further in the said cited note of August 31, that these rules have been adopted by Chile by an autonomous act, for the purpose of observing neutrality in the European conflict, it is unnecessary to rebut this point, the more so as the German minister in this capital, as has been stated above, has done nothing else, during the war, than demand by express instructions of his government, the strict fulfillment of these provisions."⁷⁰

In the light of the preceding it is a trifle difficult to interpret the paragraph which immediately follows in the memorandum of November 30:

"In conclusion our government accepts the excuses made for those acts by the government of the Empire and devolves on it the responsibility which may arise from the proceedings *re* the sailing ship *Jean*."⁷¹

⁶⁹ The note in question is the Chilean protest over the violation of Chilean neutrality by the German warship *Dresden*. See below, p. 311.

⁷⁰ *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 182 ff.; Rocuant, pp. 79-90.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

Not until the full correspondence between the Chilean and German foreign offices on this subject is available will it be possible to reconcile the acceptances of the alleged excuses of the German government with the obviously unsatisfactory and inadequate explanations embodied in the reply of the Imperial government to the Chilean protest.

The fifth and last violation of Chilean neutrality by the naval forces of the Imperial government was committed by the warship *Dresden* at the Island of Juan Fernández in March 1915. The swift and dramatic vengeance visited upon this vessel, the sole surviving unit of Admiral von Spee's ill-fated squadron, invests the whole episode with unusual interest. It appears that the *Dresden* arrived in Cumberland Bay on March 9 and requested permission to remain there for eight days in order to repair her engines. This request was refused and the *Dresden* was ordered to leave within twenty-four hours under penalty of internment. The commander of the German warship not only paid no attention to this order but refused to permit the Chilean authorities to board his ship or take other measures to render the internment effective. A few days later as will presently be noted the *Dresden* was destroyed by a detachment of the British naval forces operating in the South Pacific.

On learning of this violation of Chilean sovereignty by the *Dresden*, Sr. Lira, under date of March 29, 1915, sent a strongly worded protest to the German government through the Chilean minister at Berlin,

based on the findings of the captain of the Chilean ship *Zentano*, which was sent to Juan Fernández to investigate the circumstances under which the *Dresden* was sunk. In the concluding portion of his note Sr. Lira declared:

"Your Excellency will present an energetic protest to the German government for the violation of Chilean neutrality committed by the *Dresden* in remaining more than 24 hours at Juan Fernández without proving that it was impossible for her to navigate. The gravity of the case is greatly enhanced from the fact that this is the second time that German warships have taken on provisions and made their headquarters at this island, which on account of its geographical location cannot be subjected to due surveillance. . . . Your Excellency will add that our government hopes to obtain satisfaction, and you will end by pointing out that in case of necessity this protest will be brought to the knowledge of all the states of America through the intermediary of the Pan American Union at Washington."⁷²

Zimmermann's reply to this protest was disingenuous and in part irrelevant. He declared that according to the statement of the captain of the *Dresden*, there was no violation of Chilean neutrality as the German warship was fully entitled according to Article 14 of the 13th Convention to remain in a neutral port a sufficient length of time to effect the necessary repairs to the ship's machinery; hence there was no justification for the order of the local authorities that the *Dresden* be interned. The German minister alleged furthermore that on the basis of a comparative study of the Chilean protest and the report of the captain of the *Dresden* there existed "a lamentable misunderstanding" be-

⁷² *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 172; Alvarez, p. 228.

tween the maritime authorities of the port and the commander in regard to the order of internment. While the former considered that the warship was under no necessity of undergoing repairs, and should therefore be interned pending new instructions from the Chilean government, the commander thought that since the local authorities did not inspect the damage, they therefore took it for granted, and consequently the stay of the ship was justified, at least until the arrival of the instructions asked for. The note concluded with the general assertion that if the time-limit be exceeded by a warship of a belligerent state, that does not constitute a breach of neutrality but that the non-observance of the time-limit only brings in its train the consequences provided for in international law.⁷³

It is hardly necessary to suggest that the Chilean government would not permit to pass unchallenged this evasive, and, as the facts proved, uncandid defense by the German government. In an able rejoinder, buttressed by an imposing exhibit of evidence, the Chilean minister of foreign affairs largely demolished the German contention.

“The excuse made by the commander of the *Dresden* for not respecting the order of internment given by the corresponding Chilean authorities, namely, that he had understood that it was not in force till instructions arrived from the (Chilean) government, cannot be reconciled with the documents, copies of which I enclose, one of which is the order of the maritime governor of Juan Fernández, in which he manifests to the com-

⁷³ Zimmermann to Cruchaga, June 23, 1915, *Memoria*, 1914-1915, pp. 187-188; Alvarez, pp. 232-237; Rocuant, pp. 74-79.

mander of the *Dresden* that the internment of this ship is notified, and that in consequence, it should change its anchorage, naming the engineers who were to take out the pieces of the engines, and the other is the answer of the said commander, in which he manifests his deliberate and irrevocable intention not to comply with the order of the maritime governor. I include also a copy of the last report sent to the government by the said governor and I very particularly call your attention to the following fact, which shows how far from truth is the supposed acquiescence of the maritime governor in allowing matters to remain in *statu quo*, until new instructions should arrive from the government. From the note of the maritime governor . . . it appears that when he sent the engineer and the mate of the schooner *Argentina* to examine whether the *Dresden* needed repairs, they were driven back from the deck of the ship and menaced with being kept prisoners, if they insisted in carrying out the order of the governor."

"In such manner did the commander of this ship, who raised an exception to the rule of the 24 hours' limit, rise in rebellion against the constituted authorities, instead of taking the measures conducive to prove that his case was an exception.

"We must further add that if the commander of the *Dresden* had respected the order of the maritime gov-

"The report of the governor of the Island of Juan Fernández is printed *in extenso* on p. 173 ff. of *Memoria, 1914-1915*. In this report the governor states that when the commander of the *Dresden* asked permission to remain eight days in Cumberland Bay he (the governor) was convinced this was a ruse. The real reason for this request, he declared, was the shortage of coal. This suspicion ripened into a certainty when he discovered that the cook of the *Dresden* had so little coal that he was obliged to forage on the island for fire-wood; it was noticeable moreover, that the dead-line of the ship was far above water. The government therefore ordered provisional internment pending advices from his government.

error we should not have had to lament the unhappy events of Cumberland Bay.”⁷⁵

To appreciate to the full this last allusion it is necessary to discuss in some detail the single but highly significant instance of the flagrant violation of Chilean neutrality on the part of the naval forces of Great Britain. While the *Dresden* was anchored within Chilean waters, in direct defiance of the Chilean authorities, there appeared on March 14 a British naval division composed of the cruisers *Kent* and *Glasgow* and the armed transport *Orama*. These ships immediately prepared to open fire on the *Dresden*. The captain of the German warship sent one of his officers to the *Glasgow* under cover of a flag of truce to point out that the *Dresden* was anchored in neutral waters. The British commanding officer ignored this warning and demanded the surrender of the *Dresden*, adding that if this order were refused the ship would be destroyed. The German commander then proceeded to blow up the *Dresden* after the British squadron had opened fire at long range. The total number of casualties among the German crew was 9 dead and 40 wounded. Owing to the absence of hospital and other facilities at Juan Fernández the wounded members of the crew, as well as the officers,

⁷⁵ Lira to Cruchaga, November 30, 1915, *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 182 ff.; Rocuant, pp. 87-91. The German foreign office refused to consider the incident as closed by the Chilean note of November 30, 1915. Over a year later, on December 6, 1916, Zimmermann endeavored to meet the Chilean contention by impugning the testimony of the maritime governor. The attempt does not seem, to the present writer, to be successful. *Memoria, 1915-1919*, p. 195 ff.

were carried to Valparaiso by the *Orama*. The remaining members of the crew, who had sought asylum on the island, were conveyed to the mainland by the Chilean cruiser *Esmeralda* and promptly interned, despite the vigorous and reiterated protests of the German minister at Santiago.⁷⁰

Upon learning of this violation of Chilean neutrality the minister of foreign affairs instructed the Chilean minister at London to file a protest with the government of Great Britain. The note of Sr. Agustín Edwards, the Chilean minister in London, and the reply of Sir Edward Grey deserve special attention as they not only shed light on the most important diplomatic controversy between Chile and Great Britain which arose during the war but in their general tone and spirit present a striking and suggestive contrast to the diplomatic correspondence exchanged between the Chilean foreign office and the chancellery of the Imperial German government.

After reciting the circumstances under which the *Dresden* was sunk the note of Sr. Edwards continues:

“The act of hostility committed in Chilean territorial waters by the British naval squadron has painfully surprised my government.

⁷⁰ The foregoing account is based on the note of Sr. Agustín Edwards, dated March 26, 1915, *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 207, ff. Official English translation in *British Parliamentary Papers*, Miscellaneous No. 9 (1915), and reprinted in *The American Journal of International Law*, Supplement, 1916, pp. 72-75; the note of Lira to Cruchaga of March 29, 1916, *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 172; notes of von Erckert to Lira, dated July 17 and August 19, 1916, protesting against the internment of the crew of the *Dresden*, *ibid.*, pp. 139-143.

“ The internment of the *Dresden* had been notified to her captain by the Maritime Governor of Juan Fernández and the government of the Republic, having been informed of what had occurred, would have proceeded to the subsequent steps had it not been for the intervention of the British naval squadron. Having regard to the geographical position of the Islands of Juan Fernández and to the difficulty of communication with the mainland, the only authority able to act in the matter did everything possible from the outset, and the internment of the *Dresden* was as effective and complete as the circumstances would permit when she was attacked by the British naval squadron. Even supposing that the British force feared that the *Dresden* intended to escape and to ignore the measures taken by the maritime governor of Juan Fernández, and that this apprehension was adduced as the reason which determined its action, it should still be observed that the close watch which the British naval squadron could itself exercise precluded the possibility of the attempt. Moreover, no such eventuality was contemplated by the British squadron, which as I have said, did not give the maritime governor of Más-a-Tierra the opportunity of explaining to the naval officer in command of the island the state of the *Dresden* in Cumberland Bay. . . .

Your Excellency will not be surprised that the attitude of the naval squadron should have aroused such deep feeling in Chile if you bear in mind the fact that the British warships composing it had received, shortly before and on repeated occasions, convincing proof of the cordial friendship which united us to Great Britain, and which finds its clearest and strongest expression in our respective navies. . . . Nothing, therefore, could be a more painful surprise to us than to see our exceedingly cordial and friendly attitude repaid by an act which bears unfortunately all the evidences of contempt for sovereign rights, although it is probable that nothing was further from the minds of those by whom it was unthinkingly committed.

“Nor will Your Excellency be astonished that my government should show themselves to be very jealous of the rights and prerogatives inherent in the exercise of sovereignty. Nations which lack powerful material means of making their rights respected have no other guarantee and protection for their life and prosperity than the clear and perfect understanding and the exact and scrupulous fulfilment of the obligations incumbent upon them towards other nations, and the right to demand that other nations should equally observe their duties towards them. Few nations have given more convincing proofs than Great Britain of their desire to comply with international obligations and to require compliance from others, and few have shown more eloquently their respect for the rights and prerogatives both of great and small nations. These facts convince my government that His Britannic Majesty’s government will give them satisfaction for the act committed by the British naval forces of a character to correspond with the frankly cordial relations existing between them. Nothing could be more deeply deplored by the Chilean government than that the traditional bonds of friendship uniting the two peoples, which my government values so highly, and on which they base so many hopes of new and mutual benefits, should fail to derive on this occasion additional strength from the test to which circumstances have subjected them.”⁷⁷

The reply of Sir Edward Grey, dispatched March 30, 1915, merits quotation in full:

“SIR: His Majesty’s government, after receiving the communication from the Chilean government of the 26th of March, deeply regret, that any misunderstanding should have arisen which should be a cause of complaint to the Chilean government; and on the facts as

⁷⁷ Edwards to Grey, March 26, 1915. *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 207, ff.; *British Parliamentary Papers*, Miscellaneous No. 9 (1915). The translation used in the text is that given in the second of these two sources.

stated in the communication made to them, they are prepared to offer a full and ample apology to the Chilean government.

"His Majesty's government before receiving the communication from the Chilean government, could only conjecture the actual facts at the time when the *Dresden* was discovered by the British squadron; and even now they are not in possession of a full account of his action by the captain of the *Glasgow*. Such information as they have points to the fact that the *Dresden* had not accepted internment, and still had her colors flying and her guns trained. If this was so, and if there were no means available on the spot and at the moment for enforcing the decision of the Chilean authorities to intern the *Dresden*, she might obviously, had not the British ships taken action, have escaped again to attack British commerce. It is believed that the island where the *Dresden* had taken refuge is not connected with the mainland by cable. In these circumstances, if the *Dresden* still had her colors flying and her guns trained, the captain of the *Glasgow* probably assumed, especially in view of the past action of the *Dresden*, that she was defying the Chilean authorities and abusing Chilean neutrality, and was only waiting a favorable opportunity to sally out and attack British commerce again.

"If these really were the circumstances, His Majesty's government cannot but feel that they explain the action taken by the captain of the British ship; but in view of the length of time that it may take to clear up all the circumstances and of the communications that the Chilean government have made of the view that they take from the information they have of the circumstances, His Majesty's government do not wish to qualify the apology that they now present to the Chilean government.

"I have, etc.

"E. GREY." ⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Grey to Edwards, *Memoria, 1914-1915*, pp. 211-212; *British Parliamentary Papers*, Miscellaneous No. 9 (1915).

The explanation of the conduct of the British squadron offered by Sir Edward Grey, though it does not justify the sinking of the *Dresden* in Chilean territorial waters would seem to palliate somewhat the gravity of the offense. The real purpose of the *Dresden* seems to be reasonably clear: It was to resist internment by every means available and to secure by fair means or foul within the harbors of Juan Fernández sufficient coal⁷⁹ to sally forth and prey again on British commerce. It was not unnatural that the British fleet should have desired to remove such a possible menace, even at the risk of violation of a neutrality which for the time being the Chilean authorities were not in a position to enforce. The correct course for the British fleet to have pursued, as was intimated in the protest signed by Sr. Edwards, would have been to prevent the egress of the *Dresden* from Cumberland Bay until the Chilean government, the authority of whose agents had been flouted, had been given opportunity to make the internment effective.”⁸⁰

⁷⁹ That the *Dresden* had entered Cumberland Bay through lack of coal and not to repair her engines appears not only from the statement of the maritime governor of Juan Fernández already noted, but also by inference from the deposition of the commander of the *Dresden* made on March 18. After the British fleet was seen on the horizon, “on account of the small quantity of coal, more or less 60 tons, it was not possible to get up steam in order to fight outside of neutral waters.” *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 222.

⁸⁰ The British defense has been severely criticised by T. Baty in the *Pennsylvania Law Review*, 1915, p. 716. This writer points out that Sir Edward Grey “had the temerity to hint

There remains to record one other violation of neutrality on the part of Great Britain, which, though differing in character from the preceding, is not entirely devoid of interest. In November 1914 the cruiser *Glasgow* stopped the *Orita* of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company on its voyage from Montevideo to Coronel and removed 113 sacks of mail addressed to persons residing in Chile. The Chilean government under date of December 15 cabled its minister in London to protest to the British foreign office against the violation by the cruiser *Glasgow* of Article 1 of the 11th Convention of the Second Hague Conference touching the inviolability of postal correspondence found on the high seas on board a neutral or enemy ship.

In its reply the British government, while expressing regret for the incident, maintained that the article referred to had not been violated since it applied only to neutral and belligerent ships and not to ships of the same nationality as that of the cruiser which effected the capture. The Chilean government rejected this contention, maintaining that the disposition of Article 1, in appearance restrictive, was in reality general; that it guaranteed the inviolability on the sea of private correspondence under all circumstances. This thesis, highly favorable to the interest of neutral powers, was not admitted by the government of Great Britain. None the less it declared that in this particular instance it

that where there is no effective neutral force on the spot, the belligerent may take his own forcible measures in neutral territory."

did not desire to insist upon what it considered to be its rights, and orders were issued to return the mail bags. This concession, or if it be preferred, decision, of the British government was the more noteworthy as it ran distinctly contrary to the policy adopted towards a number of other neutral powers, notably the United States prior to 1917.⁸¹

The sinking of the *Dresden* brought in its train a number of additional problems which gave rise to a protracted and at times almost acrimonious interchange of correspondence between the Chilean and the German foreign offices.

Immediately following the destruction at Juan Fernández of the German auxiliary cruiser *Dresden* the British cruiser *Kent* and the armed transport *Orama* dropped anchor in the harbor of Valparaiso, having on board a number of the wounded officers and members of the crew of the *Dresden*. On several occasions⁸² the German minister von Erckert strenuously protested against these ships being granted the hospitality of the Chilean ports, owing to their attack on the *Dresden* within Chilean territorial waters. He based this protest on the second paragraph of Article 9 of the 13th Convention of the Second Hague Conference: "A neutral power may forbid a belligerent vessel which

⁸¹ The full correspondence between the Chilean and British governments on the seizure of the mail pouches has not been published, but it is sufficiently summarized in the *Memoria*, 1914-1915, pp. 151-153, and in Alvarez, pp. 250-251.

⁸² Verbally, immediately after the news of the sinking of the *Dresden* had reached Santiago, and in two long notes of July 17 and August 19, 1915. Cf. *Memoria*, 1914-1915, pp. 139-140.

has failed to conform to the orders and regulations made by it, or which has violated neutrality, to enter its ports or roadsteads." To the specific demand that these two British vessels be interned the Chilean foreign minister replied: "The fact of the violation of neutrality has not been made clear, and, besides, the *Orama* had reached Valparaiso in fulfilment of the humanitarian mission of bringing in the wounded Germans from the *Dresden*."

Unable to secure the internment of these two ships von Erckert tried to induce the Chilean government to refuse the cruiser *Kent* permission to make necessary repairs in the government drydock of Talcahuano, such refusal to be based on that section of Article 9 of the 13th Convention already quoted. Sr. Lira replied that the case of the *Kent* was covered by Article 17 of the same Convention, said article permitting belligerent warships to make such repairs in neutral ports as are absolutely necessary to make them seaworthy; "moreover the apparently definite removal of naval operations from the waters of the Pacific, renders the discretionary use of Article 8 unnecessary."⁸³

Nevertheless, in order to forestall possible future complications, the Chilean government, by a decree of June 30, 1915, declared that henceforth no belligerent ship guilty of having violated the rules of neutrality as laid down by Chile would be admitted to Chilean harbors, save to make such necessary repairs as were contemplated in Article 17 of Convention XIII.⁸⁴

⁸³ Lira to von Erckert, September 30, 1915. *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

A further diplomatic controversy which remained unsettled until the signing of the armistice grew out of the disposition of the crew of the *Dresden*, who, after the destruction of their ship, had sought asylum on the island of Juan Fernández and were later transported to the mainland by the Chilean cruiser *Esmeralda*. In accordance with various articles of certain conventions adopted at both Hague Conferences⁸⁵ the Chilean government proceeded to intern the crew of the *Dresden*, the locality selected being the island of Quiriquina at the mouth of the harbor of Concepción. This act was almost immediately followed by an energetic protest by von Erckert, who, acting on the order of the Berlin foreign office, demanded that the members of the crew at once be set at liberty. The German contention was that the internment was contrary to international law and hence inadmissible, since the crew of the *Dresden* had been forced to land upon Chilean soil only as a result of the violation of international law by Great Britain.⁸⁶ The Chilean point of view, reiterated on several occasions, was thus summed up by Sr. Lira :

“Without going fully into the consideration of the legal position sustained by Your Excellency, it is my duty to observe that a state has the rights and duties that emanate from neutrality, without needing to take

⁸⁵ Articles 57-60 of the Convention of The Hague of 1899 concerning the laws and uses of land war, and upon the provisions of Conventions V (second paragraph), X (Articles 14 and 15) and XIII (Articles 3, 21, 24) of the Second Hague Conference Cf. Beltrán Mathieu, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

⁸⁶ Von Erckert to Lira, March 25, 1916. *Memoria*, 1914-1915, *Ibid.*, p. 213; Rocuant, p. 115.

into consideration whether they have been violated or not by the other belligerent. The only thing that concerns the neutral country in such a case is to claim from the violator the satisfaction due, or exercise the rights which international law confers.”⁸⁷

Chile thus refused to recede from her position; but since the internment was a source of annoyance and expense to the Chilean authorities and extremely irksome to the members of the crew Sr. Lira intimated to von Erckert that the Chilean government might be willing to grant them their liberty provided the German government would accord them permission through the German minister to give their word of honor that they would not engage in fresh hostilities.⁸⁸ This permission the Imperial government refused, at the same time renewing its demands that the crew of the *Dresden* be given unconditional liberty.⁸⁹ After a further exchange of correspondence equally fruitless, the Chilean foreign office approached the British government in regard to the case, looking to the possibility of a solution of the problem which would not violate the principles upheld by Chile. But the British government held out no encouragement, declaring that “in view of the events which had occurred in the United States it was dangerous to set at liberty this crew who might set

⁸⁷ Lira to von Erckert, March 30, 1915, *Ibid.*, p. 213; Rocuant, p. 115.

⁸⁸ Lira to von Erckert, May 14, 1915. *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 215.

⁸⁹ Von Erckert to Lira, June 12, 1915. *Memoria, 1914-1915*, pp. 215-218.

about injuring British commerce.”⁹⁰ The final reply of Sr. Lira to von Erckert’s repeated demands that the crew be set at liberty was sent on November 27, 1915. The Chilean minister of foreign affairs pointed out that although the internment of the German sailors was costing the government much money and no little annoyance, no proposal for their unconditional release could be entertained. He added that in addition to the reasons already set forth the Chilean government had excellent precedent in the case of the German ship *Albatross*, which was attacked in Swedish territorial waters by a Russian cruiser. The crew of the German ship, which sought asylum on Swedish soil was promptly interned.⁹¹

The members of the *Dresden’s* crew were kept interned by the Chilean authorities until the end of the war. The obligation turned out to be onerous and vexatious. At different times, in order to alleviate the lot of the crew, the government granted members the privilege of going to various points in the republic, for reasons of health or to communicate with German authorities. These privileges eventually had to be denied on account of the number of sailors who endeavored to effect their escape.⁹² One incident of a serious character occurred. The transport *Casma*, a

⁹⁰ The correspondence which passed between the Chilean and British governments on this subject has not been published but a summary, including the line quoted in the text, is given by Sr. Lira with the notes exchanged between von Erckert and himself. *Ibid.*, p. 221. Cf. Alvarez, pp. 229-231.

⁹¹ Lira to von Erckert, *Memoria*, 1914-1915, pp. 219-222.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 223.

vessel of some eight thousand tons and a ship which Chile could ill afford to lose at the time, suffered shipwreck in pursuit of some of these interned fugitives.⁸³ Moreover, for the maintenance of the crew the government was forced to expend large sums, which though charged to the account of the German government, are yet to be recovered.⁸⁴

Before concluding our analysis of the diplomatic negotiations growing out of the violation of Chilean neutrality by the belligerent powers it seems desirable to mention the one case in which the French government became involved. We have already seen that the French sailing ship *Valentine*, while carrying a cargo of coal from England to the Chilean port of Iquique, was overhauled on the high seas by the German cruiser *Leipzig* and was taken to the island of Juan Fernández, at that time (November 1915) the rendezvous of the German squadron of Admiral von Spee and of a number of German merchant ships subsequently declared auxiliary cruisers. For some twelve days the *Valentine* was kept in Chilean territorial waters as a prize of war, during which time her cargo of coal was transferred to

⁸³ Beltrán Mathieu, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

⁸⁴ Just before the conclusion of the war the Chilean authorities were obliged to intern the crew of another German warship. In August 1918 the auxiliary cruiser *Seeadler* suffered shipwreck on the island of Mopolia in French Oceania. The crew finally reached Easter Island in a captured French bark. After receiving every courtesy by the Chilean authorities they set sail for Talcahuano on the mainland where they were interned until the end of the war, despite the vigorous protests of the German government. Data on the *Seeadler* episode may be found in *Memoria, 1915-1919*, p. 205 ff.

the German fleet. The crew, held during this period as prisoners of war, were eventually transferred to the American ship *Sacramento* on which they were carried to Valparaiso where they were immediately set at liberty by the Chilean authorities. In a deposition made before the French consul at Valparaiso Captain Guillon of the *Valentine* stated that his ship had been blown up with dynamite on the orders of von Spee within the three-mile limit.

As has already been noted the Chilean government instructed its representative at Berlin to file a protest with the German government against these acts.⁹⁵

On May 30, 1915, the French minister at Santiago presented to the Chilean foreign office a memorandum, which after reciting the history of the *Valentine* case, declared:

"The government of the republic considers that the government of Chile, by tolerating the acts above named in the places under its sovereignty and jurisdiction, by abstaining from intervening at any time to hinder a violation of its neutrality, and by allowing the Imperial German marine thereby to prepare hostile acts to the prejudice of the French sailing ship *Valentine*, has contravened its obligations, and has assumed on that account, the responsibility for said acts as regards the injury to French interests, whatever its recourse may be, against the Imperial German government."

The memorandum ended with a request that the Chilean government reimburse the owners of the *Valentine* for the losses.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ See above, p. 301.

⁹⁶ Delvincourt to Lira, *Memoria*, 1914-1915, p. 191 ff.

In its lengthy reply the Chilean government passed in review the unremitting efforts it had put forth to prevent violations of neutrality, and at the same time rejected the imputation that it had been guilty of culpable negligence in the observance of its elementary obligations. In support of its contention it adduced the testimony of the British government to the zeal and activity repeatedly displayed by Chile in upholding her rights as a neutral power. The charge that the *Valentine* was sunk within jurisdictional waters of Chile was proven untenable, since an investigation, carried on with the aid of the captain of the *Valentine* himself, failed to throw any light on the exact spot where the sinking had taken place. The defense of Chile was, in fact, so complete and adequate that the French government refrained from further pressing its claim.

As no further efforts were made during the course of the war either to violate or challenge the neutrality of Chile this chapter of Chilean diplomatic history may be said to come to a close. After a careful analysis of the various diplomatic controversies in which Chile became involved one can hardly escape the conclusion that Chile, in all that regarded the maintenance of neutrality, met her responsibilities and obligations to the best of her abilities. That the means at her disposal were inadequate for the solution of the problems suddenly thrust upon her is undeniable, but the responsibility for this situation lies partly at the door of Great Britain. At the outbreak of the war there were approaching completion in English shipyards two dreadnaughts, the

Almirante Cochrane and the *Almirante Latorre*, together with several destroyers and minor vessels. These were requisitioned by the British government with the full consent of Chile.⁹⁷ Had these war craft been added to the Chilean fleet the task of surveillance of her coast line and islands would have been considerably facilitated.

In concluding this chapter of Chilean diplomacy in relation to the war it is perhaps not irrelevant to advert to the testimony, voluntarily proffered by the government of Great Britain, in regard to the efforts put forth by the Chilean government to prevent infraction of neutrality. For instance, Sir Edward Grey in November 1914 gave to the London press the following official communication relative to the acts of the German squadron at Juan Fernández:

"There have recently appeared in the British press declarations to the effect that Chile has failed to observe the laws of neutrality. These declarations are not in accord with the facts, and do not in any way represent the opinion of the government of His Britannic Majesty."⁹⁸

The appreciation of the British government of the efforts of the Chilean authorities to prevent attacks on merchant shipping within Chilean jurisdictional waters

⁹⁷ Partly as a mark of appreciation for the willingness of Chile to cede these ships to Great Britain, partly to indicate its satisfaction with the manner in which Chile had safeguarded her neutrality, the British government during the course of the war presented Chile with a small squadron of submarines and an aerial fleet of fifty combat planes. Rocuant, p. 188; Beltrán Mathieu, p. 339.

⁹⁸ *Memoria, 1914-1915*, p. 197.

appears from the note of Sir Francis Stronge to Sr. Salinas, Chilean minister of foreign affairs, dated November 6, 1914:

"I have the honor to express to Your Excellency my cordial thanks for the prompt measures taken by the Chilean government in dispatching a ship of war with the object of ensuring that the British ship *Orensa* should not be attacked in Chilean territorial waters."⁹⁹

Reference also may be made to a note of Sir Francis Stronge relative to the measures taken by the Chilean government in regard to the ships of the Kosmos Company.

"I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have received a telegram from Sir Edward Grey instructing me to convey to the Chilean government the satisfaction of that of His Majesty at the measures taken by Chile to maintain her neutrality, in provisionally detaining the vessels belonging to the Kosmos Company, and prohibiting them from taking coal. I am further directed to express the hope that the vessels of this Company will not be released."¹⁰⁰

Finally it may be noted that the impression that Chilean neutrality was distinctly of a benevolent character in regard to the Allies, and especially to Great Britain, was heightened by the prompt and spontaneous efforts made by the Chilean government to rescue the survivors of the naval engagement off Coronel. It will be recalled that on November 1, 1914, the fleet of Admiral Craddock consisting of a transport and the cruisers *Good Hope*, *Monmouth* and *Glasgow* was defeated by the

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

¹⁰⁰ Stronge to Salinas, December 3, 1914. *Ibid.*, p. 200.

more powerful squadron of Admiral von Spee. The *Monmouth* and *Good Hope* were sunk while the transport and the *Glasgow* succeeded in effecting their escape. Although the engagement terminated three-quarters of an hour before sunset the German ships made no effort to rescue the British sailors.¹⁰¹ It was not until November 3, on the occasion of the visit of the victorious German fleet to Valparaíso, that the news of the engagement was known in Chile. The Chilean government at once, on its own initiative, sent two ships to the scene of the battle in the hope of lending aid and assistance to the survivors. But in spite of the most painstaking search no trace of them was found. Naturally the British government on its part was desirous that every possible effort be made to rescue any survivors of the disaster. Sir Francis Stronge in a note dated November 7 gave expression to these sentiments:

“The Admiralty feel confident that the ancient traditions of comradeship which unite the British and Chilean navies will prompt the Chilean government to do their utmost within the limits of neutrality to find and rescue our officers and sailors cast away on the Chilean coasts or islands.

“I need hardly say that when these instructions were dispatched Sir Edward Grey had not yet received a telegram from me in which I informed him of the prompt and generous action of the Chilean government in sending a transport to the site of the recent engagement and sending suitable instructions to the authorities along the coast.”

¹⁰¹ This was in sharp contrast to the conduct of Admiral Sturdee's fleet at the battle off the Falkland Islands. As soon as the German ships began to sink, the English launched small boats and picked up a large number of the German sailors.

Further on in the note Stronge adds that the British government was ready to authorize the British consular authorities to charter two additional steamers which should explore the coast for the same purpose. It was urged that these ships might sail under the Red Cross flag with the designation of hospital ships,¹⁰² a proposal which was immediately accepted by the Chilean government.

Despite the humanitarian mission of these vessels a strongly worded protest was made by the German minister at Santiago. In a note dated November 9 von Erckert insisted that the status of these ships, units of the Chilean merchant marine but leased by the English authorities, was in violation of Convention X¹⁰³ of the Second Hague Conference, and strongly intimated that should these vessels fall in with the German fleet they would be promptly seized.¹⁰⁴ Fortunately this threat of von Erckert was not carried out; the ships departed on their errand of mercy, but like the Chilean vessels which had preceded them, found no survivors from the battle.

¹⁰² Same to same. *Ibid.*, p. 98; Alvarez, p. 278. The *Memoria* gives only the pertinent parts of Stronge's note; the substance of the remainder is given by Alvarez.

¹⁰³ The protest of von Erckert was based more especially on Articles 3 and 5 of this Convention. The first of these articles states the conditions under which hospital ships shall be respected and exempt from capture; the second deals with the distinguishing marks with which such ships must be supplied.

¹⁰⁴ The protest of von Erckert has not been made public but the substance of it is given in Alvarez, p. 278.

With the apparently definite elimination of the German naval forces from the waters of the south Pacific in the spring of 1915, it was generally assumed that the most critical and baffling problems thrust upon Chile by the war had been solved. Though the economic and commercial situation might continue abnormal, though the propaganda of the partizans of the belligerent powers might raise its head and threaten the country's internal tranquillity, the Chileans as a whole tended to adopt the comforting view that while the war might be reshaping the destinies of the nations of Europe, to a country as remote from the center of hostilities as their own it was no longer a subject of vital concern.

This complacency received a rude shock with the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917. To be sure the Chilean government nearly two years earlier had considered the possibility of serious difficulties with Germany on the submarine issue. In January 1915 the government had leased two of the naval transports, the *Rancagua* and the *Maipo*, to commercial firms for the transportation of nitrate to Spanish and Italian ports; on their return these vessels were to touch at Cardiff to take on cargoes of coal for the Chilean navy. The Chilean foreign office supplied the German government with full information relative to the movement of these transports; the note of Sr. Lira of February 27, 1915, dealing with the subject, concludes with a paragraph capable of being construed both as a warning and a threat:

“In conclusion I must express to Your Excellency that the body of officers of the transports form part of

the personnel of the Chilean navy, and that these ships do not abandon their character of Chilean warships by reason of this commercial voyage.”¹⁰⁵

The German government apparently instructed its submarine commanders to leave these transports severely alone since no diplomatic complications with Chile arose. There is no evidence, however, that ships of the Chilean navy were permitted to carry nitrate to European ports after the German declaration of the barred zone.¹⁰⁶

The German decree of January 31, 1917, announcing unrestricted submarine warfare called forth from the Chilean government on February 8 a vigorous and dignified reply:

“Such a measure, in the opinion of the Chilean government, amounts to a restriction of the rights of neutrals, to which restriction Chile cannot agree because it is contrary to the principles that have been long established in favor of neutral nations. The acceptance by Chile of the measures adopted by Germany should, moreover, be equivalent to a departure from the strict neutrality which she has observed during the present European conflict. Chile consequently reserves liberty of action to protect all of her rights in the event of any hostile acts against her ships.”¹⁰⁷

Although the Chilean government made it abundantly clear that it would hold Germany strictly accountable for any attack on Chilean citizens or property it gave no intimation that it would depart from neutrality as

¹⁰⁵ Lira to Zimmermann, *Memoria*, 1914-1915, p. 146.

¹⁰⁶ *Memoria*, 1915-1919, p. 144.

¹⁰⁷ Beltrán Mathieu, *op. cit.*, p. 331; *Memoria*, 1915-1919, p. 145.

long as no Chilean interests were placed in jeopardy. It is true that the severance of diplomatic relations by the United States, followed by her entry into the war as a full belligerent, set in motion powerful pro-Ally currents of opinion in Chile. Thus, on February 5, the day following the announcement of the rupture of relations between the United States and Germany, *El Mercurio* declared that for all neutral nations the principles supported by the United States were of vital importance and that these nations could not without protest witness the employment of barbarous and inhuman methods of warfare. "The nations of South America, bound to the United States by historic bonds and by the intellectual relations which are being daily perfected, are today more than ever obliged to sustain the cause which President Wilson defends."

The revocation of neutrality on the part of Brazil in the war between the United States and the German Empire, and the action of Uruguay in publishing her famous declaration that she would not regard as a belligerent any American nation which is in a state of war with nations of other continents, evoked similar comments.¹⁰⁸ In reference to the action of Brazil *El Diario Ilustrado*, after stressing the traditional friendship between the two nations, declared that Chile would support Brazil and that all good Chileans would approve the action of the sister republic.¹⁰⁹ And on May 24,

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *Memoria, 1914-1919*, p. 150 ff.

¹⁰⁹ Gaillard Gaston, *L'Amérique Latine et la Guerre* (Paris, 1918), p. 117.

the same influential paper in commenting on the message of President Braz stated:

"It is no longer a question of a congress of American neutral nations, nor the formation of a theoretical policy to bring about united action. Recent events have wrought a great change. Pan Americanism and the Monroe Doctrine have a deeper meaning now than ever before. Brazil has accused Germany of acts prejudiced to Pan Americanism. Today it is Brazil, and tomorrow other nations will make the same charge. For the safeguarding of maritime traffic several nations will offer facilities for the United States warships engaged in this work. Chile will be as friendly to the United States as Brazil and Uruguay."

The pronouncements of the government though couched in more moderate and restrained language likewise reflected sentiments of cordiality and friendship. The reply of the Chilean foreign office to the announcement of the revocation of neutrality by Brazil was drawn up in the most amicable and appreciative terms.¹¹⁰ And in the note to Uruguay, Sr. Tocornal, Chilean minister of foreign affairs, declared, *inter alia*:

"My government is pleased to show to Uruguay, with which it maintains such a loyal friendship, that it appreciates highly the reasons of Americanism which have inspired the resolution of the government of Uruguay."¹¹¹

In the spring and summer of 1917 a small but notable section of the Chilean intellectuals openly counseled a break of relations between Chile and Germany. In ad-

¹¹⁰ Brazil, Ministerio das Relações Exteriores. *Guerra da Europa; Documentos Diplomáticos*, I, pp. 75-77.

¹¹¹ *Memoria, 1915-1919*, p. 159.

vocating this course of action they were supported by the most important organ of the Chilean press, *El Mercurio*, published at Santiago, Valparaíso and Concepción.¹¹² As representatives of this point of view may be mentioned Dr. Alberto Mackenna Subercasseaux and Sr. Carlos Silva Vildósola. Both are men who at one time or another have been prominent in the public eye and are writers and publicists of note. The motives chiefly stressed by these advocates of the abandonment of neutrality were the necessity of Chile's adhesion to a policy of American or continental solidarity and the fear lest Chile's aloofness from the World War might rebound to her disadvantage in the political and economic and even territorial readjustments bound to follow the cessation of hostilities. Though the subject was rarely mentioned there undoubtedly existed in the minds of many Chilean public men the belief that one of the subjects likely to come before the Peace Conference was the Tacna-Arica controversy, that legacy of the War of the Pacific which for years had envenomed the relations between Chile and her northern neighbor, Peru. By aligning herself with the Allies and the United States—assuming that Germany was doomed to defeat—Chile

¹¹² The paper, established in 1827, claims to be the oldest daily in the Southern Hemisphere. It is controlled by the Edwards family, one of whose members, Dr. Agustín Edwards, was Chilean minister to Great Britain during the war. Until 1917 its director was Sr. Carlos Silva Vildósola, who left this position to become the European correspondent of *El Mercurio*. Cf. "La alta prensa diaria en Chile," by Félix Nieto del Río, *Cuba Contemporánea*, December 1918.

would be in a better position to present her case than if she were to remain neutral.

"Have the conductors of our diplomacy considered," wrote Dr. Alberto Mackenna in this connection¹¹³ "the logical consequences which will follow after the termination of the war, the settlement of the accounts which will take place in Europe and America and the problems which will have to be solved?"¹¹⁴ And a little later, apropos of the Luxburg revelations the same writer declared: "Not to break relations with Germany would mean to sever the bonds which unite Chile with civilized countries."¹¹⁵ In the case of Silva Vildósola was the added conviction that Chile should break relations with Germany as a protest against German methods of warfare and the wanton destruction carried out in the occupied regions of France.¹¹⁶

That there was for a brief period a possibility that Chile might abandon her neutral attitude appears from the almost frantic efforts made by German agents in South America and German sympathizers among the Chileans to preserve the *status quo*. On this subject,

¹¹³ The articles and addresses of Sr. Mackenna have been assembled in a collection entitled: "*Pour le droit et pour l'honneur. Recueil de discours et d'articles publiés à l'occasion de la guerre européenne.*" (Santiago, 1918.)

¹¹⁴ *El Mercurio*, September 29, 1917.

¹¹⁵ Gaillard, p. 119.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 116. The exhortations of Sr. Silva Vildósola aroused dissent and at times resentment. Sr. Galvarino Gallardo Nieto in his work *Neutralidad de Chile ante la Guerra Europea* (Santiago, 1917), quotes a number of such utterances. The book of Sr. Gallardo, though ostensibly neutral in tone, is in reality an *apologia* for Germany and all her works.

as on many others, the Luxburg telegrams shed a curious and interesting side-light. Thus on July 19, 1917, the German minister to Argentina writes to an unnamed correspondent at Santiago—almost certainly von Erckert—as follows:

“ . . . I congratulate you on the solution arrived at. *As long as Chile is neutral*, Germany will be able after the war to carry out her South American policy just as well, if not more easily, in opposition to an infatuated and misguided Argentina as with Argentina on her side. All sensible men here, even Zeballos, allow that Chile is obviously better governed than Argentina.”¹¹⁷

And two weeks later, this same Luxburg after informing Zimmermann, “that we shall be able to carry through our principal political aims in South America . . . equally well whether with or against Argentina,” significantly adds: “Please cultivate friendship with Chile.”¹¹⁸

In a confidential circular sent out on October 24, 1917, by the “Deutsch-Chilenischer Bund”¹¹⁹ refer-

¹¹⁷ *Official Bulletin* (Washington), December 21, 1917. (The italics are not in the original.)

¹¹⁸ Dispatch dated August 4, 1917. *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ The “Deutsch-Chilenischer Bund” was organized in the autumn of 1915 and held its first congress at Concepción in October 1916. The prime movers were Dr. Guillermo Münnich of Valparaíso and Dr. Christopher Martin of Concepción. Its avowed object was “to maintain and defend, strengthen and extend German nationality (Volkstum) in Chile.” Within less than a year local branches had been established in 43 different localities. These data are taken from the *Tagung des*

ence is made to the necessity of launching unremitting propaganda in every section of Chile in favor of the German cause and especially in favor of the maintenance of neutrality:

"If thanks to this propaganda we merely retard rupture only a few weeks' time we shall have helped Germany and her allies to the extent of many millions, and damaged the Allies likewise for many millions. It therefore becomes our duty to ourselves and towards Germany who is engaged in a struggle against a legion of enemies, as also toward Chile, who cannot benefit in any way by participating in one of the greatest of wars, that we should unite with all our strength, particularly for acts such as the forementioned, for it should not be forgotten that in the event of a rupture or a declaration of war between Chile and Germany our substance will be very limited or entirely exhausted."¹²⁰

It would, however, be quite misleading to assume from the utterances of such writers as Silva Vildósola or from the somewhat hysterical anxiety of German propagandists that there was any real likelihood of a severance of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Chile and the German Empire. The overwhelming majority of the Chileans, even of those of pro-Ally

Deutsch-Chilenischen Bundes abgehalten vom 13-15, Ock. 1916 in Concepción (Concepción, 1916), pp. 50, 91-92.

The program of the "Bund" adopted in the 1917 Congress was even more aggressive in character. "We propose to consider and carry into effect means of defense against the Black List and other proceedings of the enemy and violations of neutrality. . . . We must clearly bear in mind that at the present moment our country is fighting the war of Pan-Germanism and German nationality against the whole world." *El Mercurio*, December 17, 1917.

¹²⁰ *El Mercurio*, November 26, 1917.

leanings, were thoroughly convinced that barring untoward incidents the Chilean government was following the dictates of prudence and decorous self-interest in adhering rigidly to a policy of neutrality. Whatever grievances Chile may have had in the first two years of the war against the Imperial German government—and we have already seen that they were many and serious—by the end of 1916 the various controversies growing out of the violation of Chilean neutrality had been satisfactorily adjusted. To have broken relations merely as a protest against the inhuman methods of warfare employed by Germany in Europe, or even on the high seas, as long as no Chilean interest was immediately affected, would have seemed little short of quixotic, and in the opinion of most Chileans, quite uncalled for.¹²¹

There remained another possible motive for Chilean departure from neutrality: The influence of the United States and the ideals of Pan American or continental solidarity. As has already been pointed out these factors played a large part in the decision of a number of the Latin American states, notably Brazil and Cuba.

¹²¹ Partly as a result of the attitude assumed by Chile in the spring of 1917 a rumor was launched and gained wide currency that a secret treaty existed between Germany and Chile, which presumably bound the latter country to a policy of neutrality. The Chilean legation at London felt called upon to issue an official denial that such a treaty existed. "This rumor," ran the official statement, "is not only devoid of all basis but is absolutely ridiculous. In Chile there can be no such thing as secret treaties. Treaties become valid only after their approval by Congress." *Le Temps* (Paris), May 4, 1917.

But for a variety of reasons arguments based on such motives made less appeal to the people of Chile, than to those of certain of her sister republics.

It is a fact well known to all students of South American history that at various times during the nineteenth century the relations between the United States and Chile had been far from cordial.¹²² Rightly or wrongly the Chilean people felt that during and immediately after the war of the Pacific the moral influence of the North American Republic had been exerted in favor of Chile's opponents—Peru and Bolivia. The attitude of the United States government during the Balmaceda Revolution, and more particularly in the so-called Baltimore affair, had left a legacy of suspicion and even of rancor in its train. The Monroe Doctrine, moreover, especially in its later manifestations, has won few votaries in Chile. And while these suspicions had gradually become dissipated during the first two decades of the present century, there was little disposition to follow the lead of the United States in the great war, even among these Chileans—and they were in the great majority—who fully recognized the justice and disinterestedness of her motives. Rather were the Chileans disposed to believe that the reasons which impelled the United States to conserve her neutrality during the first

¹²² For a critical estimate of the attitude of the United States and its relation to the war and to the Latin American nations *cf.* the article by the Chilean writer, V. V. Robles, "La Política de los Estados Unidos de América y la Guerra," *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras*, Vol. 59, p. 164 ff.

three years of the war applied with even greater force to the case of their own country.

Again the doctrine of Pan Americanism, though approved in principle, was regarded in its practical applications with certain misgivings. The one occasion in which Chile actively championed the cause of Americanism or continental solidarity was followed by bitter disillusionment. In 1866 when Spain on utterly frivolous pretexts attacked the republic of Peru, Chile rallied to her defense. Only a few years later, however, Chile found herself at war with her erstwhile ally—a war the responsibilities for which in the opinion of Chile rested with her northern neighbor. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the crisis of 1917 the doctrine of continental solidarity in so far as it implied a common action with the republics which had broken relations with or declared war against Germany, aroused comparatively little enthusiasm.

Thoroughly typical of the attitude of the moderate, pro-Ally elements in Chile was that of Senator Joaquín Walker Martínez, former Chilean minister to the United States and Argentina, and president of the pro-Ally League. In an interview published in *La Nación* of Santiago on April 20, 1917, he declared that the Chilean government had acted in a manner consonant with the self-respect and dignity of the nation; that as Chile had been the victim of no aggression on the part of the Imperial German government, there was no occasion, legal or moral, for a departure from neutrality. The United States and Brazil could hardly ex-

pect Chile to do more than they themselves had done, namely to conserve neutrality until a succession of overt acts on the part of Germany forced them to enter the war or sever diplomatic relations. Such a contingency, he added, was unlikely in the case of Chile, as no Chilean vessels were navigating European waters. Should any outrage occur, however, Chilean action would be as prompt as that of Brazil.¹²³

As the war continued the conviction became general, even among the most exalted pro-Ally circles that by conserving her neutrality Chile could render the cause of the Allies and the United States fully as great a service as if she had broken relations or even entered the war as a technical belligerent. Unquestionably the

¹²³ A large number of other Chileans, men notable in public life and distinguished educators and writers, expressed themselves in similar vein. Professors Montaner and Guerra of the department of international law of the University of Santiago, publicly stigmatized Germany's submarine policy as a monstrous violation of international law. Professor Molina, Dean of the Law Faculty of Concepción, zealously defended the cause of the Allies and the United States. Sr. Ramón Barros Luco (ex-president of Chile), Sr. Arturo Alessandri (senator from Marapaca and later president of the republic), Sr. Federico Puga Borne (former Chilean minister to France) while avowing their sympathies for the cause of the Allies believed that Chile should remain neutral. *El Comercio Aliado en Chile* (Santiago, 1918), *passim*. (Contains interviews with a number of public men.) On the other hand, Sr. Javir Vial Solar in *El Diario Ilustrado* for April 26, 1917, ridiculed the motives of the Allies and the United States and came out squarely for Germany. German militarism found a defender in Sr. Renato Váldes in an article entitled "Algunas verdades sobre Alemania," *ibid.*, May 20, 1917.

greatest contribution which Chile made to the Allies and to the United States was the furnishing of an uninterrupted and abundant supply of nitrate. We have a wealth of evidence of the importance at this time of nitrate as one of the chief ingredients in the manufacture of explosives. The German chemist Oswald, according to Waldemar Kaempffert, editor of *The Popular Science Monthly*, wrote some time before the war:

“If today a great war should break out between two great powers of which one were to prevent the export of saltpeter from the ports of Chile, it would thereby make it impossible for the enemy to continue longer than its ammunition supply would last.”¹²⁴

While the discovery that nitric acid could be secured from the atmosphere by means of fixation plants saved Germany from the calamity predicted by Oswald, it can hardly be denied that free access to the great Chilean nitrate deposits proved a tremendous factor in the victory of the United States and the Allies. That this statement is by no means exaggerated appears from the testimony of Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, head of the raw material division of the War Industries Board of the United States. In a statement before the subcommittee of the House Committee investigating war expenditures he declared that in the spring of 1918, at the time of the great German drive at the heart of France, the nitrate situation had become critical for the Allies. An interruption of from one to two months in the flow of Chilean nitrate to the munition factories of England, France, Italy and the United States would have caused

¹²⁴ Quoted by Dr. Beltrán Mathieu, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

all of them to close. "If Germany had seized her opportunity and bought up the Chilean nitrate fields and closed them down, it is horrible to contemplate what might have happened," added Mr. Baruch.¹²⁵

It can hardly be doubted that a break of diplomatic relations and *a fortiori* a declaration of war on the part of Chile would have been eagerly seized upon by Germany to attempt through her agents to destroy the nitrate plants or seriously to interrupt the exportation of nitrate from Chile.

Not only did Chile not give Germany this pretext or opportunity, but skilfully utilized German nitrate interests in Chile in a manner highly advantageous to both Chile and the Allies. At the outbreak of the war the government of Chile had on deposit in the banks of Berlin and Dresden large sums of money forming part of the so-called conversion fund with which it was hoped eventually to place the finances of the country on a gold basis. The Imperial government threw various obstacles in the way of the withdrawal of these sums as long as the war was in progress. The Chilean authorities, at the suggestion of the United States,¹²⁶ then proceeded to expropriate the quantities of nitrate and saltpeter belonging to the German nitrate operators and paid for it by drafts on Berlin. The nitrate thus

¹²⁵ *The Sun* (New York), December 11, 1919, quoted by Beltrán Mathieu, p. 342.

¹²⁶ According to the statement of G. B. Clarkson, Director of the Council of National Defense, in his work *Industrial America in the World War* (Boston and New York, 1923), p. 390 ff.

secured was promptly sold to the Duponts and paid for in gold at New York. The first operation of this character, which took place in September 1917, reached the imposing total of nine hundred thousand pounds sterling. This transaction was not only of great and immediate benefit to the United States and the Allies, but exercised a most salutary effect on the finances of Chile, resulting in a sharp rise in exchange.¹²⁷

Nor is further evidence lacking that the foreign policy of Chile during the last year and a half of the war tended to follow an orientation distinctly favorable to the Allies. In January 1918 the Chilean government refused to accede to the request of the German foreign office that Chile take over the interests of the Imperial government in the various South American capitals in which Germany was at that time unrepresented.¹²⁸ At the same time the Chilean foreign office decided to cancel the exequaturs of the members of the consular service who were not of Chilean nationality, the object of this measure being to eliminate the considerable number of Germans who in various cities represented Chilean interests.¹²⁹

From the foregoing account of Chilean history during the war years two facts emerge with reasonable clearness. The first is the laudable and successful efforts of Chile, frequently against great odds, to main-

¹²⁷ Beltrán Mathieu, p. 342; Gaillard, p. 120, *Le Temps* (Paris), November 7, 1917; Clarkson, *loc. cit.*

¹²⁸ Gaillard, p. 121, where a number of hitherto unpublished details regarding this transaction are given.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

tain a scrupulous and loyal neutrality. At the same time it can hardly be gainsaid that the Chilean government, within such limits as international law permitted, interpreted its obligations as a neutral in a sense distinctly advantageous to the United States and the Allies. The second fact is the change in public opinion in relation to the war and its issue. On the outbreak of the struggle the cause of the central powers evoked sympathy in many quarters and the apologists of Germany, especially in military and clerical circles, were powerful and aggressive. But as the struggle wore on the cause of the Allies, which had never lacked able champions, steadily gained in popularity and influence until the signing of the armistice found the Germanophile elements reduced to an insignificant minority. In the organs of the press and in great public gatherings the victory of the Allies and the United States was hailed almost as a triumph of Chile herself.¹³⁰

¹³⁰ Cf., e. g., *El Mercurio* of November 19, 1918, and the article in *Inter-America* (April 1919) originally published in *La Información of Santiago* entitled "Chile's tribute to the Allied Nations."

CHAPTER V

URUGUAY AND THE WAR

Although the smallest of the South American republics, Uruguay is rightly regarded as one of the most progressive and enlightened members of the Latin American family of nations. While her political evolution, until late in the nineteenth century, was characterized by a certain amount of effervescence and even turbulence, the last few decades have witnessed a remarkable advance in the fields of educational, social, and political endeavor. In recent years the republic has drawn attention to itself as a vast experimental laboratory in which are being tried out a number of social and economic reforms of an advanced and even of a quasi-socialistic character.

A comparatively small, homogeneous population, almost entirely of European extraction, has transformed a naturally fertile soil into a region of great productivity. British capital and British initiative, especially in the pastoral industries¹ and railway development,

¹ The German writer Alfredo Hartwig finds here a satisfactory explanation of Uruguay's hostility to Germany. "The republic is under the absolute control of English capital and can only nominally lay claim to being an independent state. The powerful meat industries, at the head of which is the Leibig Company, whose capital is to be sure partly German, but whose management is entirely English . . . exercises an influence which would be decisive even without the existing

have also been factors in the striking economic progress of the country. The cultural bonds between Uruguay and the Latin states of Europe, especially France, have always been close and intimate. Uruguayan literature has been powerfully influenced by French thought; the constitutional development of the republic has reflected many of the ideas germinated by the French Revolution.²

As regards the foreign policy of Uruguay, owing to her highly vulnerable position as a buffer state between Argentina and Brazil, the attitude of the nation, as for example during the Paraguayan War, has been necessarily determined by South American rather than international considerations. At the same time the Uruguayan people, especially during the last quarter century, have been keenly alive to their privileges and obligations as a member of the Pan American family of nations. Owing partly to her position, partly to the high regard in which she has been held by her sister republics, Uruguay has repeatedly enjoyed the honor of having her capital, Montevideo, selected as the ideal spot in South America at which, in congresses or other assemblies, topics of continental interest should be presented and discussed. In this respect Uruguay has played in South American affairs a rôle somewhat

inclination towards the Entente. "Die politische Stellungnahme der südamerikanischen Staaten im Weltkrieg," *Deutsche Rundschau*, December 1917, p. 337.

² Cf. Hugo D. Barbagelata, *L'Influence des idées françaises dans la révolution et dans l'évolution de l'Amérique espagnole* (Paris, 1917).

analogous to that of Switzerland or Belgium in Europe. It will be recalled that the famous A B C treaty,³ signed but not ratified by all three of the republics concerned, provided that the permanent commission, to which all disputes not settled by ordinary diplomatic means are to be submitted, is to be located at Montevideo. It is no occasion for surprise therefore that in none of the Latin American countries have the ideals of Pan American or continental solidarity met with a more ready or enthusiastic response than in Uruguay.

As was to be expected, from the very outbreak of the war, the sympathies of the Uruguayans were overwhelmingly pro-Ally.⁴ The varying fortunes of the first years of the contest were followed with passionate interest; the heroism of France evoked an admiration not exceeded elsewhere in the New World. In 1915, nearly two years before any of the American republics had departed from neutrality, the Uruguayan Congress declared the fourteenth of July a national holiday.⁵ The

³Treaty between the Argentine Republic, the United States of Brazil, and the Republic of Chile to facilitate the pacific settlement of international disputes, Text in English in "The New Pan-Americanism," *World Peace Foundation*, Pamphlet Series, Vol. VI, no. 1 (February 1916), pp. 50-53.

⁴Hartwig, *loc. cit.*, admits that "Uruguay is the only country in which is to be found a clearly expressed hostility to Germany." Typical of the attitude of the Uruguayan intellectuals is that of the distinguished writer José Enrique Rodó, excerpts from whose articles written in 1914 and 1915 are reprinted by Francisco Contreras, *Les Ecrivains hispano-américains et la guerre européenne* (Paris, 1917), p. 23 ff.

⁵J. Varela Acevedo, "Uruguay y la Guerra," in Frank H. Simonds, *Historia de la Guerra del Mundo*, 5 vols. (New

cause of Belgium and Italy—particularly in the case of the latter country, among the Italian immigrants or descendents of immigrants—was also warmly espoused by the Uruguayan people.

During the entire course of the war Uruguay was fortunate in having as her presidents and ministers of foreign affairs men who were fully equal to the many vexatious problems and heavy responsibilities thrust upon them. On March 1, 1915, President Battle y Ordóñez was succeeded by Dr. Feliciano Viera, whose term of office covered the remaining years of the war. The minister of foreign affairs during this period was Dr. Baltasar Brum, one of the most able and distinguished diplomats whom South America has produced. Largely owing to his striking success in shaping the foreign policy of Uruguay during these trying years, he was regarded as the logical successor of President Viera and was elected to the presidency practically without opposition in 1918. President Brum has ever been a firm believer in the principles of Pan American solidarity and a staunch and loyal friend of the United States.⁶

Prior to 1917, Uruguay, unlike Brazil, Argentina and Chile, did not become involved in any diplomatic

York, 1920), II, p. 272. Cf. also the brilliant address delivered on this subject by Deputy Buero in the Chamber of Deputies on July 10, 1915. Juan Antonio Buero, *El Uruguay en la Vida internacional* (Montevideo, 1919), pp. 215-222.

⁶ These ideas found eloquent expression in an address entitled *American Solidarity, Conference by the President of the Republic, Dr. Baltasar Brum, at the University of Montevideo on the 21st day of April, 1920* (Montevideo, 1920).

controversies with any of the belligerent powers growing out of any real or alleged violation of neutrality.⁷ The diplomatic history of this period may therefore be quickly summarized.

On August 4, 1914, the government issued the first of a series of neutrality decrees,⁸ and on August 7, a list of rules providing for the maintenance and safeguarding of such neutrality.⁹ These rules were based on The Hague Conventions of 1907, on the three rules embodied in the treaty between Great Britain and the United States signed in 1871,¹⁰ and finally on certain articles of the Uruguayan penal code relative to offenses against the law of nations. They followed very

⁷ According to the statement of the minister of foreign affairs of Peru the German merchant ship *Sierra de Córdoba* cleared from Buenos Aires for Bremen on October 16, 1914, proceeded to render assistance to the German warship *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and entered the harbor of Montevideo on November 26. Here she remained 26 days apparently without interference from the Uruguayan authorities. According to the procedure followed by Chile and Peru this ship should have been interned as an auxiliary cruiser. No mention is made of this episode in any of the Uruguayan official documents thus far published. Cf. Perú, *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones* 1915, p. 68.

⁸ The text of these decrees may be found in República Oriental del Uruguay, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Disposiciones sobre Neutralidad* (1914-1915) (Montevideo, 1915), *passim*, and *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. 108 (1914), pp. 854-862.

⁹ "Maritime rules of neutrality which ought to be observed in all the ports, roadsteads and territorial and jurisdictional waters of the Republic of Uruguay," *Disposiciones sobre Neutralidad*, pp. 7-11; *International Law Topics*, 1916, pp. 106-109.

¹⁰ Treaty of Washington, Art. 6. Malloy, *Treaties*, p. 703.

closely those promulgated by most of the neutral countries, differing from them only in two particulars: Territorial waters were considered to extend five miles from the coast line instead of the customary three miles; belligerent warships were permitted to remain in Uruguayan waters seventy-two hours instead of the usual twenty-four as prescribed in Articles 12 and 13 of the Thirteenth Hague Convention.

In December 1914 the rules promulgated during the preceding August received certain modifications and additions. By a decree of December 15 the sojourn of seventy-two hours permitted belligerent ships in Uruguayan ports was, in harmony with the dispositions adopted by a number of other American republics, curtailed to the traditional twenty-four hours¹¹ and on the same date an order was issued, in pursuance of the plan suggested by the Chilean government, permitting belligerent warships to take on in Uruguayan harbors only sufficient coal to reach the nearest foreign port in which fuel was available.¹²

The vexatious and complicated question of radio communications early engaged the attention of the Uruguayan authorities. By the decree of August 7, 1914, already mentioned, all ships, irrespective of their category, were prohibited from using their radio apparatus while in Uruguayan ports or waters.¹³ This decree was elaborated and amplified by a series of regu-

¹¹ *Disposiciones sobre Neutralidad (1914-1915)*, p. 27.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

lations issued August 31. Ships within Uruguayan jurisdictional waters were forbidden to communicate with each other. Radio messages proceeding from or directed to ships (save in the case of diplomatic messages which might be written in code) must be clear and written in Spanish, French, English, German, Italian or Portuguese. All abbreviations were forbidden. Radio stations on land were ordered to inform vessels approaching or entering territorial waters not to use their apparatus except in case of danger. Stations noting any intercommunication between ships were to report such action to the port authorities. All violations of these rules would result in the dismantling of the apparatus in question or the exclusion of the vessel from national waters.¹⁴ By the terms of a decree issued September 29 all ships remaining in Uruguayan waters longer than seventy-two hours were obliged to dismantle their antennæ.¹⁵ Finally, by a decree of October 20, provisions were made for establishment of a system of national licenses of all radio stations, without which they were not permitted to function.¹⁶

The limits set to our survey preclude any further analysis or discussion of public opinion in Uruguay as manifested in the press or otherwise during the first two and a half years of the war. It may merely be

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 16-18. The text of all the preceding decrees relating to radio communications may be found in English in *International Law Topics*, 1916, pp. 106-113.

pointed out that popular sympathy for the Allied cause gained rather than lost in strength in spite of the resentment caused by the tactless and arbitrary manner in which the British Black List was enforced and the unfortunate economic effects on Uruguay of certain import prohibitions which Great Britain felt it necessary to adopt. The government, on its part, through all of this trying period scrupulously upheld Uruguay's obligations as a neutral.

The reply of the Uruguayan foreign office to the German notification of unrestricted submarine warfare, presented by the German chargé d'affaires, Baron Ow-Wachendorf on February 5, 1917," was in keeping with Uruguay's attitude as a sovereign power fully conscious of its international obligations and responsibilities. After pointing out at length that the policy contemplated by the Imperial government struck at the very foundation of international law, which had been so laboriously reared during the past half century and was in direct violation of the rules laid down by Heffter,¹⁷ "illustrious interpreter of German thought in international matters," Dr. Brum, the minister of foreign affairs, added:

"Invoking all these antecedents and reasons, and after a scrupulous and serene consideration of the pres-

¹⁷ República Oriental del Uruguay, *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, (Septiembre de 1916 á 15 de Febrero de 1918), p. 413.

¹⁸ Dr. Brum's reference is apparently to the work of August Wilhelm Heffter (1796-1880). *Das europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart auf den bisherigen Grundlagen* (Berlin, 1888).

ent case, the Uruguayan government feels it incumbent to point out to the German government that it cannot admit for its nationals, for its commerce and its ships, the restrictions which are imposed upon it by the indefinite zone of blockade and the methods of the submarine campaign.

"It still ventures to hope that the Imperial government will confine its action within the limits of law, respecting those principles of humanity and justice so frequently sustained by its leading thinkers, principles which constitute the basis of the friendly relations which our two countries have cultivated without alteration; none the less, in spite of this hope, it reserves to itself the right—which the great German internationalist characterized as 'indisputable'—to employ the proper measures against procedures contrary to international usages, as well as against the arbitrary excesses with which it is threatened."¹⁹

Three days later, on February 6, the Uruguayan foreign office replied to the note of the American minister announcing the rupture of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany. The note of Dr. Brum contained the following significant declarations:

"The Uruguayan government, which on a previous occasion gave its adhesion to the efforts made by the United States in defense of the rights and interests of neutrals, recognizes the justice and nobility of the sentiments which in this emergency have guided President Wilson."²⁰

It is worthy of note that the entire Uruguayan press, irrespective of its political affiliations, warmly applauded the attitude of the Uruguayan foreign office,

¹⁹ *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1916-1918*, pp. 414-419.

²⁰ Brum to Jeffery, *ibid.*, p. 421.

indicating clearly that Dr. Brum in his replies both to Germany and the United States had clearly interpreted the sentiments of the nation.²¹

While sympathizing, as has been pointed out, with the attitude of the United States, the Uruguayan government none the less issued a formal declaration of neutrality²² when the Congress of Washington declared war on Germany. In conveying this decision to the United States minister at Montevideo Dr. Brum recalled that since Uruguay had as yet suffered no act of aggression or attack upon her rights,²³ she had decided to

²¹ Mesage of President Viera, read before Congress February 15, 1918. *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

²² The text of this decree, dated April 10, 1917, is given on p. 433 of *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1916-1918*, p. 433. Not without significance was the action of the Uruguayan Chamber of Deputies which on April 12 passed by an enormous majority the following motion proposed by Deputy Sánchez: "The Chamber of Deputies of Uruguay sends a fraternal greeting to the representatives of the American people who, as paladins of right and justice . . . are embarking upon the terrible struggle which casts its shadow over the whole world." República Oriental del Uruguay, *Diario de las Sesiones de la H. Cámara de Representantes*, Vol. 253 (Montevideo, 1917), p. 450.

²³ On April 30, less than a month after Dr. Brum's note, the steamer *Goritzia*, flying the Uruguayan flag, was sunk by a German submarine off Falmouth. But a careful investigation conducted by the Uruguayan authorities showed clearly that the *Goritzia* was not entitled to the protection of Uruguay as she was sailing under false colors. This vessel was formally the Canadian ship *Gleumont*. Her owners early in April 1916 sold her to a French firm which in turn sold her to the French government. Some months previous her Canadian owners had contrived by a ruse (the ship was transferred to the United

maintain her neutrality, "although she recognizes, as she has already stated, the justice of the position taken by the United States, to which she extends her moral sympathy and solidarity."²⁴ An analogous reply was made to the chargé d'affaires of Cuba a few days later:

"The government of Uruguay, recognizing the nobility of the sentiments which have determined the attitude of the republic of Cuba, extends to it, under the inspiration of the fraternal bonds which unite the democracies of both peoples, its cordial sympathy."²⁵

Up to this point the attitude of the government of Uruguay had not materially differed from that of a number of other Latin American republics, which though expressing a platonic approval of the course of action adopted by the United States, preserved a complete neutrality throughout the war. Such for instance

States registry for one day) to secure from the Uruguayan consul at New York provisional clearance papers, and the ship renamed the *Goritzia* sailed from New York on January 10 under the Uruguayan flag. In the investigation which followed the sinking of the ship the Uruguayan government had little difficulty in proving that her owners had deceived the Uruguayan consul at New York, who moreover was guilty of an infraction of the Uruguayan consular regulations in giving the ship authorization to sail directly to Havre, instead of first touching at a Uruguayan port. Under these conditions, in the opinion of the Uruguayan authorities, the *Goritzia* had never ceased to be a Canadian vessel. The voluminous correspondence on this whole subject will be found in *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1916-1918*, p. xvi and pp. 512-521; and *Disposiciones sobre Neutralidad, 1917*, pp. 19-26.

²⁴ Brum to Jeffery, April 14, 1917, *ibid.*, p. 432.

²⁵ Brum to Solano, *ibid.*, p. 435.

was the case of Argentina, and to a certain extent even of Chile. The Uruguayans were not, however, satisfied with such innocuous declarations. The doctrine of American solidarity, frequently discussed in the press of Montevideo headed by *El Siglo* and *El Día*, and championed by a number of Uruguayan public men, notably the distinguished writer and critic, Dr. Juan Zorilla de San Martín, was put forward by the directors of Uruguay's foreign policy as a principle to which all of the republics of the New World, confronted with the transcendent issues raised by the great war, might be expected to offer their adhesion. In urging this doctrine of continental solidarity as a common rallying point of all the nations of the Americas, Uruguay was undoubtedly influenced by the momentous step taken by Brazil on June 1 through the revocation of her decree of neutrality in the war between the United States and Germany. As explanation of this act the Brazilian government pointed out, it will be recalled, that "the republic has thus recognized that one of the belligerents (the United States) is an integral part of the American continent, and that we are bound to this belligerent by a traditional friendship and by a similarity of political opinion in the defense of the vital interests of America and the principles accepted by international law."²⁸

In the acknowledgment by Dr. Brum of the Brazilian note on the revocation of neutrality this somewhat

²⁸ Nilo Peçanha to Brum, June 2, 1917. *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 49.

nebulous doctrine of continental or American solidarity begins to assume a more definite form:

"The Uruguayan government, after examining Your Excellency's note, takes pleasure in stating that it sympathizes with the ideals to which the said communication refers, and reiterates once more its urgent desire that the policy of America through a congress of all its peoples, should give expression once and for all in judicial formulas or practical actions to the fertile aspirations of continental solidarity.

"United as are the nations of the New World by eternal bonds of democracy and by the same ideals of justice and liberty, the logic of principles and interests, for better securing the efficiency of the former and the free development of the latter, must necessarily determine, in the presence of the events that actually affect the world, a close union of action, so that an attack against any of the countries of America with violation of the universally recognized principles of international law, may constitute an offense to all and provoke in them a common reaction."²⁷

For a brief period the Uruguayan government harbored the belief that a congress of the American republics might constitute the most effective means of translating the theories of continental solidarity into realities. One may detect here the motives which led the Uruguayan foreign office to take up with enthu-

²⁷ Brum to Nilo Peçanha, June 13, 1917. *Brazilian Green Book*, p. 56. This note of Dr. Brum was the occasion of a brilliant article by Zorilla de San Martín entitled "Solidaridad Continental," published in *El Siglo* for June 16, 1917. The author developed the thesis that Uruguay, in championing the doctrine of continental solidarity, was merely carrying out a doctrine formulated a century earlier by the great Uruguayan hero, Artigas.

siasm the project of President Irigoyen of Argentina for a conference of Latin American states. As has already been noted the conference never took place, and this doctrine of continental solidarity, which, had it been adopted in the manner and to the extent urged by Uruguay, would have resulted in the democracies of the Western Hemisphere presenting a united moral front against Germany, was accepted by only a fraction of the American republics. Convinced at length that concerted action was no longer possible, and encouraged by the attitude of Brazil, the government of Uruguay determined to wait no longer. On June 18, 1917, it issued the now famous decree which follows:

“WHEREAS, In various communications, the government of Uruguay has proclaimed the principle of American solidarity as the criterion of its international policy, understanding that the grievance against the rights of one country of the continent would be considered as a grievance by all and provoke them to uniform and common reaction; and

“WHEREAS, In the hope of seeing an agreement in this respect effected among the nations of America which may make the practical and efficient application of such ideals possible, the government has adopted a watchful attitude with reference to its action, although it has manifested in each case its sympathy with those nations of the American continent which have been obliged to abandon their neutrality; and

“WHEREAS, Until such an agreement is made, Uruguay without acting contrary to its sentiments and convictions could not treat the American nations, which in defense of their own rights find themselves involved in an international war, as belligerents; and

“WHEREAS, This criterion is shared by the Senate; now, therefore, the president of the republic with the

concurrence of the council of ministers, has seen fit to decree and does hereby decree:

"*First*—That no American country, which in defense of its own rights should find itself in a state of war with nations of other continents will be treated as a belligerent; *Second*—That existing decrees which may be in contravention to this resolution shall be null and of no effect."²⁸

This striking, and in a sense unique manifestation of Pan American idealism, aroused intense enthusiasm in Uruguay²⁹ and awoke sympathetic echoes throughout the American republics and called forth a number of manifestations of adhesion. The minister of foreign affairs of Peru stated that the resolution was in entire harmony with the attitude of his government;³⁰ while a declaration of the same tenor was made by President Pardo in his message to Congress on July 28.³¹ The government of Bolivia declared that it unqualifiedly approved the declaration of Uruguay "which it considered as the faithful expression of its own con-

²⁸ *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1916-1918*, pp. 439-440. In English in *Official Bulletin* (Washington), June 20, 1917.

²⁹ Space does not permit any extended quotations from the press of Montevideo but a single excerpt from *El Día* (June 15, 1917) may be cited as typical: "How could Uruguay remain neutral in sentiment when two countries so intimately connected with her by ties of friendship and common policy as the United States and Brazil were at war? How could she be expected to judge them by the same standards as the German Empire or the Sultanate of Turkey?"

³⁰ Riva Agüero to Solé Rodríguez (Uruguayan chargé d'affaires at Lima), June 28, 1917. *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1916-1918*, p. 467.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 457.

victions and desires.”³² Brazil “recognizes that this policy upholds the diplomatic and national traditions of Uruguay . . . and congratulates the sister republic for this solemn and practical affirmation of Pan Americanism at the moment when the fundamental principles of civilization imperiled in the Old World seek shelter and equilibrium among the free peoples of the two Americas.”³³ Secretary Lansing in expressing the appreciation of the United States at the action taken by Uruguay added:

“It is exceedingly gratifying to learn that the Uruguayan government has a full realization of the motives which have inspired the actions of this country. I merely interpret the opinion of this country in stating that in this war of democracy against autocracy, of liberty against imperialism, we should have misread history if we had doubted for a moment that the sympathy of Uruguay was on the side of those who are fighting for the freedom of humanity and for those liberal institutions, which incorporated in the systems of government of all the republics of America have come to be our patrimony, a heritage which should be handed down intact to posterity.”³⁴

This decree of June 18, 1917, placed Uruguay in a curious position in reference to the belligerents, particularly in regard to the United States and Germany. Brazil, as has been previously indicated, regarded her-

³² Plácido Sánchez to Vicente M. Carrió (Uruguayan chargé d'affaires in Santiago), September 5, 1917. *Ibid.*, p. 443.

³³ Nilo Peçanha to Manuel Bernárdez (Uruguayan minister at Rio de Janeiro), *Ibid.*, p. 446.

³⁴ Included in a dispatch of de Pena (Uruguayan minister at Washington) to Brum, dated June 20, 1917. *Ibid.*, p. 456. (The English original of Lansing's note has not been published.)

self as a neutral in the war between the United States and the German Empire for nearly two months after she herself had severed diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany. Uruguay continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Germany for over three months after she had revoked her neutrality in favor of the United States and the other American republics which had entered the war. That the decree of June 18 was, in the opinion of the Uruguayan government, tantamount to the abandonment of neutrality appears clearly from the message of President Viera concerning this period read before the General Legislative Assembly at its opening on February 15, 1918.

"From this date" (*i. e.*, June 18), he declared, "and as a consequence of this decree the measures which obliged the republic to remain neutral in the war between the American states and the European countries ceased to be enforced; more specifically were abrogated the decrees of neutrality in favor of the United States, Cuba, Panama and Brazil, which were the countries of America which intervened in the struggle."²⁵

From the statement of President Viera one might well infer that the Uruguayan government regarded this situation—abandonment of neutrality coupled with the maintenance of diplomatic relations with Germany—as an anomaly which should cease at the earliest possible moment. But this suspense was permitted to continue for some time longer, as the government did not entirely abandon hope that the American republics might still agree on some form of concerted action deriving its sanction from the principle of

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

American solidarity; more specifically did it hope—to quote the words of President Viera—that

“... American sentiment would be a unit on the necessity of a rupture of diplomatic relations. . . . This point of view the Uruguayan chancellery advanced on various occasions, pointing out that if the principle of continental solidarity were accepted by the various American states, and efforts were made to honor it (*haciendo honor á el*), Uruguay would proceed to a rupture of relations and even to war. It was further pointed out that it was not necessary that the principle of solidarity be accepted through the medium of a conference, but that it might be adopted by means of direct negotiations between the various foreign offices.”³⁶

Although the consummation contemplated by President Viera was only realized in part, an opportunity was soon afforded the people of Uruguay to give concrete expression to their belief in the principles of co-operation and unity among the republics of the New World and at the same time to offer a striking testimony of their friendship for the United States.³⁷ A few days after the promulgation of the decree of June 18, the Uruguayan government was informed that the American fleet, under Rear-Admiral Caperton, then in Brazilian waters, would accept the invitation of President Viera and pay a visit of courtesy to Montevideo. The squadron arrived at the Uruguayan capital on July 12; in accordance with the decree of June 18,

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

³⁷ An evidence of this friendship was the decree of the Uruguayan government, issued shortly after the United States entered the war, declaring the Fourth of July a Uruguayan national holiday. *Varela Acevedo*, p. 282.

all regulations regarding length of sojourn were waived. The citizens of Montevideo vied with each other in the heartiness and impressiveness of their welcome. The entire city was decorated for the occasion and all business was suspended. According to the local press Montevideo had never before in its history witnessed such an enthusiastic reception of the representatives of a foreign power. A thousand sailors who were given shore leave were everywhere received with manifestations of sympathy and hospitality. The fleet remained until July 23, and returned to Uruguayan waters in October on the occasion of the severance of diplomatic relations between Uruguay and Germany.³⁸

With the full expectation that Uruguay would sooner or later definitely align herself with the United States and the Allies, the government made such preparations and took such precautions as circumstances seemed to warrant. Having reason to believe that the crews of the eight German vessels which had sought asylum in the harbor of Montevideo were preparing to sink these ships, the government issued a decree on September 14 authorizing the stationing of armed guards on board these vessels. As was anticipated, an examination of the said craft revealed serious damage inflicted upon the machinery.³⁹ And as the moment approached for

³⁸ An abundance of material on the visits of the American fleet is found in the *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1916-1918*, pp. 642-647, 654-663.

³⁹ The text of the decree is given in *ibid.*, p. 579; other material germane to the subject, on pp. 580-581.

a clearer definition of Uruguay's international status, the government resolved, before taking any decisive step towards the participation of the country in the war, to negotiate treaties of general and obligatory arbitration with those European powers which might soon be Uruguay's allies. In pursuance of this plan treaties were negotiated with several such powers. Of particular importance from the standpoint of Uruguay was abandonment of the right, claimed by a number of these countries, to have their citizens exempt in certain cases from the jurisdiction of the Uruguayan courts. This "right of extraterritoriality" as it was characterized by President Viera was now definitely suppressed.⁴⁰

During the course of the late summer and early fall of 1917 public opinion became more and more pronounced in favor of a definite break with Germany. To the four republics which had been embraced within the terms of the famous decree of June 18 were now added Bolivia, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Peru; that these countries, some of which had played an insignificant rôle in the comity of nations, should outstrip Uruguay in their championship of the ideals of Pan Americanism seemed humiliating to many Uruguayans. Other influences were at work as well. The publication of the Luxburg dispatches, with their reve-

⁴⁰ Our information relative to these treaties is derived from a brief discussion in the presidential message of 1918. The *Memoria* of the ministry of foreign affairs for the years 1916-1918 is otherwise silent on the subject. Cf. pp. xxiii-xxiv for President Viera's comments.

lation of Germany's hypocrisy and cruelty, aroused a storm of indignation. It has already been pointed out how a number of representative Uruguayans repaired to Buenos Aires and added their protests to those of the Argentines who favored a rupture of relations with Germany. And this indignation would have been in no wise assuaged had the Uruguayans learned—a fact that was not revealed until early in December—that two of the famous dispatches referred directly to their own government. Finally the realization that Brazil was obviously on the eve of entering the war as a full belligerent was not without its influence at Montevideo. As long as her northern neighbor's attitude remained undefined, there existed the possibility that the severance of relations by Uruguay might be followed by an armed raid of Germans from the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul. That such a fear was by no means fantastic appears from the inquiries made by President Viera to President Irigoyen as to whether the government of Uruguay might count on the support of the Argentine government in case the German colonists in Southern Brazil should invade Uruguayan territory.⁴¹ The favorable reply of the Argentine executive to this request has already been noted in the chapter dealing with Argentina and the war. By the beginning of October the Brazilian authorities had the situation so well in hand that the Uruguayan government might

⁴¹ *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1916-1918*, p. xxix. (Presidential message of February 15, 1918.)

well feel that any further hesitancy on the score of possible danger from the north was unnecessary.

Unfortunately the exact circumstances under which the Uruguayan General Assembly reached its decision to sever diplomatic relations with Germany are still enveloped in secrecy,⁴² although the impelling motives are sufficiently obvious. On October 2, the Chamber of Deputies, after a somewhat heated debate, invited the minister of foreign affairs to appear before that Body at his convenience "for the purpose of supplying information relative to our foreign policy, in view of the repercussion of the war upon the South American continent."⁴³ Pursuant to this request Dr. Brum on October 6 appeared before both branches of the Legislature and in a joint executive session described the orientation which had been followed by the ministry of foreign affairs in dealing with the international crisis growing out of the World War. At the conclusion of Dr. Brum's speech the executive presented a

⁴² On March 11, 1918, Deputy Ramírez proposed to the General Assembly that the memorandum read at the secret session of November 6, 1917, and which set forth the reasons for the rupture of relations with Germany, be published. This motion was supported by Deputy Buero, who urged that its publication would reveal even more strongly the loyalty of Uruguay to a Pan American policy. Although the motion was carried, the foreign office on March 19, 1918, announced that it was impossible to comply with the request of the General Assembly as the publication would involve the diplomatic documents of several countries. *Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Neutral Press Supplement* (issued by the General Staff, War Office, London), June 28, 1918.

⁴³ *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1916-1918*, p. 522.

message requesting the General Assembly to sanction a declaration of the rupture of diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany. After pointing out that the "reasons on which he based his request for such transcendent measures" had been amply exposed by the minister of foreign affairs the president stated:

"I should merely add that it is no longer possible to remain in the guise of simple and passive spectators in this world-wide contest with the autocracy of German imperialism, in which the supreme interests of democracy are at stake, including our own. Our obligation is all the greater since there have intervened in the struggle countries linked to Uruguay by a community of ideals, ideals from which we cannot withhold our aid and moral support.

"Uruguay should seek entrance at the earliest possible moment into the League of Honor, to which President Wilson alluded, thus ratifying, in this moment of peculiar solemnity, his policy, honorable, dispassionate, foreign to every subaltern material interest.

"It is my desire to lay special emphasis on the character of the attitude of Uruguay. The republic adopts a measure of such transcendental import without having any particular grievance to vindicate, without any direct offense of which she may complain. Her action, superior and calm, is based solely on the principle of high solidarity with the defenders of right and justice, who are at the same time the stalwart defenders of the sovereignty of the small nations, the self-sacrificing champions of world democracy." "

Following this noble appeal by President Viera on October 7 the Chamber of Deputies voted in favor of a rupture of relations with Germany by a vote of 74 to

"*Ibid.*, pp. 526-527, where the full text of President Viera's message is given.

23; the motion passed the Senate by a vote of 13 to 3.⁴⁵ On the same day an executive proclamation was issued, signed by the president and all the members of his cabinet, declaring the diplomatic and commercial relations between the republic of Uruguay and the German Empire officially severed.⁴⁶

The government forthwith adopted a number of measures in harmony with its changed status in regard to both groups of belligerents.⁴⁷ On October 15 the existing decrees regarding neutrality were officially revoked with respect to France, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Japan, Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro.⁴⁸ It is to be observed that none of the American republics were included within the terms of this decree as the famous act of June 18, declaring "that no American country, which, in defense of its own rights should find itself in a state of war with nations of other continents will be treated as a belligerent," was regarded as being tantamount to a revocation of neu-

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 528, where is given the text of the law authorizing the president to sever relations.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 529-530. (Text of proclamation), Cf. Gaillard, p. 127.

⁴⁷ It should be observed that no effort was made to interfere with or molest in any way the German residents. As a possible exception to this statement may be noted the withdrawal on October 10, 1917, of the charter of the organization known as the "Centro Germania." This act was based on the avowed purpose of this club "to strengthen the intellectual, economic, and social relations between the Uruguayan and German peoples." *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1916-1918*, p. 529.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 534.

trality in their case. On November 20 were cancelled the patents held by the Uruguayan consuls and vice-consuls of German nationality in Germany, Austria, Russia and Guatemala, of whom all told there were twelve.⁴⁹ But the most important series of acts or legislation resulting from the rupture of relations with Germany had to do with the German ships anchored in the harbor of Montevideo amounting all told to some 40,000 tons. We have already seen that on September 14 armed guards had been placed aboard these vessels to prevent their being damaged or even destroyed by their crews. It was immediately discovered, however, that the crews had not only seriously injured the machinery—a fact which had long been suspected—but had violated the penal code of Uruguay by removing the seals which had been placed on the radio apparatus by the authorities in August 1914. In the case of some of the ships the seals had not only been removed but the entire apparatus destroyed, or carried off. The captains of these ships were arrested and bound over for trial before the Uruguayan courts.⁵⁰

On the very day in which President Viera had delivered his message asking authorization to declare the severance of relations with Germany, he likewise requested authority of Congress for the employment of the eight German ships as Uruguay's contribution towards alleviating the world crisis in ocean tonnage.⁵¹

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 535.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 595.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 581-583. (Text of message dealing with the utilization of the ships.)

The necessary legislation was passed on November 9, 1917,⁵² and efforts were at once made to render the ships fit for service. Technical and other commissions⁵³ were appointed to make arrangement for the disposition of the ships once they had been repaired, and the following May they were leased to the Emergency Fleet Corporation of the United States. These ex-German steamers, rendered available at a time when the shortage of tonnage was distressingly acute, performed a useful service for the Allies in the transportation both of men and provisions.⁵⁴

Uruguay like Brazil generously contributed her pastoral and agricultural resources to the common cause. To facilitate their availability liberal credits were offered to the allied and associated powers. Thirty millions of pesos⁵⁵ were offered to England, fifteen million to France and twenty million to the United States. The first two of these countries eagerly accepted these arrangements and made heavy purchases in Uruguay of chilled meat, grain and other supplies.⁵⁶

As has already been intimated the possibilities for intrigues in Uruguay which might redound to the advantage of Germany had not been overlooked by the

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 589-591. (Text of law authorizing their utilization.)

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 591 ff.

⁵⁴ Varela Acevedo, p. 285. An abundance of material germane to this subject will also be found in the *Diario de Sesiones de la H. Cámara de Senadores*, Vol. 112 (1918), p. 44 ff.

⁵⁵ The Uruguayan peso at this time was worth slightly more than the United States dollar.

⁵⁶ Varela Acevedo, *loc. cit.*

notorious Luxburg of "spurlos versenkt" fame. When on December 21 Secretary Lansing gave to the press the third and last batch of the Luxburg dispatches, he stated that two of the telegrams, which referred to a friendly nation, would, in agreement with Argentina, be withheld from publicity. These two dispatches were numbers 65 and 84, and the nation involved was the Republic of Uruguay. These telegrams were some time in the fall of 1917 turned over to the Uruguayan foreign office by the Argentine government, and as early as December 9 their contents became known. The telegrams, dated July 10 and 28, advised Berlin to consent to a loan to Uruguay through the intermediary of the Deutsche Bank. The real motive of this offer was to keep Uruguay within the camp of the neutrals by demanding from the Uruguayan government certain guarantees for both the present and the future.⁶⁷ No further information regarding this intrigue is available; it is not improbable that we have here one of the matters stressed by Minister Brum in his address before the Congress at Montevideo in executive session on October 6, 1917.

The limits of our survey permit the discussion of only one other episode in the history of Uruguay's relation to the great war. In the spring of 1918 the Uruguayan government became involved in a diplomatic controversy with Germany which for a time threatened serious consequences. Early in March a military mission consisting of three colonels and a captain under the com-

⁶⁷ *Le Temps* (Paris), December 10, 1917; Gaillard, p. 129.

mand of General Dufrechou, Chief of the General Staff, left Montevideo for Barcelona on the Spanish steamer *Infanta Isabel de Borbón*, with the object of visiting the Allied front. Between the Canary Islands and Cadiz the German submarine 214, commanded by Captain Max Valentine, held up the *Infanta Isabel*. After examining their passports the commander of the submarine forced the members of the mission to come aboard his vessel, where he told them that he considered them as prisoners of war. He proposed to take them as such to Germany unless they gave their parole that they would abandon their journey to the Allied countries. To justify this attitude he claimed that war existed between Uruguay and Germany⁵⁸ according to instructions he had received from the German admiralty. General Dufrechou stated that it was untrue that a state of war existed unless it had been declared subsequent to his departure from Montevideo. He added, moreover, that the mission was not of a belligerent character, but organized solely for the purpose of studying the war. As these reasons were not regarded by Captain Valentine as satisfactory, the members of

⁵⁸ It is not without interest to note that the view of the captain of the submarine was shared by a number of Uruguayans. In a speech delivered before the Chamber of Deputies on March 17, 1918, Dr. Eduardo Rodríguez Larreta declared that Uruguay was in effect at war with Germany and he cited a number of incidents to prove his point. This opinion was shared by few of his colleagues, however. *Diario de Sesiones de la H. Cámara de Representantes*, Vol. 261 (1918), p. 290 ff. Cf. also Buero, *op. cit.*, pp. 259-266.

the mission were obliged to promise not to extend their journey beyond Spain and gave their parole to this effect, though formally protesting against what they regarded as an outrage.⁵⁹

The news of the affront to which the military mission was subjected reached Montevideo on March 22 and was the occasion of much popular excitement. The Uruguayan press voiced great indignation at what they termed an insult to Uruguay and urged the government to demand satisfaction from Berlin.⁶⁰

The Uruguayan foreign office promptly initiated negotiations looking to the release of the members of the mission from their parole at the same time demanding an explanation from the German government. After having learned from the Uruguayan legation in Spain the details of the detention of the mission, which had meanwhile arrived safely at Madrid,⁶¹ the Uruguayan foreign office instructed the Uruguayan legation at Berne to ask

“ . . . the Imperial foreign office whether the captain of the submarine acted in accordance with the instruc-

⁵⁹ Dispatch from the Uruguayan minister of foreign affairs to the Uruguay legation at Madrid, issued by the Uruguayan foreign office on May 16, 1917, and published *in extenso* in the *Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Neutral Press Supplement*, September 6, 1918, p. 362 ff.

⁶⁰ *El Día, La Mañana, El Siglo, La Tribuna Popular*, March 27, 1918.

⁶¹ The Uruguayan minister in Madrid to the Uruguayan minister of foreign affairs, March 23, 1918. *Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Neutral Press Supplement*, June 28, 1918; September 6, 1916.

tions from it, which means whether it considers that a state of war exists between Germany and Uruguay of which the Uruguayan government has not been informed by any third party. This is done in order that, in the event of an affirmative answer, Uruguay may adopt such measures as she may think convenient, but that on the other hand if that chancery does not agree with the attitude of the captain of the submarine, it may declare the members of the mission released from their parole so that they may proceed on the mission of study recommended to them by the executive power.”⁶²

The attitude of the German government when confronted by the Uruguayan demands was thoroughly characteristic, both in its evasiveness and in its effort to interpret the apology due Uruguay as a concession for which the Uruguayan government should render a *quid pro quo*. Early in April the German ambassador at Madrid induced the Spanish minister of state to offer to obtain the cancellation of the parole given by the military mission as well as to make efforts to secure from the French government the passage through France to the German front of a Chilean Mission headed by General Briebe.⁶³ The Uruguayan minister of foreign affairs in his reply, while thanking the Spanish minister of state for his offer of mediation, declined it on the grounds that “it would be derogatory to our national dignity to accept any mediation which would

⁶² Uruguayan minister of foreign affairs to the Uruguayan minister at Berne, March, 1918, *Ibid.*, September 6, 1918.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, September 6, 1918. (Unfortunately the *Daily Review of the Foreign Press*, though giving the month in which the dispatches were sent, omits their exact date as well as the name of the officials who wrote or received them.)

give us the appearance of being in doubt as to the step we have taken.”⁶⁴ Somewhat later the German government through the Swiss legation telegraphed the Uruguayan legation at Berne that “the German government has released the Uruguayan mission from their parole, but that in return for this it expects, on its part, that the Uruguayan government will use all of its influence with the French government to bring that government to authorize the passage through France of the Chilean mission which, with the designation of Germany, was travelling in the same vessel as the Uruguayan mission, and which is still in Spain.”⁶⁵

In its reply to the above communication the Uruguayan foreign office ignored this condition, but insisted that the German government make a flat declaration as to whether or not it considered itself at war with Uruguay.⁶⁶ Forced to a definite answer the Berlin foreign office stated early in May “that it did not consider itself in a state of war with Uruguay, and that further, the rupture of relations was not provoked by Germany.”⁶⁷ Whereupon the Uruguayan minister of foreign affairs telegraphed:

“The release of the mission from their parole cannot depend in any way on the affair of the Chilean military mission, for as Germany does not consider herself in a state of war with us, she could not demand paroles from soldiers under the penalty of their being treated as prisoners of war.”⁶⁸

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

The incident was closed, as far as Germany and Uruguay were concerned, by the dispatch late in May of the following telegram from the Uruguayan minister at Berne to the minister of foreign affairs at Montevideo:

“The German government states that it has subjected to no condition whatever the release of the military mission from their parole, merely having expressed the desire that I should consult my government as to the passage of the Chilean military mission. In view of the negative reply of Chile, the German government considers the incident closed.”⁶⁹

In several of the dispatches just analyzed reference has been made to the desire of the German government that Uruguay use her influence with the French authorities to obtain from them permission for the Chilean military mission, detained in Spain, to pass through France to the German front. It is interesting to note that the German foreign office quite gratuitously assumed that Chile would welcome the good offices of Uruguay in this affair. As a matter of fact, from the beginning, the Uruguayan government understood that only in the event of the Chilean government, the most interested party in the case, asking Uruguay to make such a request, would it be able to approach the French authorities on such a subject, and this as an act of solidarity and friendship towards Chile. In effect the Uruguayan foreign office did consult the government at Santiago as to whether it wished such a request to be proffered to the French government. The

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

Chilean government stated in reply that for several reasons Chile did not wish these representations to be made.⁷⁹

Both because of the character of the problems involved and the methods employed to meet them the history of Uruguay during the years of the great war merits the attention of the student of international law and of international relations. But there is in the case of Uruguay a special reason why the history of these crucial years is freighted with exceptional interest. The ideals and principles of Pan Americanism to which many of the Latin American countries in the past had rendered merely lip service were, in the case of Uruguay, adopted as the norm of her international policy. Uruguay was one of the first to realize the tremendous possibilities for concerted action among the republics of the New World presented by the entry of the United States into the World War in defense of democracy. To the creation of such a moral unity, to the alignment of all of the Latin American nations beside the United States in a common struggle against autocracy, Uruguay lent all her efforts. And while this moral unity was not achieved, Uruguay none the less, with a spontaneity and enthusiasm which many regarded as quixotic, showed herself true to what she believed to be her trust as a member of the great American comity of

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* Additional data on this whole episode may be found in the debates of the Uruguayan Congress. Cf. especially the able defense of the government's attitude by Deputy Buero delivered on May 17, 1918. *Diario de Sesiones de la H. Camara de Representantes*, Vol. 261 (1918), pp. 290-300, *passim*.

nations. With no national interest jeopardized, at the behest of no other power, this proud-spirited and cultured people voluntarily abandoned neutrality, partly as a protest against Germany's method of waging war, but largely as an evidence in their behalf in the principles of democracy and Pan American cooperation."¹

¹ Uruguayan idealism is admirably set forth in two eloquent addresses delivered by Dr. Buero (at that time acting minister of foreign affairs) before an extraordinary session of Congress held on November 11, 1918. Buero, *op. cit.*, pp. 469-488.

CHAPTER VI

PERU AND THE WAR

Of the tier of South American nations facing the Pacific the republic of Peru, during the course of the Great War, was the most pronounced and unequivocal in her expressions of sympathy towards the cause championed by the Allies and the United States. From the very outset the partizans of the Entente were an overwhelming majority. The Peruvians shared to an exceptional degree the traditional Latin American respect and affection for France. It may be noted that since 1896 France has maintained without interruption a military mission in Peru which has left a permanent imprint in the training and discipline of the Peruvian army. The intellectual life of Peru has been quickened by the presence of a number of French savants, notably the distinguished publicist and authority on international law, Pradier-Fodéré, who organized the faculty of political sciences in the venerable University of San Marcos, the oldest institution of learning in South America.

The good relations between Peru and Great Britain cover the full span of a century. A number of British soldiers, of whom the most prominent was General Miller, rendered the Peruvians invaluable assistance in their struggle for independence from Spain. And after

the war of the Pacific had left Peru with her resources dissipated and her finances exhausted, British capital, particularly as represented in the Peruvian Corporation, was largely instrumental in bringing about the country's economic rehabilitation.

Italy, too, had her partizans. This was but natural, since Peru, like a number of her sister republics, was beholden for much of her progress to the hardy Italian immigrants whose contingents, small in comparison to those who had found their way to the countries facing the Atlantic, nevertheless had made their influence felt in almost every field of national endeavor.¹

The attitude of the Peruvians towards the issues of the war was even more sharply defined after the United States became a belligerent. The traditions of friendship and good will between Peru and the northern republic have been firm and of long standing. In the various diplomatic and other controversies in which Peru has from time to time found herself involved with her neighbors the belief was generally held that she could command at least the moral support of the government at Washington. The offers of mediation made by the United States during the War of the Pacific were generally regarded by Peru as dictated by a desire to aid her in safeguarding her territorial integrity menaced by the annexationist aims of Chile. Many Peruvians have been convinced that had it not been for the sudden

¹ On the economic effects of the war—a subject omitted from our survey—*cf.* the excellent monograph by L. S. Rowe, *Early Effects of the War on the Finances, Commerce and Industry of Peru* (New York, 1920).

break in the foreign policy of the United States caused by the assassination of President Garfield and the resignation of Secretary Blaine, the offers of mediation would eventually have led to direct intervention in favor of Peru.

Peru has long been one of the most ardent votaries of the cause of American solidarity and its wider development of Pan Americanism. It was due largely to her initiative that conferences of the South American states were held in Lima in 1847, 1864 and 1874. Later, when the first of the series of Pan American Congresses was launched, chiefly at the instance of Secretary of State Blaine, Peru offered her enthusiastic adhesion. At these great gatherings held at Washington in 1889, at Mexico City in 1902, at Rio de Janeiro in 1906 and at Buenos Aires in 1910, the Peruvian delegates invariably championed all measures looking towards a closer entente among the republics of the New World; especially did they lend their support to all projects, such as the obligatory arbitration of boundary and other disputes, designed to promote international amity among the American nations. It was thoroughly in keeping with this traditional attitude of Peruvian diplomacy that, in the early months of the war, the Peruvian foreign office should exert itself to secure some form of concerted action to protect the rights of the American neutral states. The memorandum setting forth the Peruvian contention, presented by Minister (later Ambassador) Pezet to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union late in 1914 has already been noted in the introduction of the present work.

The limits of this chapter do not permit any detailed analysis of the attitude of the Peruvian press or of public opinion as represented by the utterances of Peruvians prominent in the political or intellectual life of the country. Germanophile sympathies were confined to a relatively small class recruited mainly from those Peruvians—chiefly women—amenable to clerical influence.² German propaganda, though not entirely absent, was less virulent in Peru than in Chile or Argentina. The most important organs of the press were pro-Ally in sympathy; especially was this true of *El Comercio* and *El Tiempo* of Lima. The former is the oldest and most influential of the Peruvian dailies; the latter, under the able editorship of Dr. Pedro Ruíz Bravo, from the very beginning of the war was a stalwart and uncompromising defender of the Entente.³ A list of the notable Peruvians who eagerly espoused the cause of the Allies and later that of the United States would fall little short of being a roster of the intellectuals of the nation. For particular mention may be singled out the names of Senator Mariano H. Cornejo, a fervent

²The comparatively large number of women who having taken their cue from certain members of the clergy were pro-German is stressed by Ambassador Pezet in his article "Perú y la Guerra" in Simonds, *Historia de la Guerra del Mundo*, t. II, p. 288.

³The only daily of importance which evinced any distinctly pro-German leaning was *La Prensa* of Lima. A number of provincial sheets, some of them scurrilous in character, championed the German cause. Such were *La Actualidad* of Chiclayo and *El Sol* of Piura. Much of the material favorable to Germany was supplied by Captain Guerrero, an officer of the Peruvian army, and Peruvian military attaché at Berlin during the early years of the war.

admirer of France and one of the prime movers in the campaign for a break of relations with Germany;⁴ Drs. Francisco and Ventura Calderón, two young Peruvian writers and sociologists, who have done much to interpret to Europe the cultural and intellectual movements of Peru;⁵ Dr. Javier Prado y Ugarteche, rector of the University of San Marcos, former dean and professor of the faculty of philosophy and letters, and a member of the Royal Academies of Language and Jurisprudence; Dr. Manuel Vicente Villarán, dean of the faculty of jurisprudence of the University of San Marcos and member of the American Institute of International Law; Dr. Victor Andrés Belaúnde, professor in the faculty of political science and philosophy and letters of the University of San Marcos, and director of the *Mercurio Peruano*, the oldest and most famous of the literary reviews of the republic.⁶

The history of Peru's diplomatic relations growing out of the war from the outbreak of hostilities to the beginning of 1917 may be quickly summarized. Unlike almost all of the other Latin American republics Peru

⁴ Cf. Mariano H. Cornejo, *Hommage a la France* (Paris, 1918).

⁵ Sons of the famous jurisconsult and statesman Francisco García Calderón and brother of José García Calderón who as a volunteer in the French army was killed in action at Verdun May 5, 1916.

⁶ The purely literary circles of Peru were generally pro-Ally. Mention may be made in this connection of the critic Abraham Valdelomar and the poet F. T. Marinetti. A notable exception was the poet Alberto Hidalgo. His "Arenga Lirica al Emperador de Alemania" is a fulsome eulogy of William II almost nauseating in its dithyrambic admiration. *Panopolia Lirica* (Lima, 1917), p. 123.

issued no decrees of neutrality. But during the first eight months of the war the government was forced to cope, though in a minor degree, with the same problems which had engaged the attention of Chile. As the result of urgent requests on the part of the representatives of the Allied governments the Peruvian authorities took measures as early as August 1914 to prevent the violation of neutrality by the warships and merchantmen of Germany. On August 21 orders were issued by the minister of war and navy requiring the captains of all merchant ships anchored in Peruvian harbors to declare within twenty-four hours their exact relation to the fleets of the belligerents operating in Pacific waters. The port authorities were ordered to exercise due vigilance to prevent such vessels from arming themselves or rendering any assistance to warships. The use of the wireless installation on board these merchant ships was forbidden,⁷ and by a subsequent decree, issued June 4, 1915, the antennæ of such outfits were to be dismantled.⁸

On December 10 the German Kosmos liner *Luxor* arrived at Callao, after having furnished assistance to von Spee's fleet just prior to the Battle of Coronel. She was ordered to leave within twenty-four hours and on her refusal was interned as an auxiliary cruiser, despite

⁷ Perú. *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, 1915, p. 6; *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, año XIV, No. LV (Lima, 1917), pp. 101-102. Cf. Juan Bautista de Lavalle, *El Perú y la Gran Guerra* (Lima, 1919), p. 10 ff.

⁸ *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, 1915, p. 7.

the protests of the German chargé d'affaires, Baron von Vietenghoff.⁹

When early in 1915 German cruisers appeared off the Peruvian coast, menacing commercial traffic, the government detailed the Peruvian cruisers *Almirante Grau* and *Colonel Bolognosi* to serve as escort for merchant ships belonging to the Allied nations. Thus were convoyed the English ships *Orensa* and *Magellan*, the Japanese steamer *Kiyo Maru*, and a number of others.¹⁰

The declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Imperial German government on January 31, 1917, followed by the prompt action of the United States in severing diplomatic relations with Germany, and in April by a formal declaration of war, naturally exerted a powerful influence on Peru's foreign policy. The reply to the German declaration of January 31, made public on February 9, stated that the Peruvian government reserved all rights for the protection of Peruvian citizens, ships and cargoes, to which neutrals are entitled under international law. The note continued:

"However deplorable may be the extremes to which the belligerents are carrying hostilities, now under new threats to neutral trade, the Peruvian government must declare that it cannot admit the resolution to which your government has given notification, because the Peruvian

⁹ The protracted diplomatic correspondence which grew out of the *Luxor* affair is summarized by the Peruvian minister of foreign affairs, Dr. J. Fernando Gazzani, in the *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1915*, p. 8 ff. The documents may be found in the *Boletín*, already cited, p. 119 ff., and 127 ff.

¹⁰ Lavalle, p. 12.

government considers it opposed to international law and the legal rights of neutrals.

"The recent odious case of the *Lorton*¹¹ which resulted in a claim made by my government, proves the error and injustice of the submarine campaign, now generalized in an unacceptable form by the closure of enormous zones of free seas, with serious danger to the lives and interests of neutral countries."¹²

The Peruvian minister of foreign affairs, Sr. E. de la Riva Agüero, in replying to the American minister at Lima respecting President Wilson's suggestion that the other neutral nations take the same position as the United States on the submarine campaign, said:

"In reply to Your Excellency's note of February 9, it gives me pleasure to say that my government fully appreciates the principles and intentions that guide Your Excellency in the present emergency . . . and which uphold the defense of all neutral nations, seriously threatened by the new methods of maritime war, which efforts are now being made to establish."¹³

This orientation in favor of the foreign policy of the United States was accentuated during the spring and summer of 1917. Upon learning of the declaration of war by the United States, Peru purposely refrained from issuing a declaration of neutrality, as she felt that such an act would be incompatible with the community of interests which had long existed between the United States and herself.¹⁴ Her increasing disposition to give

¹¹ The *Lorton* case is discussed later in the present chapter.

¹² John Barrett and Benito Javier Pérez-Verdía, *Latin America and the War. Special Memorandum*. (Issued by the Pan American Union, Washington, 1919), p. 25. Cf. Lavalley, p. 14.

¹³ Barrett and Pérez-Verdía, *loc. cit.*

¹⁴ Lavalley, p. 14.

a full and frank adhesion to the doctrine of continental solidarity appears in her acknowledgment of the receipt of the Uruguayan decree of June 18, to the effect that no American country, which in defense of its own rights should find itself in a state of war with nations of other continents, would be treated as a belligerent. In his reply, dated June 28, Sr. de la Riva Agüero was at pains to point out that such sentiments awoke a sympathetic echo in Peru, which on repeated occasions had proclaimed the principles of American solidarity as the key-note of her international policy.¹⁵

President Pardo, in his message to the Peruvian Congress delivered on July 28, 1917, read long extracts from the war-message of President Wilson. He approved "the principles of right and justice enunciated, to which Peru cannot be indifferent."

"Peru," continued President Pardo, "which in all her acts of international life has endeavored to incorporate those principles of justice in the judicial and political relations of the American peoples; Peru which in a war fought not long ago¹⁶ sacrificed for these ideals the blood of her sons, her wealth and her hopes for the future, cannot be indifferent to the words of President Wilson and adheres once more to such noble purposes."

In the same message the Peruvian executive endorsed the attitude of the governments of Brazil, Cuba, Bolivia, Panama and Uruguay in relation to the war.¹⁷

¹⁵ República Oriental del Uruguay. *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1916-1918*, pp. 466-467.

¹⁶ The reference is, of course, to the War of the Pacific, 1879-1881.

¹⁷ Lavalle, pp. 15-18.

Finally should be noted the motion of the Peruvian Senate, passed unanimously on September 8, 1917:

"The Senate of Peru declares that the international policy of Peru should derive its inspiration from the principle of solidarity of the peoples of the continent with the United States in harmony with the ideals of international justice proclaimed by President Wilson and with the declarations formulated on the fifth of the present month by the minister of foreign affairs in the Chamber of Deputies."¹⁸

It is quite possible that Peru, like Uruguay and Bolivia, would have given concrete expression to her belief in the ideals of Pan Americanism by a severance of diplomatic relations with Germany, even if she had not been the victim of any overt act on the part of the Imperial government. Immediately following the entry of the United States into the war a strong party in Congress, headed by Senator Cornejo, carried on a vigorous campaign in favor of such a move. And a not inconsiderable fraction of public opinion, represented by the paper, *El Tiempo*, did not hesitate to counsel an open declaration of war.¹⁹

¹⁸ Lavalle, p. 19. The text of the declaration referred to in the motion is as follows: "The minister of foreign affairs, ratifying the declarations contained in the last message of the president to Congress and confirming the views which he uttered before the Chamber of Deputies, declares that the foreign policy of the Peruvian government has as its object Pan American solidarity based on the principles of international justice, which have been proclaimed by the president of the United States." *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁹ At a secret session of the Chamber of Deputies held on September 13, 1918, a proposal was made, according to *El Tiempo* for a declaration of war against Germany. *Daily*

These elements in Peruvian public life in favor of a more aggressive attitude towards Germany found their case immeasurably strengthened through an act of brutal aggression on the part of the Imperial German government—the sinking of the Peruvian bark *Lorton*, on February 4, 1917, coupled with the refusal on the part of Germany to make any adequate or satisfactory reparation for this outrage.

The diplomatic correspondence which grew out of this incident is very voluminous and only the essential points can find a place in our brief survey. This brevity of treatment is the more justified as the whole subject is admirably discussed, with the inclusion of the more important documents, by the eminent Peruvian authority on international law, Dr. Juan Bautista de Lavalle, in his work *El Perú y la gran Guerra*, published at Lima in 1919.²⁰

The Peruvian bark *Lorton*, 1374 tons register, belonging to the firm of Roca and Miller of Lima, under the command of the naturalized Peruvian citizen, Frank T. Sanders, set sail from the Chilean port of Caleta Buena on November 22, 1916, with a cargo of nitrate

Review of the Foreign Press, Neutral Press Supplement. (Issued by the General Staff, War Office, London), December 21, 1917. An abortive revolution, signalized by the mutiny of a number of regiments of the Peruvian army in August 1917, is alleged to have had as one of its objects the entry of Peru into the war as an active belligerent. *New York Times*, August 26, 1917.

²⁰ The documents incorporated in the monograph of Dr. Lavalle are for the most part taken from the *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, año XVI, No. LXI (Lima 1919), p. 81 ff.

bound for Bilbao, Spain. On February 4, in the Cantabrian Sea, between two and three miles from the little Spanish port of Suances on the coast of Guipuzcoa, the *Lorton* was sunk by a German submarine. The crew were given five minutes to leave the ship after which it was blown up by bombs placed within the hold. The ship's papers and the Peruvian flag which the *Lorton* had been carrying were seized by the captain of the submarine.

Even the most cursory examination of the circumstances under which the *Lorton* was sunk would seem to justify the grounds of Peru's complaints against the Imperial German government. When destroyed by the German submarine the *Lorton* was sailing under the flag of a neutral friendly nation, on a voyage between two neutral ports, and was attacked in a locality lying entirely outside of the blockaded zone established by the German government itself. The probability that the sinking took place in Spanish jurisdictional waters, though aggravating the offense, was not in the opinion of the Peruvian foreign office, a factor of prime importance in determining the legitimacy of Peru's grievances against Germany. It is perhaps not irrelevant to add that the captain of the *Lorton* at the time his ship was sunk was in entire ignorance of Germany's decree of unrestricted submarine warfare.

In the opinion of the Peruvian government the attack perpetrated by the German submarine partook of a double character and fully justified Peru in demanding two distinct reparations. On the one hand was the insult to the flag of a friendly nation, on the other the

material damage caused to Peruvian citizens through the wanton destruction of their property. As reparation under the first heading the Peruvian government demanded the military salute of the Peruvian flag by one or more ships of the Imperial navy and also the formal disapproval of the conduct of the submarine commander and his trial by a court martial; under the second, indemnity for the value of the ship and cargo, amounting all told to something over fifty-five thousand pounds.²¹

The German government not only refused to accord the reparations demanded by Peru, but challenged the whole basis of Peru's contentions. The lengthy reply to Peru's demands, dispatched from Berlin on June 18, 1917, was prefaced by the statement that the *Lorton* was sunk on February 15,²² some four marine miles from the coast of Spain, and hence "beyond all doubt, outside of Spanish jurisdictional waters." The nitrate with which the bark was loaded had been declared absolute contraband by order of the German government on July 22, 1916, and by British proclamation October 14, 1915. It was obvious from the destination of the *Lorton* that the nitrate, though nominally consigned to Spain, was in reality intended for France. Under such conditions the captain of the submarine was justified in sinking the *Lorton* as it was manifestly impossible to convey the bark as a prize to any Ger-

²¹ Lavalley, pp. 32-33, where are summarized a number of communications from the Peruvian foreign office, notably that of February 12, 1917.

²² The attack on the *Lorton* really took place on February 4.

man harbor. The Peruvian contention that the destruction of the bark took place outside of the barred zone was entirely irrelevant, as the submarine was carrying on cruiser warfare, one of whose objects was to prevent contraband goods from reaching an enemy's territory. The commander of the submarine had thus acted in entire harmony with international law. To prevent the possibility of any injustice being done, however, the German government was willing to have its acts examined before the prize court at Hamburg before which the owners of the ship and cargo might present their demands.²³ And in a further note on this subject, dispatched some time in August, the German government repeated a previous offer to pay an adequate indemnity should it be proven that the *Lorton* was sunk in Spanish territorial waters ; this fact to be determined by an arbitration tribunal created *ad hoc*.²⁴

The Peruvian foreign office had little difficulty in meeting the arguments of Zimmermann. It was incontestable that the *Lorton* had been sunk in a zone lying quite beyond the confines of the barred area established by the German decree of January 31. The cargo of the *Lorton* could not properly be regarded as contraband, as it was carried on a neutral ship, sailing on a legitimate commercial errand between neutral ports, and was destined for use in a neutral country. The manifest of the cargo indicated that it was consigned

²³ Lavalle, p. 310; *cf.* p. 292 where the text of the earlier offer, dated February 18, is given.

²⁴ Summarized in dispatch from Tudela to von der Heyde, August 28, 1917. *Ibid.*, p. 308.

for the greater part to firms or individuals in the interior of Spain and was to be employed as fertilizer. Under these circumstances the case of the *Lorton* did not properly fall within the jurisdiction of a prize court. It was a clear case of the vessel of a friendly nation being destroyed by a warship of the German navy in violation of well-defined principles of international law. The offer to arbitrate the question of the exact site of the destruction of the ship was rejected as irrelevant and calculated to obscure the real issues of the controversy.²⁵

It would be wearisome and unprofitable to follow in detail the negotiations which dragged on during the autumn of 1917 between the Peruvian and German foreign offices. The Peruvian case was greatly strengthened by the willingness of the Imperial government to meet in full the demands of the Argentine republic for the sinking of the Argentine bark *Toro*. The cases of the *Toro* and the *Lorton* presented a number of striking analogies. The *Toro*, it will be recalled, was sunk on June 22, to the southwest of Cape Spartel, while bound for Genoa with a cargo of hides, wool, and frozen meat. The Peruvian foreign office did not fail to point out the obvious parallels:²⁶ Both were neutral ships, both were sunk outside the barred zone declared by the German government. Moreover both

²⁵ Tudela (Peruvian minister of foreign affairs) to von der Heyde, August 28, 1917. *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, año XIV, No. IV (Lima 1917), pp. 129-132.

²⁶ *E. g.*, in note of Tudela to von der Heyde, September 25, 1917. *Ibid.*, 136-137.

were destroyed by German submarines on the grounds that they carried contraband. But while in the case of the *Toro* the cargo was consigned to a belligerent country, Italy; in the case of the *Lorton*, the destination was neutral, Spain. If Argentina was entitled to full indemnity and reparations for the sinking of the *Toro*, *a fortiori* Peru was justified in demanding similar treatment in the case of the *Lorton*.

But the concession which the Berlin government was willing to make to Argentina it refused to grant to Peru, whose case, as we have seen, was distinctly the stronger. The demands of the Peruvian foreign office were met by a policy of shuffling and tergiversation, coupled with at least one dishonorable attempt to deceive the Peruvian minister at Berlin, Dr. von der Heyde.²⁷ Finally, convinced of the uselessness of further prolonging negotiations, and influenced doubtless by the growing impatience of public opinion in Peru,²⁸

²⁷ On November 23, in a long memorandum directed to the Lima foreign office, von der Heyde pointed out the attempts of the German government to throw dust in his eyes in regard to the status and destination of the Argentine ship *Toro*. Von der Heyde had reason to believe that the *Toro* was bound for Genoa. But such an assertion on the part of the Peruvian minister was repeatedly denied by Kühlmann and the sub-secretary, von dem Bussche; finally in a note dated October 2, Kühlmann stated categorically that the destination of the *Toro* was not Genoa but Cetta. The German foreign office, also endeavored to deceive the Peruvian minister regarding the character of the cargo of the *Toro*. *Ibid.*, pp. 207-208.

²⁸ "A good deal of impatience has been evinced by the Peruvian press at the way the German government has repeatedly evaded a straightforward pronouncement on the *Lorton* incident, and this culminated in a wide-spread feeling of annoy-

the minister of foreign affairs, Sr. Tudela, sent cable instructions on September 25 to Sr. von der Heyde to demand of the German government a satisfactory reply within eight days of the receipt of the dispatch.²⁹ On October 3, the Peruvian minister at Berlin sent a long cable, in which he summed up the results of his conferences with the German foreign office. Kühlmann had made it perfectly clear that any immediate settlement of the *Lorton* controversy was out of the question, "since to accord special concessions to Peru would throw into chaos the numerous similar cases pending with other countries." The case of the *Toro* "was very different; it was another affair and much more simple—and clear." The best that the German government could do at the present time was to return to Peru the flag which the *Lorton* had been flying at the time she was sunk and which had been sequestered by the captain of the submarine. Owing to faulty cable communications and difficulties of translation von der Heyde had not presented the Peruvian ultimatum of September 25, intimating that in view of the intran-

ance and mistrust throughout the country, when it became known that Germany had satisfactorily settled the *Toro* case, Peru's claim being considered much more justifiable. Here again the indecision and vacillation of the Peruvian government . . . has been generally condemned by the people, a fact which has been clearly revealed by the daily press and one which has only led to a series of disadvantages for the country and unpopularity for the government." *Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Neutral Press Supplement*, December 21, 1917. (Period under review, October 6-15.)

²⁹ *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, año XIV, No. LV, pp. 136-137.

sigent attitude of the foreign office such a demand would be entirely useless.³⁰

Von der Heyde's dispatch of October 3 reached Lima on October 5. On the very day of its arrival Sr. Tudela went before the Peruvian Congress and in an historic session gave a résumé of the whole diplomatic correspondence growing out of the sinking of the *Lorton*, ending with the peremptory refusal of the foreign minister, Kühlmann, to expedite the settlement of the resultant controversy.

"After this declaration, made by an official of the German government, the government of Peru can adopt no other course in the opinion of the speaker and in the opinion of the government itself, than to cease maintaining relations with the German Empire. As diplomatic negotiations, in the judgment of the executive, have ceased, the ministry of foreign affairs submits the proposal for a severance of relations, which it has just formulated, to the Congress of the republic."³¹

The Peruvian Congress by a vote of 105 to 6 approved the following motion, submitted by the Deputy from Pascasmayo, Sr. José Balta:

"In view of the declarations of the minister of foreign affairs and of the principles proclaimed by the Peruvian chancellery and the Chambers, Congress ap-

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

³¹ Lavalle, p. 50. On October 8 Kühlmann informed the Reichstag of the reasons for the severance of relations with Peru. He declared that Peru "in an abrupt manner had demanded that the *Lorton* affair be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the prize court," and when the Imperial government refused to acquiesce, the Peruvian minister was recalled. *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, año XIV, No. LV, p. 263.

proves the rupture of relations with the German Empire, proposed by the executive."³²

On October 6, Dr. Frederick Perl, the German minister at Lima, was given his passports, while at the same time Sr. von der Heyde was recalled from Berlin. Peruvian interests in Germany and German interests in Peru were entrusted to the diplomatic representatives of Spain.³³

It is interesting to note that in the discussions, both in Congress and the press, on the subject of the severance of diplomatic relations, such opposition as developed was in large part due to the alleged inadequacy of motives stressed by the foreign office in requesting Congress to sanction this step. A significant—in the opinion of many, decisive—factor in the action of Congress was the argument based on Pan American solidarity; a number of the members of Congress went so far as to urge that the motion be voted on this basis exclusively. These members felt that the *Lorton* controversy offered a too narrow and technical basis, especially in view of the dilatoriness imputed to von der Heyde and the irregularity of postal and telegraphic communications.³⁴

This apprehension lest the more fundamental reasons for Peru's act in severing diplomatic relations might be misunderstood was apparently shared by the minister of foreign affairs. On October 8, Sr. Tudela

³² Lavalle, pp. 50-51.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 332, 334.

³⁴ Editorial comment. *Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Neutral Press Supplement*, December 21, 1917.

cabled a note to Secretary Lansing, in which he developed at some length the causes which had impelled Peru to adopt such a course. Dispatches of a somewhat similar tenor were sent to the governments of the other American republics and the European Allies. The pertinent sections of the note to the United States may be quoted:

“ From the beginning of the Great War, in which the most powerful peoples of the world are involved, the Peruvian government has strictly performed the duties imposed upon it by international law and has loyally maintained the neutrality of the republic, trusting that its neutral rights would in turn be respected by the belligerents. But when the conflagration spread to the American continent, notwithstanding the efforts exerted for nearly three years by the United States government to keep that great people out of the conflict, Peru was confronted by new duties springing from her passionate desire for the continental solidarity that has ever been the goal of her foreign policy, and by the necessity of defending her rights from the new form of maritime warfare set up by Germany.

“ That was the reason why, on receiving notice of the belligerency of the United States caused by the proceedings of the Berlin government in violation of international law, the Peruvian government, far from declaring itself neutral, recognized the justice of the stand taken by the Washington government. And for the same reason the president of Peru in his message to Congress, and the minister for foreign affairs, in the Chamber of Deputies, with the express approval of Congress, solemnly affirmed the adhesion of our country to the principles of international justice proclaimed by President Wilson.

“ It was the Peruvian government's wish that the policy of the whole continent be a concerted ratification of the attitude of the Washington government which took up the defense of neutral interests and in-

sisted on the observation of international law. But the course of events did not result in joint action; each country shaped its course in defense of its own invaded rights as it was individually prompted in its adherence to the principles declared by the United States.

"Peru, for her part, while endeavoring to give prevalence to a uniform continental policy, maintained with the utmost firmness the integrity of her rights as a sovereign nation in the face of Germany's disregard of the principles of naval warfare. It was the defense of these rights which led her to sever her diplomatic relations with the Imperial government as the result of an outrage for which she duly but vainly claimed appropriate reparation: The sinking of the vessel *Lorton* by a German submarine on the coast of Spain, while the ship was plying between neutral ports, engaged in a lawful trade, without infringing even the German rules respecting closed zones—unknown to international law.

"The reluctance of the Imperial government to meet our just demands according to the general principles of international law, the very arbitrary rules laid down by that government, and the unsuccessful presentation of a precedent in an analogous claim favorably entertained by it—these are the facts in which Peru reads the complete lack of justice that marks the course of the German government's policy and the sound foundation there is for the effort to check that policy, so as to establish in the world a juridical standard that will forever cause justice to prevail in international relations."³⁵

The only other diplomatic incident of importance growing out of Peru's relation with the war had to do with the expropriation of the German ships anchored or interned in Peruvian harbors. Several weeks prior to the severance of diplomatic relations the Peruvian

³⁵ *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, año XVI, No. LXI, p. 54.

government had reason to believe that the six German steamers and three sailing vessels stationed at Callao and Mollendo³⁶ were being subjected to grave injuries and possibly even destruction by their crews. To prevent such possibilities the Peruvian authorities on September 29, 1917, placed these ships under armed guard. The apprehension proved to be by no means groundless. In the case of the steamers such damage had been done to the machinery as to render them useless without extensive repairs, while even the sailing ships had been made unserviceable. The armed surveillance of these ships was the occasion of an acrimonious exchange of correspondence between the German minister Perl and the Lima foreign office, a correspondence which was terminated only with the severance of diplomatic relations.³⁷

As the shipping crisis became more acute, threatening Peru's foreign and coast-wise commerce with stagnation if not paralysis, the conviction gained ground that the national interests demanded the use of the German shipping lying idle in Peruvian harbors.³⁸

³⁶ These ships were as follows: The steamers *Sierra de Córdoba*, *Luxor*, *Rhakotis*, *Anubis*, *Uarda*, *Marie*; the sailing ships *Hebe*, *Omega*, *Maipo*, *Tellus*. The *Sierra de Córdoba* belonged to the North German Lloyd Company, the others to the Kosmos Company.

³⁷ This correspondence is published *in extenso*, *Ibid.*, p. 266 ff.

³⁸ The reasons which justified Peru in taking this step are set forth convincingly by the foreign minister, Tudela, in his reply to the protest of the Spanish minister—entrusted with German interests in Peru after the severance of diplomatic relations—dated September 9, 1918. *Ibid.*, p. 279.

Accordingly, on January 29, 1918, Congress passed a bill, signed the following day by the president, which authorized the executive to take possession, when circumstances demanded, of such elements of maritime and fluvial transportation with all their appurtenances, as, in his judgment, were required to supply the public with the means necessary to its subsistence and the proper functioning of its industries. In every case the value of the material requisitioned by the government was to be duly credited to the owners. The valuation should be decided upon by experts, appointed partly by the government, partly by the owners or proprietors of the materials in question. Provision was also made for arbitration of possible differences.³⁹

The first use which the Peruvian government made of the authorization granted by the law of January 30, was to requisition six steel launches belonging to the Roland Line and to employ them in the transportation of petroleum products from the Lobitos oil-fields in the extreme north of the republic to Callao and other ports from which these products could be distributed into the interior. The crying need of this fuel both for domestic and industrial purposes fully justified, in the opinion of the Peruvian authorities, this step. Protests made by the Spanish legation, which since the rupture of relations had been entrusted with German interests, failed to influence the Peruvian government.⁴⁰

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 271, where text of the law is given.

⁴⁰ Count of Galarza to Sr. Tudela, February 18 and March 22, 1918; reply of Tudela, March 4, 1918. *Ibid.*, pp. 273-277.

The question of the utilization of the steamers and sailing craft belonging to the Kosmos and North German Lloyd Companies soon came to the fore. On June 13 and 19, 1918, the minister of finance issued decrees looking to the appointment of a commission, composed partly of Peruvian officials and partly of representatives of the interested companies, to draw up an inventory of these ships.⁴¹ As both companies refused to permit their agents to serve on such a commission, the government proceeded to appoint Sr. Manuel L. Lulanovich, director of the Compañía Peruana de Vapores y Dique del Callao, to appraise the value of the ships and other appurtenances belonging to the two German companies. This appraisal was carried out despite the protests of the Spanish minister, and the total value fixed at 549,098 pounds sterling.⁴² Finally on September 5 the government, taking into account the increasing stringency of shipping due to the war and especially to the submarine campaign, determined to make full use of the law of January 29, by taking possession of all of the remaining German ships and their accessories.⁴³

It was clear that the Peruvian government was not in a position to operate directly the ten German ships now under its control. The wretched condition of these vessels, after three years of idleness, especially in view of the damage to their machinery and hulls wrought by their crews, necessitated repairs and renovations which the government was not well able to perform. It was

⁴¹ Lavalle, pp. 395-397.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 375-407.

⁴³ Text of decree of September 5, given in Lavalle, p. 406.

accordingly determined to lease these ships to the Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, and a law was passed to this effect on September 6, 1918.⁴⁴ Such a move would not only be to the advantage of Peru, but it would place at the service of the United States tonnage amounting to sixty-one thousand nine hundred, at a time when the shipping crisis was especially acute. The contract entered into by the Emergency Fleet Corporation and signed September 6 provided for the leasing of the ships for the remainder of the war with the option of extending the lease six months after the termination of hostilities and the allocation of tonnage to the amount of seventeen thousand to traffic between Peru and England, France and the United States.⁴⁵

Lack of space precludes any detailed discussion of other phases of Peru's relation to the war. It may merely be noted that the Peruvian people, within the measures of their capacity, were exceptionally liberal in the support of the Red Cross and other agencies designed to mitigate the sufferings caused by the war.⁴⁶ And as the end of the great contest approached, the enthusiasm of all classes of the people steadily mounted, while the celebration of the armistice was carried out in Lima with a fervor surpassed in none of the other South American capitals.

⁴⁴ Text of Law, *ibid.*, p. 407.

⁴⁵ The contract is given in the *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, año XIV, No. IV, pp. 295-306. It is reproduced *in extenso* in Lavalle, pp. 409, 425. The protests of the Spanish minister and the replies of Sr. Tudela will be found in Lavalle, p. 426 ff.

⁴⁶ Cf. Lavalle, pp. 201, 439.

CHAPTER VII

COLOMBIA AND THE WAR

Of the South American republics which remained neutral during the Great War next to Argentina and Chile the republic of Colombia offers the greatest interest to the student of diplomacy and international relations. As the northernmost of the countries of the continent, fronting both the Pacific and the Caribbean, neighbor to the republic of Panama with the strategically vital Canal Zone, her attitude towards the war and especially towards the problems of neutrality was a matter of anxious interest to both groups of belligerents.

As long as the United States remained neutral the status of Colombia did not differ materially from that of a number of other Spanish American republics. A majority of the intellectual classes, particularly in the capital, Bogotá, were partizans of the Allies. Colombian intellectuals were quick to recognize their cultural debts to France.¹ Of Colombia's distinguished sons who whole-heartedly championed the allied cause may be singled out for special mention Dr. Santiago Pérez Triana, man of letters and diplomat, minister of Colombia to Great Britain from 1909 to 1910, delegate to the Second Hague Conference, and editor of the review

¹ Cf. the article by Dr. Henríquez de Zubiria, "La Colombie et la France," in *Voix de l'Amérique latine* (Paris, 1916), p. 44.

Hispania. In this publication and elsewhere he strove ceaselessly to further the cause of Great Britain, France and Belgium. The same fervent devotion to the ideals of the Allies appears in his book, *Some Aspects of the War*, published in London in 1915. His death in the following year robbed the Allies of one of their most doughty defenders.

Yet German propaganda and penetration, here as elsewhere, had in the years immediately preceding the war made considerable inroads. German capital had begun to enter the country in ever-growing volume and had found profitable investment in mining and agriculture. The *Compañía Hanseática del Río León*, for instance, which had embarked on the raising of bananas on a large scale, had secured a strong foothold on the Gulf of Darien, a position of immense strategic importance owing to its proximity to the Caribbean entrance to the Panama Canal and to the fact that it controls by Turbo the route to Antioquía leading to the center of Colombia.² As is well known, clerical influence is extremely strong in Colombia and those members of the clergy of ultramontane tendencies were almost solidly pro-German. On the other hand, the Archbishop of Bogotá, whose influence throughout the country is immense, was distinctly in favor of the Allies, and as will presently be pointed out, was partly responsible for the resolution passed by the Colombian Senate condemning the German system of submarine warfare. Finally it should be added that the Imperial government was fortunate during the whole course of

² Gaillard, p. 192.

the war to have as its representative at Bogotá, one of the most able and efficient members of its diplomatic service, Herr Kracker von Schwartzfeldt. This minister filled a rather trying position with consummate suavity and tact; he was a past master in flattering the *amour-propre* of the Colombians,³ and was lucky enough to escape any diplomatic controversy with the Bogotá foreign office until the very end of the war. The minister of France, on the other hand, M. Raphaël Le Brun, was a somewhat choleric person who repeatedly found himself involved in disputes and controversies with private individuals or with the Colombian government.⁴ He was eventually obliged to leave his post under circumstances which could only be characterized as unfortunate.

The outbreak of the war synchronized with a change of the executive in Colombia. On August 7, 1914, Dr. José Vicente Concha, as president-elect, succeeded Dr. Carlos E. Restrepo. President Concha appointed to the all-important post of minister of foreign affairs, Sr. Marco Fidel Suárez, who was to be elected in 1918 chief executive of the republic. Sr. Suárez is regarded

³ On the occasion of an earthquake in the Department of Cundinamarca in 1917, Herr Kracker hastened to contribute a thousand gold pesos for the relief of the sufferers, an act duplicated by none of the other foreign legations. República de Colombia. *Informe del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores al Congreso de 1918* (Bogotá, 1918), p. 83. (Hereafter cited as *Informe . . . de 1918*.)

⁴ Carlos Adolfo Ureta, "La América Latina en la Guerra Mundial; Colombia," in *La Revista del Mundo* (New York), June 1920, p. 92.

both within and without Colombia as a distinguished authority on international relations and international law. He entered upon his task with exceptional equipment and preparation as he had served in the same capacity during several previous administrations.

Both the president and the minister of foreign affairs were convinced that the most pressing and imperious obligation devolving upon Colombia as a result of the outbreak of the great war was the maintenance of a loyal and scrupulous neutrality. As early as August 13, 1914, the government issued a decree relative to the supplies which might be furnished the ships of belligerent powers touching at Colombian ports. The procedure to be followed was that adopted by Colombia during the War of the Pacific and the Spanish-American War and harmonized with that generally adopted by the other neutral powers.⁹ But Colombia was soon forced to cope with a problem for whose solution there were no adequate precedents: The possibility of violation of neutrality through the improper use of wireless apparatus either installed in permanent stations on the mainland or found on ships anchored in Colombian ports.

Colombia, like Chile, had through her representatives subscribed to the convention dealing with the rights and obligations of neutrals drawn up at the Second Hague Conference, but this convention had not

⁹ República de Colombia. *Informe del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores al Congreso de 1915*, p. 35 (Hereafter cited, *Informe . . . de 1915*) ; Naval War College, *International Law Topics*, 1916, pp. 35-36.

been formally ratified by the Colombian Senate. None the less, since "these dispositions . . . form a true doctrine, entitled to respect both because of its origin and its obvious justification" the minister of foreign affairs on August 22, 1914, issued a decree requiring all port authorities to notify ships of belligerent nations to dismantle their radio apparatus during their sojourn in Colombian waters. By the same decree no provision might be made for converting merchant ships into vessels of war on the high seas.⁶

There still existed, however, possibilities of serious complications through the clandestine or unauthorized use of a number of wireless stations erected at various points on or near the coast line. Of these stations two were of particular importance: That of Cartagena and that of Santa Marta. The former belonged to a German company, the *Gesellschaft für Drahtlose Telegraphie* of Berlin. On the outbreak of the war it had been in operation two years and was an exceptionally high-powered station with a sending radius of two thousand miles. It was chiefly engaged in commercial work for the numerous German firms in Colombia and neighboring countries. The latter station was the property of the United Fruit Company. On September 1, 1914, the government issued a decree⁷ which forbade

⁶ República de Colombia. *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, t. VII, Nos. 8-10 (August-December, 1914), p. 72. (Hereafter cited as *Boletín de Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1914*), English translation in Naval War College, *Topics, 1916*, pp. 35-36.

⁷ *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1914*, pp. 73-74. *International Law Topics, 1916*, pp. 37-38.

the use of these wireless stations, except under "the supervision and censorship of the authorities of Santa Marta and Cartagena in order that communications which may be considered of a military character or which may favor warlike operations may not be transmitted." An additional decree was issued on September 11, 1914,⁸ temporarily closing the Cartagena wireless station. The reasons assigned for this act were the inability to secure the services of a satisfactory expert to serve as censor and the "complaints and reclamations founded on the supposition that the radio company has disregarded the neutrality of the republic in the war carried on by the various states." The Bogotá foreign office published no further information regarding these complaints but it is reasonable to assume that they emanated from Great Britain and dealt with alleged communications with German warships operating in or near American waters. But on October 5 the Cartagena station was reopened, the Colombian government having secured the services of Dr. Jorge Caicedo Abadia, an expert, capable of censoring the messages.⁹

The reopening of the Cartagena station gave rise to a protracted controversy between the British and Colombian governments. It would seem that the suspicions of Great Britain were first aroused by the alleged interception by the Royal Mail steamer *Tagus*

⁸ *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, 1914, pp. 74-75. *International Law Topics*, 1916, pp. 38-39.

⁹ *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, 1914, pp. 75-76.

of secret messages from an unknown source, but supposed to be the Cartagena station.¹⁰ Captain Gaunt, the British naval attaché at Washington, was ordered by his government late in September to inspect this plant. He reported that while the station was nominally subjected to censorship it was in reality completely under German influence, and he particularly stressed the fact that none of the German employees had been removed from the premises."¹¹ Influenced probably by the reports of Captain Gaunt, the British government through the British legation at Bogotá demanded that the station be closed on the ground that similar action had been taken in the United States in regard to the wireless station at Sayville. This request was denied by Colombia, the minister of foreign affairs pertinently observing that the British government was in error as the Sayville plant continued to function under proper censorship. A little later the British chargé d'affaires renewed his demand, this time on the grounds that the Colombian censorship, even though honestly admin-

¹⁰ The charges of the British authorities in regard to the intercepted message seemed to have been based on a misapprehension. In a deposition made by Captain Morrison of the *Tagus* to the governor of Cartagena on October 24 there is nothing to indicate the the messages picked up by the *Tagus* emanated from the Cartagena station. Ramón Rodríguez Diago, governor of Cartagena, to Marco Fidel Suárez, October 25, 1914, *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, 1914, pp. 87-88.

¹¹ Captain Gaunt's dispatches have not been published but their general tenor is made clear in the note of Sr. Suárez to Mr. Bowle (British chargé d'affaires at Bogotá), November 3, 1914. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

istered might prove ineffectual, as apparently innocent dispatches might be in reality coded messages of importance. Sr. Suárez quite properly rejoined that if the procedure urged by Great Britain were followed it would result in the cessation of all telegraphic communication, both by cable and wireless.¹²

The British authorities refused to regard the incident as closed. On November 7, 1914, they appealed to the good offices of the United States government, asking it to use its influence at Bogotá "to secure a more correct observance of the obligations of Colombian neutrality, and stating that in the event of Colombia continuing in her existing attitude, the Allies might be obliged to take such measures as they deemed necessary to their interests."¹³ It appears also that a request of similar tenor was made by the government of France.¹⁴ The department of state of the United States accepted this somewhat ungrateful task, but in its communications with the Bogotá foreign office made it perfectly clear that the United States had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Colombia

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

¹³ Statement in the British Parliament by Mr. C. H. Roberts in answer to questions put by the Earl of Ronaldshay, *Times* (London), November 26, 1921. The correspondence between the British and the United States governments on this subject has not been published. Interesting editorial comments on this *démarche* may be found in the *New York Times* for November 27, 1921.

¹⁴ Leland Harrison (United States secretary of legation at Bogotá) to Marco Fidel Suárez, November 19, 1921. *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, 1914, pp. 105-106.

and that any pressure which might be exerted would be purely moral. It would seem as a matter of fact that the "good offices" of the United States did not go further than the request that the Colombian government furnish the state department with information regarding the condition of the Cartagena station.¹⁵

The Colombian government vigorously denied that its conduct had given Great Britain or France any legitimate ground for complaint and it naturally resented the appeal to the United States by these powers.¹⁶ None the less orders were sent to the governor of Cartagena to remove all German operators and assistants from the radio station. Such messages as were sent were dispatched by the Colombian censor, Dr. Caicedo.¹⁷ In ordering the removal of the German employees the Colombian government made it clear that it was following the precedent set by the United States. Finally on December 5, 1914, the government issued a decree definitely closing the Cartagena station for the duration of the war.¹⁸ This was done with the full consent and approval of the German minister and the company agreed to waive all claims for damages.

There yet remained the possibility that the station though nominally closed, might still be used for the

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Cf. the cablegram of protest, dated November 27, 1921, sent by the Bogotá foreign office to the Colombian legation in London. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

¹⁷ Marco Fidel Suárez to governor of Cartagena, *Ibid.*, p. 106. (This dispatch is not dated but it was sent late in November 1914.)

¹⁸ *Informe . . . de 1915*, p. 116; *International Law Topics*, 1916, pp. 42-44.

surreptitious dispatch of messages. In order therefore to remove all possible grounds of suspicion the Colombian authorities appealed to the United States to assign a naval officer to make an investigation of the plant at Cartagena. This request was granted; Lieutenant Raguet, after a careful examination declared that the Cartagena station could neither receive nor send messages. The allied ministers at Bogotá expressed their satisfaction at the zeal shown by the Colombian authorities and the incident was regarded as closed.¹⁹

The other important radio station, that of Santa Marta, gave rise to no diplomatic complications. No effort was made to close this plant; even after the United States entered the war it continued to function, being subjected to a more or less nominal inspection by the Colombian authorities. No reasons are assigned by the minister of foreign affairs in his reports for this preferential treatment accorded the American company. One can only conjecture that the attitude of

¹⁹ *Informe . . . de 1916*, pp. 45, 46, III, 144. On April 8, 1916, the British foreign office at the direct instance of Sir Edward Grey informed the Colombian minister at London, Dr. Ignacio Gutiérrez Ponce, that "His Majesty's government . . . are satisfied that the Colombian government has had on every occasion the genuine desire to observe strictly its obligations as a neutral power in the present war and gladly recognize that the methods which up to the present have been employed to inspect the use of the wireless telegraph will offer an adequate guarantee . . . that the interests of this country will not suffer because of any abuse of such methods of communication." *Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, 1916, pp. 126-127.

the Colombian government was dictated by a number of motives, of which the chief was a benevolent neutrality in favor of the United States and the Allies. The absence of all protests on the part of the Allies prior to 1917 or of the German Legation during the whole course of the war was doubtless another factor. The silence of the German minister is possibly to be explained through his desire not to create embarrassing complications for the Colombian authorities with whom he was most anxious, as we have seen, to remain *persona grata*.²⁰

In addition to these wireless plants belonging to two foreign companies were three others, located respectively on the Island of San Andrés, at Arauca and at Orocuo. The first of these was dismantled, part of the apparatus being carried to the mainland; the other two had not been completed when the war broke out. Rumors were also rife that there existed a number of private plants, scattered along the coast, or secreted in inaccessible places, which might escape the vigilance of the inspection of the government. In their anxiety to omit no act which might further the loyal observance of neutrality the Colombian authorities appealed through the Spanish Legation to the government at Madrid for the loan of an officer of the Spanish army who was an expert in radio telegraphy. After some negotiation, late in 1917, a contract was entered

²⁰ Reference to the continuous operation of the Santa Marta plant is found in the *Informe del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de 1917*, Circular of April 25, p. 112. Cf. also Ureta, *loc. cit.*

into with Captain Carlos Boreus Gómez, who formally entered the employ of the Colombian government and during the remainder of the war was attached to the commissions detailed to inspect the stations under government supervision and to carry on a diligent search for illegal and clandestine plants.²¹ A careful examination of the methods pursued by the Colombian authorities reveals no foundation for the oft-repeated charge that in the matter of wireless communication the government had been negligent in enforcing neutrality.

A subject which caused the Colombian foreign office almost as much anxiety as the possible improper use of radio stations was the inconsiderate utterances of certain newspapers. Legislation regarding freedom of speech and press was extremely liberal in character²² and within the latitude permitted by the law certain editors and contributors launched attacks of great violence against the various belligerents. The Bogotá foreign office again and again sent circulars to the governors of the departments and letters to the editors of newspapers and periodicals exhorting them to moderation. Thus in a circular sent out on November 27, 1914, the minister of foreign affairs was at pains to emphasize the rôle which the press should play in the maintenance of neutrality:

“The duties of neutrality devolve primarily on governments, their agents, their armed forces; but merely

²¹ *Informe . . . de 1917*, p. 188; *Idem de 1918*, p. 88.

²² A summary of the legislation on this subject is given in *Informe . . . de 1918*, p. 166 ff.

on this account it is not to be assumed that the civil society, that is the people, as represented in individuals and associations, is exempt from this kind of obligation. . . . The absolute freedom of the press does not mean the absence of duties or responsibilities. To say that in all that affects neutrality the exercise of the qualities of veracity and benevolence is incumbent on all organs of publicity, merely means that such practices are beginning to be recognized as incumbent upon civilized nations; and if international law forms part of the legislation of every people, it is an obvious corollary that even the freest press must be subject to these restrictions.

“The acceptance of this doctrine does not imply that neutrality cannot exist without the expressions of sympathy. This latter quality is just, and even necessary, since a state of absolute indifference is impossible. But sympathies and antipathies may express themselves in the rational form of truth, in the respectful form of courtesy and in the Christian form of benevolence.”²³

At various times the Colombian government had occasion to use its efforts to moderate the ardor of certain of the more violent partizans of the two groups of belligerents. The official records would seem to show that German propagandists were the most frequent offenders against these canons of good taste and international amity. A periodical entitled *Germania*, published in Bogotá, and edited by one Frasen, passed beyond all bounds of moderation in its attacks on the Allies, and especially on Italy and the dynasty of Savoy. The allusions to the reigning Italian house were in fact so scurrilous that the Italian minister,

²³ *Informe . . . de 1915*, p. 119 ff. *International Law Topics*, 1916, pp. 69, 421. Cf. Ureta, p. 92.

Marquis de la Penne, lodged formal complaint with the Bogotá foreign office. The minister of foreign affairs bestirred himself, with the result that in October 1917 the editor, Frasen, formally promised to cease the publication of these offensive articles. But on November 23 of the same year appeared an article, "Actual guerra europea, 1914-1917," in which the attacks on the Savoy dynasty were even more unrestrained. In his complaint the Italian minister pointed out that according to his investigations the author of the article in question was a Spanish priest, José de la Casa Ros.²⁴

There is no evidence that any legal steps were taken to suppress the *Germania*, but the absence of any further complaints on the part of the Italian minister would seem to indicate that the government had exerted effective pressure on the editor of the offending sheet.

An incident of a somewhat different character grew out of the attacks on the Allies and the United States by the daily paper *Transoceán* edited by one Francisco José Arevalo. This paper existed chiefly as a mouth-piece of German propaganda and was designed to play in Colombia a rôle analogous to that filled by *La Unión* in Argentina. It was almost certainly in receipt of a subsidy on the part of the German government; in fact so little effort was made to conceal its affiliations that it was published in the building occupied by the German legation.²⁵ As a result of informal complaints from the

²⁴ *Informe . . . de 1917*, p 214; *idem de 1918*, pp 121-123.

²⁵ *Informe . . . de 1918*, pp. 85-86.

United States and Cuban legations, the Colombian minister of foreign affairs not only induced the editor to soften the tone of the paper, but also to remove it from the premises of the German legation. This latter demand was justified on the basis of existing treaties between Colombia and Germany.²⁰

Colombia did not aspire to play the rôle of a mere passive neutral in the great war. She shared the belief harbored by a number of the other American republics early in the struggle that through some kind of concerted action the neutral powers, at least of the New World, might more efficaciously safeguard their neutrality, escape some of the less immediate effects of the war, and possibly attenuate its rigors. During the course of our study attention has been drawn or will be drawn to projects originating with the foreign offices of Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Argentina tending in this direction. During the month of February 1917 the first three of these republics offered proposals for common action, although the suggestions of Mexico departed widely from those of Bolivia and Ecuador. The gist of the Mexican project was the offer of media-

²⁰ The German writer, Alfredo Hartwig, declared that next to Mexico Colombia had the greatest reason to desire the triumph of Germany. "It is no wonder that this country publishes with satisfaction the communications of the German general staff and that even the simple Indian population listens to the illuminating reports from Germany when they are publicly read on the market place. The progress of the German offensive was greeted with the greatest joy. "Die politische Stellungnahme der Südamerikanischen Staaten im Weltkrieg," *Deutsche Rundschau*, December, 1917, p. 345.

tion by the neutral powers, to be followed, in the event of its refusal, by an absolute embargo on all goods sent to the belligerent countries. Bolivia and Ecuador limited their proposals to the assembly of American neutrals in Buenos Aires or Montevideo, preferably the latter capital.²⁷

The Colombian foreign office made a practically identical reply to all three of these countries, suggesting that the best means of converting these aspirations into realities would be "to authorize the Ecuadorian, Bolivian, and Mexican legations accredited at Washington, first to discuss these matters privately among themselves with a view to extending these private conferences to the legations of the other neutral states accredited at Washington, after which, should it prove feasible, plans should be made in agreement with the governments concerned for an international conference which could meet in Uruguay, and whose program should include the topics broached by the communications from Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico, and perhaps others germane to the purpose of the conference."²⁸

But as has already been pointed out the whole question of a congress of neutrals took on another aspect when the United States abandoned neutrality. The severance of diplomatic relations by the government at Washington rendered the likelihood of any concerted

²⁷ The negotiations with Bolivia are found in the *Informe . . . de 1917*, pp. 18-21; with Ecuador, pp. 56-57; with Mexico, pp. 121-122.

²⁸ Marco Fidel Suárez to Plácido Sánchez, Bolivian minister of foreign affairs, February 28, 1917. *Informe . . . de 1917*, p. 20.

action extremely slight; the entrance of the United States into the war completely shattered it. The Colombian government was quick to realize that these momentous events would color the attitude of the United States towards any kind of American conference, particularly one participated in by only a fraction of the American republics. It therefore viewed with coldness the overtures from Argentina and as has already been pointed out was one of the few Spanish American republics which declined to have anything to do with the projects sponsored by President Irigoyen and his minister of foreign affairs, Sr. Pueyrredón. "Hence the proposals formulated, considered or transmitted by Argentina, both in respect to a congress in favor of peace as well as a conference of neutrals," wrote the Colombian minister of foreign affairs, "could not be practically seconded by the government of the republic."²⁹

The anxiety of Colombia to avoid every act which might lead to the charge that her conduct was unneutral appears in various other ways. At the outbreak of the war Colombia had been negotiating with the government of Switzerland for the dispatch to Bogotá of a Swiss military mission. As the time arrived for the departure of this mission from Berne protests were made by the United States, France and England against its personnel. It was alleged that at least two of the officers who headed the mission, Colonel Spycher and

²⁹ Statement of Minister Suárez in *Informe . . . de 1917*, p. 10.

Major Hug—particularly the former—were fanatically pro-German; it was also charged that the Colombian minister in Switzerland, through whose hands the negotiations passed, labored under the same disadvantages. The Colombian government was placed in a very embarrassing position as these three officers had been selected by the Swiss government itself. But after a great deal of negotiation, and many violent polemics in the press, the Colombian government reached a *modus vivendi* with the Swiss foreign office according to which the dispatch of the mission was to be indefinitely postponed. As to the charge that the Colombian minister in Berne was pro-German the Bogotá foreign office published from this official, Dr. José María Quijano Wallis, an excerpt from a letter to President Concha which left no doubt as to his real sentiments:

“When it was learned here that Germany had decreed a submarine blockade without any restrictions and had invested it with the character of a war to the death against belligerents and neutrals, a cry of indignation arose against this barbarous procedure which would cause Christian civilization to go back fifteen centuries. . . .

“In the presence of this movement . . . we thought we should inform you of the unanimous reprobation against this savage blockade in order that you might have the greatest number of data in order to form an opinion on this important affair; we even consider proper to ask instructions from the foreign office on the attitude which the representative of Colombia should observe relative to the situation created by the blockade.”³⁰

³⁰ J. M. Quijano Wallis to Marco Fidel Suárez, February 22, 1917. *Ibid.*, p. 225; cf. p. 22 ff.

As was to be anticipated, the difficulties of Colombia's relations to the various belligerents became greatly aggravated as a result of the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare. In reply to the official notification delivered by von Schwartzfeldt on February 8, 1917,³¹ the minister of foreign affairs under date of February 16 declared that the methods proposed by Germany were in his judgment calculated to aggravate the horrors and sufferings of the war rather than to mitigate them. He ends with the statement:

"As for the effects which in determined cases these methods and practices may have upon the rights of Colombia, her government reserves the right to protest against them and demand the justice which may be due her."³²

In pro-Allied circles throughout the republic the indignation evoked by the German submarine campaign, particularly after its ruthlessness and cruelty became manifest, grew increasingly intense. The more independent and intelligent section of the Colombian press began to urge an open declaration of sympathy with the Allies, or at least an expression of disapproval of the policy of Germany. This agitation received the support of the Archbishop of Bogotá, who wielded an immense influence throughout the country. Despite the exertions of the more ultramontane elements among the clergy, despite the clever exploitation by the German propagandists of the feeling of bitterness against the United States, a resolution of censure was introduced

³¹ Scharzenfeldt to Suárez, February 8, 1917. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

³² Suárez to Schwarzenfeldt, February 16, 1917. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

into the Senate by General Holguin, and after a somewhat stormy discussion was unanimously carried on October 17, 1917. The text of this resolution is as follows:

“WHEREAS, The use of submarines against all kinds of merchant vessels or warships, whether neutral or belligerent, without any discrimination, is a practice contrary to international law, and so qualified not only by the government of Colombia, but by other neutral governments. Now, therefore, the Senate of Colombia protests against the aforesaid practice.

“It is of the opinion that the submarines of the nations which use them, as above stated, should not receive the same treatment as warships which follow the rules of international law. The Senate of the republic, therefore, believes that they should not be admitted into the ports and other jurisdictional waters of the republic, and that the nation should observe regarding those vessels the same conduct observed at the present time by other neutral governments; such conduct is based on a sense of prudence and international safety.”³³

This sentiment of reprobation against the methods employed by the German government had as its counterpart a growing admiration for France and the achievements of French arms. And on the occasion of France's national holiday in 1918, when the tide of German invasion which had threatened to engulf Paris began to recede under the onslaughts of the Allied army the Colombian Congress passed the following resolution:

“The Senate of Colombia sends greetings to the French Republic and offers its homage of admiration

³³ John Barrett and Benito Javier Pérez-Verdía, *Latin-America and the War* (Washington, 1919), p. 13.

and sympathy and joins in France's rejoicing on the date of her national anniversary, which awakens glorious memories for all the democratic peoples of the world.

"The Senate recalls with satisfaction the influence French thought has had in the national life of Colombia, and also remembers the traditional ties binding the Republic of Colombia and France, and expresses its wishes that such bonds should become ever stronger, based on common ideals of liberty and justice."³⁴

If the sentiment of the majority of the Colombian people notwithstanding the inroads of German propaganda was one of sympathy with, and admiration for, the cause of France, and to a somewhat less extent, that of Great Britain, the same could not be said of Colombia's attitude towards the United States. The entrance of the United States into the war was the occasion of a flood of commentaries which in many cases were far from flattering. It will be recalled that the treaty of April 6, 1914, which in the opinion of the Colombians was a belated and partial compensation for, and recognition of, the loss suffered by the violent separation of Panama in 1903, was still unratified by the United States Congress. It is a not unreasonable assumption that had this breach been healed Colombia would have frankly aligned herself with the other Spanish-American republics who showed their solidarity with the United States, at least to the extent of severing diplomatic relations with Germany. Instead we find that a few days after the declaration of war by the Congress of Washington the following telegram was sent from Bogotá to the Associated Press of the United

³⁴ *Ibid.*

States and signed by the following organs of the Colombian press: *El Nuevo Tiempo*, *La Sociedad*, *La Patria*, *Gil Blas*, *Gaceta Republicana*, *El Diario Nacional*, *El Espectador*, *La Tribuna de Sur América* and *La República*:

"The Colombian Press, by reason of the indefinite adjournment of the ratification of the treaty between the United States and Colombia, insists upon the necessity of Colombia's withdrawal from the Pan American Union." ³⁵

It would be a mistake to assume, however, that such resentment against the United States as appeared at this time was due entirely to the sense of injury growing out of the train of events leading to the creation of the republic of Panama or the failure to ratify the treaty of 1914. Popular opinion as voiced in the Colombian press was inflamed by the statements repeatedly made by certain newspapers of the United States, more especially by the Hearst press headed by the *New York American*, that there existed a secret alliance between the German Empire and Colombia, and that the latter country would afford Germany bases of attack, chiefly by submarines, against the United States. The effect of these statements, reprinted by the Colombian press and exploited by the newspapers hostile to the government, may be gauged by a few excerpts from a circular telegram sent by the minister of foreign affairs on March 30, 1917, to the governors of all the departments:

"The accounts which certain North American periodicals, especially the *New York American*, give of the existence of an alliance between Colombia and Germany

³⁵ Gaillard, p. 195.

are absolutely false. This categorical declaration has been made by the government of Colombia to that of the United States directly by means of our legation in Washington and the North American legation in Bogotá, and also through the intermediary of the French and British legations in Colombia. The government is aware that the government of the United States has taken note of this declaration and is persuaded of the falsity of such accounts; hence it considers that there is not the least foundation for the alarming rumor, published also by the press, that the United States is preparing hostile measures against Colombia under the pretext of the supposed alliance.”³⁶

At the same time the belief gained wide currency that the United States had actually disembarked troops at various points on Colombian territory, particularly in the region about Uraba and on the island of San Andrés de Providencia. The government was besieged with telegrams from officers of those sections of the Colombian army which were stationed near the Panama frontier demanding verification of these rumors and asking instructions.³⁷ On two occasions, on March 8 and April 13, 1917, the Colombian minister at Washington formally demanded from Secretary Lansing an investigation of these rumors. In his reply dated April

³⁶ *Informe . . . de 1917*, p. 104. The rumors of this alleged alliance attained such proportions that the British minister Wyndham and the French minister Le Brun felt called upon to inform their respective embassies at Washington that such rumors were utterly without foundation. The note of M. Le Brun to Sr. Suárez, dated March 12, 1917, recording the action of the French minister is published in the *Informe . . . de 1917*, p. 199.

³⁷ A number of such telegrams are given in the *Informe . . . de 1917*, pp. 107-III.

17 the secretary of state declared that after communicating with the American agents in Panama he could state "that no American force has disembarked on Colombian territory."³⁸

To the credit of the government of Colombia it should be made clear that throughout this trying period it acted with tact, circumspection and dignity. A circular letter sent out by Sr. Suárez to the editors of the daily and periodical press of the republic on March 31, enjoined upon them moderation and calmness in treating Colombia's international position and particularly her relations with the United States. The editors were urged not to forget that hostile and even insulting references to Colombia published abroad were for the most part the work of the enemies or detractors of the republic; "that the present government at Washington has given and continues to give solemn and indubitable proofs of its most just intentions in favor of our rights and of the decorous friendship of the two nations"; finally that the "President of Colombia, by means of this ministry and the legation at Washington neither reposes nor slumbers in his most scrupulous (*atentísima*) consideration of all matters affecting our relations with the United States, exercising a ceaseless vigilance in the protection of the honor and interests of Colombia. . . . On this important subject and in these delicate circumstances the president endeavors to act as if he were in the presence both of the nation (*la patria*) and of posterity, in order that at no time, either now or in the future, can he be taxed in the

³⁸ Lansing to Betancourt, April 17, 1917, *Ibid.*, p. 103.

performance of his duties with negligence or weakness, imprudence or indiscretion.”⁸⁹

Finally, the best proof of the firmness and dignity maintained by the Colombian government and of the groundlessness of the charges that it was subject to German influences appears in the circular of Sr. Suárez to the governors of the departments dispatched three days after the entry of the United States into the war. Though in point of form a communication from the ministry of foreign affairs it was in effect a presidential message to the nation at large:

“By order of the president of the republic, I desire to call your attention to the necessity of bringing it about, by all the prudent means at your disposal, that public opinion and its principal organ, the press, observe a most correct and discreet attitude, particularly in regard to the neutrality of Colombia and the negotiations still pending with the United States.

“The Colombian legation at Washington and many eminent Colombians residing in the United States are appealing to the government and the press in this particular regard. They patriotically warn us that the success of these negotiations, the efficacy of our neutrality, and even the future of Colombia may depend in these critical moments on the manner, wise and prudent, or imprudent and incorrect, with which the public and the press regard the course of world events and their relation to our country.

“Let us not forget that right is the brother of moderation, that the most just demand is compatible with courtesy, and that the dignity of a defense is in direct ratio to the strength of the cause defended. Let us not forget that the action and circumspection of the government demand as their basis and prerequisites an

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

opinion manifested with tact and a patriotism serene and dignified. Nor should we forget that if in the United States there are public men capable of persecuting Colombia with persistent injustice, likewise there have always been, are, and will be honorable men (*varones consulares del honor*) who will not hesitate in their defense and recognition of all that is true and just.

"We should be guilty of sophistry and prejudice were we to generalize and extend to a whole people and to an honorable government the errors and injustices committed by a few men or based on tendencies which are only ephemeral."⁴⁰

Not all of the attacks on Colombia's alleged violation of neutrality in favor of Germany originated in the United States. In England the *London Times* and the *South American Journal* were the mouth-pieces of such accusations. The latter quoted with apparent approval a speech attributed to Senator Lodge in which the charge was made that Colombia's neutrality was deceptive and that the Colombian government harbored the idea of offering its ports to German submarines in order that they might prey upon American shipping and thus force the United States to ratify the Treaty of 1914. The Colombian minister at London, Sr. I. Gutiérrez Ponce felt it necessary publically to refute these calumnies.⁴¹ A flagrant instance of injustice done Colombia by the *London Times* was the statement made in the *Times History of the War*:

"In Colombia the services of one Haines, an Irish rebel, were enlisted to take command of a bucaneeering

⁴⁰ *Informe . . . de 1917*, p. 106.

⁴¹ *Informe . . . de 1917*, p. 211.

expedition, which equipped two coastguard vessels with German crews at Puerto Colombia.”⁴²

In a note to Sr. Gutiérrez Ponce, dealing with this assertion, the acting minister of foreign affairs declared that “everything in this paragraph is absolutely false (*perfectamente falso*) ;” and he pertinently adds that if the charge had harbored even a modicum of truth it would have properly formed the basis of a complaint by the British minister at Bogotá.⁴³

In January 1918 the Colombian legation in Ecuador informed the Bogotá foreign office “that according to trustworthy information received in some diplomatic circles of Quito” news had leaked out regarding a secret alliance or agreement between Colombia and Mexico and Venezuela for the purpose of prejudicing a group of belligerents integrated by the North American Confederation.” The Bogotá foreign office considered this canard of sufficient importance to bring it officially to the attention of both the United States and the Ecuadorian governments. The state department at Washington declared that it was ignorant of such rumors, but that in any case it would have accorded them no credit, as it had absolute confidence in the loyalty of the government of Colombia. An analogous reply was received from the Ecuadorian chancellery.⁴⁴

⁴² *The Times History of the War*, Vol. XV, Chap. ccxxii, p. 19. (London, 1918.)

⁴³ Pedro Antonio Molina (acting minister of foreign affairs) to I. Gutiérrez Ponce (date not given). *Informe . . . de 1918*, p. 120.

⁴⁴ *Informe de 1918*, p. 43.

Up to the very eve of the Peace Conference the Colombian government had to cope with this insidious propaganda. On January 27, 1919, the acting minister of foreign affairs Pedro Antonio Molina, in a circular letter to the governors of the departments felt it necessary to call their attention to the charge that Colombia would be accused before the Peace Conference of having permitted certain of the islands off her coast to be used as a basis for supplies by one of the belligerents. Sr. Molina once more emphasized the fact that neither this nor similar rumors had the slightest justification.

The incidents just cited serve to indicate the extremely difficult and trying situation Colombia had to face during the entire course of the war. To a greater extent than any other of the Hispanic American republics she was the object of a systematic and often malevolent campaign to distort her neutrality into an attitude distinctly favorable to Germany. That pro-German influences in Colombia were strong admits of no doubt, although the sympathies of the majority of the cultured classes inclined towards the Entente and especially towards France. That there was, in certain quarters, a violent antipathy to the United States due to a smoldering resentment over the severance of Panama, a resentment heightened by the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the treaty of 1914, and fanned into flame by the ill-tempered and even insulting utterances of a section of the American press and the statements of certain of our public men, it would be idle to deny. But when the official acts of the government are

subjected to the most careful and exhaustive scrutiny they fail to show the slightest bias in favor of the Central Powers. Were the neutrality of Colombia to be subjected to any qualification, it would be in the shape of a recognition that within such latitude as the accepted precepts of international law permitted, Colombia adopted an attitude of distinct benevolence towards the Allies.⁴⁵ The impartial and unprejudiced investigator can arrive at only one conclusion: The government of Colombia from the beginning to the end of the war had as the sole criterion of its policy a loyal and scrupulous neutrality.

⁴⁵ In addition to the instances already noted, especially in reference to the press and to radio communications, may be cited the suspension in 1917 of Colombian consular agencies which had been entrusted to foreigners who were subjects of nations with which Great Britain was at war. (*Informe . . . de 1917*, p. 205).

CHAPTER VIII

THE REMAINING SOUTH AMERICAN REPUBLICS AND THE WAR

I. ECUADOR

The republic of Ecuador is, with the exception of Uruguay and Paraguay, the smallest of the nations of South America. Her population is less than two million and her commerce in comparison with her sister Latin American republics, has attained to only very modest proportions.¹ European immigration had been almost negligible; European capital was only beginning to find lucrative employment on the outbreak of the war. Under these circumstances it might be supposed that Ecuador not only would have remained aloof from the struggle but also would have been comparatively little affected by the world catastrophe.

But such a supposition fails to take into account several factors of fundamental importance. Ecuador is located, so to speak, on the axis of the New World, fronting the Pacific and separated from the Panama canal only by a portion of the Colombian littoral. The possession of the Galápagos Islands, located in a strategic position in reference to the Panama Canal, and offering an excellent base for hostile naval operations,

¹ In 1913 the total foreign commerce of Ecuador was approximately \$30,000,000. *Ecuador. General descriptive data*, issued by the Pan American Union (Washington, 1919), p. 25.

early in the war complicated the difficulties of maintaining neutrality. Finally the adverse effects of the war on Ecuador's chief source of national income, the export of cacao, precipitated an economic crisis from which the country suffered during the whole period of hostilities.²

During the last two years of the war Ecuador had to grapple with a different set of problems. The inclusion of a portion of the New World within the theatre of hostilities forced her to define her attitude towards a policy of continental or American solidarity. The decision was adverse to Germany. During this same period the Berlin foreign office endeavored to foist upon Ecuador diplomatic envoys who were *personæ non gratae*, an act which aroused great resentment, and increased the tension between the two countries to the breaking point. Before the end of 1917 Ecuador was enrolled among the growing number of Latin American nations which had severed diplomatic relations with Germany.

From the very beginning of the war the majority of the small but cultured population of European extraction, in whose hands the destiny of the nation rested,

² In 1913 the value of the cacao exported amounted to something over ten million dollars or over two-thirds of the country's total exports. An excellent analysis of the effects of the war on the economic life of Ecuador is given by Dr. R. H. Elizalde (at present Ecuadorian minister at Santiago) in an article "Ecuador y la Guerra" in *La Revista del Mundo* (New York), May 1920; and Dr. Victor N. Rendón (ex-Ecuadorian minister to France), "La Vie économique, commercial et financière de l'Equateur pendant la guerre," *France-Amérique*, May 1919.

was pro-Ally in sentiment.³ Here the Ecuadorians were subject to the same influences as operated in most of the other Latin American republics. Yet it would be a mistake to minimize the inroads made by German influence in the years immediately preceding the catastrophe. Much of the commerce of the port of Guayaquil passed through German houses. A number of excellent teachers, contracted for by the government, had given an impetus to the recent educational progress of the republic. The ministry of the interior and public works and the ministry of public instruction each had a German technical advisor.⁴ German capital had begun to seek profitable investment in railway extension and other public works. Construction of the important line from Simbambe to Cuenca had been awarded to Orenstein and Koppel.⁵ The Ecuadorian army had received a Prussian imprint through the employment of Chilean officers as instructors. Many members of the higher clergy, for reasons which have already been analyzed in the case of the Chilean hierarchy, were Germanophile in sympathy. Under such conditions the

³ A contrary impression is given by the Colombian writer, Sr. Enrique Pérez, who declared: "It probably surprised people in Great Britain to learn that during the war the vast majority of Ecuadorians were emphatically pro-German." "Britain and Latin America," *Sperling's Journal* (London), October 1918, p. 18.

⁴ In 1917 both of these experts were "released" on the request of the American minister.

⁵ This firm failed to live up to its contract, which was annulled by the government.

neutrality of the country seemed to many a foregone conclusion.

A number of diplomatic incidents which occurred during the first two years of the war resulted in serious tension between Ecuador and the countries of the Entente and greatly embarrassed the partisans of the Allies. The Ecuadorian government officially proclaimed its neutrality on August 17, 1914, at the same time declaring its intention to adhere to The Hague Convention of 1907, which had been approved but not ratified.⁶ This declaration of neutrality, the propriety of which was not open to question, was apparently taken amiss by the representatives of Great Britain and France at Quito,⁷ whose lack of tact was in striking contrast to the suavity of the German chargé d'affaires, Herr Heinrich Rohland. The Ecuadorian minister of foreign affairs, Dr. R. H. Elizalde, is disposed to find the real cause of the disagreeable incidents which shortly occurred in the inability of the representatives of the Entente to realize that Ecuador might remain neutral and at the same time retain diplomatic and social relations with the representative of Germany.⁸

⁶ *British and Foreign State Papers, 1914*, Vol. II, p. 816.

⁷ France was represented by a resident minister, M. Henri Francstel; Great Britain by a minister plenipotentiary, Mr. A. E. Rennie, who was also minister at Lima, where he resided, and by Mr. Lucien J. Jerome, who served in the dual capacity of chargé d'affaires at Quito and consul general at Guayaquil. It would seem that all the diplomatic negotiations between Ecuador and Great Britain, at this period, passed through the hands of Mr. Jerome.

⁸ R. H. Elizalde, "Ecuador y la Guerra," *La Revista del Mundo*, May 1920, p. 64.

In September 1914 there arrived at the Galápagos Islands the German cruiser *Leipzig*, the German transport *Maria* and the Norwegian bark *Kala*. On the basis of the investigations later conducted by the Ecuadorian authorities it appears that the cruiser remained in Ecuadorian waters some seventy-eight hours, taking on coal from the *Maria* and the *Kala*. The *Leipzig* also left on one of the islands of the archipelago the crew of a British ship which had been sunk some time previously. These men were sent by the local authorities to Guayaquil, whither they arrived on October 2. The governor of the province of Guayas immediately dispatched to the minister of foreign affairs a telegram informing him of the arrival of the British sailors, adding that "it is suspected (*según se sospecha*) that the German navy is attempting to utilize this archipelago as a base for its raids."⁹ Dr. Elizalde immediately communicated the substance of this telegram to Mr. Jerome, the British chargé d'affaires, adding that although the dispatch in question suggested merely the possibility of the use of the Galápagos as a base by the ships of the German navy, still should such suspicion be verified, the government would not fail to lodge the necessary protest with the Imperial German government.¹⁰ Mr.

⁹ Elizalde to Rohland, February 13, 1915. República del Ecuador. *Informe que el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores presenta á la Nación en 1915* (Quito, 1915), p. 303. (Hereafter these annual reports will be cited simply as *Informes* with the appropriate dates).

¹⁰ Such a protest was, in fact, lodged on February 13, 1915. *Ibid.*

Jerome, according to Dr. Elizalde, expressed himself as thoroughly satisfied with this explanation.¹¹ The event was to show that the British chargé d'affaires misunderstood or misinterpreted the statement of the Ecuadorian minister, as he subsequently stated categorically to his home government that Dr. Elizalde had informed him and his French colleague "that German warships had converted the Galápagos Islands, belonging to Ecuador, into a naval base."¹²

At the same time Mr. Jerome, and M. Francastel, the French minister, cabled their respective governments that the government of Ecuador had not exercised the necessary vigilance in controlling the radio station at Guayaquil.¹³ This statement had as little foundation as the preceding, according to Dr. Elizalde.¹⁴ The Ecuadorian minister explained that in October 1914 the British and French representatives had informed the Quito foreign office that the German chargé had been making improper use of the radio station at Guayaquil, adding that they were convinced that the Ecuadorian government had no knowledge of such abuse; at the same time they requested the authorities to take the necessary steps to prevent such incidents from occurring in the future. Not only was there no formal protest, but Messrs. Jerome and Francastel ex-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

¹² Statement made in the House of Commons, November 25, 1914. *The Times* (London), November 26, 1914.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Informe . . . de 1915*, p. 269.

pressly stated that they did not desire to carry the subject over into the field of diplomacy.¹⁵

The conduct of the representatives of France and Great Britain, after the assurances of Dr. Elizalde, is frankly inexplicable. On the basis of the available evidence—and all of the important documents from the Ecuadorian side have apparently been published—there is little reason to believe that the authorities of the republic were remiss in their duties, or failed to take such precautions as might reasonably be demanded.

The British government thought otherwise. The grievances of both Great Britain and France are set forth in the reply of Mr. C. H. Roberts on behalf of the ministry to the interpellation of Lord Ronaldshay in the British House of Commons on November 25, 1914. Mr. Roberts informed the House that the British and French governments had taken the unusual step of appealing to the United States to use its good offices to secure from Colombia a strict observance of neutrality. He then added:

"A similar communication was also made to the United States government in respect to Ecuador, the grounds of this being that the Ecuadorian minister of foreign affairs had himself informed Mr. Jerome . . . and his French colleague that German warships had converted the Galápagos Islands . . . into a naval base, and that the Ecuadorian government had failed to comply with the request of the British and French legations that proper control should be exercised over the

¹⁵ "No querían llevar el asunto al terreno diplomático." Circular letter sent to the diplomatic and consular agents accredited to Ecuador, by Dr. Elizalde, December 31, 1914. *Informe . . . de 1915*, p. 297.

wireless station at Guayaquil to prevent its use as an intelligence center for belligerents. Mr. Jerome and his French colleague were both of the opinion that further diplomatic protests to the Ecuadorian government would be useless, and his Majesty's government, not being prepared to acquiesce in the disregard of Ecuador's obligations of neutrality, judged it expedient to refer the matter to the United States government as explained above."¹⁶

On November 18, 1914, Mr. Charles S. Hartman, American minister at Quito, informed Dr. Elizalde that he had been commissioned by his government to perform this delicate task. He made it clear, however, that his activities "did not signify in any manner an act of control or intervention in matters within the exclusive competency of Ecuador."¹⁷

This action on the part of Great Britain and France caused surprise and resentment in Ecuador. It was felt that the whole unfortunate affair was the result of a misunderstanding for which the Ecuadorian foreign office was in no wise to blame. The representations made to their home governments by the British and French envoys were regarded as misleading and unfair and at the request of the government of Ecuador both envoys were subsequently transferred to other posts.¹⁸ That the governments of Great Britain and France should adopt the unusual course of appealing to the United States when they had their own representatives in Quito was construed as a gratuitous humiliation of

¹⁶ *The Times* (London), November 26, 1914.

¹⁷ *Informe . . . de 1915*, p. 292 ff.

¹⁸ M. Francastel was succeeded by M. Robert Beufve and Mr. Jerome by Mr. Hubert W. Wilson, *Ibid.*

a neutral and friendly power. These views were clearly and convincingly set forth in notes to Messrs. Hartman, Jerome and Francastel, dated November 21;¹⁹ and in two lengthy circular letters, the first, dated November 21, to the foreign offices of all of the American republics; the second dated December 31, to the diplomatic and consular representatives accredited to Ecuador.²⁰

In these communications Dr. Elizalde stated in the most positive terms that the government of Ecuador had no definite knowledge of any act which might be construed as an infringement of the neutrality of the republic, that a warship would promptly be dispatched to investigate the acts alleged to have been committed by the German fleet at the Galápagos Islands and that the government would not fail to make the necessary protests should such acts be proven; finally allusion was made to the painful impression caused by the appeal of Great Britain and France to the United States, a power in no way concerned in the existing controversy.

This correspondence apparently closed the episode, as no further protests were made by the British or French foreign office. The satisfactory termination of this incident was due in considerable part to the efforts of Sr. Dorn y de Alsúa, Ecuadorian minister in Paris,²¹ who did everything in his power to second

¹⁹ *Informe . . . de 1915*, pp. 292-294.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 294-304.

²¹ Sr. Dorn was accredited to both Great Britain and France, but resided in the latter country.

the efforts of Dr. Elizalde. Both verbally and in writing he endeavored to make clear to the Quai d'Orsay as well as to the British ambassador in Paris the efforts of Ecuador loyally to live up to her obligations as a neutral. In January 1915 M. Delcassé, the French minister of foreign affairs, informed Sr. Dorn that he considered the incident closed, adding that he recognized the perfect good faith with which Ecuador had acted throughout the controversy.²²

The government of Ecuador showed commendable zeal in removing all pretexts for further diplomatic protests. Shortly after the arrival at Guayaquil of the survivors of the British ship sunk by the *Leipzig* the authorities dispatched a commission to the Galápagos Islands, from whose report, presented early in January 1915, it developed that the *Leipzig* while engaged in taking coal from the *Maria* and *Kala* had as a matter of fact far outstayed her legal limit within Ecuadorian waters.²³ On February 13, 1915, the minister of foreign affairs duly protested to the German government against this violation of national sovereignty. It presently appeared, however, that Germany was not the sole offender in the violation of the twenty-four-hour rule. According to the complaint of the Quito foreign office the British transports *Dunraven* and *Bakedale* had remained at Guayaquil beyond the regu-

²² Dorn to Elizalde, Paris, May 5, 1915. *Informe . . . de 1915*, p. 331.

²³ Elizalde to Rohland, January 13, 1915. *Informe . . . de 1915*, p. 302, with the accompanying memorandum.

lation limit;²⁴ a similar charge was made in connection with the Japanese cruiser *Kurazama*, which was alleged to have stayed in the Gulf of Guayaquil, within Ecuadorian jurisdictional waters, from the 16th to the 19th of December 1914.²⁵ Protests were duly made to both the British and Japanese governments.

Warned by the difficulties encountered by Chile and Peru in dealing with merchant ships which sought to render aid to the warships of the belligerent powers, the Ecuadorian government on November 19 and 28 issued decrees forbidding the departure of any merchant ship from any harbor of the republic unless the port authorities had previously obtained full and official data regarding the nationality, the final destination, and the next port of call of such vessels. No ship

²⁴ *Ibid.* The replies to Sr. Elizalde's notes have never been published.

²⁵ Elizalde to Gonzalo S. Córdova (Ecuadorian minister at Washington), January 13, 1915, instructing him to protest through the Japanese embassy in the United States. *Ibid.* p. 303.

In connection with the protest to Great Britain an interesting problem developed. The Quito foreign office contended that the British ships which had remained over twenty-four hours in the so-called Canal de Jambelí, even if they were more than a maritime league from the shore, had infringed Ecuadorian sovereignty. Sr. Elizalde in developing this thesis cited the example of the Hudson, Chesapeake and Delaware bays. Sir Edward Grey refused to admit this contention and insisted that Ecuadorian sovereignty ended at the three-mile limit. A lengthy correspondence ensued without either side yielding. (The pertinent dispatches, written for the most part during December 1915, will be found in the *Informe . . . de 1916*, p. 139 ff.)

might leave whose voyage was not of a strictly commercial nature. Any merchant ship entering Ecuadorian ports whose papers were irregular in any of the above particulars was to be detained by the authorities as suspicious and was liable "to be considered as part of the belligerent forces of the nation to which it belongs and to be treated as such." Finally all Ecuadorian ships were prohibited from using their wireless telegraphy while remaining in Ecuadorian waters; to enforce this prohibition port authorities were instructed to remove parts of the apparatus.²⁶

Drastic regulations regarding the use of wireless stations were also promulgated. On October 16, 1915, the president signed a decree subjecting all radio outfits to the inspection of the government, forbidding the employment of any subject of the belligerent powers as an operator, prohibiting the use of ciphers, and finally providing that the ships of all of the belligerent powers lower their antennæ while in Ecuadorian waters.²⁷ In June of the following year, at the request of the British and French legations at Quito, this decree was modified to the extent of permitting all messages of an official character to be sent in code or cipher.²⁸

Only in one regard may the government of Ecuador legitimately be taxed with remissness in its efforts

²⁶ *British and Foreign State Papers, 1914*. Vol. II, pp. 817-820.

²⁷ *Informe . . . de 1916*, pp. 138-139.

²⁸ Elizalde to Jerome, June 21, 1916. *Informe . . . de 1917*, p. 228.

loyally to safeguard the republic's neutrality. The various measures adopted, excellent as they were, came too late to be of much practical benefit. The most serious menace with which the Ecuadorian authorities had to cope was the probability of violation of neutrality by German ships, both war and merchant, operating in the waters of the Pacific in the autumn of 1914. After the battle off the Falkland Islands this menace, in large part, disappeared.

The submarine crisis of 1917, followed by the entry of the United States into the war, naturally reacted on Ecuador's foreign policy and was indirectly responsible for her severance of diplomatic relations with the German Empire. The Ecuadorian government made no protest against the German decree of January 31, 1917, owing to the fact that it had received no official notification of this act. Herr Rohland had left Quito some time previously and the German legation was vacant at the time. But the minister of foreign affairs, Sr. Tobar y Borgoño,²⁹ in his annual report for 1917 makes it abundantly clear that had the Ecuadorian government been notified it would have formally protested against the intensification of submarine warfare, as contrary to international law.³⁰

In pursuance of the instructions received from Secretary Lansing, Mr. Hartman, the United States minister at Quito, on February 5 requested the Ecuadorian foreign office to state whether or not Ecuador was

²⁹ Sr. Tobar succeeded Dr. Elizalde in 1916, the latter having been appointed Ecuadorian minister at Washington.

³⁰ *Informe . . . de 1917*, p. xxv.

disposed to follow President Wilson's suggestion that the remaining neutral countries act with the United States in breaking relations with Germany as a result of the submarine crisis.³¹

Some statement of policy in reference to the new problems presented by the changed status of the United States now became necessary. That the sympathies of the Ecuadorians were strongly pro-Ally has already been pointed out. The ill feeling caused by the tactless *démarche* of Great Britain and France in the fall of 1914 was by this time largely dissipated. The relations between Ecuador and the United States at this time were cordial. It is true that in the past the motives and attitude of the United States had been misunderstood. Suggestions looking to the purchase of the Galápagos Islands—strategically important to the United States on account of their proximity to the Panama Canal—had aroused suspicion. Certain sections of the Guayaquil and Quito press had impugned the motives of the United States when pressure was brought to bear upon Ecuador to install sanitary works in Guayaquil, and the awarding of the contract for such works to an English rather than to a North American firm was looked upon with satisfaction in many quarters. Misunderstandings regarding the government subventions due the North American company which had built the Guayaquil and Quito Railway were and have been a fertile source of friction. But in the years immediately preceding the entry of the United States into the war a marked change for

³¹ Hartman to Tobar, *Ibid.*, p. 235.

the better had taken place. One of the chief factors in this happy consummation was undoubtedly the excellent work performed by the Rockefeller Foundation in stamping out diseases, notably yellow fever, which in certain regions of the republic, particularly on the shores of the Gulf of Guayaquil, had become endemic. Regarding the disinterested and humanitarian motives actuating this work there could be no question.

In his reply to Mr. Hartman's note Sr. Tobar stated on February 11 that "his government would never consent that any one of the belligerents diminish or flout the rights to which Ecuador is assured by international law and existing treaties." Further than this the Ecuadorian government did not care to proceed until it had ascertained the sentiments of the remaining governments of the continent. The minister of foreign affairs clearly intimated, however, that Ecuador would be very glad to cooperate in any concerted action among the American republics in defense of neutral rights.³²

³² *Informe . . . de 1917*, p. 237. It is worth recalling that Ecuador had on various occasions given proof of her belief in the doctrine of Spanish American solidarity. In 1866 the republic entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with Chile against Spain, though no Ecuadorian rights were placed in jeopardy. The motives for this act as given by President Bustamante were, as follows: "The government and people of Ecuador consider the Chilean cause to be eminently American; community of interest does not permit that Chile should find herself in the conflict without the support of her sisters; considering the unjust aggression of Spain against Chile it becomes the duty of all of them to unite their forces and resources to defend her sovereignty and political independence." *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. 56, (1865-1866), p. 711.

Realizing that procrastination would be fatal to any plan of united action among the American neutrals the Ecuadorian foreign office took the initiative in bringing the subject to the attention of the governments represented at Quito. On February 16 Sr. Tobar sent a circular letter to the ministers or chargés d'affaires of the United States, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Chile, Peru and Uruguay. The text of the letter was telegraphed to Mexico on the same day. In this communication Sr. Tobar pointed out that previous attempts to obtain joint action to defend the rights of neutrals or to attenuate the rigors of the war had broken down largely owing to the failure of more than a fraction of the neutral powers to second such efforts. He assumed that in view of the present crisis there would be greater unanimity; it was simply a question of devising machinery by which the wishes of the neutral powers might be made effective. Negotiations by correspondence were open to various difficulties, one of which was the inordinate consumption of time involved. The Ecuadorian government proposed, therefore, the immediate summoning of an American Congress, to meet preferably in Uruguay. The Agenda should as far as possible be confined to the "agreement on means for the guarantee of the rights of neutrality and a possible moderation of the rigors of the struggle."³³

The efforts of the Ecuadorian foreign office to launch a movement for the summoning of a Congress

³³ *Informe . . . de 1917*, pp. 249-250.

of Neutrals at Montevideo bore no fruit. As far as the evidence is available the replies to Sr. Tobar's circular note, with one exception, went no further than a simple acknowledgment and the promise on the part of its recipients to communicate its contents to their home governments.³⁴ The exception was the government of Mexico. On April 5 General Aguilar, the minister of foreign affairs, accepted Tobar's proposal but egregiously distorted the intentions of the Ecuadorian foreign office by assuming that the object of the proposed congress in Uruguay was to devise means to bring about *peace in Europe*.³⁵ Ecuador abandoned all efforts to take the initiative in summoning a congress of neutrals when later in the year the subject was taken up and for a time actively pushed by Argentina.³⁶

Although Ecuador had up to this time zealously stood out for complete neutrality, as the year 1917 wore on the sentiments in favor of severance of relations with Germany steadily grew in volume. The entry of the United States into the war, followed by Cuba and Brazil, and the severance of diplomatic relations by Peru, Uruguay and Bolivia, caused many

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 255 ff.

³⁵ This attempt of the Mexican government to bring pressure upon the American republics to terminate hostilities in Europe was in harmony with President Carranza's famous proposal of February 11 to the effect that an embargo be placed by neutral nations on all supplies being sent to the belligerents.

³⁶ Ecuador accepted the invitation of Argentina "since the Argentine project squares entirely with that proposed by Ecuador." Statement by Sr. Tobar. *Informe . . . de 1917*, p. xxxii.

Ecuadorians to fear that their country by remaining neutral was recreant to her ideals of American unity and cooperation. Among those who shared such apprehensions was the distinguished diplomat and jurist, Dr. Rafael Elizalde, former minister of foreign affairs and later Ecuadorian minister at Washington. In June 1917 Sr. Nicholas F. López, former Ecuadorian consul at Buenos Aires, and a publicist and writer of note, wrote a pamphlet entitled *Nuestra Actitud*,³⁷ in which he severely deprecated Ecuador's attitude of aloofness in the struggle. The fact that the writer held a high patent in the army, which was generally regarded as pro-German, increased the effectiveness of his plea. On the occasion of his annual message to Congress, delivered on August 10, President Baquerizo Moreno declared:

"We continue to uphold a policy of neutrality and our efforts to secure a more open and frank understanding among all nations of the American continent. We have said on every occasion, when justice so demanded, that we are in sympathy with and have faith in the great democratic principles, the fundamental basis of those nations. The continent of America, therefore will always find us with it."³⁸

During the course of a banquet tendered him by a number of senators and deputies, the minister of for-

³⁷ Translated into English by Peter H. Goldsmith under the title of "*The Attitude of Ecuador*" and published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Inter-course and Education, Publication no. 14 (Washington, 1917).

³⁸ Barrett and Pérez-Verdía, *Latin America and the War*. (Washington, 1919), p. 18.

eign affairs declared that Ecuador, "which regards herself as united through sentiments of solidarity with the republics of America which have entered the war, is morally on the side of the Allies."³⁹ While the government was still hesitating a series of episodes occurred which left it no other course, consonant with dignity and self-respect, than to sever diplomatic relations.

It will be recalled that in 1916 Herr Rohland, German chargé d'affaires in Quito, had retired from Ecuador⁴⁰ and German interests in so far as they were represented at all were in the hands of Dr. Perl, who as German minister to Peru, had also been assigned to Ecuador. On September 25, 1916, Dr. Perl wrote to Sr. Tobar requesting him to present the enclosed autographic letters of credence to the president.⁴¹ In acknowledging the receipt of this communication the minister of foreign affairs informed the German envoy that the president "will consider it as a great honor to receive from your Excellency the said Imperial letters, when it is possible for your Excellency to arrive at this capital."⁴² Shortly afterwards there appeared in Quito a certain Dr. Wilhelm Müller (formerly Ger-

³⁹ Communication furnished the Parisian press by Minister Dorn y de Alsúa. *Le Temps*, October 11, 1917.

⁴⁰ The circumstances attending Rohland's withdrawal are not entirely clear. Sr. Tobar merely states that the chargé "se ausentó intempestivamente y sin comunicarnos, como es de estilo, su partida . . ." *Informe . . . de 1917*, p. vii.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 77.

man Consul at Seattle) who requested that he be received as chargé d'affaires in place of Rohland; his only credentials were some telegrams and a letter of credence from Perl. Under these conditions the Ecuadorian government refused to recognize him; it took the position that even if Müller's credentials had been in order it would have been necessary for Dr. Perl to have first presented himself in his official capacity in Quito as German minister accredited to the republics of Ecuador and Peru.⁴³

Thus matters stood until the autumn of 1917. When on October 5 Peru severed diplomatic relations with Germany Dr. Perl recalled that he was also minister to Ecuador and decided to transfer his activities to the latter country. Such a decision came as an unwelcome surprise to the Ecuadorian government, which had no reason to regard with favor the German envoy. After the refusal of the Quito foreign office in the preceding year to accept his credentials by mail, Dr. Perl had endeavored "to communicate with the chancellery of Quito by means of impersonal notes, unsigned, addressed by the legation to the ministry of foreign affairs; as this procedure was extremely unusual . . . it was not possible to acknowledge the receipt of such communications. In acting thus Ecuador was merely following international precedent."⁴⁴ And at the present juncture, when Perl had become *persona non grata* in Peru, the Ecuadorian government on

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. viii.

⁴⁴ Statement of Sr. Tobar, *Ibid.*, p. viii.

October 6 requested its legation in Lima to inform the ex-German minister "that owing to considerations of Americanism and continental solidarity he will not be received officially by the Ecuadorian government if he should come to Ecuador."⁴⁵

The patience of the Ecuadorian government was badly frayed; it was evident that another incident of the kind just outlined would cause it to break. The immediate occasion for the rupture of relations with Germany was the tactless, not to say insolent, conduct of the would-be chargé d'affaires, Dr. Müller. In spite of the categorical refusal of the government to recognize his alleged credentials he continued to style himself "chargé d'affaires." On December 3, on the occasion of the death of Mgr. F. González Suárez, archbishop of Quito,⁴⁶ he addressed a letter of condolence to the vicar-general of the archdiocese in which he signed himself "the chargé d'affaires of Germany, though not yet recognized."⁴⁷ This letter was made

⁴⁵ The letter from which this quotation is taken does not appear in the *Informe*, but is quoted in a dispatch from Quito, dated October 7, to *El Telégrafo* of Guayaquil, and published in this paper on October 8. An analogous explanation is to be found in the communication of Sr. Tobar to the Senate, dated October 9, 1917. *Informe . . . de 1918*, p. 224. In an executive session of the Senate held on October 13 the action of Sr. Tobar was formally approved. *Ibid.*, p. 225.

⁴⁶ Mgr. González Suárez is known to all students of Latin American history as the author of the monumental *Historia General del Ecuador*.

⁴⁷ Statement of Sr. Tobar to the Diplomatic Corps, *Ibid.*, p. 229.

public and appeared in all the papers of the capital and Guayaquil the day following. And, at the funeral of the archbishop, Müller insisted upon being seated in the place reserved for the diplomatic corps, taking precedence over the members of the supreme court of justice.

The Ecuadorian foreign office quite properly took offense at this conduct, and on December 4 Sr. Tobar sent a communication to Sr. Víctor Eastman, Chilean minister, and dean of the diplomatic corps, in which, after describing the offensive conduct of Müller, he declared:

"I have the honor to apprise the honorable diplomatic corps, through the medium of your Excellency, that the person to whom I refer possesses no official status whatever in Ecuador, and consequently the resident diplomatic corps may not consider him as one of its members." ⁴⁸

On the very day on which this note was dispatched the diplomatic corps met to consider Sr. Tobar's communication. After some discussion the ministers of the United States, Peru, Brazil and France and the *chargés d'affaires* of Spain and Great Britain, signed a declaration, in which *inter alia*, they declared that ". . . they were amazed at the incorrect procedure of a person, who pretending to an official status not recognized by the government of Ecuador, the sole authority in this matter, attended a solemn function . . . as if he were a member of the honorable diplomatic corps. In this incorrect procedure the honorable diplo-

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

matic corps, accredited and recognized, had no share whatsoever.”⁴⁹

As Sr. Tobar's note of December 4 had been published in one of the papers of Quito, the Ecuadorian foreign office was not unjustified in assuming that Müller would embrace the opportunity to offer some eleventh hour explanation or apology for his actions. But when it became evident that no such apology was forthcoming, the government determined to remove all uncertainty regarding its attitude towards Germany and her self-styled representative. On December 7 in a circular note to the members of the diplomatic corps Sr. Tobar declared that the suspension of diplomatic relations which had existed for some time between the republic and the German Empire should from this day forth be regarded as “a formal and definite rupture.” At the same time he was at pains to point out that while the actions of Müller were the immediate occasion for such a step the severance of diplomatic relations was also based on reasons more fundamental and far reaching.

“The rupture of relations with Germany,” wrote Sr. Tobar in the memorandum which accompanied the note to the diplomatic corps, “signifies moreover that Ecuador, whose doctrine has always been that of

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 228, where the text of the declaration is given. The ministers of Chile and Colombia refused to sign this declaration but contented themselves with the statement “that in the future the honorable diplomatic corps will be more exigent in the observance of the ‘fórmulas protocolarias de práctica universal.’” *Ibid.*

American solidarity, is united in heart and thought with her sister republics of the continent, the majority of which have either broken relations with Germany or declared war against her. This resolution of the government of Ecuador announces that our democracy cannot accept without protest (the doctrine) that right may be attacked in the name of might and on the sole grounds of the necessity of conquering. And this resolution, finally, is in harmony with the wishes of the great majority of the nation which has insistently demanded it. Such a demand could not pass unheeded by a government which prides itself in being republican and sincerely democratic.”⁶⁰

Aside from the incidents outlined in the preceding pages Ecuador's diplomatic relations with the belligerents during the course of the great war were uneventful.⁶¹ The paucity of her resources, the grave perturbation in her financial life caused by the dislocation of her foreign trade, her distance from the center of hostilities, effectively prevented any active participation in the war, even had her people so desired. The real significance of Ecuador's action in severing relations with Germany is to be seen in her testimony to the cause of American cooperation and her moral contribution to the ideals which the United States and the Allies were striving to uphold.

⁶⁰ The text of the note of December 7 with the accompanying memorandum is given in *Informe . . . de 1918*, pp. 228-233.

⁶¹ A few days after the formal severance of relations the minister of war issued an order to all the port captains that henceforth all ships of the Allies or the United States might enter Ecuadorian territorial waters without restriction. *El Guante* (Guayaquil), December 16, 1917.

II. VENEZUELA

The republic of Venezuela shares with Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Paraguay the distinction of being one of the South American republics which remained neutral during the war. At first sight such an attitude seems somewhat surprising. One might be pardoned for believing that the motives which actuated the governments of Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia in breaking diplomatic relations with Germany would operate with equal force in the case of Venezuela. It is beyond cavil that the overwhelming majority of the intellectuals of Venezuela were from the very outbreak of the war strongly Francophile in sympathy.⁵² And there seemed some warrant for the belief that the entry of the United States into the war would touch a responsive chord in the hearts of the Venezuelan people. On two different occasions, within recent times, the government of Washington had rendered Venezuela indisputable services. Thanks to the energetic action of President Cleveland in 1895 the serious boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana was settled in a manner consonant with the interests and dignity of the South American republic. Later, in 1902, the virtual state of war between Venezuela and Germany, when the ships of the latter power were blockading and threatening to bombard the Venezuelan coast, was brought to a close

⁵² Cf. the article by the Venezuelan historian Carlos A. Villanueva, "Le Vénézuéla et la guerre européenne," in E. Martinenche, "*L'Amérique latine et la guerre européenne*" (Paris, 1916), pp. 189-202.

through the spectacular intervention of President Roosevelt.⁵³ Unlike her western neighbor, Colombia, Venezuela never had any real or alleged grievances against the North American republic. Finally it might be supposed that the increasing and mutually profitable commercial intercourse between the two countries would be reflected in a larger community of interests in the domain of international relations. In the critical days of 1917 and 1918 the United States should have been able, it would seem, to count on at least the moral support of her neighbor across the Caribbean.

Yet to those conversant with the internal political conditions of Venezuela the official attitude of the republic was an occasion of no surprise. Since 1909 Venezuela has been under the complete control of the dictator, General Juan Vicente Gómez. By the terms of the Constitution of 1914, drafted in harmony with his wishes, the presidential term was increased to seven years with no restriction as to re-election. Though General Gómez was overwhelmingly re-elected in 1915 by a subservient Congress, during the entire period of the war the executive power was nominally in the hands of the provisional president Dr. V. Márquez Bustillos, while General Gómez insisted on retaining his post as commander-in-chief of the army in clear defiance of the law. Constitutional usages as practiced in the United

⁵³ The details of President Roosevelt's intervention were for the first time made public in Thayer's *Life and Letters of John Hay*, vol. ii, pp. 286-288. Cf. on this as well as the preceding Venezuelan episode, Latané, *The United States and Latin America* (New York, 1920), ch. VI.

States and certain of the more advanced of the Latin American states have as a matter of fact made scant appeal to a ruthless and unscrupulous dictator of the type of General Gómez; rather did he find the whole spirit and practice of the Prussian system congenial and worthy of emulation. In so far as the evidence is available the government of Venezuela, completely under the control of the commander-in-chief of the army, was throughout the entire war pro-German in its sympathies though scrupulously careful to maintain a technical neutrality.

In his admiration for things German General Gómez by no means stood alone. In spite of the pro-Ally leanings of the bulk of the educated classes German influence had been making tremendous headway during the years immediately preceding the war. Much of the commerce and trade of the sea ports and of the capital, Caracas, was in the hands of Germans; German capital had found lucrative investment in coffee and cocoa plantations; the longest and most important railway line in the country, that extending from Caracas to Valencia, was controlled by a German company. The powerful firm of Blohm was intimately associated with the government in a number of semi-public undertakings. The prosperous and respected German colonies in Caracas and the port cities were reenforced by a considerable number of Germans from the United States and Cuba after the spring of 1917.

It would be unprofitable and unnecessary to discuss in detail the relations of Venezuela to the various bel-

ligerent powers during the early years of the war as described in the elaborate official publications of the government. The efforts of the Caracas foreign office, through the legation at Washington, to arouse interest in the assembling of a Congress of Neutral Nations in the fall of 1914 has already been noted in the introduction to the present work. At various times during the summer and autumn of that year the ministry of foreign affairs issued declarations or decrees in reference to Venezuelan neutrality.⁵⁴ For the most part they were in line with decrees of similar tenor promulgated by the other Latin American neutrals. One series, however, may be singled out for special mention. On August 12, 1914, the minister of foreign affairs reminded the minister of the interior

" . . . of the obligations under which the authorities are to prevent in the national territory the enlistment or uprising of individuals for forming corps to take part in favor of any of the belligerent countries, as well as also to prevent the offers made by citizens of the republic to lend services in the war to any such belligerents through their respective legations in Venezuela being carried into effect."⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Of these the most important were: the declaration of neutrality, issued August 8; instructions to the collectors of customs regarding measures for the safeguarding of neutrality, under the same date; instructions relating to radiotelegraphy, of August 24 and 26. *El Libro Amarillo de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela presentado al Congreso Nacional en sus sesiones de 1915 por el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores* (Caracas, 1915), p. 21 ff. (hereafter cited as *El Libro Amarillo*, with appropriate date).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

And on the 22d of the same month the minister of foreign affairs sent a circular letter to all Venezuelan representatives abroad instructing them to inform Venezuelan citizens residing in their jurisdiction that they would forfeit all claims to diplomatic protection should they enlist in the armies of any of the belligerents.⁵⁶ Not without some show of reason the partizans of the Allies regarded these instructions as inimical to the Entente. Since German citizens and sympathizers were unable for the most part to enroll in the German army owing to the Allied blockade, the practical effect of these measures was to prevent Venezuelans of allied sympathies from fighting on the side of the Entente. Despite these prohibitions a considerable number of Venezuelans served in the French and British armies in various capacities, or offered their services to the hospitals of Paris.⁵⁷

The submarine crisis of the winter and spring of 1917 caused no change in the attitude of the Venezuelan government. Singularly enough, and for reasons which are still obscure, the German government did not directly inform the Venezuelan foreign office of the decree of January 31, establishing unrestricted submarine warfare. Not until February 24 did the German minister,

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁵⁷ *E. g.*, Luis Camilo Ramírez, who received the Croix de Guerre for his bravery in Artois; Sánchez Carrero, killed in Champagne; the poet Ismael Urdenata, who met his death at the Dardanelles; Dr. Diego Carbonell, who volunteered for hospital service in Paris; the architect Marcel Villanueva, who joined the American ambulance, etc. Villanueva, *loc. cit.*

von Prollius, communicate this decision to the Venezuelan minister of foreign affairs, General Ignacio Andrade.⁵⁸ In his reply, dispatched on the 28th, General Andrade merely stated that

“ . . . my government will adjust its conduct in the future, as it has up to this time during the entire course of the war, to the principles of international law which lay down the duties and rights of neutral countries.”⁵⁹

On February 6, 1917, the United States minister at Caracas, Mr. Preston McGoodwin, informed Dr. Andrade that his government had severed diplomatic relations with Germany.

“This procedure,” added Mr. McGoodwin, “is in the opinion of the president in entire conformity with the principles enunciated in his speech before the Senate of January 23 last, and he therefore believes that it will contribute to the peace of the world, if the other neutral governments will find it possible to adopt an attitude similar to that adopted by the United States.”⁶⁰

In his reply, dated February 8, General Andrade stated that the government of Venezuela, in spite of its profound sympathy for the rights of neutrals and for sentiments of humanity, considered it necessary to maintain a strict neutrality.⁶¹ This point of view was

⁵⁸ *El Libro Amarillo . . . de 1918*, pp. 507-508.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 508.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 544.

⁶¹ This note has not been published but its substance is given in Mr. McGoodwin's reply, dated February 15. *Ibid.*, p. 547. On February 7, the day following Mr. McGoodwin's announcement that the United States had severed diplomatic relations with Germany, Dr. Plácido Sánchez, Bolivian minister of foreign affairs, cabled the Venezuelan foreign office suggesting

amplified in a further note on the same subject dispatched by General Andrade to Mr. McPreston on February 23:

"The attitude of Venezuela is in harmony with her determination not to abandon any of her duties as a neutral country, and at the same time to abandon none of her rights. . . . The position adopted by Venezuela appears perfectly clear: she aspires to preserve her relations of peace and friendship with all the countries at war, and to maintain the most perfect neutrality."⁶²

For a time it seemed probable that the government not only would refuse to follow the United States in severing relations with Germany, but also would decline to give any moral support to the course adopted by the

a collective protest on the part of the South American states against Germany's contemplated submarine policy. The Bolivian proposal was amplified in a cablegram of February 13. To both of these communications Dr. Andrade replied that Venezuela had not yet been officially notified of Germany's new submarine policy, but that in any case her attitude "would correspond to the principles of international law and to the relations of peace and friendship she had hitherto maintained with all the belligerents." *Ibid.*, pp. 511-512.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 548-549. This policy, as far as a mere technical neutrality was concerned, was carried out to a degree in some respects almost quixotic. Thus Venezuela would have nothing whatever to do with the plans for a congress of neutrals proposed by Bolivia, Uruguay and Argentina. Cf. *ibid.*, 509-510. The inconsistency between this policy and that proposed by Venezuela herself in 1914 has never been satisfactorily explained. To Mexico's proposal that an embargo be placed on all exports to the belligerents the Venezuelan government not only declared its opposition but added that the proposal departed from the accepted rules of international law. Andrade to Aguilar, February 25, 1917. *Ibid.*, pp. 569-570.

government at Washington. When on February 9 the Venezuelan minister to the United States, Dr. Dominici, cabled the terms of the proposal which the Argentine ambassador, Dr. Naón submitted to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, to the effect that the Latin American governments express their sympathy with the principles upheld by the President of the United States⁶³ General Andrade curtly replied that the "attitude of Venezuela is in harmony with the principles of international law and relations of peace and friendship with all the belligerents."⁶⁴ But during the next few weeks the tone of the official utterances of the Venezuelan foreign office became more friendly towards the United States, and it is perhaps a not unwarranted assumption that this change of tone was due in part to the recommendations of Dr. Dominici, Venezuela's distinguished representative at Washington. On March 6, in reply to a cablegram of Dr. Dominici of three days earlier, General Andrade authorized the Venezuelan minister "to declare that the attitude of Venezuela is that of sincere, loyal and inviolable (*inquebrantable*) friendship for the government and people of the United States."⁶⁵ At the same time the policy of the United States received a quasi-approval through the authorization "to express the sympathy (of the Venezuelan government) with every act which invests

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 546.

⁶⁴ Cablegram dated February 14. *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 550.

with greater respect the rights of neutrals and the principles of humanity.”⁶⁶

In his annual message to Congress, delivered on May 3, 1917, Provisional President Márquez Bustillos discussed at some length Venezuela's attitude towards the issues of the war.

“Up to the present time,” he declared, “there has been no act committed by German submarines by which Venezuela has been directly affected, and therefore she has not been involved in the complications which have drawn the United States into war with the German Empire. Venezuela, in harmony with her attitude of respect for law, maintains her right of defending the lives and the property of her nationals. She follows the course of events with a natural interest—an interest in harmony with the principles in defense of which the United States has entered the war, and with the traditional friendship which unites her to that nation, and with those general interests which the republics of this continent share in common.”⁶⁷

Important as these official declarations are, the real attitude of the government can only be understood by supplementing them with data of a somewhat different order. During the entire course of the war the press of Venezuela was subject to a thinly disguised censorship. This censorship not only extended to matters of international politics but also took cognizance of expressions

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 551. Yet it is perhaps worthy of note that announcement on April 7 by Mr. McGoodwin of the declaration of war by the United States met with a simple acknowledgment, two days later, on the part of the minister of foreign affairs. *Ibid.*, pp. 551-552.

⁶⁷ Santos A. Dominici, “Venezuela y la Guerra,” in Simonds, *Historia de la Guerra del Mundo*, Vol. III, p. 322.

of opinion dealing with the war.⁶⁸ From the evidence available there is excellent warrant for the belief that in this latter field the censorship was carried out in harmony with the wishes of the German legation at Caracas. On November 3, 1916, *El Fonógrafo* of Maracaibo, one of the most important of the provincial dailies, published a translation of an article of Pierre Loti under the title of "El Kaiser de los Alemanes." The German minister von Prollius at once lodged a protest with General Andrade. "I should like to express the hope," he declared "that the government of Venezuela will bend its efforts to the end that the moderation imposed upon the press of the capital for the sake of 'judicious neutrality' (*neutralidad judiciosa*) should be extended to the provincial press, especially *El Fonógrafo* of Maracaibo and *El Luchador* of Ciudad Bolívar." General Andrade showed himself entirely complacent. He forthwith instructed the minister of the interior to order the state authorities to bring the necessary pressure to bear upon the local press. In apprizing von Prollius of this decision General Andrade assured the German minister that the "disapproval (*reprobación*) of the government together with a warn-

⁶⁸ All publications, both official and unofficial, which are printed in Venezuela are pervaded by a spirit of sycophancy which finds a modern parallel in Latin America only in Guatemala under the dictatorship of Estrada Cabrera. In his report to Congress in 1918 the minister of foreign affairs seeks the inspiration for his task in his loyalty "to the high and fertile inspirations of the illustrious conductor of national rehabilitation, the well-deserving General Juan Vicente Gómez." *Libro Amarillo . . . de 1918*, p. v.

ing would be visited upon the responsible individuals or associations." And as a matter of fact such an official warning was issued by the state authorities of Bolívar on December 26, 1916.⁶⁹ It would appear, however, that the editor of *El Fonógrafo*, Sr. López Bustamante, continued to publish articles favorable to the allied cause. He was finally thrown into prison, but after eight months' incarceration was smuggled out of the country and arrived in New York in June 1918.⁷⁰ The bias of the government in favor of the pro-German press became so marked that the United States government forbade the export of print paper to the government controlled newspapers.⁷¹

The arbitrary and despotic régime of General Gómez and the Germanophile tendencies of the government⁷²

⁶⁹ For the text of this warning and its setting *cf.* the article (anonymous but probably written by the editor, Orestes Ferrera) entitled "El Kaiser sagrado en Venezuela," in *La Reforma Social* (New York), November, 1917.

⁷⁰ On his arrival in New York Sr. López gave out a number of interviews describing his experiences. *Cf., e. g., The Christian Science Monitor*, June 18, 1918.

⁷¹ D. G. Munro, "Pan America and the War," *North American Review*, November 1918.

⁷² An interesting sidelight on the attitude of General Gómez and his methods of government was revealed on the occasion of the resignation of Dr. Dominici as Venezuelan minister at Washington in the summer of 1922. As motives for his act Dr. Dominici alleges the pro-German attitude of General Gómez during the war and "the fact that three persons, all very close relatives, occupy the most important posts in the republic is an anomaly in the history of democratic countries and an abuse which has always been condemned as a political monstrosity." This latter charge is based on the fact that the son

gave rise to a series of rumors which were skilfully exploited by the Venezuelan *émigrés* and exiles residing in the United States and Europe. It was alleged that a German ship, anchored at Maracaibo, was permitted to use its radio outfit without hindrance by the authorities. It was furthermore declared that pourparlers were being actively carried on between the German and Venezuelan governments for the sale or lease of the Island of Margarita for a wireless or even a submarine base.⁷³ So serious and persistent did these rumors become that the United States government made formal representations to the Caracas foreign office. In his reply General Andrade asserted that these reports were utterly without foundation and intimated that they had their origin in the hostility of the Venezuelan *émigrés* to the existing régime. And it is only fair to add that up to the present time no proof has been forthcoming that

and brother of General Gómez were vice-presidents of the republic, while the general himself had resumed his executive functions in 1922. Dr. Dominici not merely offered his resignation; on July 5, 1922 (the anniversary of Venezuelan independence) he wrote President Gómez a letter in which he further condemned his policies. *El Universal* (Mexico), August 3, 1922; *La Prensa* (New York), September 19, 1922, and *passim*.

⁷³ These charges, with variations, formed the stock in trade of many of the Venezuelan exiles. Cf., e. g., the abstract of a pamphlet published in London by Rafael de la Coya, given in the *New York Times* for November 6, 1917; also a publication appearing irregularly in New York during 1918 entitled *El Joven Venezuela* (extracts given in the *South American* for October 1918).

the Venezuelan authorities were guilty of countenancing any such flagrant breaches of neutrality.⁷⁴

To the credit of the Venezuelan government it should be noted that throughout the whole period of the war the nation met its foreign obligations and maintained its credit at a high level. The period of the war, in fact, synchronized with an era of economic progress. As a result of the demand for Venezuelan products, especially coffee and cacao, the foreign commerce of the country, despite the dislocation caused by the war and the elimination of German trade, registered only a slight decline in the total value of imports and exports.⁷⁵ The gold standard was maintained and exchange remained favorable; large sums of money were invested in new industrial enterprises, chiefly with capital from the United States.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ *New York Times*, July 1, 1917, November 6, 1917; *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires), January 1, 1920; *Christian Science Monitor*, July 2, 1917.

It is a significant fact that General Gómez has found few defenders outside of Venezuela and has been frequently attacked by South American publicists and writers both for his despotism and subserviency to Germany. As a sample of the latter kind of criticism may be selected an article by the Brazilian Napoleão Azevedo published in the *South American* and reprinted in part in *Tropical Life* (London) June, 1918, under the title of "Pro-Germanism in Venezuela."

⁷⁵ The figures for the foreign trade of Venezuela for 1913 were \$47,513,893; for 1917, \$46,093,644.

⁷⁶ An excellent brief statement of the economic conditions of Venezuela during the war is given by Dr. S. A. Dominici, *loc. cit.*

III. BOLIVIA

The republic of Bolivia is one of the two land-locked countries of South America. Immune, therefore, from any direct effects of the war as carried on by sea, far removed from the theatre of hostilities, with no national interests imperilled, it seemed reasonable to assume that Bolivia would remain neutral. Were the foreign policy of the republic to incline towards either of the belligerent groups there was ground for the belief that the Central Powers rather than the Entente would exert the stronger attraction. With the possible exception of Chile there was no republic of South America in which German influence had become more firmly entrenched. It is worthy of record that in 1913, the last normal year, Bolivia was the only one of the twenty Latin American states in which Germany enjoyed an unquestioned superiority in imports.⁷⁷ The great exporting houses of Hamburg and Berlin had catered especially to Bolivian trade; the German colony at La Paz, and other commercial centers enjoyed both respect and prestige. In other fields the seed of "kultur" had also been carefully sown. The army had been trained in large part by German officers and had been indoctrinated in German methods; only two months before the outbreak of the war the German mission headed by General von Kund had left La Paz with the good wishes of large numbers of Bolivians. Yet before the war was over Bolivia was aligned with

⁷⁷ The total foreign commerce of Bolivia in 1913 amounted to \$57,908,895. The imports from Germany totalled \$7,835,732. The nearest competitor was Great Britain with \$4,329,659.

the nations of the New World which had broken relations with the German Empire. To as keen an observer as the German writer Hartwig, who had long been a resident in South America, the conduct of Bolivia was frankly inexplicable.⁷⁸

During the first years of the war public opinion in so far as it may be said to exist in a country in which the white population comprises less than 15 per cent of the total inclined more and more in its sympathies towards the Entente. At no time had the army been completely inoculated with the virus of Prussianism; even in prewar days many of the officers had preferred the French rather than the German methods of instruction. We may here detect perhaps the influence of General Jacques Sever, who at the head of a French mission, for a number of years presided over the general staff. The executive also was frankly pro-Ally in sympathy. General Ismael Montes, elected president in August 1913, was a representative of that new spirit in Bolivia which has striven to direct the energies of the nation away from steril political agitation into efforts towards national reconstruction along the lines of economic and social progress. In his desire to equip Bolivia with the means for the rational exploitation of her vast natural resources he followed the policy of his predecessors and extended a hearty welcome to

⁷⁸ "Die ganze Stellungswechsel Boliviens ist seiner innern Vorgeschichte nach so wenig wahrscheinlich, das jedes abschliessende Urteil verfehlt wäre." Alfredo Hartwig, "Die politische Stellungnahme des Südamerikanischen Staaten im Weltkrieg," *Deutsche Rundschau*, December 1917, p. 334.

capital from the United States. This invitation met a ready response; in various fields, particularly in mining and transportation, North American enterprise and capital have in recent years done much to quicken the economic life of the country.

This closer economic approximation to the United States and the disposition of the Bolivian political leaders to regard with sympathy the international policy of the North American republic explain, in part at least, the attitude assumed by the Bolivian government in reference to the submarine crisis. When the American legation at La Paz informed the Bolivian foreign office that diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany had been severed, the minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Plácido Sánchez, in his note of February 5 replied to the American minister that:

"The government of Bolivia considers entirely proper the noble and lofty attitude assumed by the government of the United States, and which is in accord with the rights of the neutral countries to safeguard their own interests and those of civilization and humanity. The government of Bolivia, therefore, frankly endorses the stand taken by the United States."

On the following day, February 6, the German minister, von Sanden, officially informed Dr. Sánchez of the decision of the German government to employ unrestricted submarine warfare.⁸⁹ In his reply, dispatched

⁷⁹ Barrett and Pérez Verdía, "*Latin America and the War*," p. 7; also summarized in the *Memoria que presenta el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Dr. Plácido Sánchez al Congreso Ordinario de 1917*, pp. 30-31. (Hereafter cited as *Memoria . . . de 1917*), p. 31.

⁸⁰ *Memoria . . . de 1917*, p. 31.

two days later, the minister of foreign affairs analyzed at length the disastrous results which would proceed from such a measure. Though not a maritime power herself Bolivia, he intimated, would be remiss in her duties as a neutral were she to allow such pretension to pass unchallenged.

“Viewed in the light of the unquestioned rights of neutral trade and merchant service on the high seas, and of the imprescriptible rights of civilization and humanity, neither the prohibition against neutral trading nor the war-like aggression against neutral merchant vessels can be allowed to pass without a protest. And it is such a protest which the Bolivian government wishes to record in this reply, and to add that it has decided to make its attitude in the present diplomatic crisis conform wholly to that of the United States government.”⁸¹

But with this declaration, emphatic as it was, Bolivia was not content. It was felt that a collective protest, subscribed to by all the South American republics, could alone be a fitting answer to Germany's announced submarine campaign. Such common action in the opinion of the Bolivian government would not only be tangible evidence of South America's sympathy with the steps taken by the United States but would directly make for the moral isolation of Germany. As early as February 7 Dr. Sánchez sent to the foreign offices of all of the South American republics the following cablegram:

“Believing that the form in which Germany proposes to carry on submarine warfare constitutes a de-

⁸¹ Barrett and Pérez-Verdía, *loc. cit.*, *Memoira . . . de 1917*, pp. 30-31.

fiance of all human rights as well as absolute contempt of those rights which are the attributes of neutral nations, whose international commerce is threatened with total destruction, we think that it is indispensable to formulate a collective protest on the part of all, or at least of some, of the South American states against the plans of Germany, as communicated officially to the government of Washington. I would be grateful if Your Excellency would inform me of your views on this subject.”⁸²

A further telegram, dispatched on February 17, was even more specific. Bolivia invited all of the nations of the continent to make the following declaration of principles :

“An attack by submarine upon neutral merchant vessels even within blockaded zones is contrary to all law, and may only be carried out in accordance with established precedent, according to the (existing) rules for the capture of prizes at sea.”⁸³

As is well known Bolivia's efforts to secure concerted action among the South American nations met with no greater success than those essayed by Uruguay, Ecuador and Argentina. Yet her action at this time is not without a certain interest. Possessing no merchant marine of any kind she was the first of all of the Latin American states to protest against Germany's assaults on the rights of neutrals on the high seas. At the same time her unqualified approval of the action of the United States in severing diplomatic relations presaged a similar action on her part in the near future.

⁸² República del Ecuador. *Informe que el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores presenta á la nación.* 1917, p. 251.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

On March 17, 1916, the Dutch steamer *Tubantia* was sunk by a German submarine. Among the passengers were Sr. Luis Salinas, Bolivian minister to Berlin, and his family. The indignation caused by this attack on a neutral vessel, imperiling the lives of Bolivian citizens was still intense when over a year later the United States formally entered the war against Germany. The feeling, at least among official classes, became general that national decorum and loyalty to the principles of American cooperation demanded a complete diplomatic break with Germany. On April 13, within a week after the United States had declared war, the Bolivian government handed the German minister his passports.

The reasons for this step were set forth in detail in the note of Sr. Sánchez to Herr von Sanden of the same date. After passing in review various violations of international law of which the German Empire had been guilty and alluding to the ruthlessness with which the submarine campaign was being conducted the minister of foreign affairs added:

“Such a situation becomes more serious from the fact that Germany is carrying out her threats against neutral ships and persons. The government of Bolivia is of the opinion, therefore, that the German government has not only violated all standards of justice and abolished the most fundamental principles of right, but has also cancelled on its own authority the treaties and conventions of The Hague, which Germany had signed with almost all the nations of the world. If to the foregoing be added . . . the circumstance that German submarines . . . sunk the neutral ship *Tubantia*, on which was travelling, in neutral Dutch waters the Bo-

livian minister in Berlin, Sr. Luis Salinas Vega, accompanied by his family, Your Excellency will understand that greatly to our regret, the maintenance of diplomatic relations between Bolivia and the German Empire is no longer possible.”⁸⁴

The diplomatic history of Bolivia during the remaining period of the war calls for no special mention. As will be noted in our concluding chapter Bolivia was one of the signatories of the Peace Treaty and in her desire to gain access to the Pacific endeavored, though unsuccessfully, to induce the Second Assembly of the League of Nations to consider the revision of the Treaty of 1904 with Chile.⁸⁵

IV. PARAGUAY

Of the ten republics of South America the one least affected by the war was Paraguay. Entirely landlocked in the heart of the southern portion of the continent, far removed from the theatres of hostilities, Paraguay suffered only the indirect consequences of the war. Yet the small but intelligent white element in the population⁸⁶ was from the outset enthusiastically pro-Ally in its sympathies, although at no time was there any thought of departure from neutrality. The entry of the United States into the war was the occasion of a number of significant declarations by the

⁸⁴ *Memoria . . . de 1917*, pp. 162-164.

⁸⁵ It is deserving of note that both during and subsequent to the war the financial record of Bolivia has been excellent. Even during the grave financial difficulties of the early years of the war the foreign obligations were promptly met.

⁸⁶ As is well known the bulk of the population of Paraguay consists of the Guaríní Indians.

minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Manuel Gondra, subsequently Paraguayan minister to the United States, and later (1920) elected to the presidency of the republic. In his note of April 13, 1917, Dr. Gondra informed the United States minister, Mr. Daniel F. Mooney, that "Paraguay and her government in these moments are in full sympathy with the policy of the United States and the American government."⁸⁷ And later in the year, on various occasions, both the president in his messages and Congress by means of resolutions emphasized the point that the norm of Paraguay's foreign policy was the doctrine of continental solidarity. Apart from the statements of Dr. Gondra, most of which were not made public at the time, perhaps the most notable expression of opinion by any of the Paraguayan public men was that of Dr. Cecelio Báez, former president of the republic, one time minister at Washington and an historian of note. On July 27, 1917, apropos of the enthusiastic receptions tendered the American fleet in the harbors of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina, Dr. Báez wrote:

"Our republics began their existence as independent states protected by the United States and England against the possible aggression of the Holy Alliance. For that reason the names of Canning, Henry Clay and Monroe, the first friends of the nations of Latin America, are always gratefully remembered by the people of this continent.

"The Washington government asks for our moral support while it devotes its attention at sea and on the

⁸⁷ Manuscript material kindly supplied the writer by Dr. Gondra.

battlefields of Western Europe to the defense of the freedom of all countries. This adhesion has not been denied. Paraguay has given her sincere testimony to this feeling, and I do not think that I err when I affirm that the public men of Paraguay think as follows:

"That without the power and benevolence of the United States towards her republican sisters they would have been attacked or their national development checked by foreign powers.

"That among these same republics peace would not have reigned but for the respect felt for the United States.

"That there is no reason to distrust the United States providing our republics respect themselves as civilized countries, respecting at the same time the rights of other.

"Let us congratulate ourselves as Americans for the cordial reception which the government and people of Argentina have just extended to the North American fleet."⁸⁸

⁸⁸ *La Tribuna* (Asunción), July 27, 1917.

CHAPTER IX

CENTRAL AMERICA AND HAITI

The attitude towards the Great War and its issues on the part of the six republics of Central America and the insular republic of Haiti was conditioned by certain factors largely absent in the case of the South American nations. The chief of these was the paramount interest of the United States in the Caribbean. The advance of the United States in this portion of the western hemisphere has been one of the outstanding features in the development of the United States into a world power. As a result of the Spanish American War the United States annexed the island of Porto Rico and established close political and commercial relations with Cuba. In 1903 the canal zone was acquired under circumstances which made the republic of Panama dependent, in her foreign relations at least, on the United States. The construction of the Panama Canal had as its natural corollary a policy of naval supremacy in the Caribbean Sea, which in turn was followed by a new political policy in reference to certain of the less stable republics of this region. In 1905 the United States assumed the financial administration of the Dominican Republic; in 1915 the finances of Haiti were placed under a similar control; in 1916 the United States secured from Nicaragua the exclu-

sive right of way for a canal through her territory and has since that time helped to maintain the political stability of the country through the presence of a detachment of marines at the capital; finally from 1916 to 1924 the United States assumed entire control of the administration of Santo Domingo. Even those Central American and Caribbean republics in whose internal administration the United States has not directly interfered have been to a greater or less extent brought within the orbit of her international policies.

Under the existing circumstances it was hardly to be expected that the Central American and the Caribbean republics, even had they so desired, could have followed an entirely disinterested or neutral policy, once the United States had been drawn within the vortex of the war.¹ Yet it would be an error to conclude, as is invariably done by German writers,² that the attitude assumed by the governments of these countries was entirely the result of pressure and untoward influence. Cuba, as we have already seen, entered the war with spontaneity and enthusiasm; of the Central American republics, five declared war against Germany. These were Panama, Guatemala,

¹There is some evidence that the attitude of Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua was influenced by the alleged endeavors of President Carranza of Mexico to encourage revolutionary plots designed to overthrow the existing governments and to erect in their place régimes more favorable to Mexico and Germany. Such a plan—if it ever really existed—would be calculated to draw the existing governments still closer to the United States.

²*E. g., Hartwig, op. cit.*

Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. One, El Salvador, maintained an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the United States and the Allies. The Caribbean republic of Haiti declared war against Germany. In the present chapter some attempt will be made to appraise the motives which led to these decisions while the foreign relations of each of these countries, in so far as they were affected by the war, will be subjected to a brief scrutiny.³

I. PANAMA

In the case of Panama, the first of the Central American republics to be considered, neutrality was unthinkable as soon as the United States had entered the war. The circumstances under which Panama had gained her independence from Colombia, the guarantee of this independence by the United States by the Treaty of 1904, above all the vital necessity of safeguarding the Panama Canal, called for the closest possible cooperation between the youngest and the oldest of the repub-

³ In the survey of the Central American and Caribbean republics the Dominican Republic is omitted. As is well known the United States interfered in Dominican affairs in 1916 and on the refusal of the Dominicans to cooperate assumed entire control of the country, a control which was not relinquished until 1924. In 1917 the United States officials in charge of Dominican affairs withdrew the exequaturs of the German consuls in the Dominican Republic. As Germany was without diplomatic representation this action has sometimes been regarded as tantamount to a severance of diplomatic relations. But to speak of the relations of the Dominican government to the war is, in reality, a misnomer, as the years 1916-1924 represent a hiatus in the national life of the republic.

lics of the continent. But the promptness and spontaneity of Panama's actions, once the crisis had become imminent, show clearly that no pressure from the United States was needed to bring home to Panama the realization of her international obligations and responsibilities. As early as February 23, 1917, less than a month after the United States had severed diplomatic relations with Germany, President Valdés sent a special message to the National Assembly in which he declared that

"... our community of interest with the United States and our loyalty towards that nation place us in the inescapable situation of cooperating in the defense of our territory and that of the Panama Canal. With the break of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany the likelihood of peace is considerably diminished and if the painful possibilities of war should be realized, Panama could not be certain that her soil and her territorial waters might not become the theatre of military operations. It is therefore imperative that the nation be forehanded in taking such measures as will tend to diminish the immediate consequences of the conflict."⁴

Immediately upon the reading of this message the National Assembly unanimously passed a resolution of sympathy with the purposes and ideals of the people of the United States. The Panamanian nation could do no less, since she is bound to the United States "not only by common interests, but also by bonds of affection and gratitude, and by the fact that both peo-

⁴ República de Panamá. *Memoria que presenta el Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores á la Honorable Asamblea Nacional en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1918* (Panamá, 1919), p. 3.

ples have been influenced by the same ideals of international justice." The resolution ended with the avowed determination of Panama "to cooperate within the measure of her strength and resources in the defense of the interests and common ideals of both peoples."⁵

In pursuance of the suggestion of the president the National Assembly on March 12 clothed the executive with a number of extraordinary powers, to be employed only in the event of the United States becoming involved in the war. These faculties dealt for the most part with the control and husbanding of the country's commercial and fiscal resources. The president was authorized, for instance, temporarily to dismiss all public employees whose services were not necessary, to reorganize the public service on the basis of greater efficiency, to reduce salaries in order to balance the budget, to increase the military forces of the nation to the extent he might judge necessary, to lower or abolish duties on articles of prime necessity and to regulate their price, to issue treasury notes up to the value of five hundred thousand dollars.⁶

On April 6, within a few hours after the United States had declared war against Germany, President Valdés sent the following cablegram to President Wilson:

"In this hour of trial for the people of the United States, the republic of Panama, their true friend and collaborator in the construction of the Canal, experi-

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

ences the keenest satisfaction in reiterating to the government over which Your Excellency presides the sincere and fervent testimony of her sympathy and of the determination which animates her to cooperate within the measure of her strength in the defense of the territory of the republic against any hostile attack which has as its object the Panama Canal. . . . The republic of Panama, whose future is intimately bound up with that of the great American democracy, will assume in this emergency the obligations inherent in this just conception of solidarity.”⁷

On the following day, April 7, Panama formally took her place among the belligerent powers opposed to Germany. But her action was unique in that no formal declaration of war was issued. In a proclamation, in many respects noteworthy, President Valdés simply declared that Panama makes the cause of the United States her own, and is disposed to follow the United States in whatever action she may take or in whatever direction she may lead.⁸

As the constitution of Panama vests in the National Legislative Assembly the sole right of declaring war, the exact status of the republic in relation to the belligerents gave rise for a time to various interpretations. The Panama foreign office soon made it clear, however, that the executive proclamation of April 7 was to be regarded as a declaration of war, in pursuance of the mandate given the president in the resolution of the National Assembly passed on February 24. When in the fall of 1917 the legislative body was summoned

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6, where the full text is given.

for an extraordinary session all acts of the executive were approved by a resolution passed on November 7.⁹

The diplomatic and other activities of Panama as a belligerent call for no detailed treatment. From April 7, 1917, up to the very end of the war the republic's foreign policy was merged with that of the United States. In all measures designed to protect more effectively the Canal and its approaches Panama loyally cooperated within the full measure of her capacity. A number of Germans residing in Panama were promptly interned on the Island of Tobago, but before the end of April, at the instance of the government at Washington, were transferred to the United States as it was felt that they were too close to the Canal.¹⁰ Within a few days after Panama's entry into the war a mission composed of the Panamanian minister to the United States, Dr. Belesario Porras, Sr. Eusebio Morales, and Sr. Julio Arona was sent to Washington to suggest means of making Panama's cooperation more effective.¹¹ In August 1917 the postal censorship which had been organized in the Canal Zone early in April was extended throughout the republic.¹² By a decree issued on November 21 all subjects of the Central Powers and their Allies were obliged to register with the governor of the province in which they were residing and were

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁰ The correspondence which passed between Mr. W. J. Price, American minister at Panama and Sr. Garay, minister of foreign affairs, is summarized in *Ibid.*, pp. 7-9.

¹¹ *New York Times*, April 29, May 1, 1917. The mission arrived at Washington on April 30.

¹² *Memoria . . . de 1918*, p. 45.

not permitted to leave the country without the permission of the authorities.¹³ The last important act of Panama in relation to the war was the declaration of hostilities against Austria-Hungary on December 10, 1917.¹⁴

Though Panama, despite her official status as a belligerent, could in no sense be regarded as an active participant in the war, her attitude and policy are not without their significance. An attitude of grudging support, even of lukewarmness, would have necessitated measures on the part of the United States for the protection of the Canal which would have added considerably to her burdens. Moreover the spontaneous enthusiasm with which Panama took up her obligations as an ally showed that Panama, like Cuba, was not unmindful of or ungrateful for the support and protection accorded her by the United States in the most critical days of her history.¹⁵

¹³ An official copy of this decree, printed separately, was issued by the Panama government and presented to the Hoover War Collection, Stanford University.

¹⁴ *Memoria . . . de 1918*, pp. 43-44. Much of the activity of the Panama foreign office during the summer of 1917 was taken up with a protracted controversy with the German government in reference to the internment of three Panamanian students at Holzminden. Through the efforts of the Spanish embassy at Berlin (to which Panamanian interests in Germany were intrusted) their release was effected. *Ibid.*, p. 10 ff.

¹⁵ Additional data on the rôle of Panama in the war are given by Ricardo Miró, "La Actitud de la República de Panamá en la Guerra y después de la Guerra," in Frank H. Symonds, *Historia de la Guerra del Mundo*, Vol. V, pp. 419-422.

II. GUATEMALA

Guatemala is the largest and most populous of the Central American states.¹⁶ For this as well as for other reasons the attitude of her government towards the war and its issues was a matter of concern to the United States and even to the Allies. Guatemala is bounded on the north by Mexico, whose policy during the most critical period of the war was the occasion of serious misgivings; she possesses important ports on both the Caribbean and the Pacific connected with each other by a well-equipped railway; she had built up the most efficient army in Central America; finally she was regarded, thanks to a long continued and intensive system of economic penetration, as one of the focal points of German influence and propaganda in this portion of the New World.

At first sight it might seem reasonable to assume that the same causes which operated to keep Mexico neutral might be present in the case of Guatemala. No national interests were imperilled by Germany's declaration of submarine warfare. Neither the fiscal nor political policy of the country was directly subjected to influence from the United States, as was the case, for instance, in Nicaragua and Panama. Such public opinion as might be said to exist in a country in which all power was concentrated in the hands of the executive favored Germany rather than the Allies; at least this was true at the beginning of the war. In the com-

¹⁶ Her area is slightly less than fifty thousand square miles and her population something over two million.

prehensive plan of economic penetration this Central American republic had been assigned a strategic position. The coffee industry, which was the chief source of the nation's wealth, had been the particular object of German attention. The most important of the plantations on the outbreak of the war were owned or controlled by Germans; it has been conservatively estimated that 60 per cent of the country's wealth was in German hands. Guatemala was the only country in Latin America in which Germany occupied the leading place in the volume of exports; in fact Germany not only far outdistanced her nearest rival, the United States, but absorbed over 50 per cent of all goods sent from the country.¹⁷ The larger part of the coffee crop was marketed at Hamburg and Bremen and was financed almost entirely with German funds. In the years immediately preceding the war German capital had branched out into other fields as well; the electric light plant in Guatemala City, for instance, was German owned and German equipped.

Throughout the early years of the war Guatemala was the center of an elaborately developed espionage system, whose ramifications extended throughout Central America. The moving spirit in this organization was the German minister to Central America, Herr Kurt Lehmann. It was probably due to his efforts that a flourishing paper *El Eco Alemán* was established and was actively employed as a means of propaganda.

¹⁷ In 1913 the total exports of Guatemala amounted to \$14,449,926, of which Germany took \$7,653,557, the United States \$3,923,345; Great Britain \$1,600,029.

Through the medium of the German legation Central America was flooded with copies of the *Heraldo de Hamburgo*, edited and printed in Germany entirely for Latin American consumption. The charge has repeatedly been made, though to the knowledge of the writer it has never been formally proven, that Lehmann was one of the chief conspirators in a series of plots designed to divert the interest of the United States from complications in Europe. Among his collaborators was alleged to have figured the notorious von Rintelen.¹⁸

Unfortunately for those Germans who hoped to convert Guatemala into a bulwark of *Deutschtum* they failed to take sufficient account of one factor essential to the success of their plans: The support of the president of the republic. Since 1899 Guatemala had been under the dictatorship of Manuel Estrada Cabrera, a dictator of the type which fortunately has all but disappeared elsewhere in Latin America. Under his rule

¹⁸ According to *The Washington Post*, for instance, "the plan contemplated an invasion of Guatemala by Mexico. At the same time there was to be launched on the territory of the republic of Salvador a revolution designed to overthrow the present government of Nicaragua. The invasion of Guatemala by Mexico was intended to bring about the intervention of the United States, to divert the attention of the American people from Europe, and to require the dispatch to Central America of a large army to restore order. This German plot was hatched in 1913 by Franz von Rintelen, a German agent (now imprisoned in the Tower of London) with the aid of an American business man named Meloy." Quoted in *Le Temps* (Paris) April 14, 1917. Cf. *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 30 and May 11, 1917.

Guatemala was governed with the ruthlessness and despotism of an oriental satrap. Liberty of the press, freedom of speech, expression of popular opinion, had practically ceased to exist. The simulacrum of popular government merely threw into greater relief the real tyranny under which the country suffered. To one even superficially conversant with political conditions in Guatemala it was obvious that the foreign policy of the most important of the Central American states was but the reflection of the views of the all-powerful dictator-president.

During the early years of the war Cabrera observed an expectant attitude. The republic formally declared her neutrality on August 12, 1914, and announced that her relations with the belligerents would be governed by the conventions of the Second Hague Conference.¹⁹ Prior to the spring of 1917 German propaganda was given a fairly free hand,²⁰ although the refusal of Guatemala to renew in 1915 the commercial treaty of 1887, by which Germany enjoyed a number of commercial advantages, indicated a desire to call a halt on further economic encroachments.²¹

¹⁹ John Barrett, "La América Central Continental e Insular," in Simonds, *Historia de la Guerra del Mundo*, Vol. IV, p. 370. (Unfortunately the present writer was unable to secure access to the original reports of the Guatemalan ministry of foreign affairs. All of the important documents, however, are quoted at length in the article by Mr. Barrett).

²⁰ This is admitted by Minister Lehmann in a lecture given before the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce shortly after his return to Germany. *New York Times*, August 6, 1917.

²¹ Barrett, *loc. cit.*

The submarine crisis of 1917 and the imminence of the entry of the United States into the war brought Cabrera face to face with new and heavy responsibilities. To the Guatemalan dictator as to President Gómez of Venezuela many features of Prussian militarism and German ruthlessness must have been essentially congenial. But whatever may have been Cabrera's real attitude towards the ideals of democracy and liberty professed by the Allies and the United States he was much too shrewd needlessly to bring upon himself the suspicions and possibly the displeasure of the government at Washington. With the example of Zelaya²² the ex-dictator of Nicaragua, before him he could hardly fail to realize that in the final instance his tenure of power rested on the suffrance of the United States. He was doubtless influenced by other motives as well. Mexico's attitude at this time aroused much anxiety in Guatemala. Antipathy between the two southern republics had been long-standing and there was a real fear of Mexican aggression. Under these conditions it is reasonable to suppose that Cabrera would not hesitate to capitalize the strained relations between Mexico and the United States to his own and to his country's advantage. There are also good grounds for the belief that the dictator was anxious to rid himself of the strangle hold which German capital had secured on the economic resources of the country. Such a result—in many ways exceedingly profitable to President Cabrera

²² President Zelaya was overthrown through pressure from the United States in 1910.

—might easily be consummated were Guatemala to enter the war as an ally of the United States.²³

In reply to the German government's announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare the minister of foreign affairs, Sr. Toledo, informed Herr Lehmann on March 7 that his government presented "a respectful but formal protest against the measures taken against neutral commerce and at the same time reserved its rights in case of any injuries which the attitude of the government of Germany might cause to the persons and interests of the citizens of this republic."²⁴ The German minister, possibly in pursuance of orders from Berlin, committed the tactical blunder of refusing to vouchsafe any reply to this communication, even to the extent of a simple acknowledgment. On April 27 the president formally issued a decree severing diplomatic relations between Guatemala and the German Empire. This decree was approved by the National Legislative Assembly on May 2. In the resolution passed to that

²³ Admiral Caperton, who visited Guatemala in May 1917 to thank President Cabrera for breaking relations with Germany stated that the reasons for Guatemala's action were as follows: (a) "Fear of aggression by Mexico and Salvador; (b) Opportunity to increase friendship of United States with consequent advantages in trade and protection; (c) Opportunity to confiscate large German estates; (d) Desire to strengthen Cabrera's administration." *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, conducted by a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Sen. Doc. 285, 66th Cong., 2d Sess.), p. 3212.

²⁴ Statement issued by the Guatemalan minister to the United States, Sr. Méndez. *New York Times*, April 29, 1917. Cf. Barrett, *loc. cit.*

effect the only explanation advanced for the rupture of relations was the refusal to acknowledge the Guatemalan note of March 7.²⁵

The significance of the severance of relations was enlarged upon by Sr. Méndez, Guatemalan minister to the United States, in his communication to Secretary Lansing, dated April 28, 1917.

"In communicating this action of my government to Your Excellency I take pleasure in reiterating that Guatemala from the first has adhered to and supported the attitude of the United States in the defense of the rights of nations, the liberty of the seas, and of international justice, and that it has always considered itself in unity with your great nation in the lofty principles which it has so wisely proclaimed for the good of humanity.

"Therefore Guatemala takes the greatest pleasure in offering to the United States her territorial waters, her ports, and railways for use in common defense, as also all elements which may be available for the same purpose."²⁶

In a statement given to the press Sr. Méndez declared that the decision of the government of Guatemala was taken

"... on account of the plots of the Germans against the safety and independence not only of Guatemala, but of the whole of Central America, and through solidarity with the principles of the rights of peoples, the freedom of the seas and universal justice."²⁷

During the course of the ensuing months it became evident that the Guatemalan government was not con-

²⁵ Barrett, *apud* Simonds, Vol. IV, p. 372.

²⁶ *New York Times*, April 29, 1917.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

tent with a mere severance of diplomatic relations, and on April 23, 1918, the republic formally declared war against the German Empire. The official explanation for this act is to be found in the resolution of the National Legislative Assembly adopted two days earlier. After alluding to the severance of relations of the year previous and to "the careful consideration of the acts and circumstances consequent on this preliminary step," the resolution stated that the time has arrived to determine the attitude of Guatemala in the European conflict.

"WHEREAS . . . continental solidarity, the geographical position of the country and the bonds, historical and international, existing between the United States and Guatemala, indicate the norm of conduct to be followed in the present case, it is therefore decreed: In the present international conflict Guatemala assumes the same belligerent attitude as that assumed by the United States with the German Empire."²⁸

That the official motives as given above supply only a partial explanation for Guatemala's entrance into the war is suggested by a series of acts which immediately followed. A considerable number of concessions which had been granted to German companies were at once rescinded; the holdings, especially coffee plantations, of Germans and German companies, were sequestered; a number of public service corporations, including the electric light and power plant of Guatemala City were taken over and administered by the government. In the administration of the properties of these enemy aliens the government was assisted by an expert

²⁸ Barrett, *apud* Symonds. Vol. IV, p. 381.

appointed by the secretary of state of the United States. At the same time all German propaganda was effectively suppressed, and measures were taken to put the northern frontier in a state of defense.²⁹

III. NICARAGUA

With the exception of Panama no country in Central America maintained on the outbreak of the war such intimate relations with the United States as did the republic of Nicaragua. It will be recalled that early in 1910 the Washington government had virtually forced the resignation of the dictator-president, Zelaya, whose activities had for years kept Central America in tension and turmoil. In 1916 was ratified the Bryan-Chamorro treaty by the terms of which Nicaragua granted to the United States in perpetuity the exclusive right to build an inter-oceanic canal across her territory, and leased to the United States for forty-nine years a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca and also the Great Corn and Little Corn Islands as coaling stations.³⁰ The United

²⁹ *Ibid.* Cf. also Maurice de Perigny, "L'Amérique centrale pendant la guerre, *France-Amérique*, 1919, p. 252.

³⁰ The text of this treaty is found in República de Nicaragua, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria presentada al Congreso Nacional . . . 1917*, 2 vols., Vol. I, pp. 275-278. (Hereafter cited as *Memoria*, 1917.) As is well known this treaty was the occasion of protests on the part of other Central American states, notably El Salvador, and was responsible for the break-up of the Central American Court of Justice. Full data on this subject in *Ibid.*, *passim*. Cf. also D. G. Munro, *The Five Republics of Central America* (New York, 1918), p. 257 ff.

States in turn paid Nicaragua the sum of three million dollars, to be expended primarily for the paying of Nicaragua's public debt. The collectorship of customs was in 1912 entrusted to a citizen of the United States. Since 1912 a company of United States marines has been maintained at Managua and a United States warship has been stationed at Corinto. There is good ground for the belief that without this outside assistance the so-called Conservative Party which has governed the country for the past decade and a half could not have maintained itself in power.

In the light of the foregoing it is not surprising that Nicaragua moulded her foreign policy in reference to the war on that of the United States. On May 18, 1917, at the instance of the executive, both houses of Congress decreed the suspension of diplomatic relations between Nicaragua and the Imperial German government and empowered the president to grant to the United States the use of Nicaraguan ports, territorial waters, means of communication and "all facilities which may be necessary during the present conflict."³¹ In commenting on this decree the minister of foreign affairs pointed out that such action was in harmony with the obligations contracted by Nicaragua in the Treaty of 1916.³²

The remaining acts of the government in reference to the war may be quickly summarized. On May 21, 1918, the German minister to Central America, Herr

³¹ *Memoria*, 1917, Vol. II, pp. 57-58.

³² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. xxx.

Lehmann, was informed of the severance of relations and of the cancellation of the exequatur of German consuls in Nicaragua and of the patents of Nicaraguan vice-consuls located in Germany.³³ On March 8, 1918, Nicaragua, through legislative decree, declared war against both of the Central Empires. By this same act Nicaragua proclaimed her solidarity with the United States and the Latin American republics which had entered the war. A state of siege was declared throughout the entire republic and the president was authorized to take all necessary steps to make the decree of March 8 effective.³⁴

IV. HONDURAS

Though only slightly smaller in area than Nicaragua and Guatemala, Honduras is exceeded in population by all of the Central American countries save Costa Rica and Panama. And of this population, of a little more than half a million, the great majority are Indians or mestizos while there is a considerable admixture of negro blood; a pure Caucasian is in fact rather rarely encountered. The history of Honduras is as stormy and checkered as that of her neighbors Nicaragua and Guatemala. Public opinion as understood in democratic countries can hardly be said to exist. Public affairs are in the hands of a small ruling class in which the president-dictator holds the balance of power.

³³ Urtecho (minister of foreign affairs) to Lehmann. *Ibid.* Vol. II, pp. 508-510.

³⁴ *Memoria*, 1918, Vol. I, pp. xxix, 239.

As in most of the other Central American republics the government was convinced of the wisdom of shaping its foreign policy in conformity with that of the United States. To the official notification³⁵ of the severance of relations between the United States and the German Empire Dr. Mariano Vásquez, minister of foreign affairs, replied that Honduras approved the measures adopted by the Washington government.³⁶ And on May 17 the Honduran government defined its attitude even more clearly by formally severing relations with Germany.³⁷ The motives which led to this step were elaborated by Dr. Vásquez in his note to United States Minister Ewing of the same date:

"I have the honor of informing Your Excellency that the government of Honduras, in view of the conflict which has arisen between the United States and the Imperial German government, impelled by the cordial friendship which exists between Honduras and the United States and by common interests and the sentiment of American solidarity, has resolved to adhere to the cause which the government of Your Excellency represents in this conflict. It offers in consequence its unstinted cooperation and declares, moreover, that if the government of Your Excellency considers it convenient that a special agreement (*pacto*) be negotiated with the government of this republic it will immediately

³⁵ John Ewing (United States minister) to Mariano Vásquez, February 4, 1917. República de Honduras, *Memoria del Secretario de Estado en el Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores . . . presentada al Congreso Nacional, 1916-1917*, pp. xx and 157. (Hereafter cited as *Memoria, 1916-1917*.)

³⁶ Vásquez to Ewing, February 16, 1917. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

³⁷ This was done by presidential decree, the text of which may be found in the Barrett, *apud* Simonds, Vol. IV, p. 388.

forward the necessary instructions to its representative at Washington.”³⁸

After the lapse of something over a year Honduras formally declared war against Germany on July 19, 1918.³⁹ According to the official explanation this action was dictated by the desire of the Honduran government to conform its foreign policy even more closely to that of the United States. In the light of subsequent events it is reasonable to assume that the government was also influenced by the desire to have a freer hand in the disposition of the relatively large German holdings in Honduras. In reply to a communication dated October 22, 1918, from Mr. Paul Moore of the War Trade Board of the United States enquiring whether the Honduran government had appointed an official with power analogous to the alien-property custodian, President Bonilla promised on October 23 to adopt such means as were possible in order to bring the policy of Honduras in line with that of the United States. At the same time he pointed out that the seizure or confiscation of enemy property would be contrary to the laws and constitution of the republic.⁴⁰ But the measures finally adopted by the government were calculated to do the maximum amount of damage to the German interests without technically violating the rights guaranteed to foreigners. The large German importing and export-

³⁸ *Memoria, 1916-1917*, p. 162. Cf. also the explanation for this step given to Congress by Dr. Vásquez. *Ibid.*, p. xx.

³⁹ This was done by presidential decree, the text of which is given by Barrett, *apud* Simonds, Vol. IV, p. 391.

⁴⁰ *Memoria, 1918-1919*, p. 75.

ing houses were practically all to be found at the Pacific port of Amapala located on an island a short distance from the mainland. On the ground that the launches belonging to these firms were being employed to subvert public order all of these boats were seized by the government, thus completely paralyzing the commercial activities of these houses. Moreover, the firms themselves were subjected to a certain amount of control by public officials.⁴¹

The Honduran government showed in other ways its desire to cooperate and work in harmony with the United States. On August 7, 1918, at the request of the Washington government, the president authorized the exportation, tax free, of the *corozo* palmtree nuts (*Elais quineensis* Lin.) used in the manufacture of poison gas. The United States sent to Honduras Lieutenant Morawki for the express purpose of arranging for the shipment of this commodity.⁴²

As one of the belligerents Honduras was represented at the Peace Conference. The chief of her delegation, ex-President Policarpo Bonilla, aroused considerable interest in Latin American circles by proposing that the reference to the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant (Article XXI) be further defined. He urged the inclusion of the statement that the Doctrine signified, *inter alia*, that the republics of Latin America had the right to an independent existence and that no nation could acquire through conquest any part of their terri-

⁴¹ *Memoria*, 1918-1919, pp. 33, 75.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 17.

tory or embark on any course of action calculated to diminish their sovereignty or impair their national dignity. In support of this thesis the Honduran president cited President Wilson's famous Mobile address of 1913 and his speech to the visiting delegation of Mexican newspaper men in 1918.⁴³ There is no reason to believe that this proposal at any time seriously engaged the attention of the Peace Conference.

V. COSTA RICA

Costa Rica, with an area of some 23,000 square miles, is the smallest but one of the Central American republics. The greater part of the four hundred thousand inhabitants of the country live on the small plateau, or *mesa central*, from three to four thousand feet in height. The most striking single feature of the population of Costa Rica is the absence of the Indian element. The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants are of pure Spanish extraction. For the most part they are small land-owners who have always exerted a strong influence on the side of peace and stable government.⁴⁴ The Costa Ricans pride themselves on their ability to solve their political problems without recourse to revolution. The intellectual level of the people is, relatively speaking, high; Costa Rica boasts of greater expenditure on her school system than on her army. When the Central American Court of Justice was established in 1907 it seemed both logical and fitting to locate it in Costa Rica.

⁴³ The text of Dr. Bonilla's proposal is given in *ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

⁴⁴ Munro, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

Through a chain of unfortunate circumstances this little republic, in many respects the most progressive of the Central American states, was destined to play an anomalous and in some respects distressing rôle during the Great War. Though her government declared war against the Central Powers neither the United States nor the Allies regarded Costa Rica as an ally and she was not permitted to participate in the Peace Conference or to sign the Treaty of Versailles. Though certain aspects of this imbroglio are still obscure, the main outlines of diplomatic and political history of Costa Rica during the latter years of the war are sufficiently clear.

In 1914 Sr. Alfredo González was elected president of the republic. Through his advocacy of a number of radical financial reforms, including a direct property tax and a heavy income tax, he brought upon himself the hostility of many of the wealthy class and forfeited the support of several of the more prominent politicians. On January 27, 1917, the president was violently ousted from power by his minister of war, Federico Tinoco. The pretext—for which there seems to be no real foundation—was the fear that President González was scheming to secure in 1918 his reelection for another four years, thus violating the Costa Rican constitution⁴⁵ which provided that no president might immediately

⁴⁵ "Proclama del General Don Federico A. Tinoco al Pueblo de Costa Rica." *Gaceta Oficial*, January 28, 1917. (Summarized by Jacinto López in *La Caída del Gobierno Constitucional en Costa Rica*, New York, 1919, p. 9.)

succeed himself. This *coup d'état* produced a painful impression both in Latin America and in the United States. It bore too close a resemblance to the methods by which President Madero of Mexico had been driven from power by his minister of war, Huerta. The Tinoco administration was not recognized by the United States, in pursuance of President Wilson's well-known policy of refusing to countenance a government which had come into power as a consequence of a revolution.⁴⁰ The example of the United States was followed by the nations of the Entente and by the larger South American republics. Germany, however, recognized Costa Rica shortly after the seizure of power by the Tinoco faction.

The new administration had little to recommend it. The government was dominated by the Tinoco brothers, Federico being president and Joaquín, vice-president and minister of war. The methods employed were tyrannical and arbitrary; the new rulers seemed to have taken as their models Cabrera of Guatemala or Gómez of Venezuela. Despotism at home had as its corollary servility abroad. The Tinocos realized that in the long run their tenure of power depended upon the recognition of the United States and the Allies, and

⁴⁰ There is some reason to believe that González was overthrown as a result of a series of machinations in which certain American oil interests figured prominently. This charge was made by the *New York Herald* in a series of articles extending from November 18 to 23, 1918. These articles contain photographic reproductions of correspondence of a most damaging character.

the foreign policy of the government was directed to this end.

In this desire to curry favor with the great powers may be detected one of the motives which led the Costa Rican government to adopt an attitude of frank hostility to Germany. Such a policy had the additional advantage that it was in harmony with the pro-Ally sentiments of the great bulk of the Costa Rican people. As early as April 1917 the government placed the sea-ports and territorial waters of Costa Rica at the disposition of the United States and the Allies, an offer which was not accepted. Diplomatic relations with Germany were severed on September 21, 1917, and war was formally declared on May 23, 1918.⁴⁷

This last act resulted in an extraordinary situation. In the eyes of the United States and the Entente, Costa Rica was not at war with Germany because the government which had declared war had, from their standpoint, no legal existence. But from the standpoint of Germany, Costa Rica was at war with that country since the Imperial German government had formally recognized the Tinoco régime.

The refusal of the United States to have any dealings with the Costa Rican government aroused considerable comment and some criticism in the United States. In the summer of 1918 a resolution introduced into the Senate by Senator J. H. Gallinger of New Hampshire

⁴⁷ *La Conférence de la Paix et la République de Costa Rica* (Confidential memorandum presented to the Peace Conference by the Tinoco envoy at Paris), Hoover War Collection, Stanford University.

called for the acceptance of Costa Rica's offer of the use of her ports and territorial waters. The resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, which appointed a special sub-committee under the chairmanship of Senator Williams.⁴⁸ In making its report to Chairman Hitchcock the sub-committee took the ground that while nothing in its investigation disclosed any valid reason why the administration should withhold recognition from the Tinoco government, at the same time, inasmuch as the president is invested with the exclusive right in initiating the foreign policy of the government, Congress should take no action which might be construed as an attempt to force the hand of the executive.

The Tinoco government, according to its own assertions, adopted a number of measures in harmony with its declaration of war against Germany. Orders were issued for the closing of radio stations whose activities were open to suspicion; a number of enemy aliens were brought under surveillance, while their possessions were placed under a rigorous control.⁴⁹ But these efforts failed to placate the hostility of the United States and the Allies and the war came to an end with the Tinoco régime unrecognized by any of the great powers save Germany. The efforts of the Tinoco administration

⁴⁸ The other members of the sub-committee were Senators Saulsbury and Swanson (Democratic) and Brandegee and Lodge (Republican).

⁴⁹ Statements made by Sr. Manuel de Peralto, Tinoco envoy at Paris, to President Wilson and the members of the Peace Conference. (Hoover War Collection, Stanford University.)

to secure a place for Costa Rica in the Peace Conference were equally futile.⁵⁰ At length in August 1919 the growing dissatisfaction with the tyrannical government of the Tinocos culminated in a revolution in which both the brothers were driven from power; Joaquín was killed; Federico succeeded, with some difficulty, in effecting his escape. Their régime has generally been regarded as an unfortunate interruption in the political evolution of Costa Rica and their passing from power caused no regret save among their immediate followers.⁵¹

VI. EL SALVADOR

Of the Central American republics El Salvador alone remained neutral throughout the war. This attitude was dictated by a number of motives. As the smallest of the Central American states, fronting the Pacific Ocean, little affected by German economic penetration, El Salvador enjoyed a somewhat greater immunity from the effects of the war than did her neighbors. It is also to be noted that the political and economic relations with the United States were less close than was the case with the remaining Central American states. Finally El Salvador has had the wisdom to hold aloof as far as possible from the internecine conflicts unhappily so characteristic of Central American history, and has tried faithfully to adhere to a policy of non-intervention. In the case of the World War it seemed

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Jacino López, "La Caida de los Tinocos en Costa Rica," *Reforma Social*, September and October, 1919.

both logical and sensible to extend this same policy to a wider sphere.

During the year 1917 occurred two events which possibly were not without their influence on the foreign policy of the Salvadorean government. On the ratification of the Bryan-Chamorro treaty between the United States and Nicaragua, El Salvador joined with Costa Rica in lodging a vigorous protest against this pact on the grounds that it interfered with their property rights in the Gulf of Fonseca. The two states took their cases to the Central American Court of Justice, praying that Nicaragua be enjoined from carrying out the provisions of the treaty. On March 2, 1917, the court decided that Nicaragua had violated El Salvador's rights, but it refused to declare the treaty void, inasmuch as it had no jurisdiction over the United States.⁵² The United States and Nicaragua paid no attention to the decision of the court which was shortly afterwards dissolved. The unwillingness on the part of the United States to respect the decision of the court which she had been largely instrumental in creating naturally caused dissatisfaction and dismay in El Salvador, and led many Salvadoreans to regard with skepticism American expressions of friendly cooperation. On June 7, 1917, an earthquake destroyed a large part of the capital, San Salvador, and worked tremendous havoc in a number of surrounding towns. For many months during the year 1917 the energies of the government were largely

⁵² Munro, *op. cit.*, p. 257. On September 30, 1916, the court had handed down a similar decision in the case of Costa Rica.

absorbed in its efforts to repair the effects of this catastrophe.

It would be an error to assume, however, that the government of El Salvador remained entirely indifferent to the issues of the war. Upon receiving official information that the United States had declared war on Germany the Salvadorean minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Martínez Suárez, cabled the legation at Washington, under date of April 10, to inform the secretary of state that El Salvador would remain neutral though extending her sympathy to the people and the government of the United States.⁵³ It soon developed that this sympathy was to find its practical application in an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards both the United States and Allies. In a communication addressed on August 24 to the Italian minister to Central America, Dr. Notarí, Dr. Martínez stated that El Salvador would be happy to extend to Italy the same privileges accorded the United States, more particularly the unrestricted use by the ships of the Allies of the harbors of the republic.⁵⁴ A copy of this dispatch was sent to the American minister, Mr. B. W. Long, who on instructions from his government, requested a clear definition of the phrase "friendly or benevolent neutrality," which had been used in the note to the Italian minister.⁵⁵ In two communications, dated October 3, and November 22, 1917,

⁵³ República de El Salvador, *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, Instrucción Pública y Justicia correspondiente al año de 1917*, p. 95. (Hereafter referred to as *Memoria de 1917*.)

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁵⁵ Long to Martínez, September 29, 1917. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

respectively, Dr. Martínez replied that as a member of the Pan American family of nations El Salvador could not regard the United States in the same light as other belligerents.

“ . . . the intention of my government,” added Dr. Martínez, “ has been and is to grant to the United States the use of the waters in such a way that the ships of the American marine have the same rights and privileges as the ships of El Salvador.”⁶⁶

From one point of view this attitude of benevolent neutrality as manifested by the government of El Salvador, and to a less extent by a number of the remaining Latin American powers which did not break relations with Germany, was a new development in the field of international relations. The comments of Professor Graham on this point are worth quoting :

“ It is true that within the modern concept of neutrality, as recognized on the eve of the war, there was no place for the idea of benevolent neutrality⁶⁷ based on a predilection for one belligerent or a desire to equalize the condition of one belligerent as regards another. . . . The peculiar phenomenon resulting from the revocation of proclamations, decrees and ordinances of

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19. (These notes were addressed to Mr. J. L. Ryan, United States chargé d'affaires.)

⁶⁷ *Cf.* the statement of Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff on September 15, 1870; “ It seems hardly to admit of doubt that neutrality, when it once departs from a strict impartiality, runs the risk of altering its essence, and the moment a neutral allows his proceedings to be biased by a predilection for one of two belligerents he ceases to be neutral. The idea, therefore, of benevolent neutrality can mean little less than the extinction of neutrality.” *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. 61, p. 759.

neutrality by certain of the Latin American states can only be explained in legal terminology as the result of the unique achievement of the society of nations in articulating an opinion, in passing a jural judgment, on the principles and issues at stake.”⁵⁸

Upon the signing of the Treaty of Peace El Salvador was invited by the United States delegation in France to express her opinion on the project of the League of Nations. In the reply, sent on March 20, 1919, the government of El Salvador stated that it approved in principle the League of Nations and expressed at the same time the hope that it would establish ample facilities for arbitration, would evince absolute respect for smaller and weaker nations, and would guarantee the integrity and autonomy of the Central American states.⁵⁹

When the Covenant of the League took definite form the government of El Salvador was assailed by another anxiety. Article XXI, it will be remembered, declared that nothing in the Covenant “shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements . . . such as the Monroe Doctrine.” Before joining the League the government of El Salvador felt that the time had arrived for a clearer definition of the scope and character of the Doctrine and on December 14 the minister

⁵⁸ M. W. Graham, Jr., “Neutrality and the Great War,” *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. XVII (1923), p. 709.

⁵⁹ República de El Salvador, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. *Libro Rosado; contiene la actuación de la cancillería salvadoreña relativa á la aceptación y adhesión de El Salvador al pacto internacional Liga de las Naciones* (San Salvador, 1920), p. I.

of foreign affairs requested of Secretary Lansing such a definition.⁶⁰ This request must have occasioned the state department some embarrassment for it was not until the 26th of the following February, and only after the subject had been repeatedly brought to the attention of the state department, that an answer was forthcoming. The belated reply was to the effect that the views of the United States in reference to the Monroe Doctrine were those expressed by President Wilson in his speech of January 16, 1916, before the Second Pan American Scientific Congress.⁶⁰ The Salvadorean foreign office professed to be satisfied with this somewhat nebulous statement. In fact it could do little else as the government had already on March 5 formally adhered to the Covenant.⁶¹ This act was ratified by the Legislative Assembly on March 11, 1920.⁶²

VII. HAITI AND THE WAR

The little republic of Haiti, located at the western end of the island of Santo Domingo, occupying a strategic position in the Caribbean, facing, so to speak, the eastern approach to the Panama Canal, could hardly escape involvement in the war, once the United States had become a belligerent. But Haiti's attitude was

⁶⁰ *Libro Rosado*, p. 36.

⁶¹ Polk to Paredes, *ibid.*, p. 16. The pertinent sections of President Wilson's address may be found in Latané, *United States and Latin America*, pp. 306-307.

⁶² *Diario Oficial*, March 5, 19, 1920. The government had deferred acceptance as long as it dared, hoping to receive a reply from Washington.

determined by political as well as by geographical considerations. It will be recalled that in the summer of 1915 the United States navy intervened in the affairs of the republic as a result of financial difficulties and of a revolution stained by bloody reprisals in which a number of prominent Haitians including the president were murdered. After the marines had restored order, a new president was chosen who could be counted upon to work in harmony with Haiti's powerful northern neighbor. By a treaty signed in 1915 Haiti became for all intents and purposes a ward of the United States.⁶³ That her foreign policy should reflect this new status was inevitable.

Yet Haiti had excellent reasons of her own for taking a vital interest in the war and its outcome. The official language of the republic is French and the small but highly educated class which governs the country looks to France as the fount from which they derive their culture and their ideals. The clergy are, to a large degree, recruited in France. Wealthy Haitians send their sons to Paris to complete their education. Prior to the war financial relations between Haiti and France had been close. It was natural, therefore, that sympathy for the cause of the Allies and especially of France among educated Haitians should be widespread.

This esteem for the Allies the Imperial German government had done much to foster during the latter

⁶³ On these subjects *cf.* Latané, *op. cit.*, p. 288 ff.; G. H. Stuart, *Latin America and the United States* (New York, 1922), p. 233 ff.; James and Martin, *The Republics of Latin America* (New York, 1923), p. 438 ff.

part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. Germany had endeavored to settle her various grievances against Haiti by means of ultimatums backed up by naval demonstrations. In the decade before the war many Haitians honestly believed that Germany was only waiting for a favorable pretext to intervene directly in the affairs of the island republic. In the early years of the war this resentment against Germany increased. A number of Haitians served as volunteers in the French army. In the sinking of the steamers *Karnac* and *Montreal* by German submarines some eight Haitian citizens perished and valuable cargo consigned to Haitians was lost.⁶⁴

It was no occasion for surprise, therefore, when President Dartiguenave, in his message presented to the National Assembly on May 4, 1917, begged that this body declare that a state of war existed between Haiti and Germany.⁶⁵ This step, however, the legislature refused to take. It contented itself with passing on May 11 a resolution in which it protested against the submarine campaign and placed upon the German government full responsibility for the loss of the lives or property of Haitian citizens on the high seas. At the same time it adopted a policy of sympathy towards the United States, in proof of which it asserted its willingness, if necessary, to sever relations with Germany.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Barrett, *apud* Simonds, Vol. IV, p. 398, 408, 409.

⁶⁵ *Exposé général de la Situation de la République d'Haiti* (Port au Prince, 1917, p. 7 ff.).

⁶⁶ *Exposé général* (1918), p. 8.

It would be a mistake to suppose that this cleavage between the legislature and the executive was due entirely to differences of opinion on the extent to which Haiti should participate in the war. As a result of the United States' intervention in Haiti a bitter antagonism had developed between the two branches of the government, culminating in the dissolution of the General Assembly on June 19, 1917.

Meanwhile the president lost no time in precipitating a break with Germany. On May 11 he instructed M. Fouchard, the Haitian chargé in Berlin, to demand indemnity for the loss of Haitian lives and property and to insist upon guarantees for the proper observance of existing international conventions. Should the Imperial government fail to accede to these demands within twenty-four hours M. Fouchard was to ask for his passports.⁶⁷ To these demands, "inspired by a lofty spirit of conciliation"⁶⁸ the German foreign office merely replied by sending the Haitian chargé his passports, "thus adding a grave insult to the acts of violence of which the government of Haiti had been the victim."⁶⁹

It was not until the following year that Haiti formally declared war on Germany. By this time the legislature had disappeared, its place being taken by a Council of State, composed of twenty-one members appointed by the president. On July 12, 1918, this

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁶⁸ This phrase is found in the official account of these negotiations published in *Le Moniteur*, June 16, 1917.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

body, at the instance of the executive, voted a declaration of war against Germany, an act sanctioned by the president the following day.⁷⁰ The official explanation of this step was the increasing barbarity of the methods of war employed by Germany;⁷¹ a more likely reason was the determination of President Dartiguenave to bring Haiti's foreign policy in line with that of the United States.

The measures adopted by Haiti as a result of the declaration of war may be briefly summarized. On July 22 the Council of State passed a law investing the executive with certain extraordinary powers among which were the right to expel, or control the movements of, enemy aliens, and to sequester the properties of such aliens, and the right to requisition such articles or properties as the government might need for purposes of national defense.⁷² In pursuance of this authorization the president on July 24 issued a decree placing under sequestration the leading German commercial houses having establishments in Haiti.⁷³ By another executive decree of the same date various restrictions were placed upon the movements of all Germans residing in the republic and provision was made for the internment of such Germans as refused to abide by these restrictions

⁷⁰ *Exposé général* (1919), p. 10; *Le Moniteur*, July 13, 1918.

⁷¹ *Exposé général* (1919), p. 10.

⁷² *Le Moniteur*, July 24, 1918.

⁷³ *Le Moniteur*, July 24, 1918. The eight German houses placed under sequestration were put in charge of the general receiver of customs and of the director of the Banque Nationale de la République d'Haiti. *Le Moniteur*, July 27, 1918.

or committed acts of hostility against Haiti or against her Allies.⁷⁴

There is some evidence that the Haitian government was desirous of giving more tangible expression to its frequently enunciated desire to cooperate with the United States. In his report for 1918 the secretary for foreign affairs, M. Borno, stated that his department was "carrying on pourparlers for the dispatch of a Haitian contingent to the front when the armistice brought hostilities to an end."⁷⁵ It seems unlikely, however, that these negotiations had progressed very far as the subject is nowhere else mentioned in the fairly voluminous correspondence dealing with the period.

⁷⁴ *Le Moniteur*, July 24, 1918.

⁷⁵ *Exposé général* (1919), p. 11.

CHAPTER X

MEXICO AND THE WAR

The attitude of Mexico towards the war and its issues is still a subject of controversy. To an extent true of none of the other Latin American powers which held aloof from the war, the sincerity and genuineness of Mexico's neutrality have been both challenged and defended. When the United States became involved in the conflict there was a general expectation that our southern neighbor, taking counsel from the dictates of enlightened self-interest and acting in harmony with the majority of her sister republics, would associate herself with the Allies and the United States at least to the extent of adopting a policy of benevolent neutrality. She had just emerged triumphant from a revolution the avowed purpose of which was to overthrow an autocratic and tyrannical government. The Mexican administration in power owed many favors, in fact, its very existence, to the United States. A declaration of sympathy towards the Allies and the United States would not only have been in harmony with her professed ideals but would have paved the way for an amicable solution of a number of embarrassing financial and economic problems.

But Mexico chose otherwise. From the first her government elected to follow the course of neutrality, a

policy which the entry of the United States into the war in no wise altered. What part a latent but not less real suspicion of the United States played in this decision it is impossible to estimate. It can hardly be doubted that the seizure of Vera Cruz in 1914 and the Pershing expedition of 1916 increased the bitterness of many Mexicans towards their northern neighbor. But in the final instance the responsibility for Mexico's foreign policy during the war years rested with President Carranza.

Any appraisal of the administration of Sr. Carranza (1915-1920)¹ must take into account the psychology of the president. Knowing no language but Spanish, unfitted by training to grapple with world politics and problems, he was provincial in outlook and his mental horizon never extended beyond Mexico, or at the most Latin America.² He has been credited with the virtues of sincerity and honesty. To these qualities should be added others, far less admirable. He was vain, egotistical, and abnormally sensitive to criticism. He was greedy for power and authority. Possibly his most

¹ Carranza was accorded *de facto* recognition by the United States in October 1915. For an admirable survey of Mexico's internal policy during these years *cf.* H. I. Priestley, *The Mexican Nation, a History* (New York, 1923), chs. 26, 27.

² President Carranza was a staunch believer in Pan-Hispanism as opposed to Pan Americanism. Any movement calculated to align the Latin American republics against the United States met with his enthusiastic support. It was owing to his initiative, according to his own account, that President Irigoyen of Argentina attempted to organize his abortive Conference of Latin American neutrals. Mexico was the only country sending a delegation to Buenos Aires to attend this conference.

marked characteristic was a stubbornness which led him to persevere in a course of action long after its disadvantages were obvious to everyone except himself. With only a slender intellectual equipment and with few of the attributes of higher statesmanship he contrived to keep himself in power for over five years largely by appealing to the extreme nationalistic and radical elements of the country and by cleverly balancing his opponents against each other.

It is obvious that President Carranza's attitude towards the United States would be one of the determining factors in Mexico's relation to the war. Unhappily his dealings with the Washington government were characterized by truculence and want of confidence. As has just been intimated his maintenance in power was due in the last analysis to the sympathy and indirect assistance he received from the United States and more specifically from the administration of President Wilson. But the generosity and forbearance of the United States, even under extreme provocation, evoked no sentiment of gratitude; rather were they acid to his egotism. His intransigent attitude appears in a number of ways. At a time when an uninterrupted flow of oil from the great fields in Tampico was essential to the Allies and to the United States he took steps to resume on behalf of the nation proprietary rights in subsoil products of which, of course, the most important was petroleum. Edicts issued to this effect were in pursuance of Article XXVII of the Constitution of 1917 which gave direct dominion over such subsoil

products to the nation, but were in violation of Article XIV of the Constitution which prohibits retroactive laws. The oil companies, both British and American, which under Díaz had secured full ownership of their lands with all subsoil privileges, quite properly protested and their claims were taken up by their governments. On several occasions this oil controversy brought relations between the Mexican administration and these foreign governments almost to the breaking point.³ In surveying the whole field of Mexican-United States relations at this period one might easily reach the conclusion that President Carranza capitalized for his partizan ends the ever latent hostility to the suspicion of the "Colossus of the North."

In this clash of political and economic interests Germany skilfully played the part of *tertius gaudens*. For a number of years both the German government and German citizens, of whom there were some 3645 in the republic according to the census of 1910,⁴ had looked

³ On this whole oil controversy *cf.* Priestley, *op. cit.*, pp. 438, 439.

Examples of President Carranza's hostility to the United States may be seen in his refusal to permit the American Red Cross to continue its activity in 1916 at a time when many Mexicans were on the verge of starvation. *Cf.* the testimony of Rev. Sidney S. Conger in the *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, conducted by a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Senate Document 285, 66th Congress, 2d Session), p. 1740. The handling of the famous Jenkins case by the Mexican administration also seemed to reveal an animus against the United States.

⁴ Mexico, Secretaría de Fomento. *Boletín de la Dirección General de Estadística* (México, 1914).

upon Mexico as a favorable field of economic exploitation and had left no stone unturned to curry favor with all classes of the population. As was the case in Chile, German scholars had exerted some influence on Mexico's educational system;⁵ a number of distinguished archaeologists, such as Professors Seler and Beyer, had through their investigations and writings done much to reveal the wealth of Mexico's pre-Columbian history; shrewd and aggressive importers and traders had gained a virtual monopoly on certain lines of commerce, notably hardware. On the other hand, German capital had little if any connection with the mining and petroleum interests, and was thus enabled to avoid some of the most serious controversies which had envenomed relations between Mexico and her northern neighbor.

As was the case elsewhere in Spanish America the votaries of Germany were especially numerous and influential in military circles. General Kloss, the son of a German officer residing in Berlin, was the director of the munition factory and enjoyed the confidence of President Carranza.⁶ Some fifty other Germans as naturalized Mexican citizens held patents in the Mexican army. A perspicacious Spanish journalist, whose

⁵ The work of Professor Rebsamen, carried on during the Díaz régime, is still remembered with affection and gratitude.

⁶ *Americanus, Mexico-Deutschland-Japan (Bibliothek für Volks und Weltwirtschaft, Heft 66, Dresden, 1919), p. 29.* The anonymous writer of this booklet shows an intimate knowledge of German-Mexican relations.

book, "Impressions of Mexico,"⁷ was distributed broadcast by the Mexican government as propaganda material, enlarges upon the popularity of the German cause among the Mexican officers. The most important government wireless stations were German-equipped and in some cases employed German operatives.

A great deal has been written about German propaganda and espionage in Mexico during the war.⁸ Much of this matter, prepared under the influence of war psychosis, suffers from distortion and exaggeration; some of it seems to have been invented out of whole cloth. At the same time it would be futile to deny that German propaganda was widespread and active. One of its most effective agencies was the *Verband Deutscher Reichsangehöriger* (Union of the subjects of the German Empire).⁹ Organized in Mexico City in June 1915 it gradually extended its influence throughout the republic and eventually established some thirty-one

⁷ "El Conde de Fox" (Maximo Valdés), *Impresiones de Mexico* (Mexico, 1919). Valdés makes the astounding statement that so great was Mexico's affection for Germany that had the United States intervened in the war on the side of the Central Powers the Mexicans would have forgotten their antipathies and made common cause with their northern neighbor.

⁸ Cf., e. g., George Marvin, "German Efforts in Mexico," *World's Work*, December 1917, and George MacAdam, "German Intrigue in Mexico," *ibid.*, September 1918. The *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, already noted, contain many references to these subjects.

⁹ C. Ackermann, *Mexico's Dilemma* (New York, 1917), p. 107; Report by Captain Hanson to Adjutant General of Texas, *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, p. 3303.

branches. Its activities were chiefly devoted to the raising of funds and the dissemination of news favorable to the German cause. To cater to the needs of the illiterate Mexicans the *Verband* subsidized *Der Grosse Krieg in Bildern* (The Great War in Pictures), a paper of some forty pages consisting almost entirely of illustrations. It also helped finance *Die Deutsche Zeitung von Mexico*. Founded in 1883 as a weekly, this paper took on a new lease of life during the war. In 1916 it began to be published tri-weekly and added a supplement in Spanish. Naturally the vernacular press was looked upon as furnishing the most useful channels for German propaganda. The most famous of the pro-German sheets was *El Demócrata*. Three other dailies of the capital favorable to the German cause were *La Defensa*, *El Boletín de la Guerra* and *El Nacionalista*. The semi-official *El Pueblo*, though ostensibly neutral, was in reality anti-American and Germanophile. The bi-weekly *Informaciones Inalámbricas*, which pretended to publish news received directly from Germany by wireless, held up to ridicule the United States and the Allies.¹⁹

That German spies were numerous in Mexico admits of little doubt, though the extent to which they actually furthered the German cause is problematical. As head of the spy system was one Kurt Jahnke, with headquarters in Mexico City. One of his subordinates, a

¹⁹ On the subject of the pro-German press cf. W. F. McCaleb, "The Press of Mexico," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, August 1920, p. 449; Carl Ackerman, *op. cit.*, p. 107; Americanus, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

German citizen named Witzke, was arrested in Nogales, Arizona, in January 31, 1918, and made a statement regarding his own and Jahnke's activities to the United States authorities.¹¹ The revelations of Dr. Paul Bernardo Altendorf, a native of Poland and a naturalized American citizen, employed by the Intelligence Department of the United States Army, contain an abundance of material on the activities of German spies and the alleged assistance they received from the Carranza authorities.¹² In the judgment of the present writer the value of testimony of this sort, supported by little if any authoritative evidence, is open to grave doubt.

It is unnecessary to point out that sympathy for the cause of Germany on the part of individual Mexicans was in no sense incompatible with the official neutrality of the Mexican government. On many different occasions the assertion was made that Mexico had loyally and scrupulously lived up to her professions of neutrality.¹³ Thus in his message to Congress of April 15, 1917, President Carranza declared:

"Having in view the fulfillment of the high duty of preserving and defending the national interests and inspired always by the most altruistic and humani-

¹¹ Witzke's statement is given in *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, pp. 3255, 3266.

¹² Altendorf's revelations are to be found in the *New York Times*, August 24-September 30, 1919, *passim*, and in *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, pp. 1229-1231.

¹³ The Constitutionalist government declared its neutrality in a circular of September 25, 1914. Gobierno Provisional de la República Mexicana, *Recopilación de las circulares . . . expedidas de las secretarías de estado* (México, 1916), p. 79.

tarian motives, I shall guide the conduct of the government under my charge by all possible and dignified means, in the direction of a most strict and rigorous neutrality.”¹⁴

The Mexican point of view was elaborated a short time later by the Mexican ambassador at Washington, Sr. Bonillas:

“Our chief aim is to remain neutral. To us this is not only a just but a necessary policy. Mexico’s position is not like that of other countries, which, until recently, have enjoyed the benefits of peace, and have now felt it necessary to embark upon a policy of war. . . . If the question of national honor or Mexico’s sovereign rights were involved, a deliberate policy of self-sacrifice might be necessary. But the belligerent countries have not given us cause for resentment, and our interests have not been injured, nor have they been seriously threatened. We cannot afford to participate in the war on one side or the other if we can possibly avoid it. Our policy is, therefore, one of peace and reconstruction as against war and its ravages.”¹⁵

And finally in his message to Congress, delivered on September 1, 1919, President Carranza expressed his conviction that the conduct of his government had been exemplary.

“ . . . it must be admitted that no one is at present nor ever will be able in the future to mention an act or omission of the Mexican government to prove the slightest breach of our neutrality, if judged in accor-

¹⁴ México: *Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados*, XXVII Legislatura, Periodo Extraordinario Tomo I, 15 de Abril, 1917.

¹⁵ Barrett and Pérez-Verdía, *Latin America and the War* (Washington, 1919), p. 22.

dance with the most exacting principles of international law, of the treaties in force, and of practice universally established.”¹⁶

The first diplomatic intimation that the Allies entertained doubt regarding the scrupulousness of Mexican neutrality appears in an interesting communication of Secretary Lansing, under date of October 25, 1916, sent to the United States embassy at Mexico City for transmission to the Mexican foreign office.

“Inform General Carranza that the representative of Great Britain in Washington has information regarding the activity of German submarines in the Gulf of Mexico and he adds that the Allies will find themselves obliged to take energetic measures in case it comes to their knowledge that aid has been granted to their enemies in Mexican waters. Make clear to General Carranza the importance of immediately taking effective measures designed to prevent the use of Mexican territory as a basis of operation for belligerent ships. Also point out the necessity . . . of immediately putting into effect a strict censorship of radio telegrams, especially those sent from Mexico to ships on the high seas. . . . General Carranza must ever bear in mind that the slightest breach of Mexican neutrality may lead to the most unfortunate consequences.”¹⁷

The reply of the Mexican government could hardly be regarded as satisfactory. After protesting against the unwillingness of the British government to transmit its complaints through the British legation in Mex-

¹⁶ México: *Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados*. XXVIII Legislatura. Tomo III, 1919, p. 14.

¹⁷ Lansing to Parker (American chargé d'affaires) *Americanus*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

ico, Sr. Aguilar, the secretary of foreign affairs, declares that the Allies are quite unjustified in demanding that Mexico be held responsible for the activity of the German submarines in Mexican waters when no protest was made against the presence of such craft in the waters of the United States. The latter portion of Sr. Aguilar's reply verges on the ironical. In harmony with its desire to draw closer the friendly relations between Mexico and Great Britain the Mexican government begs to point out how advantageous it would be if the English fleet would take steps to prevent the egress of German submarines from their home base. By such action the Mexican republic would be spared some of the unpleasant consequences growing out of the present European conflict. But should the British naval authorities be unwilling or unable to perform this service, and should German submarines appear in Mexican waters, the government of the republic will be guided according to circumstances.¹⁸

Fortunately no German submarines appeared off the Mexican coast and the complications feared by the Allies did not materialize. Though it has been frequently asserted that the Mexican authorities permitted the improper use of the radio stations, particularly the one located in Chapultepec Park, the charge has never been substantiated.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 45. The date of the reply is not given. The originals of these dispatches, to the best knowledge of the writer, have never been published. The account here given is based on the German translation in *Americanus*.

The suspicions which the Allies harbored in regard to Mexican neutrality were reenforced by an ill-advised proposal for the ending of the war put forth by President Carranza on February 12, 1917.

"The government of Mexico . . . takes the liberty of proposing to all the other neutral governments, that the groups of contending powers be invited, in common accord and on the basis of absolutely perfect equality on either side to bring this war to an end, either by their own efforts, or by availing themselves of the good offices or friendly mediation of all the countries which would jointly extend that invitation. If within a reasonable term peace could not be restored by this means, the neutral countries would then take the necessary measures to reduce the conflagration to its narrowest limits by refusing any kind of implements to the belligerents and suspending commercial relations with the warring nations until the said conflagration shall have been smothered." ¹⁹

While ostensibly based upon "a deep-seated sentiment of human solidarity" this proposal, if carried out, would have worked irreparable damage to the Allies by cutting them off from all outside sources of supplies, both munitions and foodstuffs. It was in effect calculated to play directly into the hands of the German government which only thirteen days previous had announced its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare.²⁰

¹⁹ United States, Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence with the Belligerent Governments relating to Neutral Rights and Duties. European War No. 4* (Washington, 1918), pp. 349-351.

²⁰ Nothing came of President Carranza's proposal. Secretary Lansing's reply, which clearly points out the respects in which the proposal departs from the accepted principles of international law, is given in *ibid.*, p. 351.

The suspicion on the part of the Allies that the Mexican government was favorably disposed towards the Central Powers apparently amounted to a conviction on the part of Germany. Otherwise it is difficult to understand the background for the now famous Zimmermann dispatch of January 19, 1917. On that date the German foreign secretary wrote to Count Bernstorff, German ambassador to the United States, as follows :

“ For Your Excellency’s exclusively personal information and transmission to the Imperial minister at Mexico by safe hands :

It is our purpose on the 1st of February to commence the unrestricted U-boat war. The attempt will be made to keep America neutral in spite of it all.

In case we should not be successful in this, we propose Mexico an alliance upon the following terms: Joint conduct of the war. Joint conclusion of peace. Ample financial support and an agreement on our part that Mexico shall gain back by conquest the territory lost by her at a prior period in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Arrangement as to details is entrusted to Your Excellency.

Your Excellency will make the above known to the President in strict confidence at the moment that war breaks out with the United States, and you will add the suggestion that Japan be requested to take part at once and that he simultaneously mediate between ourselves and Japan.

Please inform the President that the unrestricted use of our U-boats now offers the prospect of forcing England to sue for peace in the course of a few months. Confirm receipt.”²¹

²¹ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law. *Official German Documents relative to the War* (New York, 1923), Vol. II, p. 1337.

On February 5 further instructions were sent to the German representative in Mexico, von Eckhardt:

"Provided that there is no risk of the secret being betrayed to the United States will Your Excellency take up the alliance question even now with the President. At the same time the definite conclusion of the alliance depends upon the outbreak of the war between Germany and the United States. The President might even now throw out feelers to Japan.

"If the President were to reject our proposal through fear of North American vengeance you are empowered to offer a defensive alliance after peace is concluded, provided that Mexico succeeds in including Japan in the alliance. Wire confirmation of receipt."²²

Any extended comment on these Zimmermann notes, except in so far as they shed light on the attitude of the Mexican government, is not germane to the purpose of this study. The first of these dispatches was made public on March 1 and its genuineness was vouched for by Secretary Lansing and afterwards admitted by Zimmermann.²³ The second came to light only in 1920 in connection with the investigations conducted by the German Parliament on the responsibility for the war.²⁴ There is no evidence that von Eckhardt ever officially communicated the proposal for an alliance to the Mexican executive. In fact Sr. Ramón de Negri, Mexican chargé at Washington, issued a formal state-

²² *Ibid.*, p. 1338.

²³ United States, *Government Documents*, Serial No. 7126, Senate Document, 728. *New York Times Current History*, May 1917, p. 236.

²⁴ Deutschland, *Nationalversammlung 1919-1920, stenographische Berichte über die öffentlichen Verhandlungen des 15 Untersuchungsausschusses der Verfassungsgebenden Nationalversammlung*, Band 2, Teil 7, pp. 338-339.

ment denying that the Carranza government was in any way implicated in the matter.²⁵ President Carranza, who might well have resented a proposal whose acceptance would have brought irremediable ruin to his country, refused to make any statement, a course of action which aroused considerable criticism in the United States at the time.²⁶

However fantastic the recovery of the "lost provinces" in our Southwest may have seemed to the average citizen of the United States there is some evidence that a number of Mexicans seriously entertained such a hope. Early in 1915 one Basilio Ramos worked up the so-called "Plan of San Diego," whose purpose was to regain for Mexico not only Texas, New Mexico and Arizona, but also Colorado and Upper California.²⁷ This "plan" was regarded as of sufficient importance to engage the attention of the Department of Justice of the United States,²⁸ and there is some evidence that

²⁵ "Alliance with Mexico and Japan proposed by Germany" in *New York Times Current History*, April 1917, p. 68.

²⁶ Cf. *The New York Times*, April 10, 1917. The silence of President Carranza may be contrasted with the utterances of Count Terauchi, the Japanese prime minister. "We were surprised not so much by the persistent efforts of the Germans to cause an estrangement between Japan and the United States as by their complete failure to appreciate the aims and ideals of other nations." *New York Times Current History Magazine*, April 1917, p. 68.

²⁷ The text of the Plan of San Diego may be found in United States Congress, *Record*, 64th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 53, pp. 4846-4848.

²⁸ Testimony of Major R. L. Barnes, in charge of the San Antonio division of the bureau of investigation of the Department of Justice. *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, pp. 1232-1233.

it was in part responsible for a number of border raids during the years 1915-1919. While efforts have been made to connect the Carranza administration with this plot, the available evidence does not seem to the present writer to be conclusive.²⁹

The apologists of the Carranza administration may with some success claim that the Mexican government lived up to the letter of its neutrality decrees and professions. On the other hand, few candid investigators would be disposed to deny that the spirit of neutrality was violated on a number of occasions. Reference has already been made to the extent to which German propaganda pervaded Mexico. The efforts of German agents and sympathizers to influence public opinion in the southern republic and to create difficulties for the United States encountered few obstacles on the part of the Mexican authorities and at times enjoyed their

²⁹ The most damaging evidence is perhaps a letter of June 14, 1919, written by President Carranza to Sr. Berlanga, secretary of *gobernación*. "Esteemed Friend: Sr. Lino Caballo, bearer of this letter, is the person, who, in company with two friends, will bring to you the manifestos and the plan which they desire to put into practice in the State of Texas. This plan being very favorable to Mexico, please aid them in every way and give the necessary instructions in the frontier States. I remain, your affectionate friend, V. Carranza." *Ibid.*, p. 1224. The genuineness of this letter vouched for by Senator Fall.

The Carranza administration has also been charged with fomenting revolutionary plots in Central America designed to overthrow governments friendly to the United States and substituting in their place régimes favorable to Germany and Mexico. Our information on this subject is largely based on a long series of confidential reports by Charles E. Jones to the Department of Justice, extending through the years 1916-1919. They may be found in *ibid.*, pp. 2889-3118 *passim*.

active support. A striking example is to be found in the treatment accorded the press. During the war two of the most important papers in the capital were *El Universal* and *El Demócrata*. The former was launched in 1916 by Sr. Felix Palavicini, at one time secretary of public instruction in the Carranza cabinet and a staunch supporter of the Allies. His paper, well written and fearlessly edited, gained a wide influence; but, partly owing to his strictures on the military and partly to his espousal of the cause of the Allies, he fell under the displeasure of the administration. His paper was suspended for a time in the spring of 1917 and in May 1918 he was expelled from Mexico.³⁰ *El Demócrata*, openly charged in the Mexican Congress with being subsidized by the German embassy, poured forth a torrent of abuse of the United States and the Allies. But when the authorities at Washington endeavored to restrict its activities by refusing license for the importation of newsprint paper President Carranza turned over to *El Demócrata* paper ostensibly procured for *El Pueblo*, a semi-official organ.³¹

In the summer and fall of 1917 a reaction took place in favor of the Allies and the United States. In June *El Universal* inaugurated a campaign for the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany and the movement made considerable headway among those elements in the population in which sympathy for France was marked. On October 19 General García Vigil, leader of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, made a speech

³⁰ Cf. McCaleb, *loc. cit.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 450.

in the Chamber of Deputies in favor of adherence to the cause of the Allies,³² and on the following day there was introduced into the Senate a resolution in favor of an official declaration of benevolent neutrality towards the countries of the Entente.³³ A few days later General Pablo González, one of the most prominent military figures in Mexico, recommended that Mexico follow the example of many of the other Latin American countries and sever relations with Germany. Though he made it clear that his utterances were not to be regarded as official, his statement, given wide publicity by *El Universal*, caused a deep impression.³⁴ In the spring of 1918 the Committee on Public Information opened a branch in Mexico City under Mr. Robert H. Murray and a vigorous and successful effort was made to combat German influence in the press. Daily and weekly bulletins were issued, which were eagerly printed by most of the papers of the capital. The Mexican authorities even granted a free permit for these bulletins through the postoffice.³⁵ In June 1918 the United States government invited a group of twenty representative newspaper editors to make an extensive tour through the United States. Not only did these Mexicans learn

³² *Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados*, XXVII Legislatura. Periodo Ordinario, Tomo II, 19 de Octubre de 1917, p. 25.

³³ Apparently nothing came of this resolution, introduced in executive session. According to *El Universal*, thirty senators were in favor of a rupture with Germany. *New York World*, October 22, 1917.

³⁴ *New York Times*, October 29, 1917.

³⁵ Statement furnished the writer by Mr. George F. Weeks, at that time associated with Mr. Murray.

much regarding the foreign policy of the Washington government—President Wilson personally interpreted³⁶ the attitude of the United States towards Latin America—but they were afforded every opportunity to observe the mobilization of the nation's resources in the prosecution of the war. It is not surprising that the last months of the conflict witnessed a notable decline in German influence in Mexico; shortly after the armistice Herr von Eckhardt withdrew from his post under circumstances which pointed to pressure from the Mexican government.

The conclusion of the war did not, however, bring any immediate improvement in Mexico's international status. The relations between the Carranza administration and the Washington government continued so strained that Secretary Lansing, shortly before his break with President Wilson, expressed himself in favor of the withdrawal of the recognition of Mexico.³⁷ The republic was not invited to be a member of the League of Nations at the time of its organization. The explanation is probably to be found in the opposition, both in Europe and the United States, to certain features of the Constitution of 1917, in the inability or unwillingness of Mexico to settle the many outstanding foreign claims, and finally in the attitude taken by the Carranza administration during the war.

Although this exclusion from the League aroused much resentment it seems unlikely that an invitation

³⁶ A. B. Hart, *Woodrow Wilson. Selected addresses and public papers* (New York, 1918), pp. 261-266.

³⁷ Cf. *The New York Times*, August 15, 1919.

to join would have been favorably received. On April 23, 1919, the Mexican foreign office announced, apropos of certain suggested amendments of the Covenant, notably Article XXI, dealing with "regional understandings," like the Monroe Doctrine, that the Mexican government

"... declared publically and notified officially the friendly governments that Mexico had not recognized and would not recognize the Monroe Doctrine... since it attacks the sovereignty and independence of Mexico and would place the nations of America under a forced tutelage."²⁸

In his message to Congress, September 1, 1919, President Carranza defined Mexico's relation to the League as follows:

"When the struggle was over, the governments of the Allied Powers met to constitute a League of Nations, to which it was said that almost all countries would have access under certain conditions; all were invited excepting a few, Mexico among them, and our government has done nothing, nor will ever will do anything, to enter into that international society, because the bases upon which it was formed do not establish, either as to its functions or as to its organization, a perfect equality for all nations and races..."²⁹

The passing of President Carranza in 1920 and the election to the presidency of General Alvaro Obregón presaged a more conciliatory attitude on the part of Mexico towards the League. On November 30, 1920, on the eve of assuming office, the President-elect declared "Mexico will not ask admission to the League

²⁸ *Diario Oficial*, September 1, 1919, p. 28. (*Informe Presidencial*.)

²⁹ *Ibid.*

of Nations, but should an invitation to membership be extended, it will be given consideration.”⁴⁰ Such an invitation was in effect tendered two years later. At the closing of the Third Assembly, September 30, 1922, the president of this body, Sr. Edwards of Chile, declared:

“Need I say with what joy the League will welcome the great Mexican nation into its circle whenever she feels that the time for joining us has come? For the Latin American nations the collaboration of a sister republic . . . will be of the greatest value.”⁴¹

The consequence was an invitation to Mexico from the Latin American delegates to the League guaranteeing her admission on application. The reply, dated September 14, 1923, was in the negative. Sr. Pani, the secretary of foreign affairs, explained that as long as the Mexican government remained unrecognized by Great Britain, “Mexico will be forced to decline suggestions that she apply for admission to the League.”⁴² Thus the matter stands at the present time. That Mexico will permanently remain outside the League seems unlikely. The admission of the republic apparently waits upon her full recognition as a member of the comity of nations.⁴³

⁴⁰ *New York Times*, December 1, 1920.

⁴¹ League of Nations, *Records of the Third Assembly* (1922), Part I, p. 393.

⁴² *Ibid.*, September 15, 1923.

⁴³ In the preparation of this chapter the writer had the privilege of consulting the manuscript of the forthcoming book of Professor J. Fred Rippy on the relations between the United States and Mexico.

CONCLUSION

In this brief concluding chapter an attempt will be made to appraise a few of the more significant changes in the national and international life of the Latin American republics which may be directly or indirectly attributed to the great war. Most of these changes have already been adumbrated in the chapters devoted to individual countries; but several warrant a more complete and detailed treatment. Such an undertaking must be approached with diffidence, for it is obvious that time alone can fully reveal what results of the world-cataclysm are ephemeral and what are permanent. Yet whatever the future may hold in store, there seems reason to believe that a number of our sister republics will never completely revert to their prewar status. In some instances their national life was stirred to its depths. To them, as to us, the war years meant a period of anxious heart-searching and rigorous self-appraisal. The conclusion of the struggle found them possessed of a graver sense of national responsibility and a more sober consciousness of national dignity. The public conscience was aroused; public opinion was invested with a power and influence hitherto unsuspected. One of the most encouraging results of this quickening of the currents of national life has been the strengthening of those forces which make for a more real democracy.

If the war brought gains it also resulted in losses. In Latin America, as elsewhere throughout the world, idealism and patriotic exaltation have only too often been followed by lassitude and even cynicism. Fascism has found its votaries in Latin America, as is witnessed by the attempt to overthrow the Alessandri régime in Chile in the summer of 1924 by a military junta. The leading states of South America seem launched upon a campaign of competitive armaments which is not only a severe strain on their national budgets but is also calculated to envenom their international relations. The failure of the Fifth Pan American Conference to work out an acceptable plan of limitation of armaments reveals a spirit of aggressive nationalism which if not held in check bodes ill for the future.

The war resulted in losses in other fields as well. Reference has already been made to the grave economic dislocation, in some cases resulting in almost complete paralysis, which followed hard upon the outbreak of the struggle. In most countries fortunately this crisis was of short duration. In the long run a much more serious result was the arresting of that social and economic progress which had been making such gigantic strides in the last prewar decades. Immigration is a case in point. It is a commonplace that one of the factors in the national wealth of countries like Argentina and Brazil has been the labor of the vast stream of European immigrants, which in 1913, after deducting the loss by emigration, numbered 145,218 in the case of

Argentine alone.¹ But during the period 1914-1918 Argentina actually suffered an average yearly loss of 38,373 through excess of emigrants over immigrants. Were statistics available Brazil would probably show corresponding losses. The lessening of the productive capacity of these countries as a consequence of this decline is impossible to determine but must have been very great. In the field of transportation a number of the South American states suffered an immense prejudice as a result of war conditions. Materials needed for expansion, to say nothing of replacements, could only be had at prohibitive prices. In the case, for instance, of Brazil, whose existing rail system is quite inadequate to the needs of the country, only five hundred miles of new railway were put into operation during the years 1915-1919, less than the normal construction in a single year during the last prewar decade. Moreover, the existing lines deteriorated and in some cases had to suspend operation. Still another evidence of the slowing down of the wheels of progress is revealed by the statistics of foreign commerce. In 1923 the total foreign commerce of South America amounted to \$3,169,126,843 as against \$2,186,363,752 in 1913. While these figures would seem to show an increase of \$982,763,091 during this period, the actual quantity of goods exported and imported increased little, if any, the figures merely reflecting the increased cost of the articles in question.

¹ The immigration into Brazil in 1913 amounted to 192,684. The figures for emigration are not available.

Yet it is quite possible to exaggerate these evidences of war and postwar economic depression. So great is the recuperative power of most of our sister republics, and so enormous are their resources, actual and potential, of which the world stands in need, that these and other adverse effects of the war are destined soon to disappear ; in fact they have disappeared in part already. There is even reason to believe that in certain regards the good results of the war have been preponderant over the evil. Directly or indirectly the war has been responsible for salutary changes in the economic, social and even political life of many of the southern republics.

One of the most outstanding of these changes has been the increased dependence on their own resources and initiative. Before the war Europe furnished most of the capital and much of the brains needed for the development of these countries. But with the outbreak of hostilities the inflow of European capital virtually ceased and the importation of manufactured articles showed a marked falling off. After a difficult period of readjustment the more progressive of the Latin American republics made a most determined effort to develop their own resources and manufacture their own goods. Especially was this true in Brazil, where national capital was employed in reviving and greatly expanding the coal industry and making the country largely independent of imports of such articles as shoes and cotton goods.

The war has taught the Latin American nations not only self-reliance but interdependence. With many of

their contacts with Europe abruptly severed they were forced to become better acquainted with one another and to avail themselves of each other's resources and capital. The consequence was the creation of economic, commercial and social bonds sufficiently strong to have survived the war.² It may be noted by way of example that between 1914 and 1920 the trade between Argentina and Brazil increased five hundred per cent. Chilean capital has been finding profitable investment in the tin mines of Bolivia. While it would be preposterous to suggest that the war has delivered Latin America from all economic dependence upon Europe, it is clear that the southern republics will no longer continue to look to the Old World as their chief source of manufactured articles, capital, or even fuel.

A result of the war fully as significant as this increased capacity for economic self-development and growth of interdependence has been the expansion of the commercial and financial relations between Latin America and the United States. The value of the

² One of the most striking manifestations of this spirit of cordiality and friendship was the treaty of 1918 between Brazil and Uruguay according to which the former country cancelled the debt owed by the latter republic amounting to more than four million dollars. By the terms of the treaty the Uruguay government was to employ a part of this sum for the construction of an international bridge and the remainder for the endowment of an Institute of Agriculture open to Brazilian and Uruguayan students on equal terms. This whole subject is discussed at length in a special presidential message submitted to the Uruguayan Congress, October 10, 1918. Reprinted in *extenso* in Juan Antonio Buero, *El Uruguay en la Vida Internacional* (Montevideo, 1919), pp. 457-469.

commerce between the northern republic and her sister nations to the south rose from slightly less than three-quarters of a billion dollars in 1913 to nearly two billion dollars in 1923. Even taking into account the inflated prices of goods following the war the increase would have been regarded a few years ago as fantastic. Much of this commerce has been carried on in United States ships. In 1913 not a single vessel entered Buenos Aires flying the United States flag ; in 1919, 335 United States ships entered Argentine ports. Prior to the war only foreign banking institutions were available in South America to the United States importer or exporter ; at the beginning of 1921 there were fifty United States branch banks in South America with an equal number in the Caribbean region. Various Latin American governments and municipalities have floated large loans in the United States. For the years 1919 to 1924, inclusive, these loans reached the imposing aggregate of \$831,-198,000, or almost one-fifth of our foreign financing for this period.³ In view of the favorable reception accorded these loans there is every reason to believe that the United States rather than Europe will continue to supply the bulk of foreign capital employed in Latin America. The United States Department of Commerce, the Pan American Financial Conferences, and the Inter-American High Commission have all been effective agencies in placing these commercial and financial relations on a firm and enduring basis.

³ The National City Company, *Foreign Dollar Bonds. Review of 1924* (Pamphlet, New York, 1925).

If the war has resulted in multiplying the points of economic contact between Latin America and the United States, it has also brought about a new attitude of friendliness towards the northern republic on the part of her southern neighbors.⁴ As was pointed out in the Introduction, under the stress of war Pan Americanism ceased to be a diplomatic shibboleth and became a dynamic force. Though the "League of Honor" of all the New World Republics envisaged by President Brum of Uruguay failed of realization, the United States as the champion of the ideals of liberty and democracy gained a prestige and influence which outlasted the war. Fortunately the Washington government has striven to hold the ground thus won, through the redressing of past wrongs and through the employment of its good offices in the solution of difficulties with which certain of the Latin American states had grappled in vain. In 1921, it will be recalled, largely through the urgings of President Harding and Secretary Hughes, the Senate was induced to ratify the pending treaty with Colombia. By this act much of the misunderstanding and suspicion engendered by the Panama revolution of 1903 was removed. It was also due largely to President Harding's efforts that Chile and Peru consented in 1922 to submit to the arbitration of the United States the thorny question

⁴ Among the many fine appreciations of the United States and the rôle she played in the war should be noted that of the Venezuelan, Jesús Semprum, "The North and the South." *Inter America*, August 1919.

of Tacna and Arica which for years had embittered the relations between the two South American republics. Further evidences of growing confidence reposed by the Latin American republics in the United States may be seen in the request of Brazil and Peru for the dispatch of naval missions, in the employment by Colombia of North American financial experts to aid in the establishment of a central bank and in the reorganization of the fiscal system, and in the utilization by Peru of the services of competent North Americans in the administration of customs and in the field of education. The withdrawal of the United States from the Dominican Republic in 1924 had a salutary effect on our relations with Latin America. Finally the admirable work being conducted by the Rockefeller Foundation in combating the ravages of the hook-worm, malaria and yellow fever in such countries as Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil bears eloquent testimony to the spirit of cooperation between the northern republic and her southern neighbors.

But Latin America as a consequence of the war has not only been drawn into a closer comradeship with the United States; she has entered into a new relationship with the rest of the world as well. To our sister republics is no longer applicable the half contemptuous charge made in prewar days that they stand on the margin of international life. The new place in the comity of nations won by a number of these states is evidenced—to take but a single example—by the raising of the legations of certain non-American powers to

the rank of embassies either during or immediately after the war. In the case of Brazil, for instance, where prior to 1914 only the United States maintained an ambassador, at the present time Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Portugal and Japan maintain diplomatic representatives of this rank.⁵

The Latin American republics which severed relations with Germany or declared war against that country were entitled to participate in the Peace Conference. As a consequence eleven⁶ of these states affixed their signatures to the Treaty of Versailles, an action subsequently ratified by the governments of all of these nations with the exception of Ecuador. These powers also became members of the League of Nations, since the Covenant was an integral part of the Peace Treaty. By the terms of an annex to the Covenant other states were invited to join the League. Among these nations were Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Salvador and Venezuela, all of which accepted. With the exception, therefore, of Mexico, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic all of the Latin American republics are at the present writing members of the League of Nations.⁷

Unfortunately space will permit only a brief discussion of the share of the Latin American powers in the activities of the League. It should be made clear

⁵ Argentina, Chile and Mexico have also since the war raised their legations to embassies at Rio de Janeiro.

⁶ Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay.

⁷ On December 16, 1920, the Assembly unanimously voted in favor of Costa Rica's admission to the League.

at once that the majority of these countries have evinced a sincere desire to further the work of the League within the limits of their capacity. Although no one would pretend that the rôle which they have played in the meetings of the Council and Assembly has been decisive, it has not been lacking in importance or dignity. Representing thirty-six per cent of the total membership, Latin America's participation in the League, in point of numbers alone, has been impressive.⁸ A glance at the personnel of the important committees and at the names of the presidents and vice-presidents of the Assemblies will reveal the presence of some of the most distinguished men in the public life of Latin America. It is worthy of record that Latin America has been represented as a non-permanent member of the Council ever since the League came into existence.⁹ The Latin American delegates also took an active interest in the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice. In the election of the eleven judges constituting this court two Latin American jurists, Dr. Antonio Sánchez de Bustamante of Cuba

⁸ On November 10, 1920, a resolution was presented to the First Assembly signed by fourteen of the Latin American states, Spain, Great Britain, Switzerland and Belgium proposing that Spanish be considered one of the official languages of the Assembly. This Body voted against this proposal, partly on the grounds that the use of a third official language would entail unnecessary expense. League of Nations, *The Records of the First Assembly* (1920), pp. 172-173, 219-223.

⁹ In fact, Brazil had the honor to be mentioned in Article 4 of the Covenant itself as one of the non-permanent members of the Council until the First Assembly could elect others.

and Dr. Ruy Barbosa of Brazil were elected on the first ballot.³⁹

In our discussion of Latin America's relation to the League only two episodes call for special mention. The first was the demand of Bolivia for a revision of the Treaty of 1904 with Chile. It will be recalled that the purpose of this instrument had been to settle, it was hoped once for all, difficulties between the two countries growing out of the War of the Pacific. The most important provision of the treaty was the recognition on the part of Bolivia of Chile's ownership of the former Bolivian province of Antofagasta in return for Chile's promise to construct a railway line from Arica to La Paz. But the Bolivians had never been satisfied with the Treaty, which debarred their country from all access to the sea. At the meeting of the First Assembly Bolivia asked to have placed upon the Agenda of the Second Assembly her demand for the application of Article XIX of the Covenant to the Treaty of 1904. This article provides that:

"The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

Bolivia's demands for a revision of the Treaty were based on the contentions that the Treaty had been imposed by force, that Chile had failed to carry out its

³⁹ On the death of Ruy Barbosa (March 1, 1923), Dr. Epitácio Pessoa, former president of Brazil, was elected one of the judges of the Court.

fundamental articles, that existing conditions constituted a menace of war, and that as a result of the Treaty Bolivia had been denied all access to the sea.¹¹

The Chilean delegation, headed by Sr. Agustín Edwards, was unalterably opposed to the consideration of the Bolivian demands by the Assembly. In an address delivered on September 7, 1921, Sr. Edwards insisted on the absolute incompetency of the League to revise existing treaties. Such a right, if exercised, would mean that the League would have to take upon itself the task of revising the map of the world "and this League, created to consolidate peace, which is based on the respect for treaties, would unchain universal war." Article XIX of the Covenant is not pertinent, as the Treaty of 1904 is in no sense inapplicable and is not a menace of war. Sr. Edwards also pointed out that by the terms of Article XXI of the Covenant dealing with regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine the Assembly had no competency in purely American affairs such as those brought forward by Bolivia.¹²

After hearing the arguments of Sr. Edwards and the replies of the Bolivian delegates the Assembly was apparently in some doubt as to its competency to deal with this question. Both the Chilean and Bolivian dele-

¹¹ League of Nations, *Records of the First Assembly*, Annex A, p. 595 ff. República de Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Chile y la Aspiración de Bolivia á Puerto en el Pacífico* (Santiago, 1922), p. 47.

¹² *Chile y la Aspiración de Bolivia á Puerto en el Pacífico*, pp. 47, 50-56. League of Nations, *Provisional Verbatim Report of the Second Assembly*. September 7, 1921, pp. 1-3.

gates, at the instigation of President Van Karneebek, finally agreed that the question be submitted to a Commission of Jurists, who on September 21 reported that "the demand of Bolivia was inadmissible, as the Assembly of the League of Nations cannot modify on its own accord any treaty, such modification being solely within the competency of the contracting states."¹³ Bolivia accepted the decision of the Commission, at the same time reserving the right to bring up the question in the future.¹⁴ Up to the present writing Bolivia has made no further effort to assert this right.

The other episode which demands a brief discussion was the sudden and spectacular withdrawal of the Argentine delegation from the meeting of the First Assembly and her absence from later meetings of this body. Although the action of Argentine has been the occasion of much comment and discussion, the full history of the relations of the Platine republic to the League yet remains to be written. Only the larger aspects of the problem will be noted in our survey.

On the conclusion of the war there seemed every reason to believe that Argentina would be one of the most enthusiastic champions of the League of Nations. Dr. Honorio Pueyrredón, the minister of foreign affairs, and chief of the delegation to the First Assembly, had been throughout the war a staunch supporter of the Allies. This was likewise true of Dr. Marcelo T. de Alvear, at that time minister to France and also a

¹³ *Chile y la Aspiración de Bolivia*, p. 63.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

member of the Argentine delegation. The government itself took an active interest in the organization of the League. As early as July 12, 1919, only two weeks after the signing of the peace treaty, the Buenos Aires foreign office instructed the Argentine minister in France that the "executive power has determined to adhere to the League without any reservation."¹⁵ It should also be noted that this step was taken without any official sanction of the Argentine Congress.¹⁶ But shortly after the opening of the Assembly in the autumn of 1920 it became clear that President Irigoyen was disposed to modify Argentina's "unconditional adhesion" of the previous year. On November 17 Sr. Pueyrredón acting on instructions from his government outlined certain proposals whose adoption Argentina regarded as essential. These proposals were: I. The admission of all sovereign states to the League should they desire to become members of this Body. II. The election of all members of the Council by a majority vote of the Assembly instead of giving permanent tenure of five places to the great powers. III. The establishment of a permanent court of international justice

¹⁵ E. S. Zeballos, "La República Argentina en la Liga de las Naciones," being a series of editorials appearing in *La Prensa* in 1920 and 1921, p. 8.

¹⁶ The Argentine Constitution explicitly provides that no treaty can be valid without the sanction of Congress. All the other American powers adhering to the Covenant—an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles—submitted the organic charter of the League to their respective parliaments for discussion and approval.

with the principle of compulsory arbitration and compulsory jurisdiction.¹⁷

These proposals call for no detailed analysis. At this juncture, with the League barely launched on its hazardous career, their adoption would have been both inexpedient and injudicious. It was generally recognized that eventually Germany would be invited to adhere to the League, but in 1920 the time was unpropitious. The adoption at this time of the second proposal would have gravely compromised the usefulness of the League. The success of the League necessarily depended upon the extent to which the great powers were willing to lend their support and cooperation. Such support would certainly have been weakened were the membership of the Council to be entirely determined by the votes of the forty-odd¹⁸ powers which made up the Assembly. The third proposal, if presented alone, would have won much support, as it anticipated the efforts of the Assembly to draw up a plan for a World Court.

It should be noted that the Argentine delegation did not submit these proposals in the form of amendments. It preferred to await the action of the Assembly on a number of amendments submitted by the Scandinavian delegates, which had as their chief objectives the strengthening of the principle of compulsory arbitration and a more democratic method of selecting mem-

¹⁷ League of Nations, *Records of the First Assembly* (1920), p. 87 ff.

¹⁸ At the present time (1925) fifty powers are members of the League.

bers of the Council. The question as to whether or not the Covenant should be amended was submitted to Committee I (on amendments) for study and report. On being informed of this action by Sr. Pueyrredón, the Argentine foreign office instructed the delegation not to participate in the labors of the Assembly in any manner until a definite and categorical announcement had been made in reference to the admission of all sovereign states to the League. In case of refusal to act upon the Argentine proposals or in the event of an adjournment of their consideration the Argentine delegation was immediately to withdraw, after having presented a note in which were explicitly set forth the point of view and ideals which Argentine upheld in this hour "pregnant with significance for the destinies of civilization."¹⁹

This intransigent attitude of the Argentine executive aroused the misgivings of the delegates. On November 23 Sr. Alvear recalled to the president that as a consequence of Argentina's unreserved adhesion to the League she had assumed the obligations of an active member. Modifications of the Covenant such as the Argentine government proposed could be adopted by the League in the manner specifically provided by the constitution of that Body. Moreover, both the adhesion to the League and the withdrawal from it were matters of such transcendent moment that responsibility for them should be shared by Congress. Separation from

¹⁹ Torello (acting minister of foreign affairs) to Pueyrredón, November 20, 1920. *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas*, 1921, p. 156.

the League in the manner contemplated by the government would embark Argentina on a dangerous international policy.²⁰ Sr. Pueyrredón, though not going as far as his colleague, also deprecated the idea of a rupture. He was confident that all the sovereign states, including Austria and Bulgaria, would be invited to join the League. This invitation, to be sure, was not to be extended to Germany and Mexico, but these states had manifested no desire to be admitted. "As a consequence" he wrote, "our wish will in point of fact be realized; the Argentine theory is triumphing in the world conscience."²¹ In reply to these dispatches the Buenos Aires foreign office reiterated in a peremptory manner its previous instructions relative to Argentina's withdrawal in case her demands were not met in full.²²

On December 2, 1920, at its twelfth Plenary Meeting, the Assembly listened to the report of Committee I to which had been referred all amendments to the Covenant. The report as presented by Mr. Balfour was against the consideration of any amendments at the present session. It was freely conceded that the Covenant had its defects; "it was not thought out or inspired by Heaven, immutable and perfect in all its parts, never to be changed, modified or improved." But such changes, at present inopportune, should wait upon the League's greater experience. It was therefore recommended that the proposed amendments "shall not be taken into consideration by the Assembly" and that "the Council be

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 454.

²¹ Dispatch of November 24. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

²² Dispatch of November 28. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

invited to appoint a Committee to study the said proposals of amendment." The Assembly adopted a resolution in harmony with Mr. Balfour's report, the only dissenting vote being that of Argentina.²³

The adoption of Mr. Balfour's report was the immediate occasion for the withdrawal of the Argentine delegation; this despite the fact that no amendment proposed by the South American republic had come before the committee. None the less the Argentine delegation regarded the committee's adverse report as fatal to its own contentions. It was not so much the fact that the Scandinavian proposals embodied points included in the Argentine program as the fact that the acceptance of the committee's report meant that no amendments to the Covenant—Argentine or otherwise—would be considered by the First Assembly.

At the plenary meeting of December 6 the president of the Assembly read a statement from Sr. Pueyrredón interpreting Argentina's attitude:

"Our country saw in the proposed League the birth of a new and beneficent instrument for peace . . . and in the amendments to the Covenant it saw the prospect of cooperation in perfecting the Constituent Charter of the League. . . . We believed that they (the proposed amendments) would be considered at the earliest opportunity, as they are an integral part of the problems which concern the very basis of the constitution of the League. The vote of the Assembly has closed the question. . . . The chief aim of the Argentine Government was to cooperate in the work of drawing up, by means of amendments to the Covenant, a charter in which it

²³ League of Nations, *Records of the First Assembly* (1920), p. 246 ff.

was hoped it would be possible to embody the ideals and principles which Argentina has always upheld in international affairs and from which she will never deviate. When once this aim has disappeared, owing to the postponement of the amendments, the moment has arrived for Argentina's cooperation in the work to cease. . . . For the above reasons, and in accordance with the instructions received from my Government, I have the honour to inform . . . the Assembly that the Argentine delegation considers its mission at an end." ²⁴

The publication of the confidential correspondence which passed between Geneva and Buenos Aires on this occasion revealed a sharp divergence of opinion among the delegates on the question of Argentina's policy. On December 3, during the preparation it would seem of Sr. Pueyrredón's letter of withdrawal, Srs. Alvear and Pérez sent a joint dispatch to President Irigoyen in which they went on record as entirely disassociating themselves from the views of the head of the delegation. After pointing out that the action of the Assembly did not necessarily signify the rejection of the Argentine contentions, they stressed the point that the Argentine proposals were merely placed on the same basis as those of the Scandinavian and other countries, none of which felt called upon to withdraw from the League or to cease to collaborate in its beneficent activities. Argentina's attitude was injudicious

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 276-277. On December 6, two days after the date of Sr. Pueyrredón's letter of withdrawal, the Argentine motion for the admission of all sovereign states to the League came before the Assembly and was disposed of in the manner recommended by Mr. Balfour's committee. *Ibid.*, p. 279 ff.

and her withdrawal inopportune. In conclusion they asked the president duly to note their declaration in order to relieve them from all responsibility for the action which had just been taken.²⁵ President Irigoyen's reply was in the form of a personal letter to Sr. Alvear in which he stated that his and Sr. Pérez's arguments had been fully met in the instructions furnished Sr. Pueyrredón.²⁶ It is worthy of note that these instructions—characterized by President Irigoyen as explicit and categorical—have never been published, and in the opinion of the Argentine publicist Zeballos were never written.²⁷

The spectacular withdrawal of Argentina naturally gave rise to many commentaries, the great majority unfavorable. With the exception of the government mouthpiece, *La Época*, the press of Buenos Aires judged the attitude of the president severely. Thus *La Nación* declared on December 6:

"Like the conquered people, we remain outside of the League. While for them this situation is a tragic result of defeat, while for the United States it is a complication growing out of the Treaty of Versailles, which, as a victorious nation, she was at liberty to accept or refuse . . . for us it is a flight, it is something more grave than a defeat; it is a subject of ridicule."

President Irigoyen's hopes that the public opinion of the remaining Latin American countries would rally to his support likewise proved deceptive. None of the Latin American nations represented in the League

²⁵ *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas*, 1921, pp. 435-436.

²⁶ Dispatch of December 30. *Ibid.*, pp. 436-437.

²⁷ Zeballos, *passim*.

evinced the slightest disposition to follow Argentina's example. The pronouncements of the leading public men in these countries were almost uniformly unfavorable.²⁸ Dr. Rodrigo Octavio, head of the Brazilian delegation, described the withdrawal of Argentina as a "desertion."²⁹ Sr. Alejandro Alvarez, the well-known Chilean authority on international law, declared it was a case of Argentina being wounded in her self-esteem (*amour propre*).³⁰ Fully as caustic were the comments of the statesmen and publicists of Europe. For example, Lord Robert Cecil, while expressing sympathy with the Argentine proposals, added that "if every Member of the Assembly were to take the line which the Argentine Delegation has taken, no progress would have been possible."³¹

There is some ground for the belief that President Irigoyen felt that Argentina had withdrawn, not from the League, but merely from the Assembly, and that such withdrawal was purely temporary. On these points, when questioned by a representative of a New York daily, he refused to commit himself.³² But if the president is to be judged by his actions rather than

²⁸ As a striking exception may be noted the utterances of the Chilean historian, diplomat and senator, Sr. Gonzalo Bulnes. He warmly supported Argentina's action and urged the withdrawal of Chile as an act of solidarity with her eastern neighbor. *Associated Press* Dispatch of December 23, 1921.

²⁹ Zeballos, p. 64.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ League of Nations, *Records of the First Assembly* (1920), p. 278.

³² Zeballos, p. 78.

his utterances he may well have regarded the break as definite. During the remainder of his term of office the work of the League was persistently ignored. Argentina refused, for example, to participate in the International Labor Conference held at Barcelona in 1921,³³ nor did she make any move to meet her quota of the League's budget. Whatever may have been the juridical relations between the South American republic and the League of Nations the *de facto* severance seemed to be complete.

It is not easy to arrive at any satisfactory interpretation of President Irigoyen's intransigent attitude. The explanations as given in the correspondence exchanged with the Argentine delegates shed little light on the problem. They are, for the most part, confined to cloudy generalizations on the necessity of all sovereign states being treated on a plane of equality and on the rôle which should devolve upon Argentina in the new world-dispensation. Thus in his note of December 30, 1920, to Sr. Alvear President Irigoyen declared:

"We are trying to assure and consolidate the personality of Argentina in the international order by placing it in a temple of honor, right, and justice."³⁴

In so far as the policy of the Argentine executive lends itself to analysis it reveals an oscillation between a fervid though impractical ideology on the one hand and an intense and parochial nationalism on the other. There is reason to believe that the president hoped that

³³ *Le Temps*, March 11, 1921.

³⁴ *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas*, 1921, pp. 436-437.

Argentina might assume the leadership among the Latin American powers in demanding that the League be reorganized upon an absolutely democratic basis. In this he failed, just as he had failed to assemble during the course of the war a Congress of Neutrals under the auspices of Argentina. Neither during the great war nor at Geneva did Argentina's foreign policy reveal a firm grasp of political realities.

With the completion of President Irigoyen's term of office came the opportunity to end what many Argentines regarded as an humiliating situation. In 1922 was elected to the presidency Dr. Marcelo T. de Alvear, the member of the Argentine delegation who had most strongly deprecated his country's withdrawal from the League. As a result of his urgings the Chamber of Deputies in 1923 voted Argentina's quota for the expenses of the League and in June 1924, in his annual message he urged Congress formally to sanction Argentina's adhesion to this Body. It seems only a question of time, therefore, until Argentina takes the place in the deliberations at Geneva to which her influence and prestige entitle her.

While the post-war years have unquestionably witnessed an improvement in the relationship between the United States and her sister republics, at the same time it can hardly be doubted that the great war has created or rendered more acute certain problems whose solution is indispensable if these gains are not to be lost. Of such problems perhaps the most baffling is the relation of the League of Nations to the Monroe Doctrine. The

place of this cardinal principle of American diplomacy in the new dispensation was indicated by President Wilson in his address to Congress on January 22, 1917, in which he proposed that "the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful." This idea was reflected in Article X of the Covenant according to which "the members of the League undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League."

When the terms of the Peace Treaty became known, Article X was the object of bitter attack in the United States on the ground that its acceptance would mean the end of the policy of non-entanglement in European affairs. It was also charged that with the extension of the Monroe Doctrine it would cease to be the "time-honored, self-protective policy of the United States." A distinguished American diplomat even wrote of the "betrayal of the Monroe Doctrine."³⁵ The framers of the Covenant had hoped to anticipate the objection that Article X would deprive the Monroe Doctrine of its American character through the inclusion of Article XXI, which declared that nothing in the Covenant

³⁵ David Jayne Hill, "The Betrayal of the Monroe Doctrine," *North American Review*, November 1920.

“ shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.” Yet even with this interpretation Article X was unacceptable to many members of the Senate and was one of the reasons for the failure of the United States to ratify the peace treaty.

The present situation is fraught with disquieting possibilities. By the terms of the Covenant all but three of the Latin American nations share with each other and with the remaining members of the League certain duties and obligations from which the United States is excluded. By the terms of Article X their territorial integrity and political independence are guaranteed by a body of powers, the majority of which are non-American. By Articles XIII and XIV of the Covenant the members of the League agree to submit all disputes likely to lead to a rupture to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council of the League. Should any of the Latin American nations belonging to the League decide to submit such disputes to the Council without reference to the United States; or in case of conflicts with other powers elect to appeal to the League for protection by virtue of Article X, the problem would at once arise as to whether or not the United States would abandon the Monroe Doctrine to the extent of permitting a body of powers to which she did not belong to settle controversies to which other American states were parties. Though a satisfactory answer to this question can hardly be offered at the present time,

one may hazard certain conjectures. There would apparently be no disposition on the part of the Washington government to object to recourse to the good offices of the League on the part of any of the South American powers provided the interests of the United States were not directly involved in the controversy. There is no evidence for instance that the United States opposed the attempt of Bolivia to secure a revision of the Treaty of 1904 with Chile through the agency of the First Assembly of the League.³⁶ And it is hardly necessary to recall that in the past the Latin American republics have repeatedly submitted their boundary disputes to the arbitration of European powers. It is a fair assumption, however, that the attitude of the Washington government would be radically different were any of the Central American or Caribbean republics involved. The boundary controversy between Costa Rica and Panama early in 1921 is important in this connection. On February 28 the General Secretary of the League instructed the advisers of the Council to investigate the dispute between the two Central American republics on the ground that both countries were members of the League. On March 4 the Council sent a cable dispatch to the foreign offices of Panama and Costa Rica reminding them of their obligations as

³⁶ "Sr. Aramayo, for Bolivia, informed the Associated Press that the chancellery of the United States had been consulted regarding Bolivia's application to the League before it was submitted and had decided that mediation by the League was not incompatible with the Monroe Doctrine," *Associated Press*, Dispatch of September 7, 1921.

members. Meanwhile, however, as a result of pressure from Washington, both states had agreed to accept the mediation of the United States, although Panama denounced to the Council "the repeated acts of violence committed by Costa Rica," which country "deserves the punishment prescribed in such cases by the Covenant of the League."³⁷ Secretary Hughes on March 14 put an end to all possibility of League action by calling attention to the Panama-Costa Rica treaty of 1915, providing for the submission of disputes to the United States as mediator. The League officials showed an almost indecorous haste in agreeing to this solution of the difficulty.³⁸

In spite of Bolivia's appeal to the Assembly for the revision of her treaty with Chile there seems little disposition on the part of the Latin American republics, either north or south of the Isthmus, to utilize the machinery of the League for the solution of exclusively American problems. Highly significant, for instance, was the action in the First Assembly of the Chilean delegation, which, basing its contention on Article XXI, insisted, as we have seen, upon the absolute incompetency of the League to take cognizance of Bolivia's demand inasmuch as this was a purely American matter."³⁹ Nor is it irrelevant to recall that when Chile and Peru finally agreed to submit to arbitration their

³⁷ Garay to Drummond (dispatch undated). League of Nations, *Official Journal*, (1921), p. 214. Cf. also *The New York Times Current History*, Vol. XIV (1921), p. 151.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Chile y la Aspiración de Bolivia á Puerto de Bolivia en el Pacífico*, p. 47.

long-standing dispute over Tacna and Arica they preferred the good offices of the United States to those of the League of Nations.

Yet it can hardly be doubted that at the present time the inclusion of both Article X and Article XXI in the Covenant constitutes a very real dilemma for the Latin American members of the League. It might conceivably mean that under certain circumstances a Latin American country would have to choose between the League or the Monroe Doctrine. To call upon the League to guarantee her territorial integrity by virtue of Article X might well call forth the active opposition of the United States. To fall back upon the Monroe Doctrine would mean protection from Europe but not necessarily from the United States.⁴⁰

Various ways out of this impasse have been suggested. The adherence of the United States to the League of Nations would undoubtedly clarify the situation, although the exact relation of Article X to

⁴⁰ Dr. Alejandro Alvarez, one of the Chilean delegates to the Third Assembly, in a notable address before that body pointed out certain advantages which in his judgment the Monroe Doctrine had over Article X. The latter does not prevent a state from ceding part of its territory or placing itself under the protection of another state; it does not forbid a state defeated in war to cede a part of its territory to the victor; it does not oppose the temporary occupation of the territory of another state as a measure of coercion or reprisals; finally, it does not oppose the intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another. All of these practices, according to Dr. Alvarez, would be contrary to the Monroe Doctrine if one of the states were an American and the other a European. *L'Amérique Latine* (Paris), October 7, 1923.

Article XXI would still have to be defined. A project broached by President Balthazar Brum in 1920 may ultimately prove a solution. Dr. Brum advocated an "American League" formed on the basis of the absolute equality of all the associated powers." This league would consider jointly all American problems and would undertake to defend each of the members against aggression from Europe or from another American power. All controversies should be submitted to the arbitration of the league. This American League would not be antagonistic to the League of Nations; it might be considered in fact, as a subcommittee of the latter body for the consideration of purely American questions. The practical results of the acceptance of Dr. Brum's proposal would be the conversion of the Monroe Doctrine into a Pan American doctrine—a course of action long advocated by a number of writers and statesmen of both continents. A league such as the Uruguayan president conceived would not only be a concrete expression of American solidarity but would reflect the vastly enlarged community of interest between the United States and Latin America brought about by the war.

At least one effort was made to bring President Brum's aspirations within the domain of realities.

"The organization of this League is, in my opinion, a logical sequence to the Treaty of Versailles, which in recognizing and expressly accepting the Monroe Doctrine seems to be desirous of limiting its sphere of action as far as American affairs are concerned." Quoted by James Brown Scott in editorial on President Brum's address in *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. XIV (1920), p. 605.

When the program of the Fifth Pan American Conference, held in Santiago in 1923, was being drawn up, the Uruguayan government submitted the proposal "to examine the formation of a league of American nations, without prejudice to the right of adhesion to the League of Nations, this American league to be constituted on the basis of the complete equality of members." This proposal appeared in a somewhat attenuated form as Article IX on the Agenda of the programme in its final form.⁴² But the Uruguayan proposal never came to a vote, due almost certainly to the opposition of the United States. In fact the head of the United States delegation, Ambassador Fletcher, acting on instructions from Secretary Hughes, made it abundantly clear that the United States had no intention of relinquishing her sole right of interpreting the scope and meaning of the Monroe Doctrine and of enforcing it should occasion arise. In this respect Mr. Hughes' point of view did not differ from that of Ex-Secretary Root: "Since the Monroe Doctrine is based on the nation's right of self-protection, it cannot be transmuted into a joint or common declaration by American States or any number of them."⁴³

At the present time there is little probability that the Monroe Doctrine will suffer any essential modification as a result of the great war or the establishment of the League of Nations. In theory, at least, the Latin American republics will, in certain contingencies, still be

⁴² *L'Amérique Latine*, April 8, 1923.

⁴³ Address before the American Society of International Law, April 14, 1914.

confronted with the dilemma of choosing between the League of Nations and the Monroe Doctrine. In practice, however, it seems unlikely that such a dilemma will arise. As we have already seen there is a general disposition among the southern republics to exclude purely American problems from the purview of the League and there is little inclination on the part of the League itself to assume jurisdiction over such problems. In other words, we have a tacit recognition of a comity of American powers in which a certain moral leadership is accorded the United States. But it is hardly necessary to add that in the long run this moral leadership can only be maintained by convincing our sister nations to the south, in the words of Secretary Hughes, that "there is room in this hemisphere, without danger of collision, for the complete recognition of the Monroe Doctrine and the independent sovereignty of the Latin American republics."⁴⁴

⁴⁴ "Observations on the Monroe Doctrine," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. XVII, pp. 611-640.

INDEX

Abranches, Dunshee de (Brazilian deputy), 42.
 Aché, Napoleon (Brazilian general), 87.
 Aguilar, General Cándido (Mexican minister of foreign affairs), 126, 453, 531.
 Alencar, Alexandrino de (Brazilian admiral), 88.
 Alessandri, Arturo (president of Chile), 8.
 Alien property, in Brazil, 83.
Almirante Cochrane (Brazilian ship), 329.
Almirante Grau (Peruvian ship), 389.
Almirante Latorre (Chilean ship), 329.
 Altendorf, Paul Bernardo (United States agent in Mexico), 528.
 Alvear, Marcelo T. de (Argentine minister to France), 261 n., 554, 560-561.
 Andrade, General Ignacio (Venezuelan minister of foreign affairs), 466 ff., 470.
 André, Armando (director of Cuban food administration), 139 ff.
 Arcé, José (Argentine deputy), 236.
 Arcoverde, Cardinal, 70.
 Argentina: public opinion in, 174 ff.; British influence in, 175; Italian influence in, 176; attitude towards Germany, 177; views of intellectuals, 177 ff.; sympathy for France, 179; admiration for Germany, 180; attitude of press, 181; German propaganda in, 182; declaration of neutrality, 186; decrees enforcing neutrality, 187; ef-

fect of British "black list" on, 189; case of *Presidente Mitre*, 191 ff.; reply to German announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare, 194; Argentine intellectuals congratulate President Wilson on war message, 195; approval of action of United States in declaring war, 196; statements of Dr. Luís María Drago and Sr. Leopoldo Lugones on Argentine neutrality, 197-198; sinking of *Monte Protegido*, 199; effect on public opinion, 200; negotiations with Germany over *Monte Protegido* case, 200-203; sinking of *Toro*, 204; resultant negotiations with Germany, 205-214; Luxemburg revelations, 215 ff.; expulsion of Luxemburg, 225; effect of Luxemburg revelations on public opinion, 227-228; activity of "Comité Nacional de la Juventud," 229-230; Dr. Drago on Luxemburg revelations, 230-231; vote of Senate and Chamber of Deputies to sever relations with Germany, 233-237; refusal of executive to act, 238 ff.; protest of Dr. Rodolfo Rivarola, 239; resignation of Ambassador Naón, 240-241; labor difficulties, 242; later Luxemburg dispatches, 245-246; protests against neutrality, 247; additional Luxemburg dispatches, 248-249; attempts to explain president's attitude, 250 ff.; attempts of president to hold congress of neutrals, 255; grain convention with Allies, 258.

- Argentine centenary celebration, participation in by Brazil, 49-50.
- Aríel*, quotations from, 27.
- Army, Chilean, affected by German methods, 266.
- Aviation, in Brazil, 89 ff.; in Cuha, 157 ff.
- Báez, Cecilio (Paraguayan historian), 481-482.
- Balfour, Arthur, 558.
- Balta, José (Peruvian congressman), 400.
- Banks, German, in Brazil, 81 ff.
- Baquerizo Moreno (president of Ecuador), 454.
- Barroetaveña, F. A. (Argentine lawyer and publicist), 178, 200.
- Baruch, Bernard M., quoted, 345.
- Bates, Henry (British naturalist), 7.
- Battle y Ordóñez (president of Uruguay), 352.
- Belaúnde, Víctor Andrés (Peruvian scholar), 387.
- Belgium, violation of neutrality of, 10; protest by Brazil, 32.
- Bernstorff, Count von, 533.
- Betancourt, Mandulay, A. (Cuban deputy), 111.
- "Black list," 17; resentment against in Argentina, 190; in Brazil, 41-45.
- Bolivia: commercial predominance of Germany in, 474; sympathy for France, 475; recent progress in, 475; relations with United States, 476; protest against German submarine campaign, 476-477; sinking of *Tubantia*, 479; severance of relations with Germany, 479.
- Bonilla, Policarpo (president of Honduras), 503-505.
- Bonillas, Ygnacio (Mexican ambassador to United States), 529.
- Borno, Louis (Haitian secretary of foreign affairs), 520.
- Braz, Wenceslau (president of Brazil), 57-59, 63, 69, 336.
- Brazil: importance of in war, 30; French influence in, 31; British influence in, 33; Brazilian League for the Allies, 33-35; economic effects of war on, 36-38; negotiations with Great Britain over coffee, 38-41; effect of British "black list" on, 41-45; sinking of *Rio Branco*, 47-49; declaration of Ruy Barbosa regarding Brazilian neutrality, 49-50; correspondence with Germany over submarine crisis, 52-53; sinking of *Paraná*, 54; severance of relations with Germany, 55; revocation of neutrality in war between United States and Germany, 59 ff.; traditional friendship between Brazil and United States, 59 ff.; visit of United States fleet, 65; declaration of war against Germany, 67 ff.; League of National Defense, 71; war law (*lei da guerra*) analyzed, 72; "German peril" in Southern Brazil, 73 ff.; Luxburg revelations as affecting Brazil, 77; war legislation, 81 ff.; control of German banks, 81; cooperation with Allies, 84-85; increase of army, 86; dispatch of military missions, 86-87; naval cooperation with Allies, 87 ff.; dispatch of medical mission, 91; economic cooperation, 92 ff.; food commission, 93-94; utilization of German ships, 95 ff.; participation in work of Peace Conference, 98 ff.; negotiations with France over German ships, 102 ff.
- Brazilian League for the Allies, 33-35.

- Brum, Baltasar (Uruguayan minister of foreign affairs and later president), 352, 396, 359, 360, 371, 375, 548, 570.
- Bryan-Chamorro treaty, 499-500, 511.
- Bulhões, Leopoldo de (head of Brazilian food commission), 93.
- Bunsen, Sir Maurice (special British ambassador to South America), 18.
- Caballero, Ricardo (Argentine deputy), 236.
- Cabrera, Luis (Mexican minister of finance), 257.
- Cabrera, Manuel Estrada (president of Guatemala), 507, 593-595.
- Caillaux, Joseph, 18.
- Calogeras, Pandia (Brazilian statesman and financier), 98.
- Caperton, Admiral, 65, 88; visits Argentina, 208 n; visits Uruguay, 366.
- Carles, Emanuel (Argentine scholar), 180.
- Carranza, Venustiano (president of Mexico), 127, 256 n., 522-524, 528-529, 532, 535, 536, 540.
- Censorship, in Brazil, 79; in Cuba, 123-124.
- Central America: United States influence in, 483 ff. *See also* separate countries.
- Central American Court of Justice, 511.
- Chile: distance from theatre of hostilities, 264; character of population, 265; German influences in, 265-266; "Germanization" of army, 265-266; influence of German educators, 268; German immigration, 268-269; British influence, 270; French influence, 271; difficulties of safeguarding neutrality, 272, 275; proclamation of neutrality, 373, 374; problem of supplying coal to belligerents, 279 ff.; problem of auxiliary cruisers, 288 ff.; status of ships of Kosmos Company, 289 ff.; internment of ships of Kosmos Company, 291 ff.; admission of armed merchant ships to ports, 297; violations of neutrality by German warships, 299-313; destruction of *Dresden* by British naval division, 314-319; refusal to intern British cruisers, 321-322; internment of crew of *Dresden*, 323; resultant complications with German government, 323-324, 326; *Valentine* case, 327-328; British testimony to Chilean efforts to safeguard neutrality, 329-330; protest against submarine campaign, 334; agitation for break of relations with Germany, 336 ff.; German efforts to prevent severance of relations, 338-340; attitude towards United States, 342-344; advantages to Allies of Chilean neutrality, 344-345; value to Allies of nitrate, 345-347.
- Church, influence of, 16-17.
- Cochrane, Lord, 7.
- Code Napoleón*, 5.
- Coffee: decline in exports from Brazil, 38-39; importation into Great Britain forbidden, 39; placed on contraband list by Great Britain, 39.
- Collantes, José Marie (Cuban politician), 162.
- Colombia: sympathy for France, 408; German propaganda, 409-410; efforts to maintain neutrality, 411 ff.; radio complications, 411-419; abuse of freedom of press, 419-422; interest in conference of neutrals, 422-424; Swiss military mission, 424-425; resentment at

- German submarine campaign, 426-427; senate resolution of protest, 427; congressional resolution in favor of France, 427-428; failure of United States to ratify pending treaty, 428; attitude of press towards United States, 429; foreign attacks on Colombian neutrality, 429-434; alleged agreement with Mexico and Venezuela, 434.
- "Comité Nacional de la Juventud," 247.
- Compulsory military service, in Brazil, 85-86; in Cuba, 151 ff.
- Concha, José Vicente (president of Colombia), 410-411, 425, 431.
- Conference of neutrals, attempts of President Irigoyen to summon, 255 ff.; 362, 423, 424, 464; proposed by Ecuador, 452, 453; 564.
- "Consejo de Defensa Nacional" (in Cuba), 135.
- Costa Rica: anomalous situation during war, 506; seizure of power by Tinoco brothers, 506; declaration of war against Germany, 508; overthrow of Tinoco régime, 510.
- Constitutional guarantees, suspension of, in Brazil, 73, 78-79; in Cuba, 143.
- Córdoba, Pedro de (German propagandist), 244.
- Cornejo, Mariano H. (Peruvian congressman, 386, 392.
- Cortina, José Manuel (Cuban deputy), speech in favor of war resolution, 112.
- Council of National Defense, in Cuba, 135.
- Court of International Justice, 551.
- Craddock, Admiral, defeated by Admiral von Spee, 289.
- Cruchaga, Miguel (Chilean minister to Germany), quoted, 307-308.
- Cuba: relations with United States on eve of war, 107; treaty of 1903, 107; sympathies towards Allies, 108; declaration of President Menocal, 109; declaration of war, 110 ff.; statements of Cuban public men, 111 ff.; requisition of German ships, 114; alleged intrigues of German agents, 115; German espionage, 117; suspension of constitutional guarantees, 118; German propaganda, 119; attitude of press, 120; problem of enemy aliens, 121; appointment of enemy property custodian, 123; censorship of press, 123; severance of relations with Mexico, 126; activities of Red Cross, 129; economic effects of war, 131 ff.; food commission created, 133; Council of National Defense, 134; food administrator appointed, 139; army placed on war basis, 141; war loans, 142-143; creation of ministry of war and navy, 144-145; political dissensions, 146; amnesty bill passed, 149; compulsory military service bill, 151 ff.; correspondence with Lansing relative to Cuban expeditionary force, 156-157; aviation, 158; military cooperation with United States, 160; rôle of Cuban navy, 160; patriotic propaganda, 163; economic cooperation with Allies, 163 ff.; increase of sugar crop, 164-165; crop placed at disposition of United States and Allies, 166; subscription to Liberty Loans, 168; approval of Treaty of Versailles, 171.
- Dartiguenave, Sudré (president of Haiti), 517-519.
- Declaration of London (1909), 274, 288.
- Delbrück Law, 12.
- Delcassé, T. (French minister of foreign affairs), 446.

- Demócrata, El* (Mexican newspaper), 16, 527, 537.
- Denis, Ferdinand (French writer on Brazil), 31.
- Desvernine, Pablo (Cuban secretary of state), 156.
- "Deutsch-Chilenischen Bund," 339-340.
- Deutsche Zeitung von Mexico*, 527.
- Dolz, Ricardo (Cuban senator), 111.
- Dominici, Santos A. (Venezuelan minister to United States), 468.
- Dorn y de Alsúa (Ecuadorian minister to France), 445.
- Drago, Luis María (Argentine statesman and publicist), 197, 230, 251.
- Dresden (German cruiser), 310 ff., 321.
- Eastman, Victor (Chilean minister to Ecuador), 458.
- Ecuador: importance of location, 437; complications with foreign representatives, 438; German influence, 439; declaration of neutrality, 440; violation of neutrality by fleet of von Spee, 441; unwarranted charges of foreign representatives, 442; appeal to United States by Great Britain against, 443; resentment caused by this act, 444; measures taken to safeguard neutrality, 447-448; attitude towards United States, 450, 451; efforts to secure joint action among American republics, 452; blundering diplomacy of German envoys, 455-458; severance of relations with Germany, 459.
- Edwards, Agustín (Chilean minister to Great Britain), 315-317, 541, 553.
- Elizalde, R. H. (Ecuadorian minister of foreign affairs), 440-444, 446, 454.
- Emergency Fleet Corporation, 374, 406-407.
- Enemy aliens, in Brazil, 79; in Cuba, 121-122.
- Enemy property, in Brazil, 81 ff.; in Cuba, 123.
- Época, La* (Argentine newspaper), 561.
- Erckert, von (German minister to Chile), 286 ff., 289, 321 ff., 332-333, 339.
- Espionage, German: in Cuba, 115; in Mexico, 526.
- Food administration: in Cuba, 139.
- Food commission: in Brazil, 93-94; in Cuba, 133.
- France, influence of; in Argentina, 179; in Bolivia, 475; in Brazil, 31; in Chile, 271, 272 n.; in Colombia, 408, 435; in Haiti, 516; in Latin America, 5-7; in Peru, 383; in Uruguay, 350; in Venezuela, 461.
- Frontin, Pedro Max de (Brazilian admiral), 89.
- Fuel supply to belligerent ships, restrictions on, in Chile, 279-283; in Uruguay, 354.
- Gaceta Militar, La* (Chilean newspaper), 267.
- Galápagos Islands, 437, 441, 445, 450.
- García Calderón, Francisco (Peruvian writer and sociologist), 26, 387.
- García Calderón, Ventura (Peruvian writer), 387.
- Gast, Professor P., 16.
- German economic league for South and Central America, 14.
- German militarism, 12; in Argentina, 185; in Bolivia, 475; in Chile, 265; in Mexico, 525.
- German ships, agitation in Brazil for utilization of, 51, 59; taken over by Brazilian government, 65; difficulties with France re-

- garding, 95 ff.; requisitioned by Cuba, 114; interned by Chilean government, 291; taken over by Uruguay, 373-374; taken over by Peru, 403-406.
- German-South American institute, 13.
- Germany: influence of. *See* separate countries.
- Gómez, Juan Vicente (president of Venezuela), 462, 463, 507.
- Gondra, Manuel (Paraguayan statesman), 481.
- González, Alfredo (president of Costa Rica), 506.
- González, Joaquín V. (Argentine statesman and publicist), 233, 234, 247.
- Gouvêa, Nabuco de (head of Brazilian medical mission), 91.
- Great Britain: influence of. *See* separate countries.
- Grey, Sir Edward, 297, 317, 318, 329.
- Groussac, Paul (Argentine scholar), 177.
- Guatemala: German influence in, 491, 493; attitude of President Cabrera, 494-495; declaration of war against Germany, 498.
- Gutiérrez Ponce, I. (Colombian minister to Great Britain), 433-434.
- Hague, The. *See* The Hague.
- Haiti: relations with United States, 516; sympathy towards France, 516; attitude of President Dartiguenave, 517; severance of relations with Germany, 518; declaration of war, 519; activities as belligerent, 519.
- Hamburg Ibero-American League, 14.
- Harding, Warren G., 548.
- Hartman, Charles S. (United States minister to Ecuador), 444-445, 449, 451.
- Hartwig, Alfredo (German writer), 267 n., 475.
- Havana, University of, tenders service to Cuban government, 128.
- Helio Lobo (Brazilian writer), 98.
- Honduras: cooperation with United States, 502; severance of relations with Germany, 502; declaration of war, 503; representation at Peace Conference, 504.
- Howard, Roy H. (president of United Press), 260, 260 n.
- Hughes, Charles E., 548, 568, 571, 572.
- Immigration: Italian to Brazil, 8; German to Brazil, 74 ff.; German to Chile, 268-269; Italian to Uruguay, 352.
- Irigoyen, Hipólito (president of Argentina), 193, 242, 249, 250, 251-253, 257, 258 n., 259, 362, 424, 560-563, 564.
- Italy, influence of: in Argentina, 176; in Brazil, 8, 33; in Peru, 384; in Uruguay, 352.
- Jahnke, Kurt (German spy), 527.
- John VI (King of Portugal), 31.
- Juan Fernández, archipelago of, 323 ff., 329.
- Kosmos Company, 289 ff., 330, 388, 406.
- Kühlmann, R. von (German secretary of foreign affairs), 235, 236, 288, 399.
- Lansing, Robert, 364, 402, 449, 497, 515, 530, 539.
- Larreta, Enrique (Argentine writer and diplomat), 244 n., 246 n. "Latin Americanism," 26 ff.
- Lavalle, Juan Bautista de (Peruvian scholar), 393.
- League of National Defense (Brazil), 71.

- League of Nations: attitude of El Salvador towards, 514-515; relation of Mexico to, 539-541; relation of Latin American powers to, 550-552; article XIX of Covenant of, 552; Bolivian request for revision of treaty of 1904, 552-554; proposed Argentine amendments to, 554-563; Argentina's withdrawal from, 554 ff.; relation to Monroe Doctrine, 564-568, 571-572.
- Le Brun, Raphaël (French minister to Colombia), 410.
- Lehmann, Kurt (German minister to Central America), 492-493, 496, 501.
- Lemos, Miguel (Positivist leader in Brazil), 35.
- Liberty loans, subscriptions to, in Cuba, 168.
- Lincoln, Abraham, and Brazil, 60.
- Lira, Alejandro (Chilean minister of foreign affairs), 285 n., 290, 293-296, 298, 305, 308, 323, 324.
- Long, B. W. (United States minister to El Salvador), 512.
- Lorton (Peruvian ship), 390, 393-400, 401, 403.
- Lugones, Leopoldo (Argentine publicist), 198, 247.
- Luxburg, Karl von (Argentine minister to Argentina), 77, 193, 203, 213, 215-228, 235-236, 240, 240-241, 243, 246, 248, 251, 252, 256 n., 288, 338, 339, 368.
- Mackenna, Subercasseaux, Alberto (Chilean publicist), 337-338.
- Magalhães, Olyntho M. de (Brazilian minister to France), 84, 98.
- Manganese, exported from Brazil, 94.
- Márquez Bustillos, V. (provisional president of Venezuela), 462, 469.
- Martí y Zayas Bazán (Cuban secretary of war and navy), 145.
- Mattos, Francisco de (Brazilian admiral), 87.
- Menocal, Mario (president of Cuba), 109-110, 142 ff.
- Mercurio, El* (Chilean newspaper), 290, 335, 337.
- Mexico: policy of neutrality, alleged motives for, 521-522; character of President Carranza, 522; Constitution of 1917, 523; German influence in, 524-526; attitude of press, 527, 537; official protestations of neutrality, 528-530; embargo proposal of President Carranza, 532; Zimmermann dispatches, 532-535; "Plan of San Diego," 535; Allied propaganda in, 538; visit of newspaper editors to United States, 538; Mexico and League of Nations, 540.
- Mitre, Jorge (editor of *La Nación* of Buenos Aires), 181.
- Moacyr, Pedro (Brazilian deputy), 50.
- Monroe Doctrine, 9, 245, 342, 504, 514, 515, 540, 553, 564-569, 571, 572.
- Montalvo, Juan A. (Cuban secretary of interior), 127.
- Monte Protegido* (Argentine ship), 199, 200, 202, 205, 212.
- Montes, General Ismael (president of Bolivia), 475.
- Mooney, D. F. (United States minister to Paraguay), 481.
- Müller, Lauro (Brazilian minister of foreign affairs), 44; succeeded by Nilo Peçanha, 56.
- Naón, R. S. (Argentine ambassador to United States), 21, 195 n., 240, 241, 262 n.
- Nación, La* (Argentine newspaper), 343, 561.
- Neutrality, Declaration of, by Brazil, 47; by Chile, 273; by Ecuador, 440; by Guatemala,

- 494; by El Salvador, 512; by Mexico, 528-530; by Uruguay, 553, 358-359. *See also* separate states.
- Neutrals, rights of, 19 ff.
- Nicaragua: close relations with United States, 499; Bryan-Chamorro treaty, 499; severance of relations with Germany, 500; declaration of war, 501.
- Obregón, Alvaro (Mexican general and later president), 540-541.
- Oliveira Lima, M. de (Brazilian historian and diplomat), 32.
- Ortiz, Fernando (Cuban deputy and writer), 116, 119.
- Palacios, Alfredo L. (Argentine professor), 200.
- Palacios, Pedro B. (Argentine poet), 178.
- Palavicini, Felix (Mexican newspaper editor), 537.
- Pauama: close relations with United States, 485-486; enters the war against Germany, 488; activities as belligerent, 489-490.
- Pan Americanism, 3, 18, 350-351, 364, 368, 381, 385, 392, 401.
- Pan American Union, 20, 385, 429.
- Pan Germanism, and Brazil, 73 ff.
- Pan Hispanism, 28.
- Pani Alberto (Mexican secretary of foreign affairs), 541.
- Paraguay: immunity from effects of war, 480; approval of policy of United States, 481.
- Paraná* (Brazilian ship), 54.
- Pardo, José (president of Peru), 391.
- von Pauli, A. (German minister to Brazil), 48, 55.
- Paz, Ezequiel (editor of *La Prensa* of Buenos Aires), 181.
- Peace Conference, activities of Brazil at, 98-105; of Costa Rica, 506, 510; of Cuba, 170; of Honduras, 504-505.
- Peçanha, Nilo (Brazilian minister of foreign affairs), succeeds Lauro Müller, 56, 85, 246 n.
- Pedro II (Brazilian emperor), 61.
- Peel, Sir Arthur (British minister to Brazil), 97.
- Penne, Marquis de la (Italian minister to Colombia), 421.
- Pereyra, Carlos (Mexican writer), 26.
- Pérez Triana (Colombian diplomat), 408-409.
- Perl, Frederick (German minister to Peru), 401, 455-457.
- Peru: sympathy towards Allies, 383-384; traditional friendship for United States, 385; attitude of press, 386; attitude of intellectuals, 386; efforts to safeguard neutrality, 387-389; correspondence with Germany on submarine crisis, 389; indorsement of ideals of American solidarity, 391; *Lorton* episode, 393-399; severance of relations with Germany, 400-403; expropriation of German ships, 403-406.
- Pessôa, Eptacio (head of Brazilian delegation to Peace Conference), 98, 100, 101, 103.
- Pezet, Federico A. (Peruvian ambassador to the United States), 385.
- "Plan of San Diego," 535.
- Porras, Belesario (Panamanian minister to United States), 489.
- Portugal: Influence of, in Brazil, 33.
- Prado, Antonio (Brazilian writer), 26.
- Prado y Ugarteche, Javier (Peruvian scholar), 387.
- Presidente Mitre* (Argentine ship), 191-192.

- Press, attitude of: in Argentina, 181, 561; in Chile, 335, 336; in Cuba, 120; in Uruguay, 360, 378; in Peru, 386; in Colombia, 419-422, 429; in Mexico, 537-538. *See also* separate states.
- Propaganda: in Latin America, British, 18, French, 18, German, 11; in Brazil, 11, 13; in Argentina, 180; in Chile, 266; in Colombia, 409, 422; in Cuba, 115; in Mexico, 527.
- Pueyrredón, Honorio (Argentine minister of foreign affairs and chief of Argentine delegation to Peace Conference), 194, 209, 214, 232, 234-236, 240, 424, 555-558, 560.
- Quesada, Ernesto (Argentine writer), 185.
- Quijano Wallis, José María (Colombian minister to Switzerland), 425.
- Radio apparatus, regulations regarding: in Argentina, 187-188; in Chile, 278; in Costa Rica, 509; in Ecuador, 448; in Mexico, 526, 531; in Uruguay, 354-355.
- Ramos, Juan P. (Argentine professor), 184.
- Red Cross: in Brazil, 91; in Chile, 332; in Cuba, 129; in Peru, 407.
- Restrepo, Carlos E. (president of Colombia), 410.
- Rio Branco* (Brazilian ship), 48-49.
- Riva Agüero, E. de la (Peruvian minister of foreign affairs), 390.
- Rivarola, Rodolfo (Argentine scholar), 178, 239.
- Rockefeller Foundation, 451, 549.
- Rodó, José Enrique (Uruguayan writer), 26.
- Rodrigo Octavio (Brazilian jurist), 98.
- Rohland, Heinrich (German chargé d'affaires in Ecuador), 440, 442, 449, 455.
- Rojas, Ricardo (Argentine writer), 178, 200.
- Ruy Barbosa (Brazilian statesman and writer), 34, 49, 51 n., 59, 552.
- Saguier, Fernando (Argentine diplomat), 254.
- Salinas, Luís (Bolivian minister to Germany), 479.
- Salvador, El: Reasons for neutrality, 510; friendship for the Allies, 512; attitude towards League of Nations, 514; definition of Monroe Doctrine requested, 514-515.
- Sánchez de Bustamante, Antonio (Cuban jurist), 123, 169, 551.
- Sánchez, Plácido (Bolivian minister of foreign affairs), 476-478, 479.
- Saraiva, José Antonio (Brazilian statesman), 32.
- Schmoller, Gustav von (German economist), 74.
- Schwarzenfeldt, Kracker von (German minister to Colombia), 410, 416, 426.
- Silva Vildósola, Carlos (Chilean publicist), 337-338, 340.
- Spain, influence of: in Latin America, 28; in Argentina, 183.
- Spee, Admiral von, 24, 188, 289, 293, 299, 305, 307, 310, 331, 388.
- Stronge, Sir Francis (British minister to Chile), 275 n., 277, 285 n., 296, 297, 330, 331, 332.
- Suárez, Marco Fidel (Colombian statesman), 410 ff., 419-420, 426, 429-431, 432-433.
- Sugar, Cuban: disposition of, 164-167.
- Tacna-Arica controversy, 337.

- Tannenberg, Richard (Pan German writer), 73 n.
- The Hague, Second Peace Conference of, 19, 46, 274, 288, 353, 411, 494.
- Tijuca* (Brazilian ship), 58.
- Times, The* (London), 433.
- Tinoco, Federico (president of Costa Rica), 506-510.
- Tobar y Borgoño (Ecuadorian minister of foreign affairs), 449, 451-452, 455, 458-460.
- Toro* (Argentine ship), 205, 207, 209, 212, 236, 397, 399.
- Torriente, Cosme de la (Cuban statesman), 162.
- Tudela, F. (Peruvian minister of foreign affairs), 399, 401-403.
- Ugarte, Manuel (Argentine writer), 26.
- Unión, La* (Argentine newspaper), 16, 243, 421.
- United States, distrust of, in Latin America, 24, 524.
- United States, influence of: in Latin America, 483-487, 488, 499-500, 511, 516, 521. *See also* separate states.
- Universal, El* (Mexican newspaper), 536-537.
- Uruguay: European influence in, 349; character of foreign policy, 350; sympathy towards Allies, 351; neutrality decrees issued, 353; correspondence with Germany on submarine issue, 356; approval of course of United States, 357; attitude of press in 1917, 360; belief in continental solidarity, 361; decree of June 18, 1917, 362; reception of decree by United States, 364; visit to Montevideo of Admiral Caperton, 367; severance of relations with Germany, 371; utilization of German ships, 415; extension of credit to Allies, 373; Luxburg revelations, 375; capture of mission to Europe by German submarine, 376-380; significance of attitude towards war and its issues, 381.
- Valdés, Ramón M. (president of Panama), 486-488.
- Vásquez, Mariano (Honduran minister of foreign affairs), 502.
- Venezuela: German designs on, 10; previous relations with United States, 461; character of rule of General Gómez, 462; pro-German sympathies of government, 463; German commercial interests in, 463; declaration of neutrality, 464; attitude towards submarine crisis, 465-466; insistence on neutrality, 466; attitude of Dr. Dominici, 468, 471 n.
- Verissimo, José (Brazilian essayist), 34.
- Verny, du Verdois, von (German minister to Cuba), 114.
- Versailles, Treaty of, 171, 172, 506, 550, 565.
- Viera, Feliciano (president of Uruguay), 78, 252, 352, 365, 366, 368, 369.
- Villarán, Manuel Vicente (Peruvian scholar), 387.
- War legislation: in Brazil, 73 ff.; in Cuba, 118-119, 122.
- Wilson, Woodrow, 63, 70, 357, 390, 391, 450, 505, 515, 539.
- Zeballos, Estanislao S. (Argentine writer and jurist), 185, 199 n., 262 n.
- Zimmermann, A. (German minister of foreign affairs), 201, 202, 207, 246, 254, 256 n., 303, 311, 339, 533, 534.
- Zorilla de San Martín, Juan (Uruguayan writer), 360.

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